Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police v Jennifer Roberts

I am giving judgment now in case KOOTQ080. The applicant in this committal hearing is the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police, represented by Ms McKiernan today. The defendant is Jessica Roberts, represented by Mr Horner.

The background to this hearing is that a civil injunction order was made against the defendant on 29^th September 2023 under the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014. The defendant attended that injunction hearing in person, and so I am satisfied that she knew about the injunction order made against her on that day.

The terms of that order prohibited Ms Roberts from, paragraph.1, contacting emergency services except in case of emergency, paragraph.2, encouraging others to contact the emergency services except in case of emergency, paragraph.3, acting in any way that causes another person to be in fear for their personal safety or property, and, paragraph.4, which is the relevant paragraph for today, acting or inciting others to act in an anti-social manner, that is to say in such a manner that causes, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm, or distress, and which in turn causes that person to make contact with emergency services.

The order is a three-year term order, and a power of arrest was attached to all four paragraphs of the order. I have raised today with both counsel that the power of arrest does not in fact make it clear as to when that was to expire, but Mr Horner does not take any technical point and accepts that the power of arrest flows with the order and lasts for three years.

On 26^th October of this year, so that is yesterday, at 7.18 in the evening, Ms Roberts was arrested for an alleged breach of paragraph.4 of the injunction. I have a schedule of breaches before me, which wrongly states that the alleged incident occurred on 27^th October. I have given permission today for that to be amended to read 26^th October.

I have evidence from PC Edworthy, who was called to Victoria Street in Paignton. He tells the court that Ms Roberts had climbed scaffolding at the front of a shop on Victoria Street, which is the main high street of Paignton. He witnessed her to be shouting at members of the public and telling them to “fuck off”. After about 35 minutes she came down with two firefighters. She was arrested as she began to walk away.

PCSO Tom Damont, in his statement, describes Ms Roberts as remonstrating with two men who were trying to engage with her, swaying and drinking an unknown substance from a bottle, her speech being slurred. She was verbally challenging members of the public who walked by and either looked at her or filmed her with their telephones. She said that she had not eaten since being released from a unit in Exeter, and her behaviour was characteristic of being in drink.

Ms Roberts is brought before me to this first hearing. At this hearing today, Mr Horner, on her behalf, accepted that paragraph.4 of the injunction order had been breached, and so I do find, to the criminal standard of proof, that Ms Roberts did breach the terms of paragraph.4 of the injunction order by acting in such a way that causes, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress, which in turn causes that person to contact emergency services. I am told that the CCTV agency contacted the police and that firefighters were contacted by concerned members of the public. Therefore, I do find Ms Roberts to be in contempt of court.

Turning to sentencing. As has already been explained to the court, the objectives of sentencing are to ensure future compliance with the order, but also punishment and rehabilitation. There are five options available to me when dealing with Ms Roberts, and they are an immediate order for committal to prison, a suspended order for committal to prison, adjourning the consideration of a penalty, a fine, or no order.

I remind myself of the general principle that custody should be reserved for the most serious breaches, and for far less serious cases where other methods of securing compliance with the order have failed. There are no previous breaches that I have been informed about, and I am more than satisfied in this case that the custody threshold is not reached. It is right to say that in the most minor cases the court may decide that the impact of the proceedings is likely to achieve the purpose of the contempt jurisdiction, and it may be appropriate to make no order save for the finding of breach. All of those means of disposal mean that any future breach of the order will be treated as substantially more serious.

I have considered the degree of harm and the degree of culpability, bearing in mind the civil context. I have been taken to the well known table, which is set out in the CJC Report, but also in the case of Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631. The table is a valuable table bearing in mind that sentencing is fact specific.

I do agree with counsel that the breach of the order by Ms Roberts was deliberate. She was aware of the injunction order and what she could and could not do. I also agree that the breach was a fairly minor breach. There is no evidence of actual violence, or threat of serious violence, and there is no evidence of any harm or distress caused. Therefore, this is a case that, in my judgment, falls within culpability B with the harm category 3. It is said within that schedule that the appropriate starting point for the sentence is adjourned consideration up to one month imprisonment.

However, I take into account some elements when I think about the seriousness of the breaches. There is some history of disobedience with court orders, there is one offence in 2017 of a breach of conditional discharge, and a breach of community order in 2017. There are, looking at Ms Roberts’ previous convictions, numerous like offences of using disorderly behaviour. Set against that, there are numerous mitigating factors for the court also to consider. There has been a long period of compliance with the injunction order. There has, as I have already outlined, been no previous breaches of the order that have been highlighted to the court. I do note the vulnerability of Ms Roberts, particularly with her drinking and also, it would appear, her mental health. There are no issues of capacity for me to be concerned about today.

Importantly, in my judgment, Ms Roberts, at the very first available opportunity to her, does accept the breach. She has apologised to the court today and has acknowledged the mistake that she made. So, in the judgment of this court, already having found that the custody threshold is not passed, I do not consider that adjournment of the sentence would serve much purpose. Similarly, a fine is not appropriate.

In my judgment, the order that I make today is no order, on the basis that Ms Roberts has already spent one day in custody, has apologised for the mistake she made, and is addressing her unfortunate relapse. Therefore, save for the finding of the breach to the criminal standard, the order I make is no order.