Charlotte Rose Crane & Anor v Yorkshire Yurts Limited

The claimants married on Saturday, 8 June 2024, in a church at Guisborough, North Yorkshire, and then moved with family and guests to a wedding reception on the nearby family farm in a field at the top of a hill to celebrate the marriage; the views from that hilltop are described as spectacular. The wedding was, in unchallenged evidence, described to me as a ‘high-end’ wedding.

But, sadly, all was not as it should have been. The preparation of facilities for the wedding reception were such that on the afternoon of the preceding day the defendant advised that the larger of the tented accommodation it provided for the reception – a yurt - was dangerous to use, and proposed as a solution that it provide another marquee which was much smaller than the yurt, and would be located elsewhere on the farm, but which would have meant the claimants asking half of the 180 guests not to attend the reception. The claimants contemplated cancelling the wedding, or changing the venue for the reception to Thirsk Racecourse which is some distance away.

The bride was distraught, in floods of tears, and unable to sleep; she says the wedding was ruined. In an effort to salvage the day, the claimants came up with a solution which enabled all the guests to attend, but the solution was less than ideal, such that in her evidence the caterer to the reception described the reception conditions as the worst she had worked in during her 17 years in the catering industry.

In short, the claimants bring these proceedings to recover from the defendant the sums that they paid or costs incurred as a consequence of the failure of the yurt. In addition, and as was developed during the trial, they also seek payment of a sum in respect of what could be described as the loss of enjoyment or disappointment that they suffered as a consequence they say of the defendant’s failures.

The defendant denies the claim. It says the yurt was usable.

This judgment follows the fast-track trial of those matters before me on Tuesday, 2 September 2025. Given that the hearing of oral evidence and closing submissions concluded late in the day, there was insufficient time for me to reflect upon my judgment and deliver even an ex tempore judgment, and as such the matter was adjourned, originally for the delivery of an oral judgment, to 18 November 2025. However, as I prepared this judgment I decided instead to hand down a reserved judgment at a non-attended hearing, with the time originally listed for delivery of the oral judgment on 18 November 2025 now to be utilised for any outstanding issues.

At the trial the parties were represented by counsel; Mr Iain Bain, recently instructed, appeared for the claimants, and Miss Imogen Gray for the defendant. I thank them both for their helpful skeletons, and assistance with the hearing.

I heard oral evidence first from the 1^st claimant, Mrs Charlotte Easterby who, during the proceedings, was sometimes referred to by her maiden surname of Crane, then her father Mr Ivan Crane, and last from a family friend, Mr Nick Pomfret. For ease of reference, I will refer to the 1^st claimant throughout as Mrs Easterby. The second claimant, Mr William Easterby, did not give evidence.

The claimants also sought to rely upon the written witness statements of another six witnesses, by way of a Civil Evidence Act 1995 notice, the reason for the notice being that if those additional six witnesses were to give oral evidence then the trial would take more than one day and it was not reasonable or proportionate to call them. It is common ground between the parties that in respect of those six witnesses there is then an issue as to the weight that the court would attach to their evidence; in his skeleton, Mr Bain drew my attention to section 4 of that 1995 Act. It would be fair to say that those additional 6 witness statements, some of which are very short, support and/or amplify the claimants position. Their evidence was not the subject of any material challenge, and I accept their evidence at face value. Those 6 witnesses are Sarah Readman, Richard Thomas, Sam Hare, Tim Easterby, Dan Byrne, and Simon Parker.

For the defendant I heard oral evidence first from Mr Kyle Wailes, the defendant’s operations manager and the on-site lead for the performance of the defendant’s obligations, and Mr Thomas Sterne, the owner and sole director of the defendant.

Before the trial commenced I asked to see counsel only in order to ascertain the state of play between the parties, to learn if there were any preliminary matters that needed to be addressed, and to raise one point that I had following my consideration of the trial bundle.

The principal issue that was touched upon by counsel was whether the claimants may rely upon each of sections 24(1) and 56(1) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (2015 Act), and whether that issue should be determined at the outset. It is common ground between the parties, as acknowledged by counsel for the defendant when I put it to her direct during the trial, that the relationship between the parties is one to which the 2015 Act applies, albeit the defendant maintained throughout the trial a pleading point as to whether the claimants could rely at trial upon the 2015 Act given that at no point in either the claim form or the particulars of claim is there any express mention of the 2015 Act. I return to this later.

The point I raised with counsel was that in the bundle’s chronological section there is a list of documents passing between the parties, albeit those documents were not in the bundle nor before the court, which list included exchanges between the parties’ solicitors, with certain of the descriptions of the documents including the letters “WP”, to mean “without prejudice”. I pointed out that the fact that there had been without prejudice correspondence between the parties did not concern me and, indeed, I would have been surprised – to put it no higher - if there had not been without prejudice communications between the parties in an attempt to resolve the matter or narrow issues.

However, my real concern was a reference to a letter from the claimants’ solicitors to the defendant’s solicitors dated 22 August 2025 which was described as being the “Claimants’ Part 36 offered” (sic); CPR r. 36.16(2) is quite clear that the fact that a Part 36 offer has been made, and the terms of such offer, must not be communicated to the trial judge until the case has been decided.

I invited counsel’s submissions and suggested they may wish to take instructions, but their view there and then was that they would not take a point in relation to that mention of the Part 36 offer, upon which I indicated that unless the parties took a different view, I did not regard the matter as one requiring me to recuse myself, and as such we should proceed, as we did.

The claimants bring the claim, in contract, as follows. The relevant part of the pleaded case, starting at paragraph 3.2 of the particulars of claim, is:

“3.2

The Defendant’s informed the Claimants that they did not have enough employees to install the various equipment. The Claimants discovered that the few employees that the Defendant were able to provide were not competent in the erection of the marquee. This led to the Claimants having to hire replacement workers and carry out the installation of the equipment themselves on 7 June 2024 and 8 June 2024.

3.3

The Claimant discovered several issues with the equipment supplied. The yurt was in a poor condition, the flooring was damaged, broken chairs were provided, and the condition of the marquee was a concern due to issues with the fixings. The Defendant informed the Claimants that the Yurt would not be usable at 2pm on 7 June 2024. As a result, the Claimants had to seek alternative arrangements in relation to the inadequate equipment provided by the Defendant that were required for the event on 8 June 2024.

3.4

In breach of the terms of the order, the Defendant has failed to install and provide adequate equipment on the date required, causing the Claimants to suffer loss.” (sic)

The particulars of loss that are then set out are:

“Particulars of loss

4.1

The Claimants seek to recover the extra costs, as well as a full refund of the full order, including the following:

4.1.1

Refund for the whole order £16,504.00

4.1.2

Hire of an additional bar £ 1,200.00

4.1.3

Labour for extra workers £ 800.00

4.1.4

Hire for alternative marquee £ 2,160.00

Total £20,664.00”

The prayer for relief simply seeks:

Is also notable that the prayer for relief sets out a claim for the entire sum paid to the defendant, and then claims specific sums against specific heads of loss. However, and I must say, somewhat surprisingly, there is no prayer for general damages.

