R v Ali Aljabali

On 29 October 2025, having been convicted after summary trial before the Bristol Magistrates' Court in March 2025, the appellant was committed to the Crown Court for sentence pursuant to section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 in respect of one offence of possession of a knife in a public place and one of burglary of a dwelling (committal ending 2824). On the same date he was further committed to the Crown Court in respect of offences of possession of an offensive weapon in a public place and affray. He was convicted of these offences following summary trial before Bristol Magistrates' Court on 17 October 2025 (committal ending 5124).

On 15 January 2026 in the Crown Court at Bristol, he was sentenced to a total of 3 years and 3 months' imprisonment made up as follows:

The offences in committal number 2824 occurred on 13 May 2024. At 4.00 pm on that date Christopher Neale was on his house boat moored at Redcliffe Wharf. He heard the zipper of his awning opening and felt the boat move as if another person had got on board. He searched the boat and found the appellant on board going through his belongings. Mr Neale approached him and punched him several times in an attempt to control the situation. After a struggle he managed to eject the appellant from the boat and called the police. The appellant had left a bag on the boat which contained two large rocks. The police attended and arrested the appellant. They searched him and found a kitchen knife with an 18-centimetre blade and a lock-knife. The appellant said that the kitchen knife was for cooking. He made no comment in interview.

In an impact statement Mr Neale spoke of his feelings of anger and vulnerability following the incident which he found traumatic. He had also sustained severe bruising to his hand which had initially prevented him from working for a week. He subsequently required surgery to reset the tendon in his hand which he will never be able to close.

The appellant was plainly released following this incident because on 11 September 2024 he committed the second set of offences in committal reference 5124. At 6.30 pm on that date CCTV operators saw the appellant entering a park, wielding a large stick as he walked towards a group of men. He struck one of them with it and a fight broke out. The appellant was overpowered and left the park before returning in possession of a stick and heading towards the same group. He was then arrested. The CCTV footage showed the appellant engaged in a dispute with some youths on bicycles in which he used a stick to inflict some violence. The group reacted to that and the appellant would not desist. He persisted notwithstanding the encouragement of another at the scene to depart. Having lost possession of the stick he picked it up again and was wandering around as if keen to resume the conflict.

The appellant was aged 27 years at the time of sentence, 25 at the time of the first set of offences. By the time of sentence he had received 10 weeks' imprisonment on 15 December 2025 for four offences of criminal damage and two of battery.

The appellant was convicted of all of the offences subject of this appeal in his absence. He told the author of the pre-sentence report that he committed the offences in May 2024 as he was street homeless and thought that the houseboat looked empty. He did not know that it was illegal to carry the knife. He denied any knowledge or memory of the affray.

The report records that the appellant moved to the United Kingdom from Syria some years ago and was of no fixed abode. He presented to the author with poor mental health, likely in part because of his street homelessness. His homelessness, poor compliance with the courts and custodial sentence imposed in December 2025 meant that in the view of the author custody was the best route forwards.

In his sentencing remarks the judge observed that Mr Neale was entitled to use force to get the appellant out of his home. He had sustained a significant physical injury in so doing which still caused him real problems. The judge placed the burglary offence into category 1A of the relevant guideline. He acknowledged that the offence was committed with limited intrusion into the property but, observing the potential risk of a burglar who carries a knife, placed greater weight on the possession of that item which was a high culpability factor. The case fell within category 1 harm as Mr Neale was present at the time of the offence. The starting point was therefore 3 years with a range of 2 to 6 years' imprisonment. The judge reduced the sentence to one of 2 years and 6 months to reflect the appellant's mitigation.As the possession of the bladed article set the separate culpability categorisation the judge imposed no separate penalty for that offence.

On the affray the judge accepted that the appellant began as the victim of violence, but observed that he chose to respond with violence armed with a weapon, persisting even when others sought to dissuade him. This was in a busy area with families and children inevitably present. The judge placed the offence within category 2A of the relevant sentencing guideline with a starting point of 12 months and a range of 26 weeks to 18 months' imprisonment. He reduced the starting point to one of 9 months' imprisonment to reflect the appellant's mitigation and totality. The sentence was to run consecutively to the other term imposed. The judge imposed no separate penalty for possession of the offensive weapon connected to the affray.

The appellant contends that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. On the burglary offence Ms Evans submits that the judge erred in categorising the offence as he did. While she accepts that possession of the knife was a high culpability factor, she points out that the appellant was of no fixed abode and was merely carrying his belongings. There were lower culpability factors in the offence being committed on impulse with limited intrusion into the property.

