The Borough Council of Sandwell v Anne Marie Harris

This appeal raises four specific questions of law and procedure:

The decision under appeal is that of Deputy District Judge Mason (“the DDJ”), dated 26 June 2025, wherein he granted summary judgment to the Respondent (the Defendant in the main proceedings) on the basis that the Claimant had no reasonable prospects of succeeding in their claim for possession of the property situated at Eden Grove, West Bromwich (“the property”). The DDJ himself gave permission to appeal.

For ease of reference, I will refer to the Appellant simply as the Claimant, and the Respondent as the Defendant.

Before considering the specifics of this case, it is important to understand the statutory framework pertaining to introductory tenancies, how they are created and, more importantly for this case, how they come to an end.

Section 124 of the Housing Act 1996 (“the Act”) confers on local authorities the power to elect to operate an introductory tenancy scheme. Chapter 1 of Part V of the Act goes on to describe the characteristics of such a tenancy. Section 124(2) of the Act provides that where such an election is in force, all new tenancies granted by an authority will be introductory tenancies, except where (inter alia) the tenant had been a secure tenant in respect of the same property. In short, introductory tenancies are probationary in nature; they allow a housing authority to provide a tenancy to the tenant to enable the tenant to demonstrate that they can comply with the terms of the tenancy agreement, without the tenancy being a secure tenancy. Such tenancies also essentially make it easier for the landlord to regain possession of the property if the tenant does not abide by the terms of the tenancy agreement.

Section 125(1) of the Act provides that an introductory tenancy will remain so until “the end of the trial period” unless one of the events in s. 125(5) occurs before the end of that period. Pursuant to s. 125(2) of the Act, the “trial period” is the period of one year beginning with:

“(a)

in the case of a tenancy which was entered into by a local housing authority or housing action trust—

(i)

the date on which the tenancy was entered into, or

(ii)

if later, the date on which a tenant was first entitled to possession under the tenancy; or

(b)

in the case of a tenancy which was adopted by a local housing authority or housing action trust, the date of adoption;

but this is subject to subsections (3) and (4) and to section 125A (extension of trial period by 6 months)”.

Subsections 125(6) and (7) of the Act state that (emphasis added):

“(6)

A tenancy does not come to an end merely because it ceases to be an introductory tenancy, but a tenancy which has once ceased to be an introductory tenancy cannot subsequently become an introductory tenancy.

(7)

This section has effect subject to section 130 (effect of beginning proceedings for possession).”

The Defendant asks the Court to note that the definition of ‘trial period’ is not made subject to s. 125(7) of the Act. However, s. 125(7) makes the whole of s. 125 subject to s. 130.

Section 125A(1) of the Act provides for the extension of “the trial period …by 6months”, subject to the conditions under s. 125A being met. There is no provision for any further extension.

Section 130 of the Act concerns what happens in circumstances where a claim for possession is begun. Given the significance of this section, it is set out below in full, with my emphasis added:

“130 Effect of beginning proceedings for possession.

(1)

This section applies where the landlord has begun proceedings for the possession of a dwelling-house let under an introductory tenancy and—

(a) the trial period ends, or

(b)

any of the events specified in section 125(5) occurs (events on which a tenancy ceases to be an introductory tenancy).

(2)

Subject to the following provisions, the tenancy remains an introductory tenancy until—

(a)

the tenancy comes to an end in accordance with section 127(1A), or

(b) the proceedings are otherwise finally determined.

(3)

If any of the events specified in section 125(5)(b) to (d) occurs, the tenancy shall thereupon cease to be an introductory tenancy but—

(a)

the landlord (or, as the case may be, the new landlord) may continue the proceedings, and

(b)

if he does so, section 127(1A) and (2) (termination by landlord) apply as if the tenancy had remained an introductory tenancy.

(4)

Where in accordance with subsection (3) a tenancy ceases to be an introductory tenancy and becomes a secure tenancy, the tenant is not entitled to exercise the right to buy under Part V of the Housing Act 1985 unless and until the proceedings are finally determined on terms such that he is not required to give up possession of the dwelling-house.

(5)

For the purposes of this section proceedings shall be treated as finally determined if they are withdrawn or any appeal is abandoned or the time for appealing expires without an appeal being brought.”

The Defendant was granted an introductory tenancy of 29 Eden Grove, West Bromwich (“the property”), that commenced on 24 March 2022.

I was told that there have been persistent allegations of noise nuisance and anti-social behaviour from the property throughout the tenancy, which is continuing to date.

