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Case No: 202601144/A2, 202601146/A2, 202601147/A2
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT MANCHESTER
MR JUSTICE BRIGHT
06A10375425
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before:
LADY JUSTICE MAY DBE
MR JUSTICE SAINI
and
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PICTON
(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
REFERENCE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER S.36 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988
Between:
Rex | |
- and - | |
“VGT” “WGU” “XGV” |
Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR P JARVIC KC appeared on behalf of the Attorney General
MS A SUMMERS KC and REBECCA PENFOLD appeared on behalf of the Offender "VGT"
MR R ENGLISH and REBECCA FILLETTI appeared on behalf of the Offender "WGU"
MR R LITTLER KC appeared on behalf of the Offender "XGV"
J U D G M E N T
Lady Justice May:
Introduction
This is an application by His Majesty's Solicitor General for leave to refer three sentences as unduly lenient pursuant to section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
On 22 December 2025, after a four-week trial before Bright J and a jury, three teenagers were found guilty of the following offences: XGV was convicted of the murder of Ibrahima Seck. VGT and WGU were convicted of manslaughter. On 27 February 2026 XGV was sentenced to detention at His Majesty's Pleasure, pursuant to section 259 of the Sentencing Act 2020, with a minimum term of 11 years and 42 days. VGT was sentenced to 2 years 10 months' detention and WGU to 2 years 4 months' detention, both under section 250 of the Sentencing Act.
Reporting restrictions
The three offenders XGV, VGT and WGU were aged 14, 17 and 15 respectively at the time of sentence. There were reporting restrictions in place which is why this Reference has been listed using randomly-generated ciphers. The sentencing judge was invited to, but refused, to make an excepting direction for any of the young offenders at the time of sentence.
There were no representations from the Press at the outset of this hearing. We are satisfied to the extent that we need to be, in accordance with the principles outlined by this Court in R v RKL [2021] EWCA Crim 200, that the balancing exercise between open justice and the welfare of the child offenders falls in favour of the continuation of restrictions. To the extent that we need to therefore, we confirm the continued existence of the reporting restrictions already in place. We will use the ciphers in the published form of this judgment, although we and counsel at this hearing have used the offenders' first names to refer to them during the hearing, as we will in this judgment though, as we say, the reported version will use the ciphers. As the offenders are all under 18, we sat on this Reference without wigs or gowns and notified counsel in advance, who have done the same. For the avoidance of any doubt the order in respect of each offender is in these terms:
"No matter relating to the youth in question shall be published which would identify them, including their name, address, any educational establishment or any workplace they attend or any picture of them. This order lasts until the youth reaches the age of 18. No matter relating to the youth in these proceedings shall whilst he is under the age of 18, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him in these proceedings."
Facts of the offending
We take the facts from the Reference, noting that where there were disagreements between the Law Officers and the respondent offenders about the facts, the Reference refers to the trial judge's sentencing remarks "on the basis that there can be no sensible dispute about his factual findings."
The deceased, Ibrahima Seck, was aged 14 when XGV stabbed and killed him. WGU and Ibrahima had been childhood friends. They played together. WGU would often go to Ibrahima's house to see him. But by 2025 they had drifted apart. There is disagreement between the Law Officers and the offenders as to whether WGU bullied Ibrahima thereafter, as to which the learned judge said this:
"[WGU], your newer friends were mean to Ibrahima. Rather than stand up for him, you let this happen. He told a responsible adult at his school. That was the right thing for him to do. But your response, [WGU], was to bully him and threaten him, calling him a snitch. You also threatened one of his brothers. You went to his house and you stood outside, making threats and yelling insults. You did not always do this alone and, on one occasion, the person you took with you was [VGT].
[VGT], you had no grievance at all against Ibrahima, not even the invented one that [WGU] persuaded himself existed. But you allowed yourself to be drawn into this silly drama so that you too chased one of Ibrahima’s brothers and then stood outside the family home with [WGU], making threats."
