R v Dale Rayner

His Majesty's Solicitor General applies for leave to refer a sentence which she regards as unduly lenient. The sentence was passed on the offender on 27 January 2026 by His Honour Judge Forster KC sitting in the Crown Court at Bradford. The offender had previously pleaded guilty on the morning of his summary trial before the magistrates. They had committed him to the Crown Court for sentence.

The offences to which he had pleaded and the sentence passed by the judge were as follows:

On 11 June 2025 at about 4 pm in the afternoon, the offender made two calls to 999. The second of those calls was answered by Morgan Harrop, a call handler working for West Yorkshire Police. During a call that lasted 29 minutes, the offender said that he was walking the streets of Bradford armed with an axe and was going to murder someone of the Islamic faith. The offender repeatedly used racist language to describe the people who he wanted to kill. He told the call handler his name and address. He identified the location of a local business where he said he would find a victim. He said he had the axe in his possession during part of the time that he was on the call and he hit the axe against a lamppost so that the call handler would hear the sound of the axe striking against metal. He was warned more than once about his use of language and the fact that the call was recorded.

Just a few of the examples of what the offender said give the flavour of what he said over the period:

The police attended in response to the call and located the offender in Landscove Avenue, two streets away from his home address at Daniel Court. He was travelling in the direction of the local business to which he had referred in his call. He was found in possession of a screwdriver. An axe was recovered within a plastic bag in the garden of his home address. He was arrested at 4.40 pm.

In interview under caution he said that he could not recall what had happened but that he had spoken to his sister who told him that he had a place at 'Betel', a rehabilitation unit in Birmingham, to which he was due to go on 18 June. He said that he went to the shop and bought more alcohol. He admitted that he had a drink problem and said he was drinking every day until he blacks out. He said that he had tried to get help for a long time with no success and so this may have been a 'cry for help'. He accepted being in possession of a screwdriver and an axe but said he would never hurt anyone. He said he was not a racist person and that he had Muslim friends.

The offender was charged with the offences on 12 June 2025. His trial was listed for trial before the magistrates on 28 October 2025. He pleaded guilty on the morning of trial and was committed to the Crown Court. After an adjournment for the obtaining of a pre-sentence report he came to be sentenced on 27 January 2026.

The offender was born on 29 April 1992. He was 33 years old at the time of the offending and at the date of sentencing. He had seven previous convictions for sixteen offences, which included:

The judge had the benefit of a PSR. The offender told the writer that he had only a partial recollection of the offences due to his intoxication. He remembered calling the police on the night in question and making threats including threats to kill Muslims. He said that he did not understand why he had said this as he denied holding racist or xenophobic views. He said he did not want to harm anyone in reality and that his actions were made as a cry for help rather than with an intent to commit violence against anyone. He expressed embarrassment, shame and remorse for the fear he had caused the call handler. The writer said that he seemed genuine in his remorse.

The offender acknowledged that alcohol in particular makes him aggressive and that much of his past offending has been related to substance misuse. He had taken significant steps to address his substance misuse and his mental health issues. He had registered with a GP and had been prescribed Fluoxetine.

It was the opinion of the writer of the PSR that the offending occurred during a period of significant psychological distress, heavy substance misuse and apparent withdrawal symptoms. His behaviour was fuelled by intoxication, deteriorating mental health and was a "maladaptive attempt to seek intervention".

The writer of the PSR assessed the offender as posing a medium risk of further offending, with a medium possibility of the offender committing a further seriously harmful offence. He was assessed as posing a high risk of harm towards members of the public, in particular those of a different ethnicity to his own, and a medium risk of serious harm to emergency workers, particularly police officers executing their duties. His future risk depended substantially on whether he can remain abstinent. He has a significant history of non-compliance with supervision. The writer expressly recognised that the offences were very serious but offered alternatives to custody for the court's consideration.

The judge also had the benefit of a psychiatric report. Dr Case-Upton's opinion was that the "primary driver" for these offences was alcohol intoxication. At his interview the offender did not display symptoms in keeping with the diagnosis of a major mental illness such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or severe depression. He did not display features of a neuro-developmental disorder such as autism or ADHD. Dr Case-Upton recognised that there would be a risk of deterioration in mood in the event of a custodial sentence but pointed out that the offender would be able to avail himself of support from the mental health In-Reach team. In the event of a non-custodial disposal, he recommended that the offender engage fully in treatment to address his alcohol abuse.