On the face of it, taking the pleading at face value, the claimants could be said to be making a double recovery, namely, the original contract sum paid, plus the sums paid out by them as a result of the defendant’s failure to perform. In his helpful skeleton, and then repeated in his oral submissions, Mr Bain was at pains to point out that the claim for the refund of the entire sum paid to the defendant was the principal claim, with the other heads of claim, namely those paragraphs 4.1.2 to 4.1.4, being in the alternate to that principal claim. That must be right.

The final element of the claimants’ claim concerns the loss of enjoyment or peace of mind as a result of the defendant’s breach. This head of claim was not one expressly advanced on the face of the particulars of claim, but certainly advanced in Mr Bain’s skeleton by reference to the claimants’ evidence, and in his oral submissions. The defendant also resists this element on the basis of its general denial of the claim, and in addition that it should have been expressly pleaded.

Turning now to the essence of the case, I address first the parties’ contract, and second address in more detail the events leading up to the day of the wedding itself, Saturday 8 June 2024, and in doing so address and determine certain factual issues.

With the claimants planning their June 2024 wedding, in October 2023 Mrs Easterby, then Miss Crane, approached the defendant in order to obtain quotes for, amongst other things, a marquee and a yurt for the wedding reception. There were discussions between the parties, and the defendant submitted a written quotation on or about 18 October 2023. There then followed an exchange of emails in the period 2 and 10 November 2023, concluding with the claimants accepting the defendant's amended quotation. Paragraph 2 of the defence sets out in greater details the documents comprising the parties’ contract. Neither party relies upon any oral terms or representations.

That written quotation provided for the supply by the defendant of the following principal items:

The quotation expressly provided for the ‘event date’ of 8 June 2024 (being the day of the wedding), a 2-day set-up period of Wednesday 5 and Thursday 6 June 2024, and the defendant’s take-down and removal of the equipment on Monday 10 June 2024. I accept that those are contractual dates, and note that Friday 7 June 2024 is not mentioned, the assumption being that set-up will have been concluded by the end of the Thursday.

The contract sum, or price, was £16,504.00, including a refundable 25% damage deposit (£4,126). The claimants paid the contract sum in full prior to the wedding.

The yurt was the largest covered space to be supplied, and would be used for sit-down dining, set out with tables and chairs, and with a central feature being a large floral display. There would be fairy lights in the ceiling. The marquee, which is sometimes referred to as ‘the pole tent’, would have the dance floor and the bar.

Before me the claimants also rely upon certain terms implied in the contract by the 2015 Act, namely:

Whilst not argued before me, the supply of the equipment would constitute the hire of goods within the meaning of s. 3(2) and s. 6 of the 2015 Act, and thus Chapter 2 of the 2015 Act is engaged.

The defendant accepts those terms were implied terms of the parties’ contract but, as before, disputes the claimants’ entitlement to rely upon those terms in these proceedings; this is a further point to which I shall return.

Incorporated in the quotation was the defendant’s standard terms. Of note in the context of this case are 2 particular clauses, clause 8, ‘Adverse Weather’ and clause 9, ‘Force Majeure’, which for convenience I set out below.

Clause 8 provides in part:

Clause 9 is of particular note as the defendant pleads reliance on it in its defence, and it reads:

“9.

Force Majeure

a.

Although Yorkshire Yurts will use its best endeavours to fulfil every contract,performance of the contract is subject to variation or cancellation by YorkshireYurts for any reason beyond its control (including, but not limited to, trade disputes, fire, breakdown, act of god, extreme weather or lack of equipmentthrough non return by other hirers).

b.

Yorkshire Yurts shall not be held liable for any costs incurred by the cancellationin such circumstances and so event/wedding insurance is highly recommended.Yorkshire Yurts will notify the Hirer as soon as practicable and will provideinformation to the Hirer’s insurance company if requested. Yorkshire Yurtsliability shall be limited to refund of the Damage Deposit.”

I shall also return to those provisions, but record that the claimants did not take out event/wedding insurance; at trial the defendant abandoned a point that the failure to do so was a breach of the claimants’ duty to mitigate their loss. The defendant was right to abandon that point.

I now turn to the events in the period of 4 to 10 June 2024.

In terms of the facts of the case, it is tempting to say that there is much common ground between the parties or, if I may put it another way, material factual differences are limited.

The defendant arrived on site on Tuesday 4 June 2024, to commence setting up; this was a day earlier than the period provided in the contract, and the claimants were happy to accommodate this.

The actual location for the reception was one of three potential sites on Mrs Easterby’s father’s farm, Green Court Farm, near Guisborough, Yorkshire, that had been put forward by the claimants, and each site had been inspected by the defendant some 2 to 3 months before the day of the wedding. The site eventually selected was in fact the claimants’ preferred site, which was at the top of a hill with what is said to be spectacular views, and the defendant’s evidence acknowledges that they agreed to set up at that location, and did not raise any concerns regarding the site.

Mrs Easterby’s oral evidence was that on that first day, Tuesday 4 June, only 2 of the defendant’s workers turned up, and they began unloading from trailers the wooden boards or panels that would form the flooring to the yurt and marquee, and started to slot together those boards. She, and her father, Mr Crane, were present, and assisted with the unloading.

One issue noted by both Mrs Easterby and Mr Crane that day was that a number of the wooden flooring panels were of poor quality, namely they had holes in them, and/or were rotten in places. Mr Crane said they put them to one side, albeit their oral evidence, supported by photos before me, was that some boards were still used for flooring. I have no reason to doubt that evidence. Indeed, Mr Sterne acknowledged this, and said the poor-quality panels would have been used on the extremities of the flooring, and not towards the middle of the flooring.

The defendant’s workers at first started to lay the flooring on a piece of ground that was not flat, and which Mrs Easterby said was not the correct location, and Mrs Easterby and her father asked that the flooring be moved some 7m to a level location. This the defendant did the next day, without demur. The claimants say this relocation took no more than 20 minutes to a maximum of 1 hour.

The defendant’s evidence is that the relocation of the flooring was of a distance of some 25 meters, and delayed matters by half a day.

I prefer the claimants’ evidence on this issue. Given that only a part of the flooring had been laid on 4 June 2025, and by 2 men, it is difficult to see how this relocation could have taken half a day and delay overall completion of the defendant’s work, particularly when on the Wednesday, the first contractual date for setting up, the defendant had six workers on site. In any event, even if the defendant is correct, on any view it cannot properly be said that the move to the flat location contributed one way or another to subsequent issues, namely the failure of the erected yurt, and not the least as the work had started a day earlier than planned by the defendant. I regard the moving of the floor panels to be of no relevance to the events that were to follow and the failure of the yurt. I reject the plea on this point in paragraph 7 of the defence.

On Wednesday 5 June 2024 Mrs Easterby arrived on site at 8:30am, again with Mr Crane, and awaited the defendant’s arrival. Six workers from the defendant arrived at 11am, and finished the flooring at about midday; in this time Mrs Easterby and Mr Crane continued to assist with unloading the wooden flooring. Work then commenced on erection of the marquee, with the yurt to follow. Mr Sterne of the defendant was one of those who attended that day.

