Howard Hampshire v Kathleen Bonser

This is the Claimant’s claim for a declaration that the Claimant and the Defendant are beneficially entitled in equal shares to the net proceeds of sale of a freehold property known as Fron Oleu Hall, Llanaber, Barmouth, Gwynedd (“Fron Oleu”). In fact, at trial, the Claimant sought a lesser share than 50% of the net proceeds of sale. Title to Fron Oleu was registered in the name of the Defendant alone from 2000 until it was sold in late 2023 at a price of £850,000.

Fron Oleu was operated as a bed and breakfast guest house for a short period between 2002 and 2005. The Claimant claims that there was an agreement, or at least an intention, that the beneficial estate in the property should be shared between him and the Defendant. In support of this, the Claimant contends that he carried out decoration and improvements to Fron Oleu and that he worked in the bed and breakfast business. He accepts that he did not contribute financially to the purchase of Fron Oleu.

The Defendant denies that there was any such agreement or intention. Her case is that Fron Oleu was her property alone, purchased by her using her own funds. Such work as the Defendant did at or to the property was minimal and no more than would be expected from a partner in his position. This was not a relationship where the parties’ finances were routinely pooled. Each bought their own property when they moved to North Wales from the Midlands in about 2000. There did come a point when the Claimant and the Defendant bought a house together, using pooled funds. That property was held in joint names at a time when the Defendant continued to own Fron Oleu. When it was sold the proceeds were split equally.

Within his skeleton argument, Counsel for the Claimant has prepared a helpful factual matrix derived from the parties’ pleaded cases and witness evidence from which the following agreed facts appear to be derived:

The Claimant was born on the 23^rd May 1943 and is now 82-years old;

The Defendant was born on the 28^th September 1945 and is now 79-years old;

Both parties have been previously married and, in the Defendant’s case, had a previous longstanding cohabitational relationship with Jeffrey Bonser;

When the parties’ relationship commenced in 1998 the Claimant was a widower and the Defendant a single mother having separated from Mr Bonser in 1995;

At the outset of their relationship the Claimant was 55-years old and lived in his own property: 51, Milton Crescent, Sedgley, Dudley West Midlands. He was also in employment;

The Defendant was 53-years old and living in a property called The Holme which had been the home of the Defendant and Mr Bonser until the end of their relationship in 1995 whereupon he vacated the property;

The Defendant had a wish to run a B&B guest house / small hotel. In order to fulfil that wish The Holme had to be sold so that she could utilise her share of the net proceeds of sale to acquire a suitable property. In the event, The Holme sold at the end of 1999 and the Defendant moved in and cohabited with the Claimant in his property in Sedgley until Fron Oleu was identified and chosen as a suitable place to buy and from which to operate a guest house / B&B business;

The purchase of Fron Oleu for £180,000 completed on the 22^nd May 2000. The property was registered in the Defendant’s sole name;

On purchase, Fron Oleu was not in a condition to operate as a guest house / B&B and required considerable renovation and development work to be carried out before it could open for business;

The renovation/development works would take over 2-years before Fron Oleu opened for business in August/September 2002;

In September 2000 the Claimant resigned from his employment, sold his house in Sedgley and bought Hafod Wen;

From an unspecified date in 2002 the Defendant admits that the parties cohabited at Fron Oleu [it is the Claimant’s case that cohabitation at Fron Oleu had commenced much earlier];

The guest house B&B business operated for approximately 3-years until it closed as a business in 2005;

Also in 2002, the parties bought the property next-door to Fron Oleu, called ‘Cae Glas’;

After the closure of the business in 2005, the parties tried to sell Fron Oleu with no success and, save for a short period of time when they moved into Cae Glas, they lived in Fron Oleu as a cohabiting couple for the next 18-years until 2023;

Cae Glas was sold in 2014 and the net proceeds of sale shared equally between them;

Whilst living in Fron Oleu the parties operated a joint bank account contributing broadly equal sums each month to ensure all domestic and household expenses were met;

In 2023 the Defendant had a stroke. She was by then 77-years old and the Claimant 80. The Defendant’s daughter Rebecca Marshall (the Defendant’s second witness) invited them both to move into her property back in Staffordshire and they did so continuing to cohabit as a couple within that property alongside the Defendant’s daughter and her family;

From approximately April 2023 to November 2023 (when the property was sold) the Claimant would, on a weekly basis, travel back to Barmouth to ‘check up’ on the property and ensure it was maintained;

On the 24^th November 2023 the sale of the property completed;

On the 5^th December 2023 the Claimant was told to leave the Defendant’s daughter’s property in Cannock.