It is common ground that on 2 September 2022 the Claimant served on the Defendant a notice to extend that introductory tenancy (in accordance with s. 125A of the Act), extending the trial period of the tenancy until 24 September 2023; no request was made to review that decision.

It is further common ground that on 6 January 2023 the Claimant served on the Defendant a Notice to Terminate the tenancy; I was told the Defendant did not seek to review that decision before the first set of possession proceedings had been lodged. Those proceedings were issued on 3 March 2023 and were dismissed by HHJ Saira Singh by an order dated 30 October 2024, I was told on the basis that the Court accepted the Defendant’s argument that the Notice to Terminate was invalid. The Claimant wished to appeal that decision.

The time within which any appeal was required to be brought expired on 20 November 2024 by virtue of CPR 52.12(2)(b), no such alternative period having been directed by the lower court pursuant to CPR 52.12(2)(a). The parties are not agreed as to whether that time limit expired without an appeal having been brought.

The Claimant’s position is that the appeal papers were filed at Court on 18 November 2024, with the Claimant informing the counter staff that the deadline for an appeal was 20 November 2024. I have no direct evidence in support of how the papers were presented to the High Court Birmingham District Registry. The Defendant’s position is that, while the Claimant did attempt to file documents with the court on 18 November 2024, those documents were rejected because they had not been filed in the prescribed manner.

I have seen the letter from the Civil Appeal Section at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre, which is dated 21 November 2024, which I was told the Claimant received on 27 November 2024. The letter states that:

“The Court is returning your appeal because it needs to be filed on the high court (sic) E-Filing system. Please note that it is mandatory for professional court users to use E-Filing for all high court matters. As this appeal will be out of time when re-filed you will need to apply for an extension of time in Part B of Section 10 and Section 11 of the Appellant’s Notice. We will refund the fee of £285.00 in due course.”

The Claimant ultimately filed further appeal documentation on 28 November 2024, which is the date recorded by the High Court as the date on which the appeal was brought. This documentation was actually filed by email as there seems to have been some difficulty with the Claimant registering with the e-filing service.

The Defendant asserts that the appeal was accordingly ‘brought’ out of time.

By order of Ritchie J, dated 16 January 2025, time to bring the appeal was extended, but permission to appeal was refused on paper. Ritchie J states within his Order that:

“The Appellant applies for an extension of time to appeal and I grant that because the papers were sent to the Court on 18.11.2024. I have read the Respondent’s letter and the Appellant’s response thereto.”

I have not seen either document that Ritchie J refers to.

The Defendant argues that it is a necessary implication of Ritchie J’s order both that the Claimant required an extension of time and accordingly that its appeal was filed outside of the time prescribed. The Claimant essentially contends that (a) the papers were filed on time as they were filed on 18 November 2024 but were (incorrectly) not issued by the Court and (b) in the alternative, the appeal was not brought out of time because Ritchie J extended the time period within which the appeal could be brought.

On 24 and 30 January 2025, the Claimant served further notices on the Defendant to terminate the introductory tenancy.

On 4 April 2025, the present (second) claim for possession was issued, which ultimately led to the hearing before the DDJ.

On 7 April 2025, Soole J heard and refused the Claimant’s oral renewal of its application for permission to appeal against HHJ Saira Singh’s Order in the original possession claim. The parties disagree as to whether this decision brought the introductory tenancy to an end or not.

The EWPS operated from 16 November 2015 and brought about considerable changes in how documents were filed in the High Court and elsewhere. It should be noted that the EWPS has recently come to an end and the rules regarding electronic filing are now found at CPR 5.5 and PD 5C. The EWPS was in force at the relevant times to this case.

Paragraph 1.1 of PD 51O set out which courts and types of work the EWPS applied to. Relevant to this case, the EWPS:

Paragraph 1.2 sets out how the EWPS interacted with other provisions of the CPR, namely that Electronic Working (“EW”) worked within and was subject to all statutory provisions and rules together with all procedural rules and practice directions applicable to the proceedings concerned, subject to any exclusion or revision within PD 51O. Importantly, pursuant to §1.2(2), the provisions of Part 52 applied unless specifically excluded or revised by PD 51O. By virtue of §1.2(5), where the provisions of PD 51O conflicted with PDs 5B or 52C, PD 51O took precedence. It will be noted that PD 52B is not mentioned in this paragraph.