There was no victim personal statement, but in her witness statement Morgan Harrop said:

The prosecution submitted that the threats to kill fell within category B2 of the relevant guideline, with a starting point of 1 year and a category range from 26 weeks to 2½ years. It was culpability category B as it fell between categories A and C; it was harm category 2 because of the practical impact on the victim, whose time was wasted and who genuinely believed the offender would carry out his threats, albeit on others. The offence is aggravated by the racial hostility and required an uplift pursuant to section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The possession of a bladed article in public was submitted to be a category A2; culpability category A because the axe was a bladed article, and harm category 2 because no category 1 features were present. That meant that the starting point was 6 months' custody with a category range of 3 months to 1 year's custody.

For the offender it was submitted that the offender's culpability came within the lowest category, and that although the offending passed the custody threshold, the court could draw back from imposing an immediate custodial sentence because there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation, particularly given the offender's efforts in the months since the offending.

The judge correctly described the offender's use of language as "extreme". Having succinctly outlined the facts he then said:

The judge then referred to the suggested non-custodial sentences offered by the Probation Service. He referred to the offender's previous convictions but said that he did not find any relevant factors to increase what would be the appropriate sentence.

Referring to the guidelines, he said that the offences were difficult to place in the guideline categories. He then said:

The judge then turned to the question of suspension, saying:

He then identified the ancillary orders, including the alcohol treatment requirement for 9 months to which we have referred.

There is a probation report addressed to this court which is dated 27 February 2026 (one month after the offender was sentenced). It records that the offender has not attended any probation appointments and is now in breach of his suspended sentence order. All letters have been sent to the address he provided, and none has been returned. He has made no effort to contact probation to explain why he has not been attending. The writer had spoken to the offender on one occasion to provide him with his initial appointment. During that call he said that he had quite a large fallout from his offence because of the publicity and that he was struggling with this.

A further update has helpfully been provided by the Probation Service yesterday. It reads as follows:

The Solicitor General identifies the aggravating and mitigating features of this case as follows.

The Solicitor General submits that the overall sentence passed by the judge was unduly lenient for two main reasons.

First, the Solicitor General submits that the threats to kill offence should have been categorised as an A2 offence rather than a B2 offence because:

Turning to the bladed article offence, the Solicitor General submits that it should have been categorised as an A1 offence rather than as an A2 offence because the offence was committed on the streets of Bradford, the offender was armed with an axe and he was making specific threats to kill a person of Pakistani heritage or of the Islamic faith. The threats, coupled with the possession of the axe, clearly indicate a risk of serious disorder occurring. On that basis the starting point for the bladed article offence was therefore 18 months' imprisonment and the category range was from 1 year to 2 years and 6 months.

The second main reason relied on by the Solicitor General is that the judge failed to give sufficient weight to the serious aggravating factors, in particular the racial and religious hostility displayed by the offender, and that the threat to kill was committed against an emergency worker acting in the exercise of her functions as such.

The Solicitor General submits that the impact of the aggravating features was such that he should have arrived at a sentence towards the top of the category range. The Solicitor General submits that the least possible sentence that could be justified was one of 2 years 6 months. If, contrary to that submission, a sentence of 2 years or less were justifiable, the judge should have conducted a balancing exercise in accordance with the imposition guideline which should have led to the conclusion that only a sentence of immediate custody was appropriate.

Mr Norman represents the offender before us, as he did in the court below. His submissions are admirably clear and all the better for being succinctly expressed.

In relation to the threats to kill count, he submits that the axe was not "visible" within the meaning of the guideline: the offender made the threats to the call handler over the phone; the axe was not visible to the victim. No other category A factor was present. The offence was properly categorised as B2 and the sentence of 9 months imposed by the judge was comfortably within the category range of 26 weeks to 2 years and 6 months' custody.

In relation to the bladed article, he submits that there was no risk of serious disorder arising from the offence and no other category 1 factor was present. The offence was therefore properly categorised as A2, and the sentence of 5 months fell comfortably within the category range for A2 offences of 3 months to 1 year's custody.

Turning to the question of suspension, Mr Norman submits that over the 7-month period between the commission of these offences on 11 June 2025 and the passing of sentence on 27 January 2026, the offender "fundamentally changed his position and demonstrated a commitment to rehabilitation".

