Devon & Cornwall Police v Patricia Shorthouse

The applicant in this application is the Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall Police, represented today by Ms Summerhayes. The respondent is Patricia Shorthouse, represented by Mr Frampton. Ms Shorthouse is yet again before this court following her arrest for being in suspected breach of an injunction made on 9^th October of this year under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 which in fact was an amended injunction from an order originally made on 3^rd April of last year and made final on 2^nd July 2024.

I am afraid I have lost count of the amount of times Ms Shorthouse has been to court for breaches of the 2024 order and now the 2025 order. When the court dealt with her on 9^th October, the then district judge calculated that to be the ninth time. I am aware that Ms Shorthouse came before the court last week, although that reported breach was not established to the criminal standard. So, doing the best I can, today I think this is the eleventh time that Ms Shorthouse has been before the court since 2^nd July 2024.

The order made on 9^th October 2025 included an additional term to the 2024 order. The 2024 order (and this has been said a number of times before) prevented Ms Shorthouse at paragraph (1) from acting in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in such a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person; at paragraph (2) she was prevented from using offensive, aggressive or obscene words or gestures in a public place, such that it causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person; at paragraph (3) that she must not be in possession of any opened container of alcohol in any public place; and at paragraph (4) that she must not use the 999 system to contact the police, ambulance or fire service unless calling for a genuine emergency. The additional term was paragraph (5): that she must not enter, or attempt to enter, Shakespeare Close, Torquay, TQ2 6DA, except for on one occasion in the company of a police officer for the purposes of obtaining belongings. The order again contained a power of arrest.

I have received a certificate of service and I know and am satisfied that that injunction order was served on Ms Shorthouse on 15^th October of this year. On 9^th October of this year Ms Shorthouse came before this court and admitted a breach of the 2024 order, paragraphs (1) and (2), in that on 8^th October, when in drink, she shouted and threw two bins at her neighbour Mr Bean's property. She used offensive, aggressive and obscene words to him. Those words included "cunt", "wanker", "bastard" and "You abused your mum", "You tortured your mum". I have read the statement of Mr Bean dated 8^th October of this year, who tells the court that the incident lasted for two to three minutes. The bins hit the kitchen window as he was stood at the sink. He was left feeling incredibly angry and disappointed and disillusioned that Ms Shorthouse was back on the street with seemingly no remorse and just carrying on back into her old routine.

It is now reported by the applicant that Ms Shorthouse has breached the injunction dated 9^th October because yesterday, on 23^rd November, she was located at No. 26 Shakespeare Close, Torquay, which is the home of her now, I am told, former partner. I have read the statement from PC Spurle, who located and arrested her yesterday.

Ms Shorthouse's position today is that she accepts the later breach from yesterday, and Mr Frampton is agreeable to dealing with both matters today. To that end, I ensured that both counsel had the relevant paperwork from the October hearing, and I adjourned for an hour to enable sufficient time for preparation.

Mr Frampton, on Ms Shorthouse's behalf today, tells me that yesterday she disputes that she was wearing a dressing gown; that she was collecting her belongings and collecting toiletries which was why she was in the bathroom; that she came into the property after being assaulted. She was putting her belongings into a suitcase, and her former partner threw the suitcase outside of the door.

Dealing with the breaches first, though, I find that the breaches as set out in both the schedules to the hearing of 9^th October and the schedule of breaches for the purpose of the hearing today are all proven beyond reasonable doubt.

I find to the criminal standard of proof that the respondent, Ms Shorthouse, has breached paragraphs (1) and (2) by acting in an anti-social manner, by shouting and throwing her bins at her neighbour's property and using offensive, aggressive and obscene words towards Mr Bean, as I have already set out. I find to the criminal standard of proof that paragraph (5) of the injunction order has been made out in the manner that I have outlined. So Ms Shorthouse is again in contempt of court, and I will now proceed to deal with sentencing her for those matters.

I have received the judgment of District Judge James on 9^th October. District Judge James on that occasion adjourned sentencing for the breaches of 8^th October. I will just read out what he said in his judgment at paragraph 6:

"The real evil that this injunction is principally and primarily focused on is making the lives of Ms Shorthouse's former neighbours at Shakespeare Close better. Their life has been hell for a number of years as a result of the behaviour of Ms Shorthouse. It is, in isolation, what might be considered by some objectively to be relatively low level anti-social behaviour, but that would be a mischaracterisation because it takes it out of its context, which is that Ms Shorthouse has spent years subjecting her neighbours to the same behaviour which grinds their lives down and makes their lives intolerable. It is pernicious anti-social behaviour."

At paragraph 9 of his judgment, Ms Shorthouse was told this:

"If, Ms Shorthouse, you do go to Shakespeare Close other than on one occasion to collect your belongings in the company of the police, you can be arrested, and that in itself will amount to a breach of the injunction. It is to provide pre-emptive protection to your neighbours to remove you before you have the chance to cause them further harm by your words or actions."

He then went on to adjourn sentence, but in paragraph 13 of his judgment he made it clear that, if there have been no further breaches of the order, he intended to make no further order. But then he said this:

"If, however, Ms Shorthouse, you appear before me or any other judge, then the matter can be brought back and, if there are breaches of the injunction, the sentence that I am likely to impose –– I will of course hear submissions on that occasion, but it is right, following the jurisprudence of the senior courts, that I give you an indication of sentence. The likely sentence that I will impose will be one of eight weeks' custody".

