Hasan Shaikh & Anor v Chabila Mohammad

This is the Defendant’s application dated 6 June 2025 for summary judgment and/or to strike out the Claimants’ claim for a new tenancy pursuant to Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (“the 1954 Act”). The application is brought under CPR 24.2 and CPR 3.4(2) on the grounds that the claim was not validly brought within the statutory period specified by section 29A of the 1954 Act and is therefore time-barred. The Defendant relies on the witness statement of Usman Ali Anwar, Solicitor, dated 6 June 2025, a skeleton argument, and a bundle of authorities. The Defendant is represented by Mr Arron Walthall, counsel.

The Claimants oppose the application on the grounds that their claim was brought within the statutory period by the lodging of their claim form on 21 October 2024. Alternatively, any defect in payment of the court fee is a procedural irregularity that can be rectified under CPR 3.10. The Claimants rely on their own witness statements dated 29 May 2025, the witness statements of Saqab Shazad, a solicitor, dated 28 May 2025, a skeleton argument dated 22 August 2025, and a list of authorities. They are represented by Mr Dixon, counsel.

The premises at 15 High Bank, Gorton, Manchester (“the Property”) were leased under a written lease dated 13 July 2018 for a four-year term expiring on 6 July 2022. Rent was initially £800 per calendar month, increasing to £1,000 at the end of the fixed term. Upon expiry, the lease continued by virtue of section 24 of the 1954 Act.

On 9 May 2022, the Claimants assert that they served a Section 26 Notice pursuant to the 1954 Act seeking a new tenancy to commence on 22 July 2022. The Defendant denies that the notice was validly served or that it was compliant. The Claimants no longer pursue this point.

On 26 April 2024, the Defendant, through her solicitors, served a Section 25 Notice on the Claimants seeking to terminate the tenancy on 1 November 2024 and opposing any renewal under grounds (a), (b), (c) and (g) of section 30(1) of the 1954 Act. Both parties agree that the statutory period by which the claim form to renew the tenancy had to be issued was 1 November 2024.

On 18 October 2024, the Claimants’ solicitors lodged a claim form at the County Court in Manchester. The papers were date-stamped as received on 21 October 2024 (“the October claim form”). The claim form stated “Court fee not applicable”; no payment was tendered, and insufficient copies were filed. The court returned the documents “unactioned” by letter dated 2 December 2024. On 11 December 2024, the Claimants refiled their papers with the correct fee and which was marked received on 17 December 2024 (“the December claim form”). The claim was formally issued on 30 January 2025 and deemed served on the Defendant on 3 February 2025.

On 13 February 2025, the Defendant’s solicitors notified the Claimants’ solicitors, R&A Solicitors, that in their view the claim was issued out of time. By letter dated 11 May 2025, R&A Solicitors responded, arguing that the October claim form had been lodged before 1 November 2024 and was valid.

The Defendant then issued its application for reverse summary judgment and/or strike out dated 6 June 2025. That application was listed before District Judge Emery on 14 August 2025, but could not be determined on that occasion as the Judge only received the hearing bundle part-way through the hearing; the Claimant’s skeleton argument was delivered part-way through the hearing, and the Defendant’s skeleton argument and authorities bundle were only provided on the morning of the hearing. As a result, there was insufficient time to consider the issues, and the matter was adjourned and re-listed before this Court on 26 September 2025.

The issues I must determine are:

Section 29A(1)–(2) of the 1954 Act provides:

“(1)

Subject to section 29B, the court shall not entertain an application—
(a) by the tenant or the landlord under section 24(1); or
(b) by the landlord under section 29(2),
if it is made after the end of the statutory period.
(2) In this section and section 29B ‘the statutory period’ means a period ending—
(a) where the landlord gave a notice under section 25, on the date specified in his notice;
(b) where the tenant made a request under section 26, immediately before the date specified in his request.”

Civil Procedure Rules: Commencement of Proceedings

CPR 3.1 states:

Except where these Rules provide otherwise, the court may –

CPR 3.10 states:

CPR 3.4(2)(b)-(c) states that the court may strike out a statement of case if it appears—

“(a)

that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;
(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or
(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.”