On Thursday 6 June 2024, a critical day in events, 5 workers from the defendant arrived to undertake the work. Also present that day was Mr Nick Pomfret. Mr Pomfret is a family friend of the claimants, and a guest at the wedding. As noted, Mr Pomfret gave oral evidence before me.

Mr Pomfret lives in Leicestershire and, as it happens, he runs a business called Pop Up Parties, which supplies and erects marquees but not, he was at pains to point out, yurts, albeit he had worked with and alongside yurts at events. Mr Pomfret is not, of course, giving expert evidence – no permission has been given for that – and he gave evidence as a witness of fact, but his knowledge of and experience in erecting marquees, but not yurts, and for planning and organising events such as weddings, means he has an eye for detail that others may miss.

Mr Pomfret was surprised that as of midday on Thursday 6 June 2024, with a big wedding only 2 days away, construction of the yurt was only at an early stage. Indeed, Mrs Easterby, in her oral evidence, queried why the defendant had not commenced work in the previous week, as it had when contracted for a friend the year before, as did Mr Pomfret. However, whilst with the benefit of hindsight an earlier start may have been prudent, the defendant contractually committed to that programme, and is bound by the agreed dates. When agreeing those dates, doubtless the claimants were guided by the defendant.

Mr Pomfret took an interest in the yurt, and he also assisted with the erection of the yurt, the claimant side says, at the invitation of Mr Wailes. The defendant’s workers were on site until 9:30pm that Thursday, in the dark, trying to secure the yurt.

It is common ground between the parties that wind was an issue as the marquee and yurt were erected. The defendant says the winds caused the problems with the yurt. Indeed, Mr Sterne says he had not seen wind blow like it did when he was on site. He also said that in his 15 years in the business he had not failed to deliver an event, and he had erected many yurts in winds, and in winds much stronger than he experienced at that site.

On that Thursday Mr Crane offered to provide a wind-break to assist the defendant in erecting the yurt; this was accepted and a trailer with straw bales from Mr Crane’s farm was positioned to provide this shelter. It was subsequently removed.

The reason for the removal is disputed; Mr Crane says that with the erection of the yurt he enquired as to whether the wind break was needed, and Mr Wailes said it was not, so it was moved. The defendants’ witnesses dispute that.

Pausing here, I accept the evidence from the claimant side on this. It is implausible to believe that Mr Crane would have removed the windbreak if it was seen as essential, or even useful, to maintain the stability of the yurt; and it is implausible to believe that a father such as Mr Crane would do that and jeopardise his daughter’s wedding reception. In any event, as Mrs Easterby said in her oral evidence, it was removed after the yurt had commenced to collapse. The removal of the wind-break is irrelevant to the yurt’s failure.

By the end of Thursday 6 June 2024 the yurt and the marquee had been erected, with the catering tent due to be set up the following day, along with completion of the lighting and other works. It should be borne in mind that the contract anticipated that the defendant’s work would have been completed by the end of Thursday 6 June 2024 and, but for the catering tent and final fittings and electrics, that had largely been achieved.

On the night of Thursday 6 June into Friday, 7 June 2024, the yurt moved significantly, it is claimed by the defendant due to the ‘unusual’ wind conditions. Some of the roof spars, sometimes called ribs, in the yurt fell down or rotated. Indeed, Mr Wailes says at paragraph 5 of his statement that the poles slipped on the hardwood floor, and the wind meant it was difficult to erect the walls on the sides of the marquee and the yurt, and it took more people to execute this work

Mr Pomfret’s evidence was also that the yurt had slipped on the boarded wooden flooring upon which it had been erected, but added in his evidence that Mr Wailes told him it had been a mistake to erect the yurt on the boards and not on the grass as, if it had been on grass, it would not have slipped (see paragraph 5 of Mr Pomfret’s statement).

By Friday 7 June 2025, the catering tent was still to be erected, and outstanding work, such as power cables and lighting installed; Mr Wailes says in his witness statement that the catering tent is normally put up quite quickly with 2 workers; he did this with the only workman with him that day (paragraph 7 of his statement). The claimant’s evidence, which I accept, is that Mrs Easterby’s brother, also known as Ivan, assisted, as did others from the farm.

For a number of reasons, erection of the catering tent that day was not without its issues, and work needed to be redone. The wind was not one of those issues. The defendant seeks to put part of the blame on those assisting from the claimant side, but this is unfair, as the workers were working under the direction of the defendant’s staff. In any event, in terms of the matters to be determined in these proceedings, it has no direct bearing on those issues.

In his witness statement for the claimants, Mr Richard Tilburn, a worker on the farm, describes issues with the marquee moving on 7 June 2024, which he says was due to an insufficient number of pegs having been applied to peg it down, and that he and others had to secure the original pegs, and put more pegs in. Mrs Easterby confirmed this in her oral evidence. The defendant disputes this, but I have no reason to doubt the claimant’s evidence.

The caterers arrived on the morning of Friday 7 June 2024, and set up the tables and chairs in the yurt, including putting out the tablecloths, crockery, glasses, and cutlery. This was a big task for 180 covers, and was completed that morning (Mr Pomfret, paragraph 7 of his statement). As the catering tent had not been set up, the caterers had to leave their kitchen equipment outside.

In paragraph 7 of his statement, Mr Pomfret describes that during the Friday morning it was clear the yurt was beginning to fail. Accordingly, the tables in the yurt, including the crockery, glasses, and cutlery, which had just been set out, were removed. Mr Tilburn also describes how he and his colleagues helped to move tables and chairs from the yurt, packaged up the crockery, glasses, and cutlery from the yurt, removed he dance floor and bar from the marquee, and then moved the dining facilities to the existing marquee.

After much discussion, at about midday or not long thereafter on Friday 7 June 2024, Mr Wailes decided that as the yurt was moving considerably in the wind, and its poles had slipped, “the yurt was too dangerous to use if it could not be fixed” (see paragraph 8 of his statement). Mr Sterne was not present on site on the Friday, but in his oral evidence he endorsed Mr Wailes’ decision as correct.

The witness evidence for the claimants refers to one of the defendant’s workers saying that the roof struts had collapsed (paragraph 8 of Mrs Easterby’s statement), and a photo I have seen supports this. At this point, Mrs Easterby describes that she was,

“terrified that the wedding would be cancelled. We asked construction and farm workers from our site to help set up in a desperate effort to have everything ready.” (see her witness statement, paragraph 7).

She was distraught. Whilst she largely maintained her composure before me when giving oral evidence, it was clear from her demeanour as she retold these events that the memory of them was still raw.

Mrs Easterby also describes in her evidence how they asked the defendant for an alternate given the yurt could not be used. Mr Wailes offered to supply and erect another marquee away from the agreed site, closer to the farm house; this offer was rejected by the claimants. She said in her oral evidence the marquee offered was a much smaller one, which would have meant telling half the 180 wedding guests not to come to the reception; it is for that reason that she said in her witness statement that the defendant was unable to provide a solution to the problem. In her oral evidence she said at that point she lost all trust in the defendant. I accept her evidence, and agree, for the reasons she gave, that it was reasonable to reject the defendant’s proposed solution. I add that the rejection of that proposal cannot be said to have been a failure by the claimants to mitigate any loss.