I have heard evidence from the following:

The Defendant also relies on evidence from Jeff Bonser, the ex partner of the Defendant. He attended the entirety of the trial but as Counsel for the Claimant confirmed that he did not wish to challenge any of Mr Bonser’s evidence, he was not called to give evidence at the trial.

He said that when they were living in the Midlands, they had discussed running a business in N Wales. The Defendant had been able to sell the home which she owned with her former partner very quickly. She then lived with him in the Midlands for approximately a year when they found Fron Oleu together. She had then purchased Fron Oleu in May 2000 with the net proceeds of sale of her previous home and her former partner, Mr Bonser, contributed towards the cost of renovation. The Claimant had remained in his own home. He was still working there and needed to sell his home. Fron Oleu needed complete renovation. He said that he paid money towards some of the refurbishment and that he himself did some of the work at the property, eg refurbishing the stairs, doors and skirting boards. He had also provided the Defendant with £1300 for redecoration of the private living quarters at the property using money from his lottery winnings.

He had initially bought Hafod Wen as an investment. Fron Oleu was not ready at that stage. It was in a poor state of repair and had a mouse infestation when the Defendant purchased it and she was living in one room when she first moved in.

He would sometimes stay with the Defendant and she would stay at his. He would do work at the property and gave directions to contractors there. He had initially worked for his employer in Telford and had then secured a position as a manager at a hotel in Aberdyfi for about 12 months. It was a full time position and he would stay there overnight. The idea was that he would learn the ropes of running a guesthouse as neither he nor the Defendant had any experience of this. He continued to do work at the property and in the garden.

After 2 years of owning Hafod Wen, Cae Glas, the property next to Fron Oleu came onto the market and he and the Defendant agreed to buy it together as they thought that it would provide extra parking and access for Fron Oleu. It also gave them the option of living in Cae Glas if they decided to sell Fron Oleu in the future. The Defendant secured funds for her share of Cae Glas by raising a mortgage on Fron Oleu. The Defendant repaid her mortgage and the Claimant did not contribute to those payments.

He said that he worked ridiculous hours in the guest house when it opened in August 2002.

He was paid £45 per week so that he could still claim state benefits. He kept the books for the business and kept all of the documents for the accountant.

In Summer 2005 the business folded. Shortly prior to this, he and the Defendant had split up. The Claimant had walked out. He said that he did not fake his suicide as is alleged and he seemed ashamed about the way in which he had behaved at that stage. He said that if he is upset, he tends to walk away from things. He had returned to live in Fron Oleu in Feb 2006.

They continued to own Cae Glas which was let and the rent was split between the two of them and went into their joint account. They lived in Cae Glas only very infrequently such as when he had knee surgery and he could not manage the stairs in Fron Oleu. After that they decided to sell Cae Glas. He said that he put some of his share of the net proceeds of sale into their joint account and he bought a Jaguar which he would take the Defendant out in. His evidence was that the Defendant did not like driving although she can and did drive. The Defendant paid off the mortgage on Fron Oleu with her share of the net proceeds of sale of Cae Glas. For the next 10 years after the sale of Cae Glas, the joint account was kept with him paying £650 pcm and her £600 pcm into it. That covered most bills but not all and he said that he would top the joint account up. He denied that the Defendant topped up the joint account and he said that what appeared to be regular monthly payments of £250 into that account by the Defendant were in respect of their living expenses. He did not know what they were. He thought that she might be repaying a loan. Apart from the joint account, they kept their finances separate.

He was adamant that they lived in Fron Oleu as a couple and I do not think that that is disputed by Counsel for the Defendant although the Defendant’s evidence on this issue was interesting and I will address that later.

He said that he and the Defendant had agreed that if the Defendant predeceased him he would be able to continue living at Fron Oleu.

Counsel for the Defendant went through the joint accounts and personal accounts of the parties with the Claimant and it seemed clear that the Claimant would make payments to contractors, for instance, but that the money to pay companies such as Barnes Roofing came from the Defendant. The Claimant had access to the Defendant’s online banking and carried out many transactions for the Defendant.

Counsel for the Defendant suggested to the Claimant that he had made the payments rather than pay these contractors direct from the Defendant’s account so as to create an audit trail suggesting he had funded such contractors himself. He denied this.

