R v Elaijah Sengati

On 20 January 2026, following a trial in the Crown Court at Snaresbrook before His Honour Judge Falk and a jury, the applicant was convicted of a single offence of possessing a prohibited firearm, contrary to section 5(1)(aba) of the Firearms Act 1968.

On 29 April 2026, he was sentenced to 20 months' detention in a young offender institution.

His application for leave to appeal against sentence has been referred to the full court by the Registrar.

In essence there is a single ground of appeal, namely that the sentence ought to have been suspended, along with additional requirements as part of the order.

The circumstances of the offence were as follows. On 25 November 2024, a member of the public noticed a cross-body type bag which had been hidden in a hedgerow in a park in Walthamstow. It was damp, which indicated that it had been there at least overnight. On closer examination, it was noted to contain a firearm. The police were called. The firearm was photographed and made safe. It was then passed to a firearms expert who examined the weapon and confirmed that it was a real firearm and that it contained live ammunition. It was identified as a converted Ekol Botan blank-firing pistol. Originally, its barrel had been obstructed and a vent provided in the top of the barrel to expel gases when it was fired. The obstruction in the barrel had been removed and the vent blocked. As a consequence, the pistol was capable of firing cartridges and propelling a projectile. When the pistol was test-fired, it was found to be fully working and able to pass the test for lethality.

Prior to test firing, the pistol was sent for DNA testing, The applicant's DNA was found on three of the internal components of the weapon: the guide rod, the guide rod holder and parts of the main spring, all of which remain on the inside of the gun during normal usage. The expert evidence was that the DNA which had been found on any of these components could only have arisen if the pistol had been touched when the gun was disassembled, for example for the purpose of cleaning it.

The applicant faced two counts at his trial. In addition to the count of which he was convicted, there was a further count of possession of the ammunition. The applicant was acquitted of that charge.

The applicant did not give evidence at the trial. Nor did he give any alternative explanation for how his DNA was found on the pistol

On the basis of these facts, the judge concluded that he could be satisfied that whilst the gun was also possessed by others for criminal purposes, the unloaded gun had passed through the applicant's hands for disassembly and cleaning by the applicant, before being passed to those criminal elements. The judge was driven to the conclusion that the applicant was highly trusted by those other criminal elements to look after (albeit for maybe a short time), clean and maintain the gun, so that it could be collected ready for use.

Various pieces of further evidence featured in the sentencing exercise that the judge faced. The prosecution commissioned expert evidence to determine whether or not the applicant was over the age of 16 at the time of the offence. The expert was not able to assist with this issue, and on the basis that the charge related to a time prior to the discovery of the pistol, the judge concluded that he had to sentence the applicant on the basis that he was under 16 at the time when he handled the gun.

A further feature of the case was that the applicant was the subject of a conclusive grounds finding in relation to him being a victim of modern slavery.

The court had the benefit of a report on the applicant from his professional support worker. The report recorded that the applicant had been re-housed in local accommodation away from his home community, and that he had sought to make a fresh start. He had engaged well with his support worker on a voluntary basis. The support worker noted adverse childhood experiences, in particular when his brother was stabbed, as well as being the subject himself of serious violence and witnessing violence to others. The applicant had received no psychological support to help him cope with this adversity. It is noted in the report that the conclusive grounds decision is consistent with evidence that the applicant provided to the support worker about coercion and threats made to both himself and to family members. As a result of the engagement, the support worker noted a positive change in the applicant and a desire to build a stable and secure future, which was evidenced by him devoting himself to education and working within his cousin's business. He also had successfully completed a peer mentoring programme. The author expressed a concern about the damage to this progress which would be caused by a custodial sentence.

In support of the applicant, a clinical psychologist's report was relied upon. Dr Sinead Marriott, the author of the report, recorded that her testing of the applicant found that his cognitive abilities were within the very low and low average ability ranges. He presented with a low mood and, in her opinion, met the criteria for a diagnosis of depression. He also met the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD as a result of the traumatic experiences of his childhood, including the witnessing of a fatal stabbing, and he and his brother being subjected to violence. Dr Marriott observed that the applicant's risk of offending could more effectively be reduced by a community disposal, rather than custody.

A further report was prepared for the court by the applicant's leaving care worker. He had worked with the applicant since August 2025, and he recorded that the applicant had made notable progress in the residential setting in which he had previously been placed. The report evidences a consistent willingness to engage with support services and to make positive progress towards changing his life for the better. The applicant had engaged with a gangs worker and there were no reports or concerns regarding involvement with gangs or criminal activity. He had abided by his bail conditions. His engagement with education was noted, along with the steps he was taking to find employment. He benefited from a supportive family network.

The judge also had the benefit of a pre-sentence report. The author of the pre-sentence report concluded that the applicant presented a low likelihood of general re-offending, but that the potential seriousness of any future offending was high. The applicant presented a medium risk of serious harm to the public, which could be reduced and managed if he were to engage with professional support.

The applicant had been the subject of a caution in 2022 for possession of a bladed article in a public place and assault of an emergency worker. These offences occurred when the applicant was aged 14. Conditions were attached to the caution which required him to attend the Youth Justice Service; and his appointments with that service were successfully completed.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge noted the difficult background that the applicant had experienced, and in particular his witnessing of the stabbing which has been referred to above, as well as the violence to his brother and the robbing of the applicant on more than one occasion. The judge noted the positive engagement and progress documented in the reports, and he gave credit for the applicant's intention to embark upon training and to seek employment. He noted that there had been no breaches of bail, or evidence of any further gang involvement. The judge noted the assessment of risk in the pre-sentence report and the evaluation of Dr Marriott in her psychological report.