PD 51O §2.2 stated that EW applied to and could be used to start and/or continue, inter alia, CPR Part 7, Part 8 and Part 20 claims, pre-action applications including applications under rule 31.16, insolvency proceedings, and arbitration claims in the Rolls Building Jurisdictions, the Business and Property Courts District Registries, the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division, King’s Bench District Registries and applications for permissions to appeal and appeals in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division). It will be noted that §2.2 does not explicitly include appeals from the County Court to the High Court, or indeed within the High Court.

Pursuant to §2.2H, from 18 October 2021, there was a requirement for legally represented parties to use EW to “start and/or continue any relevant claims or applications” in the King’s Bench District Registries that were part of the EWPS. This can be contrasted with §2.2J, which deals with the Court of Appeal and the requirement to use EW “to start and/or continue any appeals or applications”.

The Claimant relied upon §3.2 of PD 51O, for reasons that I will return to below. At this stage, I merely set out that provision:

“Proceedings which have not been started using Electronic Working may be continued using Electronic Working (subject to the provisions in paragraph 1.1(1)(c)) after documents originally submitted in those proceedings have been converted to PDF format. The proceedings shall then continue as if they had been started using Electronic Working.”

CPR Part 52 and the associated PDs deal with appeals, including appeals from a Circuit Judge sitting in the County Court to a Judge of the High Court.

CPR 52.12(2) requires an appellant to “file” the appellant’s notice at the appeal court within 21 days of the decision of the lower court unless a direction is made by the lower court for a different period of time.

CPR 52.2 states that all parties to an appeal must comply with PDs 52A to 52E.

Pursuant to CPR 2.3(1), “filing” means delivering a document or information, by post or otherwise, to the court office.

PD 52A §3.5 sets out the destinations that apply to first appeals. Decisions from a Circuit Judge are to be determined by a High Court Judge, unless they are in relation to contempt proceedings.

PD 52B applies to appeals from the County Court to the High Court. Paragraph 2.1 of PD 52B states that:

“Appeals within the County Court, appeals from the County Court and appeals within the High Court to a judge of the High Court must be brought in the appropriate appeal centre and all other notices (including any respondent’s notice) and applications must be filed at that appeal centre...” (emphasis added).

Table B at the end of PD 52B sets out that the Appeal Centre for appeals from the County Court on the Midland Circuit is Birmingham.

Paragraph 4.1 of PD 52B states that an appellant’s notice must be filed and served in all cases; there is no specification as to how it should be filed. This should be contrasted with §3 of PD 52C (appeals to the Court of Appeal), which states:

“(1)

An appellant’s notice (Form N161), including grounds of appeal on a separate sheet, must be filed and served in all cases. The appellant’s notice must be accompanied by the appropriate fee or, if appropriate, a fee remission certificate.

(2)

If the appellant is legally represented, the appellant’s notice and accompanying documents must be filed using the HMCTS e-filing service.”

I was referred to the decision of Van Aken v London Borough of Camden [2002] EWCA Civ 1724, which dealt with how a homelessness statutory appeal was brought pursuant to s. 204 of the Act. Whilst the parties disagree as to the relevance of this case given the issues concerning how the appeal paperwork was filed in this case, the parties do appear to agree that Van Aken is authority for the proposition that an appeal is ‘brought’ for the purposes of s. 204 of the Act at the time that an appeal is ‘filed’. There was no suggestion made that the word ‘brought’ has a different meaning within s. 130(5) of the Act than is does within s. 204 of the Act and therefore I proceed on the basis that an appeal would have been ‘brought’ in this case when the Appellant’s Notice was properly filed.

Given the issues raised in this appeal, I will deal with the grounds of appeal out of order, as grounds 2 to 4 deal with the substantive issue as to how the appeal was brought and whether it was in time and thus sets the scene for the other grounds.

Grounds 3 and 4 largely rise and fall together. The nub of the Claimant’s case is that it was not a requirement that the appeal documentation be lodged/filed electronically and the DDJ was wrong to so find. The Claimant criticises the DDJ for simply adopting the Defendant’s arguments rather than considering whether EW applied at all, or whether a failure to comply with it meant that the court staff were correct to reject the appeal papers.

It should be noted at the outset that the DDJ does not provide detailed reasoning within his judgment as to why he considered it mandatory for the appeal documentation to be filed electronically, and he did simply adopt the Defendant’s reasoning. I proceed on the basis that the DDJ adopted the Defendant’s reasoning as set out before me on this appeal and therefore consider that reasoning and analysis.

