R v Robert Wayne Worrell

An order has been made in this case under section 45A of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 that no mater relating to the two children of the complainant Quang Hong Ly concerned in the proceedings shall be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as persons concerned in the proceedings, in particular: (a) their names, (b) their addresses, (c) the identity of any school or other educational establishment attended by them, (d) the identity of any place of work, or (e) any still or moving picture of them.

On 16 September 2021 in the Crown Court at Portsmouth, the applicant was convicted by a jury of an offence of conspiracy to kidnap, contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

On 9 February 2024, in the Crown Court at Winchester, His Honour Judge Mousley KC (“the Judge”), who had presided over the trial, sentenced the applicant to an extended sentence of 13 years, comprising a custodial term of 10 years and an extension period of 3 years.

Leave to appeal against sentence was refused by the Single Judge. The applicant subsequently renewed his application for leave to appeal to the Full Court. He requires an extension of time of 41 days in relation to his renewal application. He also requires an extension of time of 430 days in relation to his application for leave to appeal.

The applicant is represented by Mr Martin-Sperry, who did not appear below. He has appeared pro bono before this Court and the Court is very grateful to him. Mr Martin-Sperry explained to us that he does not currently have access to the documentation on the Digital Case System ("DCS") regarding this case, and it emerged during the hearing that he was not in a position to answer some of the questions that we asked of him. After reflecting, Mr Martin-Sperry asked us to adjourn this renewal application and for us to direct that he has access to this case on DCS. Before determining the application to adjourn, we gave Mr Martin-Sperry the opportunity to address us on the merits of his grounds as well, indicating that when we rose, we would consider both the adjournment application and the merits, as appropriate.

The applicant was born on 10 November 1977. He was aged 43 at the date of conviction and 46 when sentenced.

The applicant was tried and convicted along with one of his fellow conspirators, Michael Groves. Perry Hunt, another conspirator, had earlier pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge. Jamie Green was convicted after a trial held in his absence in March 2023. Nathan O'Brien was tried in September 2023 and was acquitted. Two other alleged conspirators were acquitted at various stages.

The kidnapping was planned in early February 2019. The plan was for the conspirators to pose as police officers and abduct the victim, threaten him and demand he hand over substantial sums of money.

After details of the complainant's home address, work address and his cars were sent to Hunt on 8 February 2019, he contacted Green and the applicant. Then on 11 February 2019 Hunt travelled to Portsmouth, contacting the applicant on the way. Hunt went to the complainant's home and work premises and made further contact with the applicant and other conspirators. Meanwhile, in southeast London the applicant was provided with a BMW motorcar fitted with blue flashing lights in the grill, so as to resemble a police vehicle. The applicant and another male then drove the BMW to Petersfield where they met with Hunt, and the three men then travelled on to Portsmouth.

In Portsmouth, the three men followed the complainant when he left his home with two of his children and drove to a friend's house. The blue lights on the BMW were then switched on and two of the men, including the applicant, got out of the BMW wearing police baseball caps. They said they were police officers and that the complainant was to come with them. When he declined, a choke hold was applied and his legs were held, as he was forced into the BMW. A blanket was put over his head. He was then punched and choked, and his hands were handcuffed behind his back. His phone was taken along with his watch, his cash and his keys. His children were left behind in his car.

After about half an hour, the car stopped. Groves was present with a van and Green was there with another van. The complainant was pulled out of the car and forced to his knees, with his head still covered. The kidnappers continued to demand money from him. When the complainant said he did not have any, he was beaten. The Judge was satisfied the applicant was involved in this. The complainant was then put in the back of the van driven by Groves and driven to the Rochester area. The other vehicles followed. The van stopped after about an hour, the doors were opened and further demands for money were made. White paint was sprayed at the complainant. The contacts on his phone were searched, and he was made to contact two of these individuals to ask them for loans. When this proved unsuccessful, he was beaten again.

The complainant was then driven for a further half an hour. When the vehicle stopped, he was further assaulted. The handcuffs were then removed, and he was made to change his clothes. He was pushed out of the van and told he was going home. His house keys were thrown at him. It was now about 2am.

On 17 February 2019 the complainant received a text stating the procedure would be repeated and a demand was made for £2.5 million. Another threatening text was sent to him on 18 February 2019. Both of these messages were sent by Green.

