R v Adam Daniel Froom

On 14 February 2025 before His Honour Judge Patrick sitting at Bristol Crown Court, the appellant, Adam Froom, following guilty pleas to a number of assaults, was sentenced as follows:

The appellant was in breach of a restraining order made on 26 February 2024, due to expire on 26 February 2026, in respect of which he was sentenced by the judge to 12 months' imprisonment concurrent.

The offending placed the appellant in breach of a suspended sentence imposed on 26 February 2024 of 16 weeks' imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, which was activated by the judge for the full custodial term.

The offending also placed the appellant in breach of a community order made on 18 January 2023 for a period of 3 years, which was revoked. The judge re-sentenced the appellant for those offences as follows:

Therefore the total sentence imposed was a determinate sentence of 16 weeks' imprisonment, followed by an extended determinate sentence of 5 years, comprising a custodial term of 4 years and an extended licence period of 1 year.

The appellant appeals against his sentence by leave of the Single Judge.

The material background facts are as follows.

In January 2018 the appellant entered into a relationship with Mary Connors, who suffers from Short Bowel Syndrome, PTSD, Depressive Behaviour Disorder and anxiety. About four months into the relationship the appellant became violent towards her.

On 25 May 2022 the appellant challenged Ms Connors about use of her mobile phone, grabbing her by the hair and slapping her across the face.

On 2 July 2022, at a retail park in Bristol, CCTV captured the appellant shouting at Ms Connors in a store and hitting items off a shelf towards her. When asked by security guards to leave, the appellant said to Ms Connors, "I'm going to beat you up. I'll punch you now." Ms Connors returned to their vehicle and sat in the back seat, while the appellant sat in the front passenger seat. He turned and repeatedly punched Ms Connors to her head about eight times, causing her to strike her head against the car window. As a result, Ms Connors sustained a cut above her left eye, a cut to her nose and a bump to her forehead. This was the section 47 assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

On 5 August 2022 Ms Connors left the property they were living in because she suspected that the appellant was about to assault her. He followed her. Ms Connors telephoned the police. The operator advised her to return to their property and lock the doors. The appellant banged loudly on the windows and told her to let him in. She then heard a very loud bang at the front door, and the appellant entered the property. He kicked the bathroom door open, jumped on top of Ms Connors and pushed her down to the floor. She held on to her mobile telephone, tightly curled up into a ball, and told him she was on the phone to the police. He let go and fled.

On 2 September 2022 Ms Connors and the appellant were at home in their bedroom. She declined to give him money. He then asked to borrow her mobile telephone. He walked away with it and returned it in a smashed unusable state. He dragged her from the bedroom to the living room by the hair. She attempted to open a window to shout for help. He then punched her to the back of her head and kicked her to the right thigh. She screamed for help. The appellant proceeded to throw an angel statute belonging to Ms Connors, which she purchased in memory of her late father, and then ripped apart a photograph of her father with his teeth.

On 3 September 2022, in the Emergency Department at Southmead Hospital, the appellant threatened to punch a security guard in the face.

It was those offences against Ms Connors that gave rise to the convictions for assault and other offences in respect of which the three-year community order was imposed at Bristol Crown Court on 18 January 2023.

In around March 2023 the appellant entered into a relationship with Jade Khan. A similar pattern of violence was inflicted by the appellant on his new partner, Ms Khan.

On 30 December the appellant assaulted Ms Khan by beating her. He pleaded guilty to the offence of battery and on 26 February 2024 he received a 16 week custodial sentence suspended for 12 months. On the same date he was made subject to a two year restraining order with the condition that he must not contact Ms Khan directly or indirectly.

In August 2024, during the course of an argument between the appellant and Ms Khan, the appellant suddenly and forcefully pushed Ms Khan to the ground, causing her to suffer a fractured finger which was displaced. She required treatment at hospital and the provision of a protective splint.

Between the end of July and mid-August 2024 there were two further assaults by beating inflicted by the appellant on Ms Khan. In one assault the appellant kicked Ms Khan's back during the course of an argument at his flat. On another occasion he pushed her during an argument causing her to fall and hit her head.

