R v Corey Morgan

Corey Morgan is now 21 years old. He was born on 21 October 2004.

The offence which brings this appeal against sentence before the court was committed on 12 July 2025. At that time the appellant was 20 years old. He was, however, 21 years old both at the date of conviction before the Crown Court and at the date of sentence.

On 6 May 2026, at the Newport Magistrates' Court, he pleaded guilty to one offence of dangerous driving, contrary to section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. He was committed to the Crown Court for sentence, pursuant to section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

On 3 June 2026, in the Crown Court at Chester, the appellant was sentenced by Mr Recorder Bull KC to an immediate sentence of eight months' imprisonment, and was disqualified from driving for 22 months. That disqualification involved a discretionary period of 18 months, with a four month extension, under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 and until an extended driving test is passed. That four month extension was designed to reflect the period of time which it was anticipated the appellant would spend in prison before his release. The extended driving test was required as a consequence of the conviction for dangerous driving, as was a mandatory minimum disqualification period of 12 months.

The applicant's application for leave to appeal against sentence has been referred to the full court by the Registrar. We grant leave to appeal.

22 March 2026 is another highly significant date in the history of this case. That was the date that section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 came into force. That occurred as the result of section 1 of the Sentencing Act 2026. That section of the 2020 Act applies to all cases where a person is convicted of an offence on or after the commencement date, 22 March. As we have said, the date of conviction in this case was 6 May 2026.

Section 277A(1) provides that if an offender is convicted after the commencement date, and is aged over 21 at the date of conviction, and the term of a prison sentence to be imposed is not more than 12 months, and a suspended sentence order is available, then, under section 277A(2) the court must make a suspended sentence order, unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which (a) relate to the offence (or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it) or the offender; and (b) justify not making the order.

We have just attempted to summarise the combined effect of subsections (1) and (2) of section 277A.

Section 277A(3) then sets out a list of circumstances when section 277A does not apply at all. None of those circumstances existed in this case. Therefore, section 277A(1) and (2) did apply, and, having determined that the appropriate sentence to be imposed was one of eight months' imprisonment (i.e. less than 12 months), the Recorder was obliged to determine whether there were exceptional circumstances of the kind described in subsection (2); and only if he determined that there were did he have power to impose an immediate custodial sentence. In the absence of any such determination, the effect of section 277A is that a suspended sentence order in those circumstances is mandatory.

In this case, as the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the sentencing remarks makes clear, the Recorder did not consider section 277A at all, and proceeded to impose the immediate custodial sentence without first having decided that there were exceptional circumstances in this case of a kind which would justify the imposition of an immediate custodial sentence.

In those circumstances, Miss Sally Harmes, who appeared for the appellant in the court below and who appears before us today, argues that the Recorder fell into error and that the sentence of imprisonment which he imposed ought to have been suspended.

On 12 July 2025, a young woman called Holly Nash was out driving her car with her child in it in order to settle the boy to sleep. She was pregnant at the time with her second child. During this excursion she met a friend, Molly Jennick. Miss Jennick was, or had until very recently been, the appellant's partner. There had been an argument between Miss Jennick and the appellant, and that is what caused the events which we are about to describe.

Miss Nash took Miss Jennick to the appellant's address so that she could collect some of her belongings. He was there, and the argument broke out again. The appellant shouted at her. It was later to transpire that he had consumed not only alcohol in a significant quantity, but also other controlled substances. The argument carried on and Miss Jennick got back into Miss Nash's car so that they could leave. Rather than letting them do so, the appellant got into his own vehicle and shouted to Miss Nash, "I'll ram you". Miss Nash told him that she had her child in the car and told him not to ram her. She drove away. He followed her. He had passengers in his car as well.

There followed some form of chase around the streets of this residential area. We have been able to see some video recording of it from CCTV cameras. During the chase, the appellant struck an unattended, parked motorcar belonging to a Mr Robins, which caused that car to be written off. Mr Robins has provided a Victim Personal Statement which sets out the significant financial loss that that caused him. In it he explains that he is not a man of sufficient means to be able to bear such a loss without substantial hardship to him and his whole family.