The burden of salvaging the wedding reception thus fell to the claimants. Enquiries were made by the claimant side as to other options, and one option, following a call made by Mr Tim Easterby, the father of the 2^nd claimant, appeared to be holding the reception at Thirsk Racecourse, some distance away, as it was able at very short notice – a day, if that - to accommodate the 180 guests.

The solution collectively decided upon by the claimant side in the 24 hours before the wedding was to utilise what was available on site that could be used, and change the use of the marquee to dining, moving the bar and dance stage from it to another marquee, if one could be procured.

An extra marquee, albeit one much smaller that the yurt, and a stand-alone trailer bar, were found at exceedingly short notice for the reception’s post dining events, and erected and set up on the morning of the wedding. A large group of some 20 people assisted with this, and moving the table and chairs – and tablecloths, crockery, glasses, and cutlery, to the claimants’ acquired marquee. The costs to the claimants of the additional marquee was £2,160 and for the trailer bar, £1,200.

The foregoing does not, of course do due justice to the drama as events unfolded and the solution that was decided upon, an additional marquee located and delivered to site, erected, and fitted out, all by the claimant side, being completed on the day of the wedding. Many of the claimants’ witnesses described how stressful this was.

In his evidence Mr Pomfret describes how Mr Wailes departed from the site on the Friday at 5:30pm, and that he, Mr Pomfret, was left to complete installation work on the marquee supplied by the defendant, and on the morning of the wedding he had to complete the electric cabling and connect the power supply for the lights in that marquee and the electrics for the caterers, all this had been left unfinished on the Friday by the defendant. Whilst many contributed to ensuring the wedding reception could proceed in some way, Mr Pomfret’s contribution to salvaging the wedding reception, should not be underestimated.

Mr Byrne, from Vintage Event Bars, the company supplying the bar and is experienced with working with a number of other marquee companies, explained in his witness statement the difficulties he encountered, including at first relocating the large oval bar that would serve the 180 guests, calling in additional staff to assist with moving things round, and then the steps they took to provide an alternate bar when it was decided that the oval bar would take up too much room in the marquee. He also expressed his disbelief that the claimants had been left in the position they were by the defendant, without the defendant even supplying additional staff to assist the claimants.

However, this final arrangement was less than perfect. In her witness statement Ms Sarah Readman of Nabs Nosk Catering, the wedding caterers, says that the marquee conditions for the wedding were the worst she had worked in during her 17 years in the catering industry. Her concern was such that given the events they had experienced on the Friday, the caterers arrived 3 hours earlier than planned on the Saturday as they did not know what to expect. The tables, relocated to the original marquee supplied by the defendant and which was now to be used for dining, were she says crammed together such that the guests could not move round or sit comfortably. Catering staff had to pass meals like a conveyor belt as there was no room to walk between tables. She concludes her statement by saying that it was the hardest wedding her team had to been called upon to cater. I accept her unchallenged evidence.

In her oral evidence, Mrs Easterby sighed with evident disappointment as she said the important central floral display in the yurt, could not be used as intended.

On Saturday 8 June 2024, Mr Sterne of the defendant sent a message to Mr Pomfret at about 8:28am, saying:

“Hi Nick, it’s Tom from Yorkshire Yurts here. Very sorry to bother you today. Thank you for your help yesterday. It was a big comfort to Kyle [Wailes]. I’m sorry I couldn’t be there. I’m just hoping we can do something today to help the situation even if removing the 50ft [yurt]. We are trying to get a team together. We don’t want to get in the way. Can I ask. What’s it like up there at the moment and what time do the guests arrive?”

Mr Pomfret saw the message after 10am and replied at 10:14am:

“Hi Tom. Too late today, guests already here, sort Monday.”

Mr Sterne nevertheless attended the site that day. Alone. He complains that he received a hostile reception. Mrs Easterby said in her oral evidence that she was not there and could not speak to it, but given that his daughter was in tears, could not sleep, and felt ignored by the defendant, it was perhaps not surprising that her father was not in the best frame of mind when he met Mr Sterne.

In his evidence, Mr Sterne says that on the Saturday the weather had cleared, and he believed if he had brought a team the issues with the yurt would have been rectified; he acknowledged the poles on the yurt had slipped on the flooring, and the canvas walls needed to be replaced (see paragraph 26 of his statement). However, on his own evidence, he was not denied access to the site. It is notable that as early as his text at 8:28am that day he said that he was “trying” to assemble a team, but there is no evidence he was successful in assembling a team, nor that he arrived with replacement canvas walls.

In any event, it does not change the position that it was all far too late; understandably, the claimants had to make decisions on the Friday afternoon to save the wedding reception and, as it happened, to do so unaided by the defendant. Mr Sterne’s attendance on 8 June 2024, reflected, I assume, a sense of responsibility for the performance of his company’s obligations; if there had been no attendance by the defendant then there would have been further justifiable criticism.

Of note is that Mr Sterne was on his own – there was no team from the defendant – just him. He made some repairs to the yurt, but Mr Pomfret noted that by mid-afternoon the spars were rotating again, and some had fallen out. Each time a spar rotated that afternoon, he said the roof canopy lost tension, flapped more, and became disconcertingly noisy. I accept that evidence.

The defendant sent a team on Monday 10 June 2024 to remove the defendant’s equipment. They were not well received, and they were refused entry to the site. The defendant consulted its solicitors, hethertons (sic), who wrote on 10 June 2024 to Mrs Easterby demanding access be given to retrieve the defendant’s property. By this time, Mrs Easterby was on her honeymoon, with the letter dealt with in her absence, and a few days later the defendant was permitted to remove its property. Amongst other matters, the defendant’s solicitors stated in their letter:

“Our client recognises that because of difficulties that occurred with windy conditions you will be entitled to some reimbursement in relation to the charges for the Yurt supplied that you did not use.”

The parties have agreed that the value of the yurt as part of the parties’ contract price is £6,615.60, calculated as:

I now set out my conclusions in respect of the foregoing factual matters. As I mentioned earlier, the underlying facts of this case are for the most part not in issue; I have identified certain of those disputed facts which call for judicial comment, and decided them.

The facts as I have found them are, for the most part, an acceptance of the claimants’ factual case. I found the witnesses for the claimants who gave oral evidence had come to assist the court in the resolution of this matter, were credible, and consistent, in their evidence.

I found Mr Wailes for the defendant was, in his oral evidence, and in general terms, straightforward, but at times he struggled convincingly to explain, or appeared reluctant to accept, what had happened and/or why. Mr Sterne was someone not always on site with direct knowledge of events, which left Mr Wailes as the only person on the defendant side with direct knowledge of events. I should add that in his oral evidence, Mr Pomfret commended Mr Wailes for his dedication.

Against that background, I need address the issue of the wind, or in other words, the weather, given the reliance placed upon it by the defendant.

In paragraph 6(b) of the defence, the defendant states the wind caused the poles to slip. Whilst the wind played a part in the difficulties the defendant encountered with the yurt, the defendant was the expert in erecting the contracted equipment, and doing so in difficult circumstances.