The Claimant’s argument has several strands, which can be summarised as follows:

PD 51O is not drafted as clearly as it could have been. This has led to a situation where there is a lack of clarity as to the appropriate steps that an appellant should take when filing an appeal from a Circuit Judge to the High Court when the local appeal centre is one of the District Registries that is part of the EWPS. Having considered the various CPR provisions alongside each other, I have reached the conclusion that there is a lack of clarity and, indeed, some contradiction as to the appropriate steps to take. This is therefore not an easy point to resolve, with valid points on both sides as to the appropriate construction of the various rules.

As has been set out above, neither CPR 52.12 nor PD 52B mentions filing the appellant’s notice electronically. This is in contrast to appeals to the Court of Appeal, where PD 52C does state that the documents should be filed using EW. The King’s Bench Guide also specifically mentions electronic filing for appeals brought at the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division, but not the District Registries. One can therefore see why a party would reach the conclusion that an appeal brought in a District Registry does not need to be filed electronically.

There was arguably a lacuna between the provisions of §§1.1(1)(c)(v) and 2.2 of PD 51O when it comes to appeals. On the one hand, when an appeal is brought from a decision of a Circuit Judge in a District Registry of the High Court, they can be described as new and separate proceedings. Those proceedings receive a new case number as they are different proceedings to the ones in the County Court below, albeit relating to a decision made in the County Court. The Defendant argues that, given that the appeal in this case was brought in the Birmingham District Registry, §§1.1(1)(b)(v) and 1.1(1)(c)(v) of PD 51O applied as these were proceedings commenced there after 19 July 2021. As such, the Defendant argues, such proceedings should have been filed using EW and thus CPR 2.3 is modified in those circumstances.

The Defendant also points to CPR 5.5 and 51.2, which provides for a PD to modify or disapply any provision of the CPR during the operation of a pilot scheme. In my judgment, that needs to be read alongside the provisions of the PD of the specific pilot scheme in question, i.e. PD 51O in this case.

The potential lacuna arose out of the wording of §2.2, where:

Paragraph 2.2H specified the requirement for legally represented parties to use EW to start and/or continue “any relevant claims or applications”. Appeals were not specifically mentioned. The Defendant contends that §§2.2 and 2.2H have the same scope and §2.2 sets out the different types of case to which the EWPS applied, it being noted that the term “relevant claims or applications” is not specifically defined in PD 51O. I do not dissent from that analysis, but as has already been noted, §2.2 did not mention Part 52 appeals or appeals from the County Court to the High Court and thus it is not clear that such appeals were covered by the wording “any relevant claims or applications”.

It could be argued that §2.2 deliberately excludes High Court appeals from the scope of PD 51O. However, on 11 February 2019, the (then) Senior Master issued a Practice Note about the EWPS, paragraph 3 of which stated that:

“All Claims and Appeals issued on and after 17 November 2018 are now managed through CE File and all documents filed are held on CE-File” (emphasis added). (Footnote: ¹)

My understanding is that, in practice, this is how appeals worked in both the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division and at the Birmingham District Registry. One might have expected that if it was the intention of the draftsperson to exclude High Court appeals from the EWPS, that would have been specified; it is not, but it is far from clear that the EWPS does apply to such appeals.

Whilst electronic filing may have been the expected practice at Birmingham District Registry, for the Court to make the robust finding that the Claimant was out of time for bringing the appeal, in my judgment the Court would have to find that there was a failure to comply with the appropriate rule(s) for the filing of an appeal.

As already trailed, pursuant to §1.2(2) of PD 51O, the provisions of Part 52 applied unless specifically excluded or revised by PD 51O. By virtue of §1.2(5), where the provisions of PD 51O conflicted with PDs 5B or 52C, PD 51O took precedence. It will be noted that PD 52B is not mentioned in this paragraph. I was not taken to any part of PD 51O that specifically excluded Part 52 or PD 52B. PD 52B does not mention electronic filing like PD52C does. Moreover, given the lacuna that I have identified at paragraphs 48 and 49 of this judgment above, I am not satisfied that the rules clearly demonstrate that appeals from the County Court to the High Court fall within the scope of the EWPS such that electronic filing using EW was mandatory. In those circumstances, I cannot see that the Claimant can be said to have failed to file an appeal appropriately where it was filed in compliance with Part 52, PD 52B and CPR 2.3(1).

I accept that this does not fit neatly with the wording of §1.1 of PD 51O, but neither does §2.2 of PD 51O. Taking §2.2 of PD 51O, Part 52, PD 52B and CPR 2.3(1) together, it was permissible (or was not impermissible), in my judgment, for the Claimant to file the Appellant’s Notice on paper at the Court Office at Birmingham District Registry.