The vehicles lost contact, but encountered each other soon afterwards, not very far away. The appellant was pulling out of a side street, revving his car. Miss Nash thought that either one or both of his passengers had left the vehicle by this time. She had some difficulty passing him, but she managed to pull around him and she drove away along the road. He followed her and he rammed her vehicle with his from behind. Again, the chase continued, travelling at significant speeds, and there was a further impact when he rammed Miss Nash's vehicle again. A third impact occurred after they passed a roundabout.

Understandably, Miss Nash was terrified. She thought that her life was in danger and so was that of her baby and her unborn child. Miss Jennick, who was also in the car, was also terrified.

The chase came to an end when they encountered another roundabout. At this point the appellant carried out another extremely dangerous manoeuvre in an attempt to impede or ram Miss Nash's vehicle again. On this occasion he hit a kerb and crashed into a tree, causing his vehicle to turn over onto its roof. He remained in the vehicle at that stage, upside down. Passers-by came to help and the emergency services were called.

Some limited damage had been caused to Miss Nash's vehicle. She was surprised at the limited nature of it, given the number and the force of the impacts which she had experienced. She was very concerned about her own health, that of her child, and that of her unborn child.

The police arrived. The appellant was still in his vehicle. He was unconscious, with blood coming from his face and head. When he came round, the officers told him to stay where he was because they were concerned about his injuries. He chose to leave his car, at which point the officers could smell alcohol on his breath. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while being unfit through drink or drugs. He was subsequently arrested again for dangerous driving, reminded that he was under caution, and he said: "I weren't driving".

When he was taken to hospital, it was discovered that he had sustained very serious injuries. He had a fractured skull, a broken neck and a bleed on the brain. Blood was taken from him in hospital. The blood sample showed that his blood contained not less than 84 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood (against a legal limit of 80 milligrams). That blood sample was taken at 4 am – some hours after the driving had finished.

Tests revealed a metabolite of cocaine present in his blood, above the "legal limit". Cannabis was also found to be present in his blood, also above a "legal limit". He was uninsured. He has never passed a driving test, and therefore was guilty of a number of summary offences. He was bailed because he was not fit for interview.

He was finally interviewed on 22 October 2025 and made no comment.

Six months were allowed to pass before he was charged with dangerous driving on 1 April 2026. The effect of that unexplained delay was that no summary only matters could now be charged against him. Accordingly, he was not prosecuted for the offence of driving while over the limit, or driving without a licence, or driving whilst uninsured. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that all of those offences had in fact been committed and were disclosed by the evidence available to the court; and to the extent that it was appropriate, those matters were capable of being taken into account as aggravating factors of the offence of dangerous driving.

The Recorder had before him the antecedents of the appellant. He was of previous good character.

The author of a pre-sentence report described him as being extremely immature. Since leaving school, he has worked for only one week. He appears to be living a rather rootless and aimless existence. The author of the report proposed certain requirements that could be attached to a community order or a suspended sentence order in the event that the court decided that either type of order was an appropriate disposal of the case.

Miss Jennick did not make a statement in support of this prosecution, or a Victim Personal Statement about any harm that she ultimately sustained from it. Indeed, on the night of the event, when she realised what had happened to the appellant, she rushed to his aid.

Miss Harmes submits, shortly and succinctly, that the Recorder erred in not considering section 277A of the Sentencing Code, as inserted by the Sentencing Act 2026, when he decided that the appropriate custodial sentence to impose upon the appellant was an immediate term of eight months (i.e. a sentence of less than 12 months).

In response, Mr Desai, who appears before us on behalf of the prosecution (and who did not appear below), has submitted that, even if he had considered section 277A, the Recorder would have been entitled to conclude that the circumstances of the offending, as we have set them out above, were sufficiently exceptional for the Recorder to make such a determination which would enable him to impose an immediate custodial sentence.

The sentence in this case was, as we have said, imposed on 3 June 2026, following conviction on 6 May 2026. Section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 therefore applied, with the effect that we have set out above.

The Sentencing Council published a guideline which was available from the time when section 277A came into force to assist judges to impose sentences in compliance with it. That is a revised version of the guideline on the imposition of community and custodial sentences. This carefully distinguishes the approach which is to be taken where a defendant was convicted after 22 March 2026 from the approach which would have been taken had the conviction occurred before that date.