The judge identified that the firearm was a Type 1 weapon and that the offence fell into culpability B and category 3 harm. For an adult, the starting point would have been five and a half years' custody, with a range of five years to seven years.

The judge noted the mitigating features, including an absence of previous convictions, but also pointed out that there was no evidence of coercion or intimidation giving rise to the offence, and he was concerned that the applicant had failed to have regard to the obvious risk to innocent members of the public as a result of involvement with such a dangerous weapon.

The judge noted that he had to sentence the applicant as a 15 year old who had been arrested when he was 17½ and who was convicted after he had become 18 years of age. As a consequence, he was not subject to the mandatory minimum sentence provisions that commonly apply to offences of this sort.

The judge did not apply the youth sentencing guidance on the basis that the applicant had decided to plead not guilty and await his trial. The judge noted the progress that the applicant had made in recent times, and he made a significant reduction in the starting point, down to two and a half years. Because the applicant had "crossed the age barrier" (as the judge put it), he further reduced the sentence to two years. Allowing for the four months that the applicant had spent in local authority accommodation with restrictions on his liberty, a further reduction was made to arrive at the sentence of 20 months' custody.

Given the length of the sentence, the judge then turned to the question of whether the sentence could be suspended in this case. He observed as follows:

The applicant has, as has already been observed, a single ground of appeal, namely that the custodial sentence ought to have been suspended.

In her helpful, succinct and constructive submissions this morning, Miss Papamichael advances the submission that the imposition of an immediate sentence of custody was excessive, in particular given the extensive mitigation, which has been set out above, and the applicant's clear prospects for successful rehabilitation. She submits that the sentencing of a person who is 15, which was essentially the exercise in this case, should be closely focused on rehabilitation; and that achieving the age of 18 did not amount, as has frequently been observed, to a "cliff edge", following which a person can be treated as a fully mature adult.

Before we engage directly with the proposed grounds of appeal, it is necessary to make some observations about the route which the judge took in finding his way to the determinate sentence which he imposed.

In her submissions this morning, Miss Papamichael accepts that it is no part of her case to criticise the ultimate outcome in terms of the length of the sentence. However, in our analysis, the judge's reasons are not altogether clear. It appears to us that, as a matter of principle, the judge should have commenced by adopting the approach clearly set out in R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281; [2023] 1 WLR 1858. That case is the leading authority in relation to the correct approach to take when sentencing a defendant who committed an offence whilst under 18, but who has passed the age of 18 when they come to be sentenced. This court provided clear guidance in relation to the questions which arise in such a situation in [32] of the judgment. It is not necessary to set that out in full, because not all of the points covered arise in this case. But in particular [32 (i) and (iii)] are on point. Under [32(i)] the court must have regard to the youth sentencing guideline and apply it in cases of this kind, unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice so to do.

In this case the judge was therefore wrong to specifically disregard the youth sentencing guidelines in passing sentence. By virtue of [32(iii)], the court must take as the starting point the sentence which it considers was likely to have been imposed if the child offender had been sentenced shortly after the offence. It is far from clear to us that this was in truth the approach taken by the judge.

As a result of this concern, we have undertaken our own assessment of what was the appropriate sentence for the applicant's offending. We accept the categorisation and the starting point identified by the judge from the relevant guidelines, which is five and a half years' custody. Applying the youth sentencing guidelines, as is required by Ahmed, that should be reduced by around half to reflect the applicant's youth at the time of the offence, giving a sentence of 33 months. A further deduction is necessary to reflect the personal mitigation recorded in the reports from the people supporting the applicant and the engagement and progress he has already made in pursuit of turning his life around and securing a positive future for himself. There is also a need to reflect the findings of Dr Marriott.

Taking all of these factors together, we consider that the sentence should have been reduced by a further nine months. We also agree that a reduction of four months is required to reflect the loss of the applicant's liberty when he was in local authority accommodation. On this analysis, the sentence of 20 months' custody arrived at by the judge, whilst arrived at by means of an inappropriate route, was not of an inappropriate length.

We turn to the question of whether the sentence should have been suspended. The imposition of a suspended sentence is an exercise of discretion by the judge and therefore, as has often been observed by this court, it is necessary to show that in exercising his discretion, the judge has left out of account a material consideration, or reliance had been placed upon an irrelevant consideration, or that the judge has exercised his discretion unreasonably.

In our view, the judge clearly applied the relevant criteria in the imposition guidelines in respect of this aspect of the sentencing exercise. He took account of the applicant's mitigation and the prospects for rehabilitation in particular. He also afforded priority to the applicant's welfare and the need for him to find a positive future.

All of the relevant evidence was, in our view, clearly taken into account by the judge in forming his view. Nor was there any misdirection that we are able to identify. Contrary to Miss Papamichael's careful and persuasive submissions, we are not satisfied that (as she puts it) all factors in this case pointed in favour of the suspension of this sentence. The judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the risk to the public and the significant seriousness of the offence, involving as it did the possession and preparation for use of a lethal weapon, was sufficient to justify his decision.

It is clear that involvement with an illegal gun, possessed for violence and intimidation for criminal purposes is a very serious offence and brings with it serious and lengthy sentences, given the appalling consequences that can arise from the use of firearms in the community. The judge specifically found that this offence had not arisen from the coercion of the applicant and was entitled to be concerned that a key aspect of rehabilitation, a full acknowledgement of responsibility and an understanding of the offence, was not available in this case as the applicant had not provided any explanation for his involvement with the weapon.

Having heard the trial, the judge was well place to make the observations he did about the risk to the public that the applicant posed.

Ultimately, we are not prepared to accept that the judge erred in reaching the conclusion which he did, that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. We are therefore not persuaded that there is any basis upon which this application for leave to appeal against sentence could be allowed. It is accordingly refused.