As Mr Sterne acknowledged, the defendant – including Mr Wailes - had erected yurts in windy conditions before, and the wind speed was well within the tolerance for yurts. Indeed, as Mr Sterne said, he had not experienced winds exceeding 50 to 60 mph during the 15 years he had been running his business. Mr Wailes said that the site was incredibly exposed on 3 sides, and the weather that week was ‘very windy’ (see para 5 of his statement). He also stated that he did some 80 ‘builds’ of marquees and tents a year, and this was the most difficult.

At paragraph 23 of his statement, Mr Sterne said,

“We have had our yurts in many storms and strong winds and have coped with winds much stronger. However, I believe that it was the exposed nature and upward wind direction which made the build particularly difficult for us.”

Mr Sterne also said that the issue with the wind was during the erection of the yurt with the winds complicating the work, and that strong winds after erection would not have been an issue; there may well be some truth in that, but I do not see that as assisting the defendant when it comes to explaining the yurt’s failure or its consequences.

The position was that despite the wind, the yurt, like the marquee, was erected. It was afterwards, when up, that the yurt failed. It was only after midday on the Friday that Mr Wailes decided the yurt could not be used, a day when only he and one other worker from the defendant were on site, and that was to attend to the erection of the catering tent and other outstanding work. No explanation has been given by the defendant as to why more effort was not made on the Friday to remedy the situation.

It is worth recalling the evidence that a yurt is a structure that originates from Mongolia, and the design is said to be one well suited for challenging climactic conditions, including wind. Mr Pomfret pointed out in his oral evidence that the defendant’s website mentions that a yurt can withstand winds of up to 70 miles an hour, a point confirmed by Mr Sterne in his oral evidence. I am satisfied from Mrs Easterby’s evidence that the winds in the Guisborough area did not come anywhere near 70 mph in the period of 5 to 8 June 2024.

I accept the evidence of Mr Pomfret in paragraph 5 of his witness statement that the yurt had slipped on the wooden boarded base, and his reporting of a statement made by Mr Wailes, namely,

“it had been a mistake …, had it been on the grass it would not have moved”,

albeit that Mr Wailes did not accept in cross-examination making that statement. Mr Pomfret, who knows something about erecting marquees, but not yurts, would have understood what he was seeing before him and what Mr Wailes was saying. In his written evidence, paragraphs 18 and 26, Mr Sterne confirmed that the poles had slipped on the wooden floors.

I find it is more likely than not that the placing of the poles of the yurt on the boarded floor, and not on the grass, caused the poles to slip on the wooden floor, thus causing the issues with the spars rotating and in some cases falling out. This the defendant could have, and should have, avoided.

I have already found that Mr Sterne’s assertion that if he had access to the site on 8 June 2024 then the yurt could and would have been fixed and used, is wrong. At the risk of repeating the point, he did not have a team to undertake the remedial works, his efforts that day were ineffective, and in any event were far too late. It would have been quite unreasonable to expect the claimants to stand back on the Friday afternoon and do nothing, in the hope that on the Saturday the defendant would attend and correct all outstanding matters.

I do not accept that the wind can relieve the defendant from responsibility for the yurt’s failure. Indeed, the letter from the defendant’s solicitors of 10 June 2024 expressly referred to the wind but, rather than using the wind to excuse performance or rely upon the operation of clauses 8 and 9 of the defendant’s standard terms, the solicitors stated that a refund was due.

The defendant has also left unexplained the lack of personnel it provided, for example on the Friday, with the claimant side having to supplement the defendant’s staff. The claimant side brought in some 40 farm workers and contractors to assist on the Friday, and some 20 on the Saturday to erect the additional marquee, including relocating the dining equipment into the defendant’s supplied marquee. That should not have happened had there been a substantially better response by the defendant to events it caused.

Accordingly, in terms of the reasons for the for the failure of the yurt and what was to follow from that, as a matter of fact responsibility lies solely with the defendant.

In terms of other issues, I accept the claimant’s case that surfaces of the walls of the yurt and the matting on the floor, were unacceptably dirty, and that an unquantified number of the floor boards were in an unacceptable condition, as was the laying of them such that in places they protruded outside the walls of the yurt in an unseeming manner.

I do accept Mr Sterne’s point in cross-examination that no one should expect new equipment; however, it is clear the claimants were not expecting that, and nor were they saying that.

At the end of his cross-examination Mr Sterne, perhaps in exasperation with a robust cross-examination, said that if the claimants wanted something better than the service his company provided then they should have gone elsewhere and paid three times more.

I acknowledge and accept Mr Sterne’s evidence that his company has had good reviews – many being 5-star reviews, he said. However correct that may be, anyone may have a bad day.

Having considered the facts of the case, I now address the legal issues.

Before considering the legal implications as to the defendant’s performance of its obligations, there is one particular point that was not expressly addressed before me, and as such not argued, namely, contractually, was the obligation upon the defendant to deliver and erect a yurt an absolute obligation such that if it failed to do so for any reason it would be in breach of contract, or was the obligation something less than absolute?

In paragraph 6(b) of the defence the defendant refers to using its ‘best efforts’ to erect the yurt. That, however, is not the wording of the parties’ contract; the opening words of paragraph 9(a) of the defendant’s standard terms and conditions state:

“Although Yorkshire Yurts will use its best endeavours to fulfil every contract….” (emphasis added)

I take the expressions ‘best efforts’ and ‘best endeavours’, to be synonymous.

On that basis, the obligation on the defendant is not an absolute obligation, it was an obligation to use its best endeavours when performing its obligations. As to what an obligation of best endeavours may entail, the courts have recognised certain principles:

Given my findings on the facts, it is clear the defendant did not use its best endeavours in the performance of its obligations, namely as to the erection of the yurt, and nor in making good or effecting remedial work to the yurt such that it could safely be used. In addition, I note that the obligation to use best endeavours does not detract from or lessen the effect of the terms implied in the contract by the 2015 Act.

I now turn to the legal basis for the claim, and this concerns my ruling on the preliminary issue at the start of the trial, namely whether the claimants could rely upon sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act. That decision influences, amongst other matters, the claimants’ reliance upon terms implied in the parties contract, namely sections 9(3)(a), 10(1), and 49(1) of the 2015 Act, and the remedies flowing from a breach of those terms or, in terms of the 2015 Act, the remedies that flow from the goods supplied by the defendant or the services it provided, “not conforming” to the contract.

Having heard argument on the preliminary issue, I determined that the claimants could rely upon sections 24 and 56, but given the implications of that decision it may assist if I expand briefly upon that decision.

When considering s.24(1), the starting point is s.19 of the 2015 Act which provides:

“Consumer's rights to enforce terms about goods

…

(3)

If the goods do not conform to the contract because of a breach of any of the terms described in sections 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14, or if they do not conform to the contract under section 16, the consumer's rights (and the provisions about them and when they are available) are—

(a)

…;

(b)

…; and

(c)

the right to a price reduction or the final right to reject (sections 20 and 24).”

I note that before me the claimants seek to rely upon ss. 9 and 10 of the 2015 Act.