CPR 24.(2) states that the court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if—

“(a)

it considers that the claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; and
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”

Mr Walthall referred to the statutory framework under Section 29A of the 1954 Act. He stated that the landlord’s Section 25 notice fixed 1 November 2024, and the October claim form was not validly “brought” because the correct court fee was neither paid nor tendered with the claim form when lodged. The October claim form wrongly marked “court fee not applicable,” was returned by the court office. The subsequent filing of the December claim form with the fee was therefore made after 1 November 2024 and, in line with the authorities’ view, was out of time. He relied on the following authorities to submit that a claim is only “brought” when the claim form and the appropriate fee are delivered together.

In Barnes v St Helens [2007] 1 W.L.R 879, the Court of Appeal held that proceedings are not brought until both claim form and the fee are received. Page v Hewitt (No 1) [2012] EWCA Civ 805 confirms that the claimant must do all that is required of him, including payment of the correct fee for the valid issuing of a claim form. Page v Hewitt (No 2) [2013] EWHC 2845 (Ch) emphasises that the need for the ‘cheque’ to be in the correct amount is an ‘essential requirement’. Liddle v Atha [2018] 1 W.L.R. 4953 introduces the requirement of causation: where the failure to pay the correct fee causes actual delay, the claim is not in time. Hayes v Butters [2021] 1 W.L.R. 2886 was different to the case at hand, as it involved an inadvertent miscalculation and not non-payment and included obiter comments (paragraph 24) that were not binding on the court. In Chelfat v Hutchinson [2022] 1 W.L.R. 3613, the court expressed sympathy for the view that the inadvertent miscalculation of the court fee should not bar a claim, but did not decide the issue.Peterson v Howard [2023] 1 W.L.R. 3057 confirms that the claim is not brought until the correct fee is paid, and CPR 3.10 gives the Court no power to cure such a fundamental defect. Mr Walthall noted that authorities such as Hayes v Butters and Sunnymeads, and Gelfat v Hutchinson, which may suggest leniency in cases of inadvertent miscalculation, are obiter and non-binding, and are in any event distinguishable on their facts.

Mr. Dixon agreed on the limitation date (1 November 2024) and the necessity for the claim to be “brought” by then but disagreed on the definition of “brought.” He referred to the White Book commentary at CPR 7.2, which explains that a claim is brought when it is delivered and stamped by the court. He cited the case of Liddle v Atha, which confirmed that there is no requirement for a party to do all it can to ensure the claim form is accompanied by the correct issue fee for the claim to be valid.

He highlighted two documents: the October claim form, filed on 18 October (noting that the court fee was marked as not applicable), and a letter from the court to the Claimants’ solicitor dated 2 December, with a return letter received by the court on 17 December 2024. He argued that the timing of the claim form’s return (15 days after the court’s letter) did not imply the Claimants could not have addressed the issue sooner, if notified earlier, especially considering postal delays in December.He submitted that serving the October claim form 11 days before the statutory deadline was not unusual in such cases, as parties often negotiate up to the deadline and that it should not be seen as “running the risk” as there was enough time to rectify any defects. He addressed the criticism regarding the use of different claim forms on different dates, explaining that the updated form was only required because the court returned the original for amendment. The information in both forms was the same, except that the updated form included the court fee.

Mr. Dixon analysed the authorities that Mr. Walthall had presented to the court. He argued that in Page & Hewitt (No 1), the High Court’s reliance on the need to pay the court fee was based on a misinterpretation of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which was not decisive on that point. In Liddell, he observed that the court declined to follow the reasoning that parties must have done everything in their power to ensure the court fee was correct, especially when discrepancies did not impact the timing. In Hayes v Butter [2021] 1 WLR 2886s, he highlighted the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that non-payment of a fee does not prevent a claim from being brought within the limitation period, and that the test is whether the parties did all they could to bring the claim, allowing for mistakes. He aimed to distinguish Peterson & Howard, noting that the High Court’s ruling concerned whether the court could remedy a fee error under rule 3.10, rather than whether the claim was timely. Regarding Sunnymeads Motor Co Ltd v Tolfree-Cross [2024] EWHC 2822 (KB), he pointed out that the court did not decide the fee issue but that HHJ Pearce indicated courts should adopt a liberal approach where claims are filed on time but are hindered by fee-related technicalities. Finally, he relied upon Bhatti v Asghar [2016] EWHC 1049 (QB), where Warby J observed that a party who has “done all in his power” to set the wheels of justice in motion should not be penalised for subsequent court failings. 