He said that he and the Defendant had lived together like man and wife. It was a relationship based on trust.

It was put to him that he had known that he did not have a share of Fron Oleu and that this was why he had written to the Defendant at the end of their relationship saying that he had no interest in the property, that it was the Claimant’s to dispose of as she wished and that he never intended to profit from her. He explained that he had written that letter in distress having been told to leave the property of the Defendant’s daughter in which he and the Defendant had lived for 6 months after her stroke. During that six month period he had returned to check on Fron Oleu on a weekly basis and would do the garden when he was there. The Defendant had never told him why he was being asked to leave. He took it for granted that he was not welcome at the Defendant’s daughter’s house and her daughter had asked him to leave. One of the daughters had told him that he was only after the Defendant’s money which he said was not true.

He confirmed that he worked as a gardener for the parties at Fron Oleu. Initially he was asked to spend half a day per week on the garden but he eventually ended up doing two days’ work a week for them. He said that the parties would also work in the garden with him. The Claimant would empty the bin bags of garden waste in his absence

She had known the parties from 2018 onwards and had at one stage lived next door to them in Barmouth. She had also stayed with them in Fron Oleu on occasion. She recalled that both parties would work in the garden with the gardener. The garden needed a lot of work.

She was very surprised that the Defendant would allow her daughter to ask the Claimant to leave her daughter’s property and that the Defendant would have no contact with the Claimant thereafter. The Defendant had not had any contact with her either since she had her stroke. She had been shocked when told that the parties had separated. They had presented as very much a couple who had been in a long term relationship.

She came across as being very bitter towards the Claimant. I was very surprised at her attitude. She appeared to dismiss the 25 year relationship which she had been in with Claimant. She came across as very cruel in her attitude towards him and their relationship.

She explained that she had purchased her own home in Cannock approximately 2 months ago for the sum of £240,000 out of the net proceeds of sale of Fron Oleu. She had invested the rest.

She agreed that she had, early on in her relationship with the Claimant, discussed her dream of running a guesthouse or restaurant and that the Claimant had driven her to various viewings and that he had been with her when they found Fron Oleu which was in need of complete renovation. She said that she had also discussed this plan with Mr Bonser, her ex partner and father of three of her adult children, with whom she remained on good terms. He was a businessman and was responsible for funding part of the project of renovating Fron Oleu. She was reasonably familiar with the area as her daughters owned caravans not far away but the Claimant had no connection to the area.

She had been able to sell her property in the Midlands very quickly and had lived with the Claimant for about a year until she was able to purchase Fron Oleu. She then moved into one room in Fron Oleu whilst the renovations were undertaken. The Claimant had remained in his home until he was able to work his notice and sell his own property and buy Hafod Wen. She said that she may have stayed with the Claimant in Hafod Wen about once.

She accepted that the Claimant did some work with the professional builders on Fron Oleu.

She sought to rubbish the work which the Claimant had done on the property and continued to stress that the Claimant was inexperienced and simply worked with the builders. She accepted that he did some stripping down of paintwork and that he helped with the flat within the property but that he did not help with the gardening until later.

She accepted that they were living together prior to running a business in Fron Oleu in 2002. She confirmed that for the year before they opened the business, the Claimant commuted to Aberdyfi where he worked as a manager of a hotel so as to learn how to run such a business.

She accepted that he worked front of house in the Fron Oleu business.

She agreed that they had bought Cae Glas in joint names so as to give them options in terms of developing Fron Oleu.

She confirmed that the Claimant had proposed marriage to her on many occasions but that she had always turned him down. She said that she never regarded them as being in a quasi marital relationship – “never”.

She confirmed that they had split up three years into the relationship and that the Claimant had moved out but that she had had the Claimant back. They had then shut the business, which was not a success, and they continued to live in Fron Oleu. She disagreed with Mrs Wesson’s evidence that they presented as a devoted couple.

She accepted that the Claimant had access to her online banking.

Prior to selling Cae Glas, they had discussed moving to live there as a couple. They had moved in there at one stage when the Claimant was recovering from surgery so that he did not have to use the stairs in Fron Oleu but they decided to continue living in Fron Oleu. Fron Oleu had at one stage been on the market after they shut the business but it had failed to sell.