On the afternoon of Sunday 8 June 2025 Ibrahima left his home address with his older twin brothers and two friends. The five of them made their way to the park to play football. The three offenders were in the area at the time. VGT and WGU were on a scooter, XGV was on a bicycle. The judge recorded in his sentencing remarks what happened:
"Ibrahima and his group were walking in one direction along a quiet residential street, Nuthurst Road. By chance, they came across the three of you walking in the opposite direction. This was all on the other side of the street from a pub, meaning that the confrontation was all captured on CCTV. It is obvious, from the CCTV footage which I have seen as the jury did, that there was a degree of tension when you saw each other, in particular when Ibrahima and the members of his family recognised you, [WGU]. You and [VGT] were on a scooter together and you stopped and got off it. Initially, nothing happened.
Some of the other group carried on walking and [XGV], who was riding a bike, carried on ahead of the other two.... Then, for some reason, we do not know why, [XGV] jumped off his bike and started moving quickly and... aggressively towards Ibrahima and his companion, [X]. [X] saw trouble coming and got his retaliation in first. He punched [XGV] and then they began grappling. [WGU], you started running towards those two to help [XGV]. Shortly after this, [VGT], you did the same.
[X] and [XGV] separated. [X] joined the other members of Ibrahima’s group while you, [XGV], were with [WGU] and [VGT]. There came a moment when one group of three boys was lined up, facing the group of five boys. It is not clear what would have happened next were it not for this.
At this point, [XGV], who knew that you, [VGT], were carrying a knife, asked you to give it to him. You did so. He started brandishing it purposefully towards the other group, who started backing away. [XGV], you then started advancing towards the other group. [WGU] and [VGT], you backed him up. The others continued to back away but, as the three of you, led by [XGV] with the knife, got closer to them, they broke and they ran. [XGV], you ran after them. [WGU] initially did not. [VGT] also ran, albeit lagging behind [XGV] and then, [VGT], you stopped and looked around for [WGU].
The other group, four ran in one direction and Ibrahima ran in the opposite direction from his companions. Ibrahima was pursued by [XGV]. Ibrahima slipped and fell. This was at about the time that [VGT] stopped and turned round to look for [WGU]. [XGV], you did not stop. You caught [up] with Ibrahima. As he lay on the ground on his back, unarmed, unthreatening and defenceless, you stabbed him once in the chest directly to the heart. It seems to have taken you a second or two, and a perhaps a few swings of the arm, before you managed to do this with your knife, but you made sure you did so. Then, having achieved this, you did not pause. You got up and looked around for the rest of Ibrahima’s group. Meanwhile, [WGU], you caught up with [VGT] and the two of you then ran, more or less together, towards Ibrahima. You got to him shortly after [XGV] had left. You appear simply to have looked at him to see what had happened. You did no violence but you offered him no help. Ibrahima got up and ran off. Neither of you did anything to stop him.
[VGT], you ran after [XGV] and, like him, started chasing the others. As you did so, you and Ibrahima Seck almost bumped into each other. Neither of you behaved aggressively to each other. [XGV] and [VGT], you chased the others for a while and then gave up and returned to Nuthurst Road, the place where everything had started. [WGU], you were not involved in that. You mooched around and my impression is that you did not really know what to do with yourself at this point. When the other two came back, you all started moving off, [XGV] on the bike, [WGU] on the scooter, [VGT] running after them, trying to keep up."
The judge recorded what Ibrahima did, and how he died:
"Although Ibrahima had sustained a single fatal wound to the heart that would kill him, he does not seem to have realised immediately how badly injured he was. Having jumped up from the ground, he ran off again in a different direction from the others in his group. He could not keep up the effort of running for very long. He got to a house and knocked on the door and tried to get help, even though the people who lived there were complete strangers. They were initially baffled and surprised to have their Sunday afternoon disturbed by this unfamiliar person, but they soon realised he was bleeding. He collapsed. They did their best to help him and to comfort him. Their evidence was read to the court. It was heartrending. He told them that he did not want to die. This, as I know, had an enormous emotional effect on all of us who heard it. The mother of the family held his hand as he breathed his last. I hope that it is of some comfort to his family that, in his last moments, he received kindness from these good people."