I should also address §3.2 of PD 51O, which permitted proceedings that were not started using EW to be continued using EW after documents originally submitted in those proceedings were converted to PDF format. Those proceedings were then to continue as if they had been started using EW. The Claimant relies on this provision to support the proposition that filing documents in paper format is not fatal to the appeal having been filed in time as this is eventuality is accounted for within §3.2. I am not clear that this is what §3.2 was for, as it could also be used to convert cases that pre-dated the implementation of the EWPS to electronic documentation in order to use EW. In any event, this paragraph of PD 51O does appear to envisage a flexibility within the system to make a case compliant to work within EW where it was not started using EW. Furthermore, I was not taken to any provision that suggested that failing to file an appeal electronically but instead filing it in paper format was fatal to that document being issued.

It is unfortunate that the court staff at Birmingham District Registry treated the filing of the appeal in this case as they did. The Claimant’s appeal papers were lodged at Birmingham District Registry on 18 November 2024, some two days before the CPR 52.12 deadline. I am told that the Claimant’s legal representatives informed the counter staff that the deadline for an appeal was 20 November 2024. If there was to be a refusal to issue the appeal, the Claimant should have been notified immediately or at least in time to be able to remedy the issue. Instead, the Court wrote to the Claimant the day after the expiration of the primary time period for appealing, with that letter being received nearly a week later.

In a further twist, it appears from the appeal bundle that the appeal documentation was subsequently filed by email rather than using EW (because there was an issue with the Claimant using EW) but on that occasion the appeal papers were accepted by the Court. When the appeal was subsequently issued, with the now required application for permission to extend the time for seeking permission to appeal, Ritchie J allowed that application for an extension of time, which was clearly the correct decision in the interests of justice. Ritchie J cited the fact that the appeal papers were lodged with the Court on 18 November 2024 as part of his reasoning for granting an extension of time. What is unfortunate is that there was seemingly no application to backdate the date of filing to 18 November 2024, nor was CPR 3.10 invoked. Instead, the Appellant’s Notice was sealed on 4 December 2024. However, I strongly suspect that the issue now before me, or indeed the issue of backdating, was not raised at the time that the Court was considering what was a straightforward application to extend time in circumstances where most, if not all, appeal judges would have granted such an extension in the circumstances of this case.

Insofar as the Defendant argues that the fact that Ritchie J gave such an extension of time must mean that such an extension was required, I find that such an extension was required because the appeal had not been issued by the Court when it should have been. An extension of time was, therefore, in fact required because the second set of appeal paperwork bore a date more than 21 days after HHJ Saira Singh’s decision. I do not take Ritchie J’s granting of such an extension of time as him deciding that the first set of appeal paperwork was improperly filed. On the contrary, Ritchie J explicitly referred to the appeal papers being lodged on 18 November 2024.

For the foregoing reasons, I allow ground 3 of the Claimant’s appeal. It is not clear from the DDJ’s judgment precisely why he decided that electronic filing was compulsory in this case, but that was the nub of his decision and that was wrong.

Turning to ground 4, the Claimant contends that the DDJ erred in law in finding that the appeal was not brought in time because the requirement that it be filed electronically meant that it was invalidly filed, which was contrary to CPR 3.10. Given that I would allow ground 3, it is unnecessary to consider this ground in any detail as it rises and falls with ground 3. Fundamentally, I would allow the appeal in terms of the DDJ’s decision that the Claimant’s appeal was not filed properly. I do have some sympathy with the Defendant’s submissions regarding ground 4 in the respect that many of the issues raised within ground 4 ought to have been ventilated within the first set of appeal proceedings, but I need not consider this further given that I allow ground 3.

Ground 2 is that the DDJ erred in law in finding that the Claimant had not brought an appeal in time, where appeal papers had been filed at Court on 18 November 2024. The Claimant relies on the decision of Van Aken. I should note that I was told that this case was not brought to the attention of the DDJ.

As has already been alluded to above, the parties appear to agree that Van Aken stands for the proposition that the word ‘brought’ should be read consistently with ‘filed’ for the purposes of s. 204 of the Act. The Defendant however contends that Van Aken only applies where one of the permissible methods of filing was utilised by an appellant. The Defendant argues that, in the present case, the appeal was not filed in a permissible way because of the impact of PD 51O.

