R v Billy Martin Price

On 19 June 2024 the appellant, Billy Martin Price, was sentenced for three offences. First he was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for possessing a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence. Secondly, he was sentenced to an extended determinate sentence of 10 years, comprising a custodial element of 6 years and an extended licence period of 4 years for an offence of possessing a prohibited firearm. That sentence was to be served concurrently with the sentence on count 1. Finally, Mr Price was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment for an offence of possessing explosives, again to be served concurrently.

His application for leave to appeal, made out of time, was referred to this Court as an extended sentence cannot be imposed for the offence of possession of a prohibited firearm. We grant the extension of time sought. We grant leave to appeal.

The facts can be stated shortly. The appellant had a collection of weapons at his home. One was a prohibited firearm, namely a pump-action shotgun, which was the subject of count 2. Following a dispute with a neighbour about loud music being played, Mr Price produced the shotgun and asked the neighbour to go with him. That altercation fortunately ended without further (count 1). When the police searched Mr Price's home they found, amongst other things, three petrol bombs, that is three glass jars filled with petrol (count 3 on the indictment). No further penalty was imposed in relation to a fourth offence.

The judge took the possession of the prohibited firearm as the lead offence and he fixed a custodial element of 6 years for that offence. That period of 6 years was intended to reflect all the offending in respect of all the offences on the indictment. The judge also found that the appellant met the statutory test of dangerousness, and he imposed an extended determinate sentence on count 2 of 10 years. That comprised the 6-year custodial element and an extended licence period of 4 years. The judge then went on to impose a sentence of 5 years, the statutory minimum sentence for count 1, to be served concurrently, and he imposed a sentence of 3 years' imprisonment for count 3, the possession of the explosives, also to be served concurrently.

There can be and there is no criticism of the terms of the custodial periods fixed for each sentence. Similarly, there can be no criticism of the finding that Mr Pryce met the statutory test for being a dangerous offender. The sole issue concerns the imposition of an extended determinate sentence for count 2, the possession of a prohibited firearm. An extended sentence cannot be imposed for that offence, although it could have been imposed for the offence on count 1 (see sections 279 and 306 and Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Act 2020). Mr Price appeals against the sentence on count 2.

Where the Crown Court has passed two or more sentences in the same proceedings, as happened here, an appeal against one sentence is treated as an appeal in relation to all the offences on the indictment (see section 11(2) Criminal Appeals Act 1968). On an appeal against sentence this Court may quash any sentence and pass an appropriate sentence so long as the appellant is not treated more severely overall than when he was dealt with in the court below (see section 11(3) Criminal Appeals Act 1968).

We will restructure the sentences as follows. First, on count 2, possession of a prohibited firearm, we quash the extended determinate sentence of 10 years, comprising the custodial element of 6 years and an extended licence period of 4 years. We substitute a determinate sentence of 6 years' imprisonment for count 2.

On count 1, possessing a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence, we quash the sentence of 5 years' imprisonment. We impose an extended determinate sentence of 9 years, comprising a custodial element of 5 years and an extended licence period of 4 years. That sentence is to be served concurrently with the sentence for count 2.

The sentence on count 3 is unaltered.

We would thank both counsel, Mr Roberts and Ms Wilks, for their very practical and sensible assistance today, and to the extent indicated we allow the appeal.