The offenders made their way to XGV's home. His mother was there. She drove the three offenders to the home address of a close friend, once there the offenders showered and changed their clothes. WGU disputed that he showered and changed his clothes, as to which the learned judge said this:
"[XGV], [VGT] and [WGU] made their way to [XGV's] house. His mother was there.... [XGV] went in to see her and the two of them, after a while, left the house together. She drove [XGV] and also [VGT] and probably [WGU] as well to a place nearby, the house of...a very close friend... and a sort of quasi-mother or aunt to [XGV]. The boys got out of the car and made their way to [the home of the friend]. There, they showered and they changed their clothes."
WGU left and went home. VGT and XGV waited a while before going to the police station to hand themselves in. WGU was later arrested at his home address. In interview the three offenders answered "no comment" to all questions.
The judge was satisfied from the evidence he heard at trial that (i) the knife belonged to XGV, (ii) that XGV had given his knife to VGT when they set off earlier that afternoon and (iii) XGV had done that because he was subject at the time to a police caution for possessing a knife and would be in "big trouble" if the police found him in possession of another one. The learned judge was also satisfied that WGU had not known of the presence of the knife until VGT produced it and handed it to XGV.
Ibrahima Seck
Ibrahima was 14 years old when XGV stabbed and killed him. His older twin brothers were with Ibrahima that day and witnessed what happened. We have read the moving victim personal statements from his heartbroken mother and father. They describe how the actions of the offenders have shattered their family. Nothing this Court says can undo the events of that day or bring Ibrahima back to them. No sentence could possibly be an adequate reflection of the value of Ibrahima's life.
Sentencing child offenders for serious offences, particularly offences which have resulted in someone's death and which have such dreadful lifelong consequences for the families and friends of the victims is always difficult. The law requires the court to consider the welfare and rehabilitation of the child offenders in arriving at sentence. Inevitably, as here, there are long and detailed reports on each of the offenders to be read and gone through. In doing that, in focusing on the offenders as the law requires, it can seem as if the victim and their family have been overlooked - forgotten even. But that is not so. Throughout our consideration of this Reference, we remain acutely conscious of why we are here. We remember that the person at the heart of this case is 14-year-old Ibrahima Seck and that his family have lost him. Last Monday was the anniversary of his death.
The offenders
On 8 June 2025 when Ibrahima was killed XGV was aged 14 years and 2 months, VGT was aged 16 years and 8 months and WGU was 14 years and 3 months. XGV had no previous convictions but in December 2024 (some 6 months previously) he had received a police caution for being in possession of a knife in a public place. Neither VGT nor WGU had any previous convictions, cautions, warnings or reprimands recorded against them.
The judge presided over the 4-week trial and was able to observe the offenders throughout. One of them (VGT) gave evidence, allowing the judge to see and hear his account of what took place. In terms of further information about each offender for the purposes of sentence the judge had the following additional material:
Pre-sentence reports for each offender prepared by the Youth Justice Service. As is usual the reports were full and detailed, drawing on many sources of information.
So far as VGT was concerned, there was a letter which he wrote to the court expressing sadness and remorse, also a character reference from his mother.
There was a psychological report from Dr Ian Hamilton on XGV together with an intermediary report. XGV had an intermediary for the whole of the trial.
There were Sentencing Notes from all counsel together with several Court of Appeal authorities.
We have read and considered all this material. We have also viewed the CCTV of the incident.
The judge turned to XGV first. He said he would sentence him on the basis that it was his knife and that he had gone out that afternoon with the knife intending to have it at his disposal in case he needed it. Applying the starting points for minimum terms for murder enacted by Parliament at paragraph 5A of Schedule 21, this gave a starting point of 13 years. As to aggravating and mitigating factors, the judge said that he could not be sure XGV had used the knife intending to kill Ibrahima. However, he had clearly found it "exciting and enjoyable" to have and use the knife. He had chased after the others and would have stabbed them too had he caught up with them. The offence was in public and XGV had a caution for carrying a knife at the time. He had disposed of his phone and his clothes but that was of limited effect since he had turned himself into the police later that day and admitted having been there. The judge noted that XGV had been, and still was, very young. Dr Hamilton's report detailed significant cognitive limitations and ADHD.
