Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. | R v Hedges |

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT LEWES
HHJ LAING KC CP No: 47EE2293724
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before :
LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE
MR JUSTICE SOOLE
and
THE RECORDER OF LUTON
HIS HONOUR JUDGE MICHAEL SIMON
(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
Between :
REX | Respondent |
- and - | |
RHYS BILLY HEDGES | Appellant |
Keir Monteith KC and Tom Copeland (instructed by Faraday Solicitors) for the Appellant
Ryan Richter and Emily Thornton (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 9:45am on 24 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
.............................
LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE :
On 29 April 2026 this court dismissed the appeal by Mr Hedges against his conviction for manslaughter in the Crown Court at Lewes on 28 March 2025. The appellant applies for leave to appeal against that decision to the Supreme Court.
We have considered the submissions of Mr Monteith KC and Mr Copeland for the appellant, together with the authorities cited, and the response by Mr Richter and Ms Thornton on behalf of the prosecution.
The appellant has asked us to certify the following as a point of law of general public importance:
“In the absence of a defendant unequivocally admitting an intention to cause some harm, where a jury is left manslaughter as an alternative, must they be asked whether they are sure a defendant intended to cause some harm notwithstanding the nature of the act?”
We addressed this issue in our judgment primarily at [46]-[51], from which it is apparent that our decision turned on the facts and circumstances of this case. The appellant stabbed the victim. His defence was self-defence. There was no suggestion that the stabbing was an accident. The jury rejected self-defence. There was no issue that the actus reus for unlawful act manslaughter was made out. No rational jury could properly have concluded that the mens rea for that offence was not proven. The appellant’s case that his conduct had been no more than an “instinctive” reaction simply formed part of his case of self defence which was rejected by the jury. Having considered the matter carefully, the Court concluded that there was no basis for treating the conviction for manslaughter as unsafe.
The appellant now seeks to rely upon two additional authorities: R v Grey [2024] EWCA Crim 487 and R v Bukhari [2025] EWCA Crim 1353. Those authorities refer to earlier decisions.
In some cases this Court has said that in the absence of a direction on the mens rea of unlawful act manslaughter a conviction was unsafe, but in others it has said that a conviction for such a manslaughter was not rendered unsafe because the trial judge had not given that direction (see also by way of example R v Manen [2025] EWCA Crim 1080). These decisions turned on their facts and circumstances.
For example, the conviction in Grey was unsafe because the judge failed to give directions on both the actus reus and mens rea of the unlawful act where that was necessary given the “live issues” to which the facts and circumstances of that case gave rise (see [22]-[36]).
Consequently, the cases cited by the appellant do not indicate that the proposed ground of appeal is arguable. The Court did not depart from “the settled approach” in the existing case law.
Paragraphs 5 to 6 of the appellant’s submissions ignore the reasoning of the Court in its judgment.
The present case does not raise a point of law of general public importance. For these reasons we refuse to certify a point of law of general public importance. We also refuse to grant leave to appeal.