Section 24(1) and (2) provides:

“Right to price reduction or final right to reject

(1)

The right to a price reduction is the right—

(a)

to require the trader to reduce by an appropriate amount the price the consumer is required to pay under the contract, or anything else the consumer is required to transfer under the contract, and

(b)

to receive a refund from the trader for anything already paid or otherwise transferred by the consumer above the reduced amount.

(2)

The amount of the reduction may, where appropriate, be the full amount of the price or whatever the consumer is required to transfer.”

When considering s.56(1), the starting point is ss.54(2) and (3), which provide:

“(2)

In this section…a reference to a service conforming to a contract is a reference to –

(a)

The service in accordance with section 49…

(3)

If the service does not conform to the contract, the consumer's rights (and the provisions about them and when they are available) are—

(a)

. . .;

(b)

the right to a price reduction (see section 56).”

I note that before me the claimants seek to rely upon s. 49 of the 2015 Act.

Section 56(1) and (2) provides:

“Right to price reduction

(1)

The right to a price reduction is the right to require the trader to reduce the price to the consumer by an appropriate amount (including the right to receive a refund for anything already paid above the reduced amount).

(2)

The amount of the reduction may, where appropriate, be the full amount of the price.”

Before me neither counsel confirmed they were unaware of any judicial authority as to the operation of sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act.

On the face of it, and leaving aside the 2015 Act, an English common law lawyer would likely be hard pressed to see how a ‘refund’, as opposed to damages, could be made, or how the court could alter the parties bargain and reduce the agreed price, by an ‘appropriate amount’. But that is what parliament has decided a court may do, doubtless influenced by European jurisprudence. It is therefore a matter of statutory interpretation. For my part, and whilst neither counsel referred me to authority, I note R (on the application of O) v. Home Secretary [2023] AC 255, [2022] UKSC 3, in the UK Supreme Court, and paragraphs 29 to 31 in the judgment of Lord Hodge DPSC, as a starting point as to statutory interpretation.

Mr Bain opened his submissions by saying the reference in paragraph 4.1.1 of the particulars of claim to a refund of the whole sum paid arose by reason of the claimants’ right to a refund pursuant to either sections 24 or 56 of the 2015 Act, and noted also that those same sections expressly stated that a refund could be for the full amount paid.

Mr Bain then referred me to 2 paragraphs from the explanatory notes to the 2015 Act, paragraphs 266 and 267, which state:

“266.

A “reduction in price of an appropriate amount” will normally mean that the price is reduced by the difference in value between the service the consumer paid for and the value of the service as provided. In practice, this will mean that the reduction in price from the full amount takes into account the benefit which the consumer has derived from the service. Depending on the circumstances, the reduction in price could mean a full refund. This could be, for example, where the consumer has derived no benefit from the service and the consumer would have to employ another trader to repeat the service “from scratch” to complete the work.

267.

In relation to services, however, there may be some cases consumer (sic) is able to ask for a reduction in price even where it may be argued that the value of the service as provided has not been reduced by the breach of the consumer’s rights. This could occur, for example, where the trader has not complied with information they gave about themselves. For example, if the trader tells the consumer that they will pay their workers the living wage and this is important to the consumer and a reason why they decided to go with this particular trader, arguably this does not affect the value of the service but the consumer would still have the right to request a reduction of an “appropriate amount” to account for the breach.”

Those explanatory notes do not, of course, form part of the Act, nor the law, and are not binding, but I note them. Given my reading of sections 24 and 56, the 2 paragraphs quoted above are, in general terms, consistent with the application of those 2 sections.

Returning to the issue as to whether the claimants may rely at trial on those 2 sections, I have to say that to some extent I sympathise with the defendant’s complaint that it was not apparent on the face of the pleading that the claimants relied upon either of those statutory provisions. However, in an email from the claimants’ solicitors to the defendant's solicitors dated 18 August 2025, the claimant's solicitors simply stated,

It would be fair to say that the defendant’s solicitors objected to this, and stated that they regarded the matter as one requiring a formal amendment to the claimants’ pleading. The claimants’ solicitors in turn demurred from that, saying it was simply a clarification of the pleading, did not require an amendment, and no such application was or has been made.

In making his submissions on this point Mr Bain referred me to the Court of Appeal decision in Ali v. Dinc & Anor [2022] EWCA 34, and paragraph 25 in particular from the judgment of the court delivered by Birss LJ, in which he says:

“By placing the emphasis on prejudice, the point I am making is that the modern approach to definition of the issues requires judges to adopt a pragmatic approach in line with the overriding objective and not seek to be governed by unnecessary formality, provided always that it is just not to do so.”

I gave the claimants permission to rely upon sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act as the legal basis for the court having jurisdiction to entertain a refund of all or part of the sum paid by the claimants, or the reduction in the contract sum, and the trial proceeded on that basis.

I did so because the claimants’ pleading was clear; equipment supplied by the defendant had failed, and the claimants’ sought their money back. There is no obligation under CPR r.16.4 to set out the legal basis for the remedies sought. In any event, the defendant was told on 18 August 2025 of the legal basis upon which the claimants sought that relief, and that was in good time for the trial. The clarification provided by the claimants was consistent with their pleaded case.

Neither party suggested that the claimants’ position required further evidence, nor an adjournment nor, in the defendant’s case, an amended defence. They were both right to adopt that position.

I did not, and do not, see that the defendant was or is prejudiced by giving the claimants permission to rely upon those 2 sections of the 2015 Act, nor that it is unfair.

I now turn to the issue as to whether in these proceedings the claimants may rely upon certain terms implied in the parties’ contract by the 2015 Act. In part, this flows from my earlier decision concerning the claimants’ reliance upon sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act, as those sections refer back to breaches of certain terms implied by the 2025 Act, as I have noted.

Before me the claimants sought to place reliance upon the breach of certain implied terms arising from the 2015 Act, namely:

By way of what may be termed a pleading point, the defendant objected to the claimants relying upon those terms for alleging breaches of contract, correctly saying that the particulars of claim make no mention of them. Again, I have a degree of sympathy for the defendant.

As mentioned, the requirements for particulars of claim are set out in CPR r.16.4; that does not expressly require setting out the contractual terms relied upon, albeit it is axiomatic that at the very least it may be helpful to set them out such that the other party and the court gain a true and fair understanding of the case that is being advanced and to be met; but not to do so is not necessarily fatal. The claimants’ position is not helped because the claimants’ pleading at paragraph 3.4 of the particulars of claim appears predicated upon the basis that the obligation on the defendant was to produce equipment that was “adequate”, which is not what the contract states, not what the terms implied by the 2015 Act require, and sets the bar for performance and thus liability too low, whereas the 2015 Act implied terms requires a higher standard to be met before liability for breach is engaged.

It is also notable that the defendant, whilst not obliged to do so, did not seek clarification of the claimants’ case. I assume that was a tactical decision, albeit one that carries with it certain risks.

When in closings submissions counsel addressed whether the claimants could rely upon the 2015 Act implied terms, Mr Bain again referred me to Ali v. Dinc and paragraph 25 as mentioned earlier.