The pre-sentence report referred to difficulties XGV had experienced growing up, including episodes of domestic violence and abuse in the home. The youth team worker was of the view that the remorse XGV had expressed was genuine and the judge accepted that. XGV had shown progress whilst on remand which the judge took into account. He observed that all of the features justified "a significant reduction" in the sentence.
Turning to VGT, the judge noted that he was older than the other two but he had not been the ringleader - in fact the opposite. He had been led by the others. VGT was the only offender who had given evidence and the only explanation he could give for being with WGU and XGV was that it was "exciting". He had never seen XGV with a knife before and did not know he would use it to injure anyone. The judge said that he had to reconcile this with the jury's verdict of guilty to manslaughter, accepting the submissions of VGT's counsel that it was consistent with an expectation that XGV would merely threaten the others with the knife and make them feel apprehensive of violence. The judge said that he was "certainly persuaded" that VGT did not expect XGV to stab Ibrahima as he lay defenceless on the ground. It was notable, the judge said, that VGT "never… threatened any of [the other group] or looked as if you had any intention of harming anyone". The judge declined to follow the prosecution's invitation to place the offence in category B culpability of the Adult Guideline, instead deciding that"... in the circumstances in which you found yourself, it was not obvious to you that [XGV] would use the knife and stab someone.", placing the offence in category C.
The pre-sentence report for VGT was "favourable and positive", the author noting that he had expressed genuine regret and remorse. His likelihood of re-offending was assessed as low. The author of the pre-sentence report suggested a 36-month Youth Referral Order in VGT's case. The judge noted that, like XGV, WGU was still only 14. He had had a more significant role in the background to the incident but his involvement on the day was "relatively limited". There was no evidence that WGU had known about the knife. The judge assessed his culpability, as with Riley, to fall into category C of the Adult Guideline.
WGU's background had been unsettled, moving with his family from Nigeria when he was 10, being in a home where there was domestic abuse. The pre-sentence report had also identified factors leading to a Conclusive Grounds Decision - WGU had been the victim of child criminal exploitation. The risk of re-offending in his case, unlike VGT, was assessed as high.
The judge then proceeded to pass the sentences which we have already noted. In XGV's case he deducted from the minimum term the number of days which he had already spent on remand.
Arguments on this reference
XGV
The principal criticism made in respect of XGV's sentence is that the judge should have moved up from the starting point of 13 years given in the table at paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 before adjusting for aggravating and mitigating features to reflect the fact that at 14, XGV was at the top end of the 5-year age range to which the 13-year minimum term applies. Citing the decision in BGI and CMB [2024] EWCA Crim 1591, Mr Jarvis on behalf of the Solicitor General, submitted that the starting points "must not be applied mechanistically" and that once the applicable starting point in Schedule 21 has been identified there ought to be movement up or down to reflect the age and proper level of maturity of the particular offender. Given that XGV was at the top end of the age range, his age should have caused the judge to move up from the 13-year starting point before adjusting for aggravation and mitigation. In response Mr Littler KC for XGV, pointed out that XGV had been assessed as having significant cognitive limitations, to the extent that Dr Hamilton concluded that 99 per cent of his peers would outperform him. XGV had a diagnosis of ADHD and the Youth Justice Service Team confirmed that he had been a victim of modern slavery. He had experienced a multiplicity of adverse childhood events such that he was highly vulnerable. He required an intermediary for the whole of the trial. Mr Littler suggested that in truth XGV was significantly under the age of 14 in terms of his maturity and that the judge had properly reflected this in arriving at the minimum term of 11 years 10 months from which the days spent on remand had had to be deducted.
VGT and WGU
Mr Jarvis, for the Solicitor General, argued that whilst the judge had been entirely correct to determine that a custodial sentence was inevitable in the cases of both boys, he erred in placing the offence within culpability category C of the Adult Guideline. He submitted that on the correct interpretation of the guideline culpability should have fallen into category B not C, as both boys ought to have known that there was a high risk of death. It must have been obvious to them, he said, that there was a high risk of death or at least grievous bodily harm from being stabbed with a knife. On that analysis, the starting point for an adult would have been 12 years' custody. He said that the judge, in otherwise careful and considered sentencing remarks, had simply not addressed the part of the guideline factor identifying the risk as something which ought to have been known to the boys and in failing to address that the judge had erred. Had he done so he must, Mr Jarvis says, have placed culpability into the higher category.