Ms Evans submits that balancing those factors should have caused the judge to find medium rather than high culpability. Ms Evans also submits that the judge fell into error when he placed the offence within harm category 1. Whilst the occupier was present at the time of the burglary and sustained substantial physical injury, Ms Evans submits it is also the case that there were two category 3 factors, in that nothing was stolen and there was limited damage and disturbance to property. Ms Evans submits that balancing these factors should have led to the offence being placed in category 2B with a starting point of 18 months. The appellant's lack of convictions, age, remorse and difficult background, resulting in his refugee status should, Ms Evans submits, have resulted in a further downward adjustment.

Turning to the affray, Ms Evans again submits that the judge erred in his categorisation of this offence within the guideline. She again submits that he failed to properly balance the culpability A factor of the use of a weapon to inflict violence, with the C factor that the appellant acted in self-defence. There was no evidence, she submits, to rebut his assertion that he so acted. The case more properly fell with culpability category B particularly as the weapon was a stick picked up from the ground.

Ms Evans further submits this was a case of category 3 rather than category 2 harm. She points out that no witnesses from the scene gave evidence and there was thus no basis for the inference that some fear or distress was caused. A category 3B offence has a starting point of a high-level community order with a range of low-level community order and 36 weeks' imprisonment. She draws to our attention the same mitigation together with a significant degree of provocation in support of her assertion that there should have been a significant downward adjustment. Finally, Ms Evans submits that insufficient account was taken of totality in coming to the overall term, particularly as the appellant was a serving prisoner at the time of sentence for offences which occurred after the index offences.

We have reflected upon these submissions but find ourselves unable to accept them. When considering questions of culpability and harm in any offence within the relevant Sentencing Guideline, it is not unusual to find factors which fall into different categories. That does not mean that if there is one category A factor and one category C factor, the offence necessarily falls into category B. As each of the relevant guidelines says:

In our judgment, the judge was entitled to find that the burglary fell within category A culpability. It was not in dispute that the appellant was carrying a knife. The guideline does not require that he had it with him for the purposes of committing the burglary. Had that been the case he may well have been charged with the offence of aggravated burglary. The high culpability rests, as the judge said, in the risk that someone who has a knife at the time may have recourse to it if disturbed. The judge was entitled to find that the lesser culpability factor of the offence being committed on impulse did not balance that serious factor out.

We are equally unpersuaded that the offence fell within harm category 2. Mr Neale was present in his home when the appellant burgled it. That fact has made him feel significantly less safe. He was entitled to use force to eject the appellant and had been substantially injured as a result. In our view, these factors firmly place the offence within category 1 harm.

The fact that nothing was stolen and there was limited disturbance to property has substantially less relevance to the question of harm in those circumstances. It follows that in our view that the judge was right to adopt a starting point of 3 years' imprisonment. He rightly imposed no separate penalty for the possession of the knife to avoid double counting. He applied an appropriate downward adjustment for mitigation. The resulting sentence of 2 years and 6 months was just and proportionate in the circumstances.

Turning to the affray, we again consider the judge was entitled to place the offence within category 2A. As is accepted, the appellant did use a weapon to inflict violence. The judge accepted that he had initially acted in self-defence but we observe, having left the scene, the appellant returned to it once again armed with a stick. There was no element of self-defence at that point. He persisted in spite of the efforts of another to dissuade him. The judge imposed no separate penalty for the offence of possession of an offensive weapon. In those circumstances the offence was properly placed into category A culpability.

We consider the judge was also entitled to place the offence within category 2 harm. Although the youths to whom violence was directed had not given evidence the judge was entitled to conclude that the harm intended to be caused was between categories 1 and 3. Moreover, the offence was in a busy public area where families and children were likely to be at 6.30 pm on a September evening, which was a significant aggravating factor and warranted an upward adjustment to the notional sentence.

No issue is rightly taken with the sentence on the affray being consecutive to that imposed for the burglary. If not on bail the appellant would have been released under investigation on the burglary matter at the time he committed the affray. We are unpersuaded that in making the sentences consecutive the judge failed properly to reflect totality. In coming to the sentence of 9 months' imprisonment for the affray he expressly took both that and the appellant's mitigation into account. We are unpersuaded that a discount should have been applied in respect of the 10-week sentence imposed after the commission of the index offences.

It follows that we are unpersuaded that the total sentence of 3 years and 3 months was manifestly excessive on all the facts of this case, and this appeal is accordingly dismissed.