The defence sentencing note prepared for the Recorder by Miss Harmes said:

Neither that note, nor the one provided by counsel who then appeared for the prosecution refers in terms to section 277A. Miss Harmes has candidly told us this morning that that was because at the time when she was preparing her sentencing note, she had not anticipated a sentence of less than 12 months.

The result was that the Recorder did not have his attention drawn to section 277A at any time during the hearing. It would appear that he did not consult the imposition guideline himself. Had he done so, he would inevitably have seen the important distinction which is made in Part 8 of that guideline between cases which arise before the commencement date of section 277A and those which arise after it.

At the time when he was deciding what the outcome of the case would be, the Recorder was aware that he had in mind a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment or less. In that respect he had the advantage over counsel. At all events, the sentencing hearing came and went without anybody mentioning the new provision.

The Recorder dealt with the question of whether or not his sentence could be suspended. He said:

That, it seems to us, was clearly a reference by the Recorder to the table which has featured in the imposition guideline for some years. It sets out factors which militate in favour of suspending a sentence, alongside other factors which at present would militate in the opposite direction. One of the factors suggesting that suspension may not be "appropriate" is "the seriousness of the offence means that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody".

In cases which arose before 22 March 2026, that table, which includes that consideration, had to be considered in all cases where suspension of the sentence was an option. In those circumstances the court then was deciding whether suspending the sentence was "appropriate".

In the new version of the guideline, the Sentencing Council has indicated that the table now arises where the sentence is 12 months or less in a rather different way. The guideline says that the table will arise where "none of the exemptions to the presumption to suspend apply, or if the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offending is more than 12 months and no more than three years". Those two circumstances where the table requires consideration are circumstances, first, where the exemptions in section 277A(3) apply, so the section simply does not apply at all and the old law applies without amendment. Equally, the table will require consideration where the sentence is more than 12 months, where again the section does not apply and the old law will apply without amendment.

The guideline lists a finding of exceptional circumstances in section 277A(2) among the exemptions identified in section 277A(3). It is in fact at the bottom of that list of "exemptions to the presumption to suspend".

This may perhaps not be as clear as it could be because if a finding is made of exceptional circumstances under section 277A(2), the court will almost invariably impose an immediate sentence, and it is not obvious that the statute requires a further step, where the court, having decided that there were exceptional circumstances which justify an immediate custodial sentence, would go on to consider separately and by reference to the table in the guideline whether an immediate sentence was "appropriate". The table and a consideration of appropriateness remains highly relevant in circumstances where suspension is a matter of unfettered discretion. It is hard to see why it is relevant in circumstances where that discretion is fettered in the way Parliament has provided in section 277A(1) and (2).

Including such a finding of exceptional circumstances as the last in a list of exemptions may perhaps also tend to conceal its fundamental importance in all cases to which section 277A applies. Since the Recorder in this case does not seem to have had any of this in mind, these suggestions about the form of the new guideline do not explain what happened here.

It is clear that this is a case where none of the exemptions in section 277A(3) applies, and where the court had decided to impose a sentence of not more than 12 months' imprisonment. In those circumstances, in our judgment the critical and perhaps often the only remaining question is whether there are exceptional circumstances of the kind envisaged by the Act.

As we have said, the Recorder's decision was based on the seriousness of the offending. Before we deal with that, we should explain shortly how he arrived at his term of eight months' imprisonment. The Recorder determined that the appropriate starting point from the guideline for offences of dangerous driving was 18 months' imprisonment. That is because it was agreed before him, correctly by counsel who then appeared and correctly determined by him, that this was an offence in category A1. There were, in fact, multiple factors which put it into category A culpability, and there was substantial damage to vehicles, as we have said.

The Recorder took the starting point of 18 months and decided that there were significant aggravating factors: there was the drink that had been consumed; there was chasing of the vehicle on a public street; there was the deliberate cause of harm, with the very high risk of causing serious injury to others; and all of this arose in the context of an intimate relationship which has features, therefore, of domestic violence. It was indeed a very serious case.

The Recorder decided that without any mitigation the appropriate adjusted sentence to reflect the aggravating features would have been one of 21 months' imprisonment. Then, because of the appellant's difficulties, he decided that the sentence should be reduced to 12 months' imprisonment, before making a discount for the guilty plea which had been tendered at the very earliest available opportunity. That is the process by which the sentence of eight months' imprisonment was assessed.