So, following on from that, he said that the power was in her hands.

It is this court, of course, that is dealing with both matters today. I am not bound by that indication. I need to exercise my judgment afresh. I remind myself that the objectives of sentencing are to ensure future compliance with the order, punishment and rehabilitation. That was set out in Wigan Borough Council v. Lovett [2023] 1WLR 1443. There are a number of options available to the courts when dealing with Ms Shorthouse and they have been explained by Ms Summerhayes. They are either: committal to prison - immediate or suspended; to adjourn; to make a fine; or to make no order. Custody should be reserved for the most serious breaches and for less serious cases where other methods of securing compliance with the order have failed. A custodial sentence should not be imposed if an alternative course is sufficient and appropriate. If I decide to impose a term of imprisonment, that term should always be the shortest term which will achieve the purpose for which it is being imposed. If custody is appropriate, the length of the sentence should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended.

In the most minor of cases, the court may decide that the impact of the proceedings is likely to achieve the purposes of the contempt jurisdiction. It may be appropriate to make no order, save for the finding of breach. The court should consider a penalty for each breach found proved. I need to consider a penalty for each breach found proved.

In my judgment, adjournment of sentence as a deterrent and to secure a means of compliance serves no purpose. Ms Shorthouse has a history of repeatedly coming back to court for breaches of the injunction order. The adjournment as ordered by District Judge James has served no useful purpose. A fine is not appropriate on the facts of this case. Has the custody threshold been passed, I ask myself. In my view, it clearly has, given the history.

So far as sentencing is concerned, I give consideration to the degree of harm and the degree of culpability, bearing in mind the civil context. I have regard to the well-known Civil Justice Council guidance based on the three levels of culpability and harm. The court indicated that the breach of the order on 8^th October fell within culpability at Level B, at Category 2 for harm. Should I disturb that indication? In my own judgment, I have decided not to disturb that indication. In my judgment, I am dealing with a Level B2 case.

The appropriate starting point, therefore, is one month custody, but within the category range is adjourned sentence up to three months. Dealing with the breach from yesterday, the degree of culpability first, again, in my judgment, the breach of the order by Ms Shorthouse was deliberate and that falls within culpability at Level B. She was served with the order. She was present when that specific paragraph (5) was added. She did not oppose that addition. She knew that she could not go to or enter the close, save without a police officer on one occasion. The previous judge spelt out the consequences to her were she to return, and within seven weeks she breached that order. With regard to the level of harm, there was no harm or distress caused and so I agree that it falls within Category 3, and so I am dealing with a B3 for yesterday's breach. The appropriate starting point for that sentence is adjourned consideration, but the category range can be adjusted from adjourned consideration to one month imprisonment.

There are aggravating factors in this case. There is a history of Ms Shorthouse's disobedience with the orders made. There is, sadly, a disregard for the injunction orders and for the court process. She has a long history of offending behaviour. Her previous convictions are 17 pages now in length and she has 56 convictions for 92 offences. Are there any mitigating factors? I have read a letter written by Ms Shorthouse which was presented to the court in October. That letter says how sorry she is to be in court. That letter also says she will never live at No. 26 again; that she had been badly injured by her partner in early October; that she intended to travel to Cheshire to stay with good friends and should have done that months ago. She said in her letter that she could categorically state that she would never be living at Shakespeare Close again and did not mean to upset anyone.

Mr Frampton submitted that she was returning yesterday for the purpose of collecting belongings. He reminded me that this was a domestically abusive relationship. Mr Frampton also submitted that Ms Shorthouse was not in drink on the second occasion and that she was not offensive to anyone yesterday; that she has moved on from the relationship and is leaving, although he recognised that her return was not in accordance with the order. She did, through Mr Frampton, apologise today and she clearly does continue to have vulnerabilities. I think I have said it before, but I say it again. She is in bad need of help for alcohol use, for domestic abuse. This court does understand how difficult it can be to pull away from such a relationship, but she does need to break this cycle and she needs to find a way of doing that.

Having said that, in my judgment the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty is appropriate. Firstly, with regards to the breach of 8^th October of this year, I am going to impose a sentence as indicated on 9^th October of one of eight weeks' custody. I see no reason to impose any alternative sentence on the facts as I have heard them and read them today. I do not give Ms Shorthouse any further custodial penalty for the breach that took place yesterday. Although it was a breach, there was no harm caused and, in my judgment, no further order is necessary to mark that breach.

So that makes a total sentence of eight weeks, and so 56 days' imprisonment. However, I do note that the respondent, Ms Shorthouse, has served the equivalent of four days following her arrest yesterday and two days following her arrest in October, and so the sentence I pass today is 56 days less six days for time spent in custody following her arrest, which gives a total sentence of 50 days, of which Ms Shorthouse will serve half. That, in my judgment, is proportionate and just. I do not intend to suspend the sentence of imprisonment. A suspended sentence would not and has not in the past brought about compliance.

Ms Shorthouse of course will be advised that she has a right to appeal that decision without permission to a circuit judge and she has 28 days in which to do so. That is my judgment.