For the reasons that are set out above, the Claimant did file the appeal in a permissible way in this case. Applying Van Aken, the appeal was therefore brought in time. Insofar as the DDJ gave summary judgment on the basis that the Claimant had not brought the appeal in time, that was wrong, albeit forgivable for the reasons set out above.

I therefore also allow this ground of appeal.

Ground 1 is that the DDJ erred in law in that he overlooked that, as a matter of “hard fact”, the Claimant had been granted an extension of time for appealing, so the time for appealing had not expired. This ground is otiose given that the other grounds have been allowed. However, for the sake of completeness, I do address the substantive arguments put before the Court.

In summary the Claimant’s submissions were as follows:

The Defendant argues that:

In my judgment, the first part of the Appellant’s analysis conflates two separate issues, namely (a) was the appeal issued in time and, if not, (b) was permission given to extend the time for the Appellant to file its appeal. The time for appealing had, as a matter of fact, expired without an appeal having been issued. Ritchie J then extended the time to appeal. That was a judicial decision applying the power to extend that time contained within the CPR. The fact that Ritchie J extended the time for the Appellant to appeal does not mean that an appeal was issued in time, or that the time for appealing had not expired at the date of the new possession proceedings being issued; it means that the Appellant was allowed to continue with the appeal despite the appeal having not been issued in time.

Had the other grounds not succeeded and thus I had determined the appeal had not been brought in time, I would have rejected the Claimant’s analysis about the time at which the Court should consider what type of tenancy was in existence ignoring whether an appeal was brought in time. Housing law can be complex but is there, at least in part, to ensure that both landlords and tenants know what their respective rights are. In my judgment, this is important because the parties should know what their respective rights are at any given time, not simply or just at the time consideration is given by the Court to the making of a possession order.

In terms of s. 130(5) of the Act, the Court must interpret the statutory provisions strictly. Section 130(2)(b) is drawn widely and, absent any further provision, would have allowed the Court to consider when, in all the circumstances of the case, the proceedings were finally determined. However, s. 130(2) must be read alongside s. 130(5). Section 130(5) narrows the interpretation of when proceedings are to be treated as finally determined. That must have been intentional in that Parliament presumably wanted to ensure that there was a degree of certainty as to when proceedings were so treated when there was a potential appeal in the offing. Section 130(5), when interpreted strictly, clearly defines events in time that can be fixed at a set date. Proceedings will be withdrawn or an appeal abandoned on a set date, a date that is unlikely to be open to interpretation or debate. Similarly, the time for appealing expiring without an appeal being brought is a set date set out by CPR 52.12(2), namely either within 21 days of the decision of the lower court or any other period that may be directed by the lower court. Again, that will be a fixed date, rather than a date that will be open to interpretation or discretion.

The words “shall be treated”, are also important. This wording envisages that the proceedings might not actually be finally determined but are treated as finally determined when one of the events in s. 130(5) occurs. As such, I would have rejected the Claimant’s contention that the Court ought to take a step back to look at the reality of whether an appeal was extant or in the offing when interpreting s. 130(5), had I determined that the appeal had not been brought in time. If that was what the statute was directing the Court should do, I cannot see why the words “shall be treated” would be required.

In my judgment, the wording “time for appealing expires” is clear and should not be embellished in the way suggested by the Claimant. If the date conferred by s. 130(5) could be retrospectively amended or extended, it would create uncertainty in a situation where both a landlord and tenant must understand what their respective rights are at any given time.

Using the present case as a hypothetical example, if I had found against the Claimant on grounds 2 and 3, on 20 November 2024, the time for appealing would have expired without an appeal having been (properly) brought. On 21 November 2024, the tenancy would in that scenario therefore have ceased to be an introductory tenancy pursuant to s. 130(5). Between 21 November 2024 and 16 January 2025, when Ritchie J extended time for permission to appeal, the appeal would not have been brought in time. Throughout that period, the Defendant would not have had an introductory tenancy, she would have had a secure tenancy and thus had the rights of a secure tenant. The Defendant was entitled to know precisely what rights she had at that time. If the Claimant is correct, it would have created a period of uncertainty where there was no definitive answer as to whether the Defendant was an introductory or a secure tenant; it is difficult to imagine that this would have been Parliament’s intention in an area such as housing law.