The applicant has 19 convictions for 41 offences between 12 December1995 and 26 May 2021. They include:

As best as we can discern, the relevant chronology is as follows. On 2 March 2018, the applicant was released on licence from the 10-year sentence of imprisonment imposed in 2013. He then committed the index offence in February 2019. According to the Prosecution's Sentencing Note, approximately two months after the index offence, he committed the offence which led to the Plymouth Sentence. The Prosecution's Sentencing Note also indicated that on 15 April 2019, the applicant was recalled to custody in respect of the breach of his licence conditions regarding the 2013 sentence, although in his new grounds Mr Martin-Sperry indicates that from April 2019 the applicant was in custody in relation to the offence that led to the Plymouth Sentence. The applicant was subsequently charged with the index offence and, it appears, remanded in custody (although we do not have the exact date for this). On 26 May 2021, the Plymouth Sentence was imposed, and as we have indicated, he was then convicted in September 2021 and sentenced in February 2024 for the index offence.

In new Grounds of Appeal that were only filed with the Court yesterday, Mr Martin-Sperry indicates that the applicant was due to be sentenced for the index offence on 23 June 2023. He says that, in the event, only Hunt was produced for sentence, the prison van being told to transport Hunt alone from HMP Winchester, because the applicant's sentencing was being postponed by the Judge. Mr Martin-Sperry also says that at the hearing on 23 June 2023, the Judge indicated that he would await the conclusion of the final trial involving O'Brien before sentencing the applicant. Groves was sentenced in the interim on 5 July 2023.

The Victim Personal Statement made by the complainant described how the incident had had a substantial impact on his health, his lifestyle, and his family relationships. He was unable to work for a period of time after the kidnapping. His two children had been upset and shaken by the events.

A Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) dated 12 June 2023 was before the Court. Due to difficulties with the video-link, the author had been unable to interview the applicant. She summarised an earlier risk assessment from July 2022. The applicant was assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm to members of the public. The nature of the risk was serious physical, emotional and psychological harm, including through the threat and potential use of weapons and guns. The author of the report noted there had been a clear escalation in the applicant's offending in recent years. He had a history of committing further offences of a serious nature whilst subject to existing sentences and licences. He also had a history of absconding and non-compliance during his times of community-based management.

The Judge noted the applicant's history of using firearms and weapons. He was "quite satisfied that you have been involved in organised crime for many years".

There was no offence-specific sentencing guideline. The Judge took account of the following features: the length of the abduction, which lasted for about seven hours before The complaint was left in a fairly remote location near Guildford; the circumstances of the detention, including that he was kidnapped just outside his home with his children nearby, that he was blindfolded and driven for a lengthy period of time and handcuffed; the extent of the violence used upon the complainant and the effect which this terrifying incident had upon him; that there were at least six conspirators; and they had imitated police officers. The Judge acknowledged that no weapon had been used.

The Judge recognised that because the applicant had been convicted of a schedule 18 offence, he was required to consider the issue of dangerousness. He was satisfied the applicant presented a significant risk of committing further specified offences and a significant risk of causing serious harm thereby. In this regard, the Judge referred to the nature of the offence and the applicant's previous convictions.

The Judge said he bore in mind the signs that the applicant was changing his ways and, as a result, he would reduce the sentence he otherwise would have imposed.

The Judge said that if he were passing a determinate sentence, 10 years was the least period of detention he could impose in the circumstances. However, he concluded such a sentence would not fully address the risk that that the applicant currently represented, so that it was necessary to impose an extended sentence in order to protect the public in the future. Having indicated the custodial period and the extended licence period he would impose, it is necessary to refer to the Judge’s concluding remarks, which were as follows:

Green and Hunt were sentenced by the Judge on 23 June 2023. He said that Green was at the centre of the conspiracy, planning and organising everything. He identified a starting point of 13 years' imprisonment. He noted Green had no recent previous convictions, but that he could not ignore his earlier convictions. Green had fled from the UK and remained outside of the jurisdiction. There was no real mitigation. A sentence of 15 years imprisonment was imposed.

Hunt was Green's right-hand man. He had also fled the UK but had surrendered himself after 18 months. He had previous convictions for robbery, but as a significantly younger man. The Judge took a starting point of 8 years’ imprisonment. He said he increased this to reflect the aggravating features, but then significantly reduced the figure in light of the remorse Hunt had shown and the steps he had taken whilst on remand to put his life in order. The Judge said: "I am impressed by what you have done whilst you have been on remand and I sentence you as you appear to be now rather than what you were, or appeared to be, four years ago." In addition, Hunt was entitled to one-third credit for his plea. A sentence of 64 months’ imprisonment was imposed.

Groves was sentenced by the Judge on 5 July 2023. He was now aged 33 and had been sentence to 3 years for an offence of robbery in 2019 and had been on bail for that offence when the index offence was committed. The Judge considered that Groves had played an important role in the conspiracy, but he was impressed by the very positive steps Groves had taken whilst on remand. He also considered it was clear that Groves was remorseful and had good insight. The sentence imposed was 7 years' imprisonment.