Ms Summers KC for VGT, argued the culpability B factor "death was caused in the course of an unlawful act which carried a high risk of death or GBH which was or ought to be obvious to the offender" is a subjective test. It is asking what would have been obvious to VGT in the circumstances that existed, including his age. The judge had heard all the evidence and was in the best position to determine what must have been obvious to VGT. His decision that VGT's culpability fell into category C was unimpeachable. Whilst the judge had not have referred explicitly to the ought to have known part of the guideline, she argued that it was apparent from his remarks that he considered the prosecution submission that the risk of serious harm or death was "all too obvious", and had not accepted it. Furthermore, Ms Summers pointed out the guideline applies to an adult. What is or should be obvious to an adult will not necessarily be so to a child caught up in a fast-moving and unexpected chain of events. That too needed to be taken into account.
Mr English KC for WGU likewise submitted that the judge had not erred. He had considered the proper level of culpability, deciding on category C rather than B. He had then followed the Sentencing Council Children and Young Person's Guideline, adjusting for aggravation and mitigation before making the appropriate reduction for age.
Discussion and decision
We start by noting that there is not, nor could there be, any suggestion that the judge's findings of fact were wrong or were not open to him.
In BGIandCMB William Davis LJ, giving the judgment of the Court, reviewed the cases dealing with the application of the graduated starting points for minimum terms enacted by Parliament in Schedule 21. At paragraph 20 he cited this extract from the judgment of the then Lord Chief Justice in R v Jones [2005] EWCA Crim 315, observing that it applied equally to the starting points for young offenders given at paragraph 5A of Schedule 21:
"The guidance given by Schedule 21 is provided to assist the judge to determine the appropriate sentence. The judge must have regard to the guidance, but each case will depend critically on its particular facts. If the judge concludes that it is appropriate to follow a course that does not appear to reflect the guidance, the judge should explain the reason for this….. The starting points give the judge guidance as to the range within which the appropriate sentence is likely to fall having regard to the more salient features of the offence, but even then, as paragraph 9 [as it then was – now paragraph 8] recognises, 'detailed consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors may result in a minimum term of any length (whatever the starting point), [emphasis ours] or in the making of a whole life order'. The starting points must not be used mechanistically…"
The key passage from BGI for present purposes is at [25] where the Court said this:
"The starting point with which we are concerned relates to all offenders aged 14 and under. It would be contrary to good sense and experience of how children change between the ages of 10 and 14 to apply a starting point of 13 years to every child from the age of criminal responsibility up to those about to reach their 15th birthday. It may be that it is not a debate worth having given that the huge differences between a 10-year-old and a 14-year-old might be accommodated by dealing with them via mitigating factors. However, as a matter of principle and having regard to the way in which starting points in Schedule 21 are to be applied, we conclude that the starting point for offenders aged 14 and under must not be applied mechanistically. Cases in which offenders will be as young as 12 at the date of the offence will be very rare. That does not mean that the principle should not be applied properly. This principle should apply at all levels of the starting points in paragraph 5A."
We do not accept that the Solicitor General's submission that in the light of what is said in BGI it follows that the 13-year starting point must be uplifted for a child at the top end of the 10 to 14 age range. There is nothing in paragraph 5A which suggests that this must be so. In BGI the Court made a downward adjustment to the 13-year starting point on account of the young age of the offenders in that case although, as William Davis LJ observed, the same result would follow from approaching youth as a mitigating factor. In any event it does not follow that the starting point given in paragraph 5A must be raised where the child is at the upper end of the age range. Children are all different and whilst some 10 year olds will be mature for their age, some 14 year olds will be assessed as immature. That is why the Sentencing Council Guideline and all the recent cases stress that children must be sentenced individualistically. There is no one-size-fits-all approach.
As the Lady Chief emphasised in Kamarra-Jarra [2024] EWCA Crim 198:
"... the starting points in paragraphs 2 to 6 of Schedule 21 are not to be applied mechanistically, but in a flexible way so as to achieve a just result."