Importantly, by virtue of s. 125(6) of the Act, once an introductory tenancy ceases to be an introductory tenancy, it cannot morph back into an introductory tenancy. This, it seems to me, is the real difficulty with the Claimant’s arguments had I found that the appeal had not been brought in time. This provision must ‘bite’ at a set time. On a strict interpretation of the Act, and particularly this provision, a judicial discretionary decision to extend time to appeal cannot usurp the statutory provision that prevents an introductory tenancy becoming an introductory tenancy again once it has ceased to be such. Therefore, applying the provisions of ss. 125(6) and 130(5) together, on 21 November 2024, had I refused grounds 2 and 3, the Defendant would no longer have had an introductory tenancy, she would have become a secure tenant. The Appellant’s argument would mean that a later decision of the Court to allow the time to appeal to be extended would effectively render a tenancy that ceased to be an introductory tenancy to become one again, which would fall foul of s. 125(6). The Claimant provided no satisfactory answer as to how s. 125(6) would not apply in these circumstances.

If Parliament had intended that the courts could exercise discretion as to when proceedings are finally determined in these circumstances, either s. 130(5) would not be necessary, or it would likely have explicitly stated that proceedings shall be treated as finally determined when the time for appealing expires without an appeal being brought or the court refuses to extend such time limit, thereby allowing an element of discretion. To put matters another way, Parliament could have further qualified s. 130(5), or indeed s. 125(6), by including the making and refusal of any application to extend the time for appealing, but it did not.

There are also sound reasons for this strict approach. It could be that an appeal is brought a considerable amount of time after the CPR time limit to appeal has expired. Whilst the appeal court may allow such an appeal to proceed out of time, for whatever reason, it would be unsatisfactory, and indeed against the principle of finality, that there would be uncertainty during that interregnum as to whether the tenancy was introductory in nature or not, depending on whether such an extension of time is granted.

I reject the Claimant’s argument that the date upon which the Court should be considering whether there was an introductory tenancy or not is the day on which the possession proceedings are issued, without looking at whether the introductory tenancy had in fact come to an end at an earlier point in time.

I also reject the argument that the Defendant’s interpretation of the Act somehow excludes or fetters the Court’s powers in terms of the appeals process set out at s. 77 of the County Courts Act 1984. The fact that the Court has the power to extend time, as Ritchie J did in this case, provides a solid example of why the Claimant’s argument in this regard is wrong. The Act does not fetter or exclude the Court’s powers to extend time in the appeal, it simply deals with whether the tenancy is introductory in nature or not.

Drawing the above strands together, the Act provides the statutory framework by which introductory tenancies operate. Whilst related, the appeals process is separate and governed by different rules. As such, whilst Ritchie J properly extended time for the appeals process, in my judgment, that would not have disabled the functions of ss. 130(5) and 125(6) of the Act.

The DDJ did take into account Ritchie J’s extension of time. In any event, the fact that Ritchie J had extended time for permission to appeal does not mean that the provisions of s. 130(5) of the Act did not bite.

For the reasons set out above, ground 1 is dismissed, but is in any event academic given my findings on grounds 2 and 3.

The Defendant argues that, should the Claimant succeed on any of the grounds of appeal, the appeal must ultimately be dismissed because the current set of possession proceedings do not satisfy s. 130(1) of the Act. The Defendant argues that the first set of possession proceedings were unambiguously finally determined by Soole J when he refused permission to appeal on 7 April 2025. As such, at that time, the tenancy ceased to be introductory in nature because the new possession proceedings could not satisfy the preconditions set by s. 130(1) of the Act for the tenancy to be extended. The upshot of this argument is that an introductory tenancy could only be extended once by s. 130(2) and not for a second time. I was not taken to any case law with regards to this submission and was invited to perform both a textual analysis of the provisions but also a purposive reading of the legislation. I must say, once again, I have not found this an easy issue to determine as there are sound arguments on both sides for the opposing contentions as to meaning of s. 130 of the Act.

I accept the Defendant’s submission that the introductory tenancy regime was designed to provide social landlords with a trial period, extendable up to 18 months, to see whether the terms of the tenancy would be complied with by the tenant. After that trial period, the landlord had to decide whether to keep the tenant on or evict them using the processes set out in Chapter 1 of Part V of the Act.

In my judgment, the purpose of s. 130 of the Act is to stop an introductory tenancy from ceasing to be an introductory tenancy where a landlord had started possession proceedings to bring that introductory tenancy to an end just because such proceedings may not have been resolved within the initial 12 (or extended 18) month trial period. As such, any initial possession proceedings brought on the basis that the tenancy was an introductory one must be brought before the end of the trial period of the introductory tenancy ends or indeed any of the events listed at s. 125(5) occurs. In other words, s. 130(1) prevents an introductory tenancy morphing into a secure tenancy when possession proceedings are extant.