On 3 September 2024 police received a report from a work friend of Ms Khan who said that she had received a number of messages from Ms Khan advising that she was in trouble and needed the police to attend her home as soon as possible. When the police arrived at the house initially there was no response, but Ms Khan eventually opened the door and stepped outside to speak to the officers. She was very quiet and insisted nothing had happened but she looked scared. The officers entered and searched the address. The appellant was found hiding behind the door of what appeared to be a storage room. Initially he gave a false name and was aggressive. He was arrested and taken into custody regarding breach of the restraining order. Ms Khan disclosed that they had had an argument which escalated and got violent. The appellant smacked her in the back of the head and spat in her face. He was verbally aggressive, calling her names like "slut" or" slag", and he refused to leave when she asked him to do so.

The appellant was born on 29 June 1996 and at the time of sentencing he was 28 years old. He had 28 convictions between 2016 and 2024 including nine offences against the person. These included convictions relating to domestic incidents, demonstrating the appellant's history of violence against women over a period of 8 years.

In respect of the offending that gave rise to the community order, the judge took the section 47 offence in relation to Ms Connors (i.e. the incident of the retail park) as the index offence for the purpose of identifying the notional term that it would attract. He considered that it was Culpability A because it was a prolonged or persistent attack, and Harm 2 because there was significant impact on the victim, together with serious physical and psychological injury. Aggravating factors were the appellant's previous convictions, the context of domestic violence and the fact that it occurred in public.

A 2A offence has a starting point of 18 months' custody with a range of 36 weeks to 30 months.

The additional common assault counts would have entitled the judge to adjust upwards from the starting point to reflect overall criminality. He determined that the appropriate term was a notional sentence of 30 months subject to 20% credit for that offending, which would have brought it down to 24 months.

The pre-sentence report indicated that the appellant's compliance with the community order was superficial at best. The appellant failed to disclose that he was breaching the court order, and he continued to abuse drugs and alcohol. The judge considered that there was no meaningful compliance with the community order and none which merited any reduction in sentence.

The judge considered that the breach of the suspended sentence order in circumstances where there was a persistent failure to comply with the court orders required activation of the whole of the 16-week sentence.

The breach of the restraining order was considered to be a wilful breach which occurred over many months. It was both very serious and persistent. The judge accepted that Ms Khan was, as he described it, complicit in the breach, but that had to be considered in the context of domestic violence: the appellant's violent and aggressive behaviour towards Ms Khan made her very scared of him.

The judge concluded that the breach of the restraining order was Category A culpability, based on the very serious and/or persistent breach, and Harm 1, causing very serious harm or distress, giving a starting point of 2 years with a range of 1 to 4 years. Aggravating factors were the appellant's relevant previous convictions. The judge determined that a notional sentence following trial would be 3 years, subject to full credit for the guilty plea, taking it down to 2 years.

The assault occasioning actual bodily harm that occurred in August 2024 had to be assessed against the background of domestic violence against Ms Khan. On that basis the judge found that this was medium culpability B offending. He considered that the fractured finger amounted to a serious physical injury because it restricted Ms Khan's ability to work as a care worker and therefore it fell into Category 1 harm.

A Category 1B offence gives a starting point of 18 months with a range of 36 weeks to 30 months.

Aggravating factors were the appellant's relevant previous convictions, the fact that it was committed in breach of community and suspended sentence orders, and the context of domestic abuse. If taken as the index offence for the 2024 assaults against Ms Khan, a further adjustment upwards would be required for the other assaults by beating which the judge categorised as Category 1B offending, that would give a starting point of a community order with a range of up to 4 months.

In mitigation the judge had regard to the medical reports adduced by the appellant from Dr Beigi and Dr Khisty and character references but concluded they provided little by way of personal mitigation.

The judge determined that the notional sentences that would be appropriate were:

We note that the notional terms for the assault offences reflect significant reductions on the 30-month starting point indicated by the judge prior to credit and reduction for totality, and likewise the 12 months for breach of the restraining order had in turn been reduced from a notional starting point of 24 months.

As to the question of ‘dangerousness’ within the meaning of the Sentencing Code, the judge stated:

The judge activated the 16-week suspended sentence in full. He took as index offences the section 47 assaults against Ms Khan and Ms Connors. In respect of each of those counts he imposed an extended sentence of 5 years, comprising a custodial element of 4 years and an extended licence period of 1 year, to run concurrently to each other and consecutive to the 16-week activated sentence. Concurrent sentences were imposed on all other offences.

The grounds of appeal for which leave has been granted are:

We are very grateful to Ms Davis, counsel for the appellant, for the very clear way in which she set out the grounds of appeal in the Appendix to her Advice and Grounds