Here the judge took the 13-year starting point and adjusted it by reference to the various factors which he identified as having made the offence more serious (public place; running after the others; previous caution; disposing of evidence). The judge then took account of factors relating to XGV himself which mitigated this most serious of offences, which he specifically accepted as calling for a "significant reduction", including XGV's immaturity as identified by the psychologist and the Youth Justice Service, his background of violent abuse and neglect and of modern slavery together with all the other factors identified in the long and detailed Youth Justice Service report. It is not suggested in the Reference that the judge erred in according these factors considerable weight.
Sentencing children for very serious offences calls for an exceptionally difficult exercise of judgment, balancing out all relevant factors in seeking to achieve a just result. We can find no error in the way in which this judge exercised his judgment in arriving at the final minimum term in XGV's case. The upwards adjustment for age from the 3-year starting point given in Schedule 21 was the sole point taken by the Solicitor General in the Reference. As we have said, we do not accept it. We refuse leave.
VGT and WGU
A single point is taken in relation to the manslaughter sentences passed on VGT and WGU, namely that the judge erred in concluding that the offences fell into culpability category C and the Adult Sentencing Council Guideline for Unlawful Act Manslaughter. Mr Jarvis argued that the judge should have placed the offence in culpability category B. Category B has a starting point for an adult offender of 12 years with a range of 8 to 16 years. Category C has a starting point of 6 years with a range of 3 to 9 years.
There are two important points to bear in mind when considering the appropriate sentence for those young offenders. First, that the Manslaughter Guideline is an Adult Guideline. It was only indirectly applicable to the sentences through the application of paragraphs 6.45 and 6.46 of the Sentencing Council Sentencing Children and Young People Guideline, where this guidance is provided:
Only if the court is satisfied that the offence crosses the custody threshold, and that no other sentence is appropriate, the court may, as a preliminary consideration, consult the equivalent adult guideline in order to decide upon the appropriate length of the sentence.
When considering the relevant adult guideline, the court may feel it appropriate to apply a sentence broadly within the region of half to two thirds of the adult sentence for those aged 15 – 17 and allow a greater reduction for those aged under 15. This is only a rough guide and must not be applied mechanistically. In most cases when considering the appropriate reduction from the adult sentence the emotional and developmental age and maturity of the child or young person is of at least equal importance as their chronological age. This reduction should be applied before any reduction for a plea of guilty."
It is worth restating here that the judges are obliged by section 59(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020 to:
"… follow any sentencing guidelines which are relevant to the offender's case... unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so."
The second important qualification when considering the indirect application of the Adult Guideline is that the culpability factors must be considered bearing in mind that the offender is a child. Here the relevant culpability B factor identified in the Adult Guideline is:
"Death was caused in the course of an unlawful act which carried a high risk of death or GBH which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender."
It is not the case that something which ought to have been obvious to an adult offender can simply be read over as something that ought to have been obvious to a child offender. It is clear from the arguments addressed to him by prosecution and defence at the sentencing hearing, a full transcript of which we have and have read closely, that the judge was asked to and gave careful thought to the competing guideline factors and to what VGT (aged 16 in June 2025) and WGU (aged 14) ought to have appreciated about XGV's use of the knife. The judge plainly considered the prosecution submission about what the boys ought to have known, as appears from his reference to the submission made to him that the risk was "all too obvious".
We cannot find that the judge erred in concluding that culpability category C, not B, provided the nearest guidance when arriving at the appropriate custodial sentence for these offenders in the circumstances of this case. We remind ourselves that the judge heard all the evidence, saw VGT give evidence and was best placed to make the appropriate assessment of his and WGU's culpability in relation to this incident, bearing in mind that the jury had acquitted both boys of the very much more serious offence.
No other point is taken in the Reference in relation to sentences. We refuse leave.
We ought to explain to the boys what this means. XGV, we have decided not to increase your minimum term, it stays where it is. VGT, likewise, in relation to you, your sentence will not be increased. Finally, WGU, your sentence stays as it is, it will not be increased.
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