Section 130(2) of the Act results in an introductory tenancy remaining as such, once possession proceedings have been commenced, until either the order for possession is executed (s. 127(1A) of the Act) or the possession proceedings are finally determined. Given the findings above, this date would have been 7 April 2025.

However, the Claimant issued further possession proceedings on 4 April 2025. At that time, the Defendant still had an introductory tenancy as the other possession proceedings had not been finally determined. As such, the Claimant had to bring any further possession proceedings on the basis of the nature of the tenancy in force at that time (pursuant to ss. 127 and 128 of the Act). When the Claimant served the Notices to Terminate in January 2025 pursuant to s. 128 of the Act, it was entitled to do so as the Defendant still had an introductory tenancy at that time as the introductory tenancy had been extended by virtue of s. 130(2) of the Act until the appeal arising from the original possession proceedings was finally determined by Soole J on 7 April 2025. When the second set of possession proceedings was issued on 4 April 2025, the Defendant still had an introductory tenancy for the same reason. Those proceedings therefore had to be pursued on the basis of the type of tenancy in force, namely an introductory tenancy. I also note s. 130(3) of the Act suggests that, even where an introductory tenancy ends in the circumstances set out therein, ss. 127(1A) and (2) of the Act (termination by landlord) apply as if the tenancy had remained an introductory tenancy.

The Defendant’s interpretation of s. 130 of the Act would, in reality, create a situation where only one set of possession proceedings could ever be brought or any possession proceedings would need to be brought within the trial period. If that was Parliament’s intention, I would have expected that to form part of the wording of s. 130 of the Act.

The Defendant contends that on purposive reading of the legislation, her analysis is correct. I accept that analysis insofar as it goes to the introductory tenancy regime being in place to allow a trial period, at the end of which the landlord needs to decide to either keep the tenant on or to seek to evict them. I reject the Defendant’s analysis beyond that point. The Claimant in this case did seek to evict the Defendant before the end of the trial period. This is not a case where the Claimant was seeking to extend a trial period indefinitely; on the contrary, the Claimant was actively seeking to evict the Defendant by the first set of possession proceedings, the appeal and then the second set of possession proceedings. In my judgment, the purposive reading of s. 130 of the Act is that when a local authority is seeking to bring (any) possession proceedings during the currency of an introductory tenancy, the introductory tenancy does not come to an end until those possession proceedings are finally determined.

Whilst I accept that my analysis of s. 130 of the Act above potentially creates a situation where theoretically a local authority could issue repeated possession proceedings with repeated appeals to keep a tenant as having ‘introductory status’, I cannot see why they would do so and that is clearly not the intention here. For a start, if such repeated possession proceedings were flawed, the local authority may face significant costs orders against them, let alone any findings that may be made about proceedings being an abuse of the Court’s process.

I am not clear from the transcript of his judgment to what extent the DDJ actually grappled with this specific issue, despite it forming the second limb of the Defendant’s summary judgment application. My understanding of §§15 and 22 of the transcript of his judgment was that he was considering the issue as to whether the proceedings had been finally determined as of 20 November 2024 (based upon his finding that the appeal paperwork had not been filed appropriately) rather than the issue taken within the Respondent’s Notice. Reading §§21 and 22 of the transcript together, the DDJ was not clearly saying that, had the appeal papers been filed in a compliant way, the second set of proceedings was still the subject of summary judgment on the basis that they were not issued within the trial period. If that was part of his reasoning, he would not have had to consider whether the appeal documentation had been filed in time as it would be irrelevant as, either way, the second possession proceedings were filed after the end of the trial period.

In any event, it is the order that a judge makes that is appealed rather than the reasoning for it. I have concluded that the judge was wrong to enter summary judgment as he did. What is clear is that the Claimant is asserting that it has the right to continue with the second set of possession proceedings and that the DDJ was wrong to enter summary judgment on that basis. I agree with that analysis and allow the appeal accordingly for the foregoing reasons.

I allow the Claimant’s appeal and specifically dismiss ground 1 and the argument contained within the Respondent’s Notice. I therefore set aside the DDJ’s Order.

The parties are invited to agree the terms of a draft order that encapsulates the above and any associated costs order, along with directions to progress the now extant (second) possession proceedings. Should the parties be unable to agree such a draft order, written submissions shall be filed by 4pm on 17 December 2025.

I am grateful to both Counsel for their assistance.