Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council v Jade Grannell

These are my sentencing remarks in relation to the breaches that have been proven against you Ms Grannell. I refer to the court order that has previously been made in this matter in respect of the proven breaches. Firstly, that you, Jade Grannell, did on 25 September, attend a property known as 110A Princes Road, within an exclusion zone, in breach of paragraph seven of the order of DDJ Connolly dated 27 March.

Secondly, that three weeks later, on 14 October 2025, you attended the property known as 110A Princes Road, again within the exclusion zone, again in breach of that paragraph of the order.

Thirdly, that on 14 October 2025, the same day, you entered the property known as 110A Princes Road, with another male, who that other male) stole money from Mr Lee Hunt through using force and verbally abusing him, in breach of paragraph two of the order, and you were there and aided that breach.

Fourthly, that on 20 October, a week later, you entered the property known as 110A Princes Road, and demanded money from Mr Lee Hunt, the occupier, in breach of paragraphs one, two and seven of the order of DDJ Connolly.

Fifthly, two days later, on 22 October, you attended the property known as 110A Princes Road, banged on the door, shouted demands for money from the occupier, Mr Lee Hunt, in breach of paragraphs one, two and seven of the order of DDJ Connolly.

The history of this matter is that an injunction order was made by DDJ Connolly on 27 March 2025, with a power of arrest attached to it. That is the relevant injunction order. That was personally served upon you on 9 April 2025, proven by certificates of service. There is no doubt, therefore, that you knew of the terms of this order. You have explained to me today that you have dyslexia and found some difficulty understanding it, but I have no doubt that you clearly understood the terms of the order and that you were not to go to the exclusion zone. I have no doubt therefore, that when you have breached the order, you have done so, knowing that you are in breach.

I note that there have been a number of breaches and a number of times when you have been arrested. For example, on 25 September you were arrested by PC Malcolm for that breach. You were brought before the Court. Again, I have no doubt that the consequences of the order were explained to you. You have been brought before the Court on a number of occasions, and it has been explained to you that the order exists and the consequences of not complying with it could be a custodial sentence.

I heard the committal hearing on a previous date, when you chose not to attend, you having had notice of that hearing, and I found those breaches to be made out and proved to the appropriate standard, which is the criminal standard, so that I am sure that you chose not to defend those matters. Today, you have confirmed that you accept those breaches and that you do not wish to appeal, nor have you brought an appeal.

Two weeks ago, you were before me in Chester when you were due to be sentenced for these breaches. On that occasion you pleaded with me to have an adjournment so that you could be represented. I granted that adjournment, but I explained to you then, that if, at the next hearing, which is today, you did not have representation, you would need to provide a very good explanation for an adjournment in order to get representation. I urged you to get representation urgently. You were provided with details of local solicitors who had legal aid franchises and carried out this sort of wok. You told me you would see a solicitor. Today, you have appeared before me without representation. I asked whether you wanted it to be adjourned and, having considered the matter (you saying that you had got a solicitor but they were not going to be able to represent you) you said you wanted to get it over with today and to proceed, even without representation. I explained to you that you could face potentially serious consequences. You however, reiterated, repeated that you wanted to proceed without a solicitor today, and that is what I am doing.

I am now going to sentence you in relation to each of those breaches separately. The sentencing powers of a Court for breach of a civil injunction have been considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of Lovett v Wigan Borough Council& Ors [2022] EWCA Civ 1631 and I have referred carefully to that judgment.

I recognise that these are orders, injunctions, made by a Civil Court, and the objectives in sentencing for breach are the ones applicable to civil contempt, namely first to ensure future compliance with this order, secondly punishment, and third rehabilitation. That is different from a criminal sentence; this Court wants its orders to be complied with. In this case, I note that you have repeatedly and consistently failed to comply with the orders of the Court.

There are five options before me, in dealing with your breaches and I start from the bottom: no order; a fine; adjourning consideration of a penalty; a suspended order for committal to prison with conditions; or an immediate order for committal to prison.