Mr Walthall responded by arguing that the binding authorities require the correct court fee to be paid for a claim to be properly brought, referencing cases such as Liddell and Peterson and Howard, and noting that even if the Court of Appeal might be sympathetic to inadvertent miscalculations, this case involved total non-payment and actual delay. He concluded that, under any of the possible legal tests, the claim could not proceed because no court fee was paid and there was delay, distinguishing this case from those involving mere miscalculation or minor procedural errors.

Section 29A of the 1954 Act is expressed in mandatory terms: the court “shall not entertain” an application made after the statutory period. The statutory scheme demands certainty. The parties agreed that the court could not entertain any application under section 25 beyond the statutory period (s.29A) (which in this case was 1 November 2024). For the reasons I set out below, I am unable to accept the Claimants’ arguments. They would, in my judgment, undermine that certainty by allowing defective, fee-less claim forms to suspend limitation.

In Barnes v St Helens MBC [2007] 1 WLR 879, a claim form was lodged at court just before the expiry of the limitation period, but the court did not issue the claim until after the period had expired. The issue was when proceedings had been “brought” for the purposes of limitation—when the claim form is delivered to the court, or when the court issues it? Tuckey LJ stated:

“The 1980 Act can perfectly properly be construed so that in the context of the CPR a claim is brought when the claimant’s request for the issue of a claim form (together with the court fee) is delivered to the court office.”

In Page v Hewetts (No 1) [2012] EWCA Civ 805, the case involved a claim against solicitors for alleged misconduct in the administration of an estate and the sale of property. The issue was what a claimant must do to ensure a claim is brought within the limitation period, and who bears the risk of court processing delays? Lord Justice Lewison at paragraph 29 stated:

“When an action is “brought” for the purpose of the Limitation Act 1980 is, in my judgment, a question of construction of the Act. It is not a question of construction of the CPR, let alone a question of the construction of a Practice Direction. The CPR (and perhaps the Practice Direction) may inform the construction, but the question remains: what does the Act mean?

Further, at paragraph 38, he stated:

“If, therefore, the claimants establish that the claim form was delivered in due time to the court office, accompanied by a request to issue and the appropriate fee, the action would not, in my judgment, be statute-barred.”

In Page v Hewetts (No 2) [2013] EWHC 2845 (Ch), Hildyard J, at paragraph 35 stated:

“It is made plain in the judgment of Lewison LJ in the Court of Appeal (see especially paragraph 38) that it was, at this full trial of the preliminary issue, for the Claimants to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that they had done all that was required of them in terms of delivering to the court office the Claim Form, accompanied by a request for issue and the appropriate fee. Upon proof of that to the requisite standard, any delay should not rebound to the disadvantage of the litigant. But the burden was and is on the Claimants to show that they had indeed done what was required of them.”

And at Paragraph 44:

“However, and as is implicit above, there is a further point to consider: that is, whether the documents received were complete, and in particular whether they were accompanied by the appropriate fee. Inclusion of the appropriate fee (or, it seems, a solicitors’ cheque in the right amount) was identified by the Court of Appeal as being an essential requirement (see, for example, paragraph 38 of Lewison LJ's judgment).”

These authorities establish a consistent line in support of the contention that a claim is validly brought only when a claim form is submitted together with the fee.

Against that backdrop, the authorities relied upon by the Claimants do not carry the same force. Bhatti v Asghar was concerned with court failings post-lodgement and does not decide the question of whether payment of the fee is an essential condition for a claim form to be issued. Hayes v Butters contains observations which, at first blush, appear sympathetic to claimants who inadvertently miscalculate fees. Still, those remarks do not apply here, where there has been non-payment and were, in any event, obiter as the case itself was resolved on other grounds. Sunnymeads likewise contains dicta indicating sympathy for inadvertent miscalculation, but the Court there was clear that wholesale non-payment falls outside any scope for judicial indulgence. None of these authorities overturns the binding ratio of Barnes, Page, Liddle, or Peterson.

As to whether the Claimants did all that they reasonably could to bring proceedings within the limitation period, the chronology is clear. The claim form was sent to the court on 18 October, in circumstances where the limitation period was due to expire on 1 November. By leaving the matter until the final fortnight, the Claimants’ solicitors assumed a considerable and ultimately fatal risk. That risk was compounded by the fact that the documents submitted were deficient in two respects: first, the requisite number of copies of the claim forms were not provided; secondly, and of greater significance, no fee was paid. The form itself recorded “not applicable” against the fee box, which would appear to suggest that some enquiry was attempted, but it is clear that it was inadequate. In my judgment, solicitors are expected to be familiar with the fee regime and to comply with the procedural requirements governing the commencement of proceedings.