The original threefold grounds of appeal that were before the Single Judge were contained in a document dated 12 May 2025 bearing Mr Martin-Sperry's name. In summary, they were as follows.

Ground 1 alleged that the Judge had granted the applicant full credit for the time he had served on remand and that, notwithstanding this, the Prison Service has failed to deduct the three years he had spent on remand, in turn rendering the sentence manifestly excessive in law and effect. The ground said that section 240ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 ("CJA") mandates that any period spent in custody which relates to the offence for which the sentence is imposed must be credited towards the sentence unless expressly disapplied by the Court and no such disapplication was directed by the Judge.

Ground 2 was the Judge failed to apply the "COVID" effect sentence reduction to which the applicant was entitled pursuant to the Manning [2020] EWCA Crim 592 line of authorities, as he endured detention under pandemic conditions and, like his co-conspirators, he should have benefitted from the same mitigating consideration. It was said that the Judge's failure to do so resulted in unfairly disparate treatment.

Ground 3 alleged that there was an unjustified disparity between the applicant's sentence and the sentences imposed on his co-conspirators, as he was the only one to receive an extended sentence. The ground argued that there was no basis for this disparity and the Judge failed to articulate any rationale for imposing an extended sentence on the applicant alone. There was no clear risk assessment that distinguished the applicant from his co-conspirators.

On 25 June 2026 (a day before this hearing) Mr Martin-Sperry submitted a new Grounds of Appeal document. This continued to rely upon the alleged COVID reduction disparity, although the alleged disparity was now only raised in relation to Hunt's sentence and the original Ground 3 appears to have been broadened into a more general complaint about disparity, in particular in comparison to the sentence imposed on Hunt.

The new Grounds also submit that the applicant was unfairly disadvantaged by only being sentenced on 9 February 2024. The significance of this, as we will go on to explain, is that the time he had spent in custody prior to this point did not count for the purposes of his sentence for the index offence as time only ran from when the sentence was imposed.

Orally today Mr Martin-Sperry also advanced points in relation to the offence that led to the Plymouth Sentence. It is unnecessary to go into those in detail, but we record that the account which Mr Martin-Sperry gave the court, no doubt on instructions, bore virtually no relation to that set out in the Prosecution's Sentencing Note for the index offence.

We have considered the application to adjourn. We appreciate Mr Martin-Sperry's difficulties in not having access to the DCS. However, we all have access to the DCS, and we have carefully considered all of the relevant documentation in relation to this case. We conclude it is clear that there is no merit in any of the grounds advanced, for the reasons we will come on to explain. Accordingly, we see no value in granting the adjournment sought.

In terms of the Grounds itself, we will first address the position in relation to the time the applicant spent on remand in respect of the index offence.

We refer to the version of section 240ZA CJA that was in force when the applicant was sentenced. Subsection (3) did provide that the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody in connection with the offence or a related offence was to count as time served by the offender as part of the sentence. However, subsection (3) said in terms, "But this is subject to subsections (4) to (6)". Subsections (4) and (5) provided:

In Phillips [2015] EWCA Crim 427, [2015] 2 Cr App R (2) 19 this Court considered the circumstances in which the sentencing court could disapply the effect of section 240ZA(4) and (5). The judgment of the court indicated that the effect of section 240ZA(4) and (5) was that where an offender committed a further offence when out in the community on licence in respect of an existing sentence and then was recalled to prison with his licence revoked, any time spent on remand in connection with the further offence did not count as time served to be deducted from his sentence if this period coincided with his detention pursuant to the recall.

The Court noted that in Kerrigan [2014] EWCA Crim 2348, [2015] 1 Cr App (S) 29 this Court had accepted that the court does have a residual discretion to make allowance for time spent on remand if the court considered this was required to correct an injustice, for example in a case involving excessive delay. However, Kerrigan made clear that this was "very much a residual discretion to correct any perceived injustice" and it could not be used to run a coach and horses through the statutory provisions, where Parliament's intention was clear that time spent on remand for an offence does not count as time served as part of the sentence if it coincides with time spent in custody on recall. The judgment continued that an offender "is not entitled, and should not expect, to have his sentence discounted in such circumstances". The discretion, by definition, required the court to exercise an assessment of the facts and to make a judgment as to what was required.

As we have indicated earlier, it appears the applicant was in custody from April 2019 in relation to his licence recall relating to the 2013 sentence and from a point shortly afterwards also in relation to a remand in custody regarding the offence for which he received the Plymouth Sentence. Then, of course, from May 2021 he was in custody as a result of the Plymouth Sentence.

Accordingly, the effect of section 240ZA(4) and (5) was that the time the applicant spent on remand for the index offence would not count as time served towards his sentence unless the Judge specifically exercised his discretion to disapply the usual statutory consequences.