The mitigation which resulted in that very substantial reduction was essentially the good character of the appellant, the injuries which he had sustained in the accident of which he was the sole cause, and his age. Other problems in his background, which were set out in the pre-sentence report, also operated as some level of mitigation.

That is the way that the Recorder assessed the seriousness of the offence. It was undoubtedly a very serious offence, but it was an offence whose level of seriousness enabled a custodial sentence as low as eight months to be imposed.

It seems to us, applying the new statutory provision as best we can, that it is unlikely that the seriousness of the offence, on its own, could amount to an exceptional circumstance such that an immediate custodial sentence could properly be imposed. After all, in all cases where this section applies, the sentence will be not more than 12 months' imprisonment, which is a measure of the seriousness of the offending with which the court is dealing. It means that it cannot be at the upper end of seriousness of criminal offending. The term of 12 months' imprisonment is, as custodial sentences go for adults, not a long sentence, and is generally not to be imposed for offences which are to be regarded as exceptionally serious.

In this case we have no doubt that the offending, as an offence of dangerous driving, was very serious indeed for all the reasons that we have stated. In our judgment, the seriousness of the offence would certainly have justified a sentence in excess of 12 months' imprisonment, even after credit for the guilty plea. We can well see why Miss Harmes, when preparing her sentencing note, felt that it was unnecessary to refer to the possibilities which might ensue if a sentence of less than 12 months' imprisonment were to be contemplated. However, that is not the view that the Recorder took. He said:

The mitigation was significant, but not, in our judgment, exceptionally strong, and the reduction of nine months from that original sentence of 21 months was very generous. The sentence therefore could well have been long enough so that section 277A had no application. However, it was not.

It cannot be an exceptional circumstance justifying the imposition of a short immediate prison sentence that the sentence should really have been longer. Therefore, in order to uphold the unlawful sentence passed by the Recorder, this court would have to identify exceptional circumstances which lead it to hold the opinion that an immediate term of imprisonment was justified, even though it was short.

We do not intend to try to define or list what might amount to exceptional circumstances in this context. We do, however, underline the strong word chosen by Parliament: "exceptional". Whatever such circumstances might be in any given case, they are obviously not circumstances (related to the offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it) which are commonly encountered.

Here, regrettably, there was nothing exceptional about this case. This kind of uncontrolled aggression on the streets by men who have grown angry with a partner is not unusual.

In any event, it was for the sentencing judge to address this issue and to decide whether there were exceptional circumstances such that the sentence should be an immediate one. Since he did not address that issue and did not therefore make any finding to that effect he was required to suspend the sentence.

In these circumstances, in our judgment, having arrived at a sentence of eight months' imprisonment as a result of an assessment of the seriousness of the offence with which he was dealing, the Recorder was required by the new Act of Parliament to suspend it. It may be of interest to record that prior to the passing of that Act, we would not have interfered with the Recorder's immediate sentence of imprisonment. It is the will of Parliament, as expressed in section 277A, that short prison sentences should almost always be suspended. It is the function of the courts to apply the law as enacted by Parliament, and that is what we will do.

This appeal is allowed. The sentence of eight months' imprisonment will be suspended for two years. The appellant has spent two weeks in prison when he, on this analysis, ought not to have done. In these circumstances we do not impose any punitive requirements on this suspended sentence order.

We will impose the requirement proposed by the author of the pre-sentence report for 15 Rehabilitation Activity Requirement sessions, because we hope that they may help the appellant to avoid behaving in this way again. He now knows what will happen to him if he does. We have chosen an operative period of the suspended sentence order which we now impose of two years, so that he will be subject to it for an important part of his process of growing up.

The disqualification from driving imposed by the Recorder was 18 months and until an extended driving test is passed. That is unchanged. The Recorder also added four months as an extension period to reflect the time that he anticipated that the appellant would spend in custody. That four month period of extension falls away in view of the outcome of this appeal. The disqualification is therefore now 18 months. The requirement for the extended driving test continues to apply.

To that extent, therefore, this appeal against sentence is allowed. We quash the Recorder's immediate sentence of eight months' imprisonment and substitute in its place a suspended sentence order of eight months' imprisonment, suspended for two years, with a requirement for 15 Rehabilitation Activity sessions.