Miss Gray in turn referred me to an earlier paragraph in that decision, paragraph 23, in which Birss LJ. quotes with apparent approval paragraph 35 of the judgment of Nugee LJ. in Satyam Enterprises Limited v. Burton [2021] EWCA Civ 287, which reads:

“This is not therefore a case, as sometimes happens, where one or other of the parties seeks to run a different case at trial from that pleaded. That itself is unsatisfactory and can cause difficulties, as has been said recently by this Court more than once: see UK Learning Academy Ltd v Secretary of State for Education [2020] EWCA Civ 370 at [47] per David Richards LJ where he said that statements of case play a critical role in civil litigation which should not be diminished, and Dhillon v Barclays Bank plc [2020] EWCA Civ 619 at [19] per Coulson LJ where he said that it was too often the case that the pleadings become forgotten as time goes on and the trial becomes something of a free-for-all. As both judges say, the reason why it is important for a party who wants to run a particular case to plead it is so that the parties can know the issues which need to be addressed in evidence and submissions, and the Court can know what issues it is being asked to decide. That is not to encourage the taking of purely technical pleading points, and a trial judge can always permit a departure from a pleaded case where it is just to do so (although even in such a case it is good practice for the pleading to be amended); in practice the other party often, sensibly, does not take the point, but in any case where such a departure might cause prejudice he is entitled to insist on a formal application to amend being made: Loveridge v Healey [2004] EWCA Civ 173 at [23] per Lord Phillips MR.”

I accept, as I am bound to, the guidance as set out in Ali and in Satyam, when determining these issues.

The claimants’ case has consistently been that the yurt and associated goods were defective and could not be used or should have been replaced; see paragraph 3.3 of the particulars of claim. In that same paragraph, they complained about the condition of certain parts of the goods supplied by the defendant. The claimants’ evidence was directed at that, and the defendant’s defence positively asserted the yurt and other equipment could be used.

As recently as the email from the claimants’ solicitors of 18 August 2025, quoted earlier, the defendant was put on notice that at trial the claimants placed reliance upon sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act, which provisions in turn refer to various implied terms set out in that same Act; see sections 19(1) and 54(3). Given the claimants’ stated position that it relied upon ss. 24 and/or 56 of the Act, it flows from that that the claimants must also be relying upon breaches of some or all of the implied terms stated in sections 19(1) and 54(3), and the defendant should have recognised that.

The claimants seeking to rely upon the implied terms is not a departure from their pleaded case, as Miss Gray submitted, and in her submissions she also prayed in aid the final sentence quoted above from Satyam suggesting an amendment was needed.

It has not been suggested, and rightly so, that the defendant’s defence to this claim would have been different, or further evidence required, or how in any real way it has been prejudiced or is unfair. The reasons set out earlier in this judgment for permitting the claimants to rely upon ss. 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act are of equal application here. Accordingly, no amendment to the particulars of claim was or is needed.

Accordingly, the claimants may rely upon the implied terms set out in sections 9(3)(a), 10(1), and 49(1) of the 2015 Act in support of their claim.

Before moving to the issue of whether or not the defendant has as a matter of law breached the contract and is liable for that, it is appropriate that I address one point the defendant relies upon in its defence. In that defence, paragraph 8, the defendant pleads reliance upon clause 9 – Force Majeure – of its standard terms to defeat the claim.

The event relied upon by the defendant is ‘extreme weather’, and no other event or circumstances; Miss Gray confirmed this. I have already determined that the failure of the yurt was not due to the weather, whether it was ‘adverse’ or ‘extreme’, but due to the defendant’s method of erection of the yurt. On that basis, clause 9 does not assist the defendant given clause 9 addresses the only circumstances relied upon by the defendant. Leaving those findings to one side, and in case I am wrong as to those findings, I consider the application of clause 9 of the defendant’s terms and conditions.

I note that this clause is one in the defendant’s own terms, and for its benefit; the court must therefore approach its interpretation using the contra proferentum rule.

First, the clause states that performance of the contract by the defendant is subject to variation or cancellation by the defendant, “for any reason beyond its control (including, but not limited to, . . ., extreme weather …)”.

The fact of weather conditions affecting events such as the claimants’ wedding is addressed in the contract; see the preceding clause, clause 8 (Averse Weather). Clause 8(c) gives an express right to cancel if weather conditions ‘might’ pose a risk to health and safety and/or property. The defendant did not cancel the contract, nor any part of it. Indeed, as late as the day of the wedding, Mr Sterne attended the site seeking to repair the yurt, but his efforts that day failed.

Miss Gray also sought to argue that the defendant had varied the contract, namely by extending the time for performance, and that the reference to ‘vary’ should be given a wide interpretation, such that time for erection and completion of the ‘Equipment’, and thus the yurt, was up to the time of the reception itself. I note that this argument is not one pleaded in the defence.

However, there is no evidence before me that the defendant sought in any way to operate that clause by way of a variation (nor indeed, to cancel), which is what clause 9 enabled the defendant to do. This point was raised for the first time in oral closing submissions.

In its defence, at paragraph 5, the defendant says the yurt could be used, but that is simply not correct; on the evidence alone of Mr Wailes, it was dangerous to use, and Mr Pomfret’s evidence was that it continued to fail into the afternoon of the wedding.

Second, leaving the foregoing aside, if there was any such variation, it is impossible to see how the defendant could vary the contract beyond the date and time for the yurt’s intended use, namely, so that the wedding guests could sit down and use it for dining. The yurt was emptied on the Friday afternoon. At the appointed time, the Saturday, and despite Mr Sterne’s efforts that day, the yurt was still unusable and, again, as Mr Pomfret’s evidence makes clear, it deteriorated further as the day went on.

Accordingly, clause 9(a) of the defendant’s terms does not assist it.

Whilst addressing clause 9, for the sake of completeness, I find that clause 9(b) also does not assist the defendant. That sub-paragraph applies to reduce the defendant’s financial exposure in the event of cancellation; however, there was no cancellation. The claimants are accordingly not limited to the recovery of only the Damage Deposit as provided in clause 9(b) of the defendant’s standard terms.

Accordingly, the pleas at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the defence also fail.

Drawing together, I find that in relation to the yurt, the defendant breached its contract with the claimants in each of the following ways:

In addition, by reason of the dirty floor matting, marks on the wall, and some of the floorboards being in a poor state, the goods were not of satisfactory quality; that is a breach of s. 9(1) of the 2015 Act. In determining the quality of goods, guidance is given in ss. 9(2) and (3). The claimants principally rely here upon s.9(3)(a), which sets out the obligation of, “fitness for all the purposes for which goods of that kind are usually supplied”, but I note also sub-paragraph 9(3)((b) which provides that regard may be had to appearance and finish, and sub-paragraph 9(3)(c) as to freedom from minor defects.

Those matters would not justify a full reduction of the contract sum; I would assess the appropriate amount for them as £500 in total.

Accordingly, in terms of section 19(3) and s.54(2) of the 2015 Act, the goods and the services provided by the defendant did not conform to the parties’ contract, and thus s. 19(3) engages the remedies in s. 24(1), and s.54(3) engages the remedies in s.56. (I note other remedies may also have been available to the claimants, for example see s.54(6) and (7), but the claimants have not pleaded their case in that way.)