In support of that he relies upon the fact that:

In the light of this change, Mr Norman submits that the judge was entitled to impose the sentence he did, which included stringent requirements. He submits that the recent breach of the terms of the order does not retrospectively render the original sentencing decision unduly lenient.

We agree with Mr Norman that the offences were properly categorised by the prosecution in the court below.

Dealing first with the threats to kill, they were made to the call handler to whom the axe was not visible. We do not accept that the possibility that people to whom the threats were not being made might have been able to see the axe qualifies it as a "visible weapon" so as to demonstrate higher culpability.

Nor is this a case of "threats with significant violence". In our judgment, this factor applies where there is significant violence accompanying the threats, not where the threats are themselves threats of significant violence. The Solicitor General's submission appears to us to ignore the fact that what is being threatened in every such case is the ultimate act of violence, namely death. What matters for this factor is not whether there are threats of significant violence but whether there are threats with significant violence, which is different. Therefore the starting point for the offence of threats to kill was 1 year, with a category range from 26 weeks to 2 years and 6 months' custody. As the judge himself noted, the offender's language was "extreme" and it was persistent, continuing for almost half an hour.

There were, however, significant other aggravating features:

Turning to mitigation in respect of the threats to kill, in truth the only substantial feature apart from his belated plea of guilty was the offender's remorse, allied to the limited evidence of his determination to change.

Viewing this offence in isolation, the judge appears to have reached a notional sentence of 9 months after taking into account the aggravating and mitigating features other than what he described as "the statutory aggravating factor". Even leaving out of account the statutory aggravating factors, we can see no justification for arriving at a notional sentence that was 3 months below the starting point of 1 year. In our judgment when all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are brought into account the net result must be a sentence that is well above the starting point. This was on any view a very serious category B2 case. Giving maximum credit for his mitigation including his plea on the morning of trial, we consider that the least sentence that could reasonably have been passed in respect of the threats to kill offence was one of 21 months' imprisonment.

Turning to the bladed article offence, we are not persuaded that the offence was committed in circumstances where there was a risk of serious disorder. Had there been evidence that the offender had addressed any of his threats to people on the streets while carrying the axe, we would have had no difficulty in accepting that such conduct would give rise to a risk of serious disorder. However, that is not this case. There is no evidence of him interacting with people on the street. The starting point was therefore 6 months, with a category range from 3 to 12 months. This was once again a serious offence of its kind and one to which the statutory aggravating features applied. In addition, it was committed while under the influence of alcohol, which is an aggravating feature identified in the bladed article guideline.

Again viewed in isolation, we can see no justification for the judge's imposition of a sentence that was lower than the starting point of 6 months for an A2 offence. When the relevant aggravating and mitigating features are taken into account, the lowest sentence that could reasonably have been imposed was one in the order of 9 months' custody.

Pausing there, we reach the conclusion that the least sentence that could be passed for these offences when each is viewed in isolation would be a sentence of 21 months for the threats to kill and 9 months for the bladed article offence.

The judge imposed concurrent sentences for the two offences. That was justifiable, provided that the lead offence reflected the criminality of both. It does not appear that the judge weighted the sentence he was passing on count 2 by reference to the sentence that was appropriate on count 1 or vice versa. The principle of totality applies. Applying that principle, if concurrent sentences were to be employed, there should have been a downward adjustment from 30 months. It is however impossible to justify a downward adjustment of more than 6 months on the facts of this offending. It follows that the lowest aggregate sentence that could reasonably imposed was, in our judgment, one of 24 months' custody.

We have paid close attention to the imposition guideline. On one side, the offender presents some risk and has a history of poor compliance with court orders. That has continued since he was sentenced. On the other, the most recent information provides a mixed picture which does not wholly exclude the prospect of rehabilitation. His personal mitigation is not strong, and it is not suggested that immediate custody would have or would result in a significant harmful impact on others. However, in our judgment this offending was so serious that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody. This was, as we have said, very serious offending that was both extreme in content and protracted in duration. The sentence cannot properly be suspended.

For these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the sentence passed by the judge was not merely lenient but unduly lenient. We therefore quash the sentence passed by the judge and in its place impose a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment on count 2 (treating that as the lead offence) and 6 months concurrent on count 1. That sentence is not suspended.