The maximum term that I can impose in relation to this is two years’ imprisonment, pursuant to section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. One half of that would be served in prison before automatic release. Time spent on remand is not automatically deducted, so if I were to give credit for that, consideration would also be given to doubling the period deducted to take section 258 of the Act into account. I have to take into account the custody threshold which is applicable, and I remember that custody should be reserved for the most serious breaches, after less serious, and other methods of securing compliance, have failed.

I have got to consider the totality of the penalties imposed. In terms of suspension, I would need to look at whether there was any real confidence that this Court would have that if a sentence were suspended, that that would have an effect, and there would not be future breaches of this order.

In turning to the question of sentence, I have to look at the questions of harm and culpability as set out in the case of Lovett. Paragraph 47 of the case identifies three levels of culpability. A: high culpability, very serious breach or persistent fear of breaches; B: deliberate breach falling between A and C; C: lower culpability, minor breach or breaches.

I turn to the level of harm which is determined by weighing up all the factors of the case, to determine the harm that was caused, or the risk of being caused, by the breaches. In assessing any risk of harm posed by the breaches, consideration should be given to the facts or actions which led to the order being made, in this case the nuisance and disturbance and threatening of the residents. The three levels of harm are Category 1, breach causing very serious harm or distress; Category 2, cases falling between categories 1 and 3; and Category 3, breaches causing little or no harm or distress.

The approach that the Court should take in identifying culpability and harm separately to determine a starting point for sentence and a range within which a judgment can be made, for mitigation and aggravating features. Examples are given in the case of Lovett of such features. For example, where there has been genuine remorse, ill health, age, lack of maturity. Early admissions of contempt may also be found to be factors which are mitigating. Aggravating features could be persistent breaches of the order, increasing seriousness of the breaches, and particular vulnerability of any victim. I have therefore considered all of those matters and the sentencing grid at paragraph 54 of the case of Lovett.

Turning to the breaches in question, it appears to me that this is a case where the breaches have been persistent. They are serious and they have been aggravated by the fact that there have been repeated breaches of the order, even when you have been brought to Court, and warnings have been given, the breaches have continued. It has been brought to my attention, not only that these are persistent breaches, but also there is an aggravating feature given the vulnerability of the victim, Mr Hunt, as set out in his affidavit in the Court papers. I note that and take it into consideration.

I also turn to the question of mitigating features. Has there been genuine remorse shown? I asked you as to that, and you said you wanted to say sorry. I asked who you were sorry to, and you indicated that you were sorry to me, by which I mean the Court. I asked whether you wanted to express that you were sorry to the victim, Mr Hunt, and you said that you would, but only after proceedings were at an end.

You also indicated that Mr Hunt had in fact been holding onto your money, which you pay benefits to him, and that also he has been requesting sexual favours from you in exchange for money. You produced no evidence to the Court, as to that, and I cannot therefore take that into account as a significant mitigating feature. Rather, it suggests to me, that that does not indicate genuine remorse on your part. It tends to be you, I think, trying to excuse yourself for your behaviour. I do not consider that to be genuine remorse.

I asked whether there was any good reason why you should be in the exclusion zone, and you explained that it was because your partner, who was the first defendant in the injunction I note, lives in that zone. That is no explanation for the Court. The whole point of this exclusion zone and this injunction was to keep you away from there. Not to go and see Mr Swift when you felt like it and ignore the injunction. You have, in my judgment, blatantly ignored it, and chosen to disregard it.

Having said all of that, I recognise that you have some vulnerabilities. You have explained to me that you have mental health issues for which you receive benefits; that you have asthma; that you have dyslexia; that you are a methadone user and have been for some three years. I take that into consideration, in terms of mitigation generally.

Having looked at matters in the round, I am going to look at the nature and gravity of the contempt. As I have said, the breaches were deliberate and repeated. They were undermining the authority of the Court and the purpose of the injunction, which was to protect the residents of Princes Road from harassment and nuisance.

On the first occasion you entered the exclusion zone, you were arrested there and you were brought before the Court. I accept that in relation to that offence, it falls, in terms of culpability at point B and Category 2. Therefore, it is a 2B matter for the breach. The starting point for that is one month. I have not been given any mitigation which would persuade me that I should move from that. Therefore, for the first breach, having considered that the custody threshold is crossed; that a less severe sentence would not be appropriate; that this is not an appropriate case for a fine or no order, given the persistent breaches, I find that 28 days in custody is the appropriate order.