She said that the Claimant deserved to be thrown out of her daughter’s home in Cannock. “It served him right. He had been awful the way he treated me and he told lies.” Counsel for the Claimant noted that this was approximately two weeks after Fron Oleu was sold.

She seemed to play down the amount of work which the Claimant did at Fron Oleu – “He lived a life of comfort and luxury when he lived with me. He had the best food. I would have done this for anyone which I do do.”

She appeared to think that the Claimant was lying when he said that he did not have the finances to secure another property to live in when he was thrown out of her daughter’s property and thought that he might have secret accounts which he had not disclosed.

In response to my questions, she again played down the nature of her relationship with the Claimant. She explained that they only had a joint account when they sold Cae Glas.

She said that their relationship was strange. The Claimant could be very secretive and deceitful. She said that he did not like to discuss things as a couple and that he would simply walk away. She did not know why she had not finished the relationship and thrown the Claimant out. “I am resentful now about him living a life of comfort. I am resentful now because of how things have turned out.”

She is the daughter of the Defendant. Interestingly, she sat behind her mother’s barrister for the trial and her mother sat behind her next to the Defendant’s other daughter. The parties moved into Mrs Marshall’s home after the Defendant had the stroke in 2023. She now has power of attorney for her mother. She took responsibility for the mechanics of the sale of Fron Oleu but she did not need to use the power of attorney for that sale because her mother was able to sign all of the relevant documents.

She confirmed that the net proceeds of sale of Fron Oleu had gone into her mother’s bank account.

She confirmed that after her mother experienced the stroke, she was contacted by the Claimant who told her that the Defendant was in hospital. She said that they kept each other up to date in relation to her mother’s health.

She said that “out of kindness” she had invited both the Claimant and the Defendant to stay at her home after her mother’s stroke.

He was the former partner of the Defendant and was the father of three of her four children. He attended the trial but ultimately did not give oral evidence at the trial as Counsel for the Claimant did not seek to challenge his evidence.

I do not think that there is any dispute as to the law which appears to be well established. In any case where the beneficial co-ownership of property is at issue the principles that must be applied are those laid down by the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432.

Stack v Dowden decides that in any claim to an equitable interest in real property in which the title is registered in the sole name of one of the occupants, the starting point is that that person will be taken to own the whole of the beneficial interest. In cases where a claimant alleges that he or she has an interest in property but is not a legal owner then the burden is on that claimant to prove that he or she has any interest in the property at all. Similarly, where the legal title is held jointly the legal owners are also presumed to hold the beneficial estate for themselves jointly: see Stack v Dowden at [56].

The first step for the Claimant is to establish that the parties had a common intention that the beneficial estate in the property should be shared. In Stack v Dowden Baroness Hale put it in this way:

“The search is to ascertain the parties’ shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it.”

This requires the court to consider whether there were any express agreements betweenthe parties that they would share beneficial ownership or whether such an agreement can be inferred and, if so, how the shares in the property were to be divided. In addressing that question, the Court must consider the factors identified by Baroness Hale in Stack at [69], namely:

“Each case will turn on its own facts. Many more factors than financial contributions

may be relevant to divining the parties’ true intentions. These include: why the home was

acquired in their joint names; the reasons why (if it be the case) the survivor was

authorised to give a receipt for capital moneys; the purpose for which the home was

acquired; the nature of the parties’ relationship; whether they had children for whom they

both had a responsibility to provide a home; how the purchase was financed, both initially

and subsequently; how the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together

or a bit of both; how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other

household expenses. When a couple are joint owners of the home and jointly liable for

the mortgage, the inferences to be drawn from who pays for what may be very different

from the inferences to be drawn when only one is owner of the home. The arithmetical

calculation of how much was paid by each is also likely to be less important. It will be

easier to draw the inference that they intended that each should contribute as much to the

household as they reasonably could and that they would share the eventual benefit or

burden equally. The parties’ individual characters and personalities may also be a factor

in deciding where their true intentions lay. In the cohabitation context, mercenary

considerations may be more to the fore than they would be in marriage, but it should not

be assumed that they always take pride of place over natural love and affection.”

Lewin on Trusts (20th Edn) at 10-062 – 10-075 breaks this down into 6 tests to be applied when considering the issues raised by Stack v Dowden. They are these:

The House of Lords in Stack v Dowden made it clear that cases where it could be shown that the beneficial interests differ from the holding of the legal estate are not straightforward: per Baroness Hale at [68].