Stamping by the court office is an administrative act only; it evidences receipt, not that proceedings have been validly brought. The court cannot be criticised for failing to act upon documents that were not in proper form or accompanied by the appropriate fee. To hold otherwise would be to transfer responsibility from those who seek to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to the court itself. The only occasion when the claim form was received in a form capable of issue was 11 December 2024, when the correct fee was submitted. The fee was processed on 17 December 2024, and the claim was issued on 30 January 2025. Each of those dates fell after the statutory deadline of 1 November 2024.

If I accept the Claimants’ submissions, it would permit parties to lodge incomplete or defective documents without the fee, in the expectation that any defect could be cured later, thereby undermining certainty and introducing delay. Such a practice would be inconsistent with the overriding objective and would neither be just or fair.

In my judgment, the omission of the correct (or any) fee in October 2024 meant that no valid claim was brought before the statutory deadline of 1 November 2024. The later December proceedings were outside time. The Claimants’ reliance on obiter observations in Hayes and Sunnymeads, in my judgment, cannot displace the clear and binding line of authority culminating in Peterson. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the proceedings were validly “brought” within the statutory period for the purpose of section 29A of the 1954 Act.

The Claimants invite the court to consider CPR 3.1 and CPR 3.10 to enable the defect, if one exists, to be cured. Mr Dixon addressed procedural errors, such as the number of claim forms provided and the alleged failure to sign the claim form, arguing these were matters the court could rectify under CPR 3.10 and CPR 22.2, and that striking out the claim without giving the party a chance to fix the defect would not be a proportionate order.

The Defendant submits that the court has no such discretion, relying on Peterson. InPeterson, the Court held that it had no power to remedy a failure to pay the correct court fee where that failure meant the claim was out of time. Eyre J (paragraph 41) stated:

“Rule 3.10 was a rule made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee by virtue of its powers under the 1997 Act. It is difficult to read that Act as giving that committee the power to set out the consequences of a failure to comply with rules lawfully imposed by others.”

Further, at paragraph 58:

“I am satisfied that, properly interpreted, an error of procedure for the purposes of rule 3.10 is limited to an error in a procedure laid down by the CPR or potentially by an equivalent procedural provision and that it is not concerned with matters occurring before the commencement of proceedings (although it can be used to remedy defects of form in proceedings once commenced). In relation to the circumstances of this case an error of procedure does not include a failure to pay a court fee needed to initiate proceedings where the requirement to pay that fee derives not from the CPR nor from any other rule or direction made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee but from an order made by the Lord Chancellor exercising powers deriving from the Courts Act 2003.”

The Claimants’ attempt to invoke the Court’s general case management powers under CPR 3.1(2)(a), and CPR 3.10 to remedy an error in this case is not appropriate. CPR 3.1 gives the court power to extend time for compliance with a rule, practice direction, or court order. This case is about s.29A of the 1954 Act. Further, CPR 3.10 is subject to the hierarchy of legislative authority. It cannot be used to override the express prohibition contained in section 29A. To do so would be to extend a statutory limitation period by judicial discretion, contrary to established authority.

Accordingly, I am not satisfied that CPR 3.10 can be used to cure the defect caused by the Claimants’ inability to bring the proceedings in time.

I recognise that striking out the claim or giving reverse summary judgment will cause significant prejudice to the Claimants, who will lose both their business premises and goodwill. But the Defendant, too, would suffer prejudice were the statutory bar to be disregarded. Parliament has imposed an absolute time limit, and the Court is not at liberty to extend it by recourse to the overriding objective.

In those circumstances, I conclude that the prescribed fee did not accompany the October 2024 claim form and was incapable of amounting to a validly “brought” claim within the statutory period prescribed by section 29A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. This was a case of non-payment, rather than an inadvertent miscalculation or mistake, for which there was no evidence. The Claimants did not do all that they possibly could because they failed to pay the fee when they should have and therefore carried all the risk. The December 2024 claim form was out of time, and the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings. The Section 26 Notice of May 2022 does not need to be determined as the Claimants no longer pursued it.

Accordingly, I find the Claimants’ statement of case constitutes an abuse of process under CPR 3.4 and should be struck out. To that end, the Defendant’s application is granted.

I therefore invite counsel to agree on a draft order including costs (both liability and quantum) and to submit that order for approval.