In relation to breach two, which was that on 14 October you went to the area and attended the property, again in relation to that, I am prepared to say that this was Culpability B and Category B[sic] in relation to harm. Again, I am going to impose a 28-day sentence in relation to that.

In relation to the third breach, that you entered 110a Princess Road with another male who stole money from Mr Hunt with force and verbal abuse, I recognise that this is a higher degree of harm and culpability generally. This is now becoming more persistent, and in my judgment, the position is that this is Culpability still B, but harm Category 1. In those circumstances a higher starting point would be appropriate. Therefore, Culpability B, harm Category 1, would be a three month starting point. Again, I have looked at the question of mitigating and aggravating features, and I am unpersuaded that anything should change from the starting point, and for that, I am going to apply a period of three months, which is 84 days.

In relation to the fourth breach, namely that on 20 October, only a week later, you entered into Mr Hunt’s property again; you demanded money from him, and you were then arrested in relation to that. This is significantly worse. Again, persistent; again, having been brought before the Court you continued to breach the order. There is an acceleration or an aggravation of your behaviour. I consider that there was serious harm and distress which falls into Category 1, and this was high culpability. The starting point in relation to that is a six-month sentence and I am persuaded that I should not reduce or increase that but rather remain at the starting point. Therefore, for that I will impose a six month sentence; we will work out the days afterwards in relation to that.

The final breach, breach five, is that you on 22 October attended at the property; banged on the door; shouted demands. I accept that in terms of culpability this is high culpability; very serious persistent breaches, and in relation to harm I accept that this breach caused very serious harm or distress, because it is a culmination on top of the previous breaches, and directed again against Mr Hunt, who is a person who I accept is vulnerable, given both his presentation before the Court and what is said in his affidavit. Again, I am unpersuaded that I should move from the starting point, which is six months. I will work that out in days afterwards.

I have to take a step back and look at the totality. Looking at matters, it appears to me that a sentence which is a consecutive sentence would be inappropriate, but rather each of these sentences should be concurrent. That means that the periods of 28 days, 84 days and six months should all run concurrently.

The next question for me to consider is whether credit should be given for any period spent on remand, and I am told and accept that you have on three different occasions spent a period of up to 24 hours in custody, and you shall have credit for each of those – equivalent to - six days. Therefore, six days credit in relation to time spent on remand.

The final point for me to consider is whether a suspended order should be appropriate. I asked you very carefully why a suspended order should be made and how I could trust you not to breach the order again. You said because you do not want to be in trouble and that you would comply with any order. However, I remind myself that you have been given these warnings on at least three, four or five occasions in the past by the court, and yet you have been unable to stop yourself breaching the order. You seem to choose to do so and seem to choose to ignore the authority of this Court. I have no confidence whatsoever that providing a suspension for these orders of imprisonment would in fact have any impact. I am satisfied, therefore, that it is inappropriate to suspend this order. If it were suspended, I have every confidence you would be back before the Court within a matter of days, as you have been repeatedly over the past few months.

For all of those matters therefore, I impose a custodial sentence which will have immediate effect. It will be for - we will do the calculation in a moment - six months, which we will work out in days, minus the six days that you have spent on remand. No suspension is appropriate given the repeated and persistent nature of these breaches.

The existing injunction remains in force. The existing injunction, when you do come out of custody, still exists, Ms Grannell. Therefore, the injunction still is there. Therefore, when you come out of custody, the injunction still applies.

I am going to direct that these sentencing remarks are published on the website. I am going to direct that a transcript of my remarks is made at public expense on an expedited basis. I am going to remind you that you remain subject to the terms of the injunction, and I inform you that you have the right to appeal this decision without applying for permission. The time limit for that is 21 days. The route of appeal is to the Court of Appeal, and you have the right to do so. I therefore advise you that if you want to appeal, that is the time limit and that is the route.

Ms Grannell, the result of this sentence is that you are immediately being sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 162 days, of which you will serve half, which is 81 days. The order will be drawn up, and I understand that the police officers are going to now take you to custody.