It is clear that the shares declared at the time of acquisition of the property may subsequently be varied but, even allowing for the decision in Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776, it will be an exceptional case where the Court will find a post-purchase variation in interests. The Court of Appeal in Morris v Morris [2008] Fam Law 521 described a post-purchase variation of beneficial interests as a “rare bird”.

The Court may infer a post-purchase agreement to alter the beneficial interests but not impute one: Stack at [138] per Lord Neuberger.

By this method a beneficiary’s interest may be enlarged or acquired after the date of acquisition of the property, provided that the beneficiary can demonstrate an agreement, arrangement or understanding to that effect on which he has acted to his detriment: see Lewin on Trusts (20th Edn) at 10-053. However, the courts take a much stricter approach to an alleged variation based on conduct: see Morris at [36] and Williams v Lawrence [2011] WTLR 1455 at [21]. In both those cases Counsel were unable to identify a single case in which the variation of beneficial interests had been held to have occurred based on conduct alone.

The spending of money or the carrying out of work on a property belonging to another without more (in other words mere conduct) does not provide the party carrying out the work with a beneficial interest, save in exceptional circumstances: see Williams v Lawrence at [22]. Improvement works very seldom operate to assist in shifting the equitable interests: see Morris at [20], [23]-[26]. Morris confirms that the person who claims to have acted to his or her detriment must have done so in the belief that he or she was acquiring an interest in the property.

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Geary v Rankine [2012] 2 FCR 461 provides an interesting example and exposition of these principles. Ms Geary and Mrs Rankine were in a long-term relationship and had a child together. Some years into the relationship Mr Rankine purchased a guest house business in Hastings in his sole name.

Subsequently, Ms Geary contributed her labour to the business (e.g., cleaning, helping with guests) but did not contribute financially to the purchase of the property or its mortgage.

The couple lived in the guest house property and ran the business. After the breakdown of their relationship, Ms. Geary claimed a beneficial interest in the property, arguing a common intention constructive trust existed.

The trial Judge and the Court of Appeal rejected that claim. Ms Geary had made no financial contribution to the purchase of the property, which was registered solely in Mr Rankine’s name. The Court made it clear that there will be no automatic inference of beneficial co-ownership from cohabitation or business contribution; simply living together or working in a business does not create a beneficial interest. What is required is clear evidence of a common intention to own a property jointly. There must be an express or inferred intention to share ownership and that intention must relate specifically to property, not just income or business profits. Detrimental reliance on that shared intention is also a pre-requisite.

The Court of Appeal also reiterated that registration of title in one party’s name alone is strong evidence of what was intended; where property is registered in one party’s name, it is hard to rebut the presumption that that owner holds full beneficial title.

Counsel have both provided me with detailed skeleton arguments which are extremely helpful and they have expanded on those at trial.

Counsel for the Claimant submits that this was a committed relationship despite what the Defendant says and that there was an inferred common intention which can be readily established by simply looking back at the quarter of a century during which the parties shared their home, their outgoings, income and every facet of their lives together.

Despite the Defendant’s evidence, Counsel for the Defendant concedes that this as a quasi marital relationship. However, his submission is that the Claimant’s contribution was simply what any individual would make if they had been living at Fron Oleu rent free, as the Claimant did for such a long period of time.

I think that there is no dispute that there was no express common intention. However, as Baroness Hale recognised in Stack, such common intention can also be inferred and that appears to be the Claimant’s case.

Before I consider that question in more detail, it is important that I bear in mind the very wise words of Baroness Hale in Stack which, as Counsel for the Claimant says, could have been written about this case:

“In family disputes, strong feelings are aroused when couples split up. These often lead the parties, honestly but mistakenly, to reinterpret the past in self exculpatory or vengeful terms. They also lead people to spend far more on the legal battle than is warranted by the sums actually at stake.”

The Defendant was openly hostile in her manner towards the Claimant. It was interesting to observe the Defendant’s daughters in the courtroom and their body language and their faces also showed such hostility towards the Claimant. At no stage, did I sense any hostility from the Claimant. I therefore have to question much of what the Defendant said in the witness box.