Finally for this section of my judgment, I address one further point. With the failure of the yurt and it being declared by the defendant dangerous and therefore unusable, the claimants looked to the defendant to come up with a solution; the defendant was thereby given the opportunity to remedy the breach or, in other words, the opportunity of repeat performance, and this it failed to do either at all or, do so effectively, in the time available before the guests arrived.

The defendant’s solution was another marquee, smaller in size, located elsewhere, albeit meaning half the guests invited to the reception would then have to be told not to come. I have found that the claimants cannot be criticised for rejecting that proposal. Further, the defendant’s attendance on site on the day of the wedding in an effort to remedy the position was wholly inadequate and ultimately ineffective and, as Mr Pomfret said, too late.

By paragraph 17 of the defence, and in the alternate to its other defences, the defendant claims the claimants have failed to mitigate their loss by not allowing the defendant on to site to complete rectification works, or take out insurance. These 2 points may be dealt with briefly:

Against the background of those findings, I turn to the relief sought by the claimants. As noted there are two principal elements to this, the sum paid to the defendant for the yurt, and second, the claimants’ claim for the non-financial consequences of the defendant’s breach of contract.

The claimants incurred costs seeking to provide an alternate to the failed yurt amounts to £4,160, as set out in sub-paragraphs 4.1.2 to 4.1.4 of the particulars of claim. That is a sum less than that paid for the yurt of £6,615.60 as part of the contract sum. As Mr Bain made clear, the claimant’s primary position is to have refunded, or the contract sum reduced, pursuant to sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act, by the value of the sum paid for the yurt of £6,615.60, with recovery of the £4,160 the fallback position in the event the primary claim fails.

There is no good reason why the defendant should retain all or any part of the sum paid for the yurt, when it could not be used because it was dangerous to do so because of the defendant’s breach of contract. Accordingly, the defendant must refund to the claimants the sum of £6,615.60, plus pay interest on that sum; in terms of the 2015 Act, £6,615.60 is the ‘appropriate amount’. If I am wrong on this, then the claimants succeed on the claims set out in paragraphs 4.1.1 to 4.1.4 inclusive, plus interest.

Second, the claim for non-financial loss. In his skeleton at paragraph 47 Mr Bain describes this as:

“(a)

The distress caused to Cs by their initial concern that the wedding would haveto be cancelled [124, para 8];

(b)

The general stress to Cs of having to alter their wedding plans at the lastminute and having to work until late on 7 June to do so [145 – 146];

(c)

The fact that the changes were good enough to “make do”, but were far fromhow Cs wanted their wedding organised, created logistical issues for the dayof the wedding, and forced to Cs to rely upon the support of their friends andfamily to implement them.”

Pausing there, I accept that the breaches of contract by the defendant caused real distress to the claimants, and do so on the evidence to Mrs Easterby in particular. I touched upon that at the beginning of this judgment: after midday on the day before the wedding, arrangements for the reception were set asunder. The cancellation – I would like to think a postponement – of the wedding itself, was actively contemplated by the claimants, as was changing the venue for the reception to Thirsk Racecourse some distance away or, if the claimants had accepted the defendant’s proposed solution, half the guests would be told not to attend.

Mrs Easterby’s evidence was clear that she was distraught, as her plans for her wedding had been ruined; she was stressed, unable to sleep, and in floods of tears. That is all too real and, as noted, still raw as she gave evidence. I have also seen some of the messages passing between the bride and groom about this the night before the wedding (see exhibit CR2). This is not the case of a jitters on the night before one’s wedding. As Mrs Easterby said in her evidence, coming from farming backgrounds, the claimants are used to facing and confronting challenges, and getting on with it, but not something like this.

I accept that evidence of the effect on Mrs Easterby of the defendant’s breaches or, in terms of the 2015 Act, that the defendant’s performance was not in conformity with the contract; in any event, her evidence on this was not challenged by the defendant.

The claimants’ prayer for relief does not include a prayer for general damages, and therefore a common law claim such as this would not succeed by reason of that pleading point.

The claimants therefore again rely upon sections 24 and/or 56 of the 2015 Act, and argue that in determining a reduction in price or refund, such non-pecuniary losses may be taken into account. The defendant disagrees.

In approaching this issue, Mr Bain again referred me to the explanatory notes to the 2015 Act, and paragraph 267 in particular (quoted above), and adopted the reasoning set out therein, in support of the application of sections 24 and/or 56 of that Act and the remedies those sections provided, including for non-pecuniary loss; I accept that submission. The wording of the relevant sections is such as to admit a remedy which would include a non-pecuniary loss, and I see no basis upon which to restrict those sections by excluding a non-pecuniary loss or, in other words, I see no reason to exclude from the phrase ‘appropriate amount’, a non-pecuniary loss which the trader’s non-conformity performance with the contract has caused.

As to quantum, Mr Bain submits that the court may be guided by common law principles as to the award of damages for breach of a contract for which enjoyment or peace of mind is the sole or predominate purpose; see Milner v. Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 389 approving Jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd [1973] 1 Q.B. 233.

In this context Mr Bain submitted that in 2010 damages for a ‘spoilt holiday’ would be £4,500 which in today’s money and allowing for a Simmons v. Castle [2012] EWCA Civ 1288 uplift he said would be some £8,550.

I have accepted that non-pecuniary losses such as the wedding being ruined can be compensated under either section 24(1) or section 54(1) of the 2015 Act. The goods and services the defendant was contracted to provide were to be provided pursuant to a contract for which enjoyment and peace of mind was the sole or predominate purposes; the defendant’s breach of contract was a direct cause of the failure of that enjoyment and peace of mind.

In terms of quantum, and determining what is an appropriate amount, I note Mr Bain’s submissions, and conclude:

Accordingly, an award in these circumstances of £8,550 is insufficient to reflect the damage suffered by the claimants; I find that an award of £10,000 will go someway to compensate the claimants, in so far as money can do that; that sum reflects principally the effect upon Mrs Easterby, with an allowance for Mr Easterby. In terms of the 2015 Act, the ‘appropriate amount’ is £10,000.

The award here is of a refund or reduction of the contract sum with a payment back to the claimants. The claimants paid the defendant the sum of £16,504, and as such they cannot be refunded more than that sum (I do not see sections 24(1) or 54(1) of the 2015 Act as allowing for reducing the contract sum to a negative sum with the negative balance being paid). The sums I have found in favour for the claimants, leaving aside interest, amount to £17,115.60 (which sum includes the £500 addressed in paragraph 150), which means £611.60 cannot be recovered pursuant to sections 24 or 56 of the 2015 Act.

Accordingly, there will be judgment for the claimants in the sum of £16,504.00, plus interest pursuant to section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984, and costs.

If needed I will hear submissions on interest, but to assist counsel I would have thought interest at say 4% per annum, simple, running from 14 days after 8 June 2024, namely 22 June 2024 to the date of judgment is appropriate.

In terms of costs, costs will ordinarily follow the event, and I am conscious that a CPR Part 36 offer has been made.

Hopefully counsel will be able to agree the position on interest and costs, but if not this can be addressed at the hearing listed for 18 November 2025, as can any other issues that may arise. If the order is agreed and approved before then, then that hearing may be vacated.

I ask that counsel settle a draft order between them, with Mr Bain taking the lead.