Like the Single Judge, we do not consider it arguable that the Judge's words at the end of his Sentencing Remarks, where he said "any time you have spent on remand will count towards your sentence", was an indication that he had exercised this residual discretion. He was simply giving a standard form indication of the usual effect of section 240ZA(3). As Phillips confirms, the discretion may be exercised in particular circumstances and after a careful assessment of the facts in order to correct an injustice. However, there is nothing in the Judge's Sentencing Remarks to indicate he considered the applicant would suffer a particular injustice as a result of the usual application of section 240ZA(4) and (5), nothing to indicate he was exercising the residual discretion we have described and, indeed, nothing to indicate that any application was made before him on behalf of the applicant to do so. Further, Mr Martin-Sperry's new argument of unfairness appears to be predicated on the basis that the Judge did not make any such direction. In any event, it appears to us the difficulties that have arisen are largely of the applicant's own making, arising from the fact he chose to commit two very serious offences shortly after he was released on licence from the 2013 sentence.

Once the applicant was sentenced for the index offence in February 2024, this sentence ran concurrently with the Plymouth Sentence: see Costello [2010] EWCA Crim 371. In this sense the applicant benefitted from the statutory sentencing provisions. However, in a situation that was, as we have said, largely of the applicant's own making, we are unsympathetic to Mr Martin-Sperry's new argument that the applicant was unfairly disadvantaged by not being sentenced along with his co-conspirators in June 2023. We do not have a transcript of the June 2023 hearing, but it appears to us very likely that the Judge, quite properly, postponed sentencing of the applicant in relation to this matter because he was aware that he was serving the Plymouth Sentence and aware of the effect that we have just referred to, namely that the two custodial sentences would be served in tandem once a sentence for the index offence had been imposed. It appears to us that this was an entirely legitimate approach for the Judge to take. Also, as we have pointed out, in so far as it is now said the applicant has suffered an injustice as a result of the date of this sentence, application could have been made to the judge to exercise the discretion we have just referred to in order to disapply the effect of section 240ZA(4) and (5) but it does not appear that this was done.

We turn to the alleged disparity arising from a COVID reduction which Mr Martin-Sperry says was applied to Hunt. In his new grounds he says the Judge reduced his starting point of 8 years for Hunt because of the one-third guilty plea credit and by a further 10% to reflect the hardship of his being incarcerated during COVID and a further 10% to take account of the adverse conditions then existing at HMP Winchester.

However, unlike Mr Martin-Sperry, we have a transcript of the Judge's Sentencing Remarks and they contain no such indication. There is no reference to COVID or to conditions at HMP Winchester. To the contrary, the Judge specifically explains that he will reduce the figure of 8 years to take account of the progress Hunt had made on remand, as we have already indicated. Accordingly, there is no apparent disparity.

Furthermore, even if the Judge had made such a reduction in Hunt's case, the applicant's position was distinct from Hunt so far as the COVID aspect is concerned, as his relevant time in custody for the purposes of this sentence did not begin until 9 February 2024, when pandemic conditions would no longer have been in operation.

We also note there is no rule of law that all sentences must be reduced for this reason even during the period when pandemic conditions did apply and the longer the sentence, the less likely it is that a reduction on this basis would be called for: Fairclough [2021] EWCA Crim 1214.

We turn to the other points that have been raised regarding disparity, firstly addressing the original Ground 3 contention.

In light of their respective records, there was every justification for the Judge to distinguish between the applicant and his co-conspirators in terms of imposing an extended sentence. Given his repeated offending involved firearms and weapons, the fact he quickly committed these two further very serious offences in 2019 after he had been released on licence, the risks cogently identified in the PSR and the nature of the index offence, the Judge was fully entitled to find the applicant was "dangerous" and that the protection of the public warranted the imposition of an extended sentence. As we have already noted, Green, Hunt and Groves were far more lightly convicted than the applicant. The Judge was not obliged to explain this self-evident distinction to the applicant.

As regards the newer wider suggestion of disparity, Green's longer sentence of 15 years reflected his role as the ringleader. In sentencing Hunt, the Judge accepted there were aggravating features which increased his initial starting point of 8 years, before he then made the reduction we have identified for the reasons we have identified. Those reasons were specific to Hunt and the very significant progress he had made. The Judge gave a similar indication in relation to Groves. The applicant, however, was not in a comparable position. Further, the aggravating features were more substantial in his case, given his record of offending. Accordingly, the Judge was entitled to increase his starting point figure in the applicant’s case to 10 years’ custody.

For these reasons we refuse the application for an adjournment. As the applicant's grounds do not identify any arguable basis for showing that his sentence was manifestly excessive, we refuse the application for leave to appeal against sentence. In the circumstances, the two applications for extensions of time do not arise.