The Defendant sought to rubbish the Claimant’s contribution and to their life together at Fron Oleu. I do not believe her. Her own Counsel accepts that this was a quasi marital relationship and it is quite clear to me from hearing the evidence of the Claimant, hearing from the Claimant’s witnesses and seeing the photographs of the parties over the course of many years that this was a committed and generally happy relationship. There were bumps along the path, as there are in many relationships but the parties remained together apart from for a short period of time in 2005. The Defendant left Fron Oleu at that stage. If the relationship was as bad as the Defendant made it out to be, why on earth did she have him back? She tried to make out that the Claimant simply lived a life of luxury with her for which he contributed little but that is simply nonsense. I accept the evidence of the Claimant, Mr Hupperdine and Mrs Wesson that both parties were hard workers and that they both worked hard to ensure that Fron Oleu was kept in immaculate condition which is evident from the sale particulars. There were periods of time when the Claimant was seriously ill, he was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and diabetes and he had to have surgery to his leg. The Claimant was complimentary about the care which the Defendant had provided to him during these periods. The Defendant did not deny that she provided such care but simply dismissed it on the basis that she would have provided such care to anyone. I do not believe her. She provided that care because she was in a loving relationship with the Claimant, just as he cared for her when she had her stroke.

It is also, in my judgment, significant that the relationship only came to a rather abrupt end when the Claimant was asked by the Defendant’s daughter to leave her home. This is where the parties had been living at that daughter’s invitation for six months after the Defendant suffered a stroke. The Defendant says that the Claimant’s behaviour during that period was bad but it must have been a stressful time for him, not only worried by the Defendant’s stroke but also living with her family. I do wonder whether the parties would have separated had they remained living in Fron Oleu, been able to return there or to some other accommodation separate from the Defendant’s family.

The parties were committed to each other even before they moved to North Wales. The Defendant lived with the Claimant at his home once her house in the Midlands had been sold. The Claimant helped the Defendant fulfil her dream of owning a guesthouse. He drove her to view various properties in North Wales and the two of them found Fron Oleu together. The Defendant purchased Fron Oleu on 22 May 2000 and the property was registered in the Defendant’s sole name, the Defendant having paid the purchase price with her share of the net proceeds of sale of the Holme, the property which she owned with her previous partner, Mr Bonser. There is no doubt that the property was in a poor state of repair and that the Defendant paid a significant amount of money on renovating the property with Mr Bonser also making a significant financial contribution towards the renovation work as well. However, the Claimant also did help with work sanding and doing the jobs which he was able to do and which would have been time consuming and costly for a contractor to undertake. He also gave the Defendant £1300 of his lottery winnings to enable the flat in Fron Oleu to be decorated.

What, in my judgment, is particularly important evidence is that in September 2000 the Claimant resigned from his employment, sold his house in the Midlands and purchased Hafod Wen. His evidence was that he and the Defendant stayed in Hafod Wen and Fron Oleu as Fron Oleu was still being renovated. The Defendant said that she stayed only once at Hafod Wen. I do not believe her. Her evidence is tainted by her current hostility towards the Claimant and I prefer the evidence of the Claimant in relation to this. This also makes sense as Fron Oleu was in a poor state of repair and was being renovated so it was, in reality, uninhabitable with the Defendant occupying only one room at Fron Olau when she first moved in.

I am also satisfied that the guesthouse was very much the parties’ venture. Whilst it was the Defendant’s dream to run a guesthouse, it was the Claimant’s hands on support which helped her fulfil this dream. Money could only pay for the renovations. What is significant and is not disputed is that after resigning from his employment, the Claimant worked as a manager for a hotel in Aberdyfi with the specific goal of learning how to run a hotel. He did this for a year until he was “let go” by his employers when they realised why he had taken the position. This is significant evidence in support of the fact that this was a couple very much committed to each other and to a man who was helping his partner fulfil her dream in a practical and hands on fashion. At the latest, according to the Defendant, the parties were cohabiting in 2002 which was the year Fron Oleu opened as a guesthouse. In that same year, they bought the property next door to Fron Oleu, Cae Glas. To raise his share of the funds to purchase that property, the Claimant sold Hafod Wen which he had purchased only two years previously. Why do so, particularly so soon after purchasing Hafod Wen, other than to fully contribute to the development of Fron Oleu and their life together. The intention was that ownership of Cae Glas would give them options for Fron Oleu in terms of parking and having a right of way over Cae Glas to Fron Oleu. Whilst Counsel for the Defendant submits that this was, in reality, a business transaction with the parties buying a half share and ultimately splitting the net proceeds of sale of Cae Glas when they eventually sold it in 2014, this was when the Claimant completely gave up being on the property ladder in his own right so that they could develop the business and improve the amenities of Fron Oleu. It is also significant that they had considered (but ultimately discounted) living in Cae Glas in the future so that would have been a property which they owned together. There appeared to be criticism of the Claimant for buying a Jaguar car from some of the net proceeds of sale of Cae Glas. The Claimant’s evidence , which I accept, was that he would drive the Defendant around in it as she did not like driving. She therefore benefited from this as well. If she was so concerned about his spending money on a car, why did she not tell him that he should buy another property, that she would be leaving everything to her family and that he needed to ensure that he had somewhere else to live? Because they both understood that they would continue cohabiting and that he had a share of Fron Oleu. After the closure of the guesthouse business in 2005, the parties continued to live in Fron Oleu until 2023 when she had a stroke. Had she not had a stroke, it is likely that they would have remained in Fron Oleu until they could no longer manage.

Having considered those facts, I then turn to the 6 tests which are to be applied when considering the issues raised by Stack. I do not need apply all of them given that there was no argument at trial that there was an express agreement as to beneficial ownership.

The tests which I need to apply are as follows:

Such agreement can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and, in particular, the way in which the parties arranged their financial and other affairs. Any intention must be “common” to both parties. Applying Geary, the Claimant has to establish that despite the fact that the legal title to Fron Oleu remained in the Defendant’s sole name, the Defendant actually intended that the Claimant should have a beneficial interest in it. Counsel for the Defendant submits that this case is on all fours with Geary but I disagree. In Geary, the Defendant had purchased a B and B in his sole name with his own money with the intention that it would be an investment with him employing a manager and him and the Claimant remaining in London. It was only when the plan with the manager did not work out that the Defendant was forced to run the B and B and then asked the Claimant to go and help him. In contrast, here the Claimant was involved in the planning of the guesthouse from a very early stage. He resigned his employment and found a position running a hotel in Aberdyfi so that he could learn how to run the guesthouse, something which neither he nor the Defendant had any experience in. He did the paperwork for the guesthouse, he ran the front of house operation, albeit at a very low wage to ensure that his entitlement to benefits was not affected. He gave £1,300 of his lottery winnings to the Defendant to enable the flat in Fron Oleu to be decorated for the two of them. He gave up his life in the Midlands to move to a part of the country with which he was unfamiliar. He did work at the property which he could undertake such as sanding the woodwork at the property, no mean feat in a property this size. He was doing much more than, say, doing some cleaning and minor maintenance. He sold his own home so that he and the Defendant could buy a property together so that they could have that as a potential home for the two of them in the future and so that the amenities of Fron Oleu could be improved. By then he was 59 and had resigned from his permanent employment in the Midlands. This was not a time to come off the property ladder unless he had a home. As Baroness Hale states in Stack, “many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant in divining the parties’ true intentions.” Would the Defendant really have been able to achieve her dream of opening a guesthouse without the Claimant’s skills? There is no evidence that she went out to learn how to run a guesthouse. Whilst she tried to put down his DIY skills, could she really have coped with a house of this size on her own? Whilst she put the money in and paid for the significant work to Fron Oleu (as well as Mr Bonser), she relied on the Claimant for his help with running the B and B, with the paperwork and with the general maintenance and gardening.

This case can also be distinguished from Geary because after the business closed in 2005, the parties remained living there in a quasi marital relationship for another 18 years, whatever the Defendant said to me in the witness box. The Claimant said that he would do the DIY tasks at the property and that he would do work on the garden. The garden is clearly a large, high maintenance garden and Mr Hupperdine was employed to maintain the garden alongside both the Claimant and the Defendant. The Claimant says that he also did work on the garage roof during this period. Counsel for the Defendant submits that this is no more than what a cohabitee would be expected to do. I disagree. He did more than that. He enabled the Defendant to fulfil her dream of opening a guesthouse and he worked hard with her on this business. His ongoing support thereafter meant that they were able to continue living in Fron Oleu. He continued to check on the condition of the property when the Defendant had a stroke on a weekly basis. He could have left this to the Defendant’s family had he understood that he had no beneficial interest in Fron Oleu. It can be seen from the sales particulars that the house and gardens were immaculate when the house was put on the market. The Claimant’s contribution to that cannot be underestimated.

Counsel for the Defendant makes much of the fact that after the parties split, the Claimant wrote to the Defendant on 25 January 2024 and on 9 February 2024 as follows:

“I did not visit a solicitor to enquire about compensation for the sale of Fronoleu (sic). I always accepted that it was your property to dispose of as you wished…..

Please note carefully: I never attempted to benefit from the sale of Fronoleu (sic) or wished to access any of your bank accounts….” (first letter).

“Who suggested to you that I wanted some of the proceeds from the sale of FRONOLEU (sic)? This is not true!!” (second letter)

Those letters come across to me as tragic. This is a man who has been thrown out by the Defendant’s daughter. The Defendant has not had the decency to speak to him to explain why he is being thrown out. He is not far off 80 and in poor health. In those letters, he is denying what the Defendant’s daughters have apparently accused him of, that he is after her money. He has not sought legal advice at that stage, according to the first letter. He is just trying to understand why the Defendant has finished with him. In any event, the Claimant is entitled to make this claim. Whatever he says in this letter does not change that.

If there was no common intention, why did the Defendant tolerate a situation where the Claimant firstly sold his own property and then came off the property ladder? Because there was an understanding that the Claimant had a share in Fron Oleu. There is no other explanation for it. She could have offered him the chance to buy her share of Cae Glas. She could have told him to buy a new property with his share of the net proceeds of sale of Cae Glas. She did not because there was that inferred agreement.

It is for the Claimant to prove that he acted to his detriment in the reasonable belief that by so acting he was acquiring a beneficial interest in Fron Oleu. The detriment incurred must be of a sufficient nature to affect the conscience of the party denying the interest.

The Claimant left his life in the Midlands behind. He sold Hafod Wen only two years after its purchase so that he and the Defendant could purchase Cae Glas with a view to them having a property to live in in the future and, significantly, with a view to improving the amenities of Fron Oleu. He lost his place on the property ladder when Cae Glas was sold. He gave up his employment in the Midlands and found a position managing a hotel in Aberdyfi so that he could learn how to run a guesthouse. The Defendant had the dream but he did the practical things to enable that dream to become a reality apart from making the major financial contributions. He did not buy another property because he and the Defendant had an understanding that he had a share in Fron Oleu. Why else did the Defendant not ask him if he wanted to buy her share of Cae Glas or tell him to buy another property when Cae Glas was sold? He came off the property ladder at a time when, at his age, it would be very difficult to get back on that ladder. He was no longer in employment. He purchased a Jaguar, a deteriorating asset, which both parties enjoyed instead, something he would not have done had he understood that he had no beneficial interest in Fron Oleu. He acted to his detriment in that regard.

The Court must determine the share that it considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between the parties in relation to the property. “The search is for what the parties, as reasonable people, would have thought at the relevant time, and thus for what they in fact intended.” I consider they would have considered that the Claimant should have enough to enable him to buy a modest property for his future. The Defendant paid for the property and for the majority of the significant renovations with some financial assistance from Mr Bonser. The evidence is that during the cohabitation period she paid for any major works done to the property. However, the Claimant provided significant assistance with the running of the guesthouse and thereafter with maintenance and contributed financially to the cost of maintenance and with the garden. Maintenance in a house of this size and age in a coastal position cannot be underestimated. He also contributed financially to the cost of decorating the flat and he did the tricky jobs such as sanding woodwork at the property. He did work on the garage. Counsel for the Defendant submits that the percentage applied should be very low, 10%. The Claimant has made an open offer to settle in the sum of £175,000. I think that offer was made on the Claimant’s understanding that the property sold for £975,000. In fact, we discovered during the trial that the property sold for £850,000. The completion statement sets out the net proceeds of sale as amounting to £838,492.00. At trial, Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant should be awarded a 20% share. That would amount to £167,698.40. I am satisfied that the appropriate share should be 15% which I calculate as amounting to £125,773.80. That would mean that the Defendant can still keep her house and she can, if she so wishes, pay back Mr Bonser for his contribution to the cost of renovating Fron Oleu. It reflects also the significantly greater financial contribution made by the Defendant to Fron Oleu but it also reflects the Claimant’s contributions, most of which were in kind.

I order that there be judgment for the Claimant in the sum of £125,773.80.

I ask Counsel for the parties to provide me with a single document, if possible, with their corrections to this judgment by not later than 9 am 19 September 2025. This judgment remains in draft until I deliver it but may be shared with the solicitors and the parties subject to them also understanding the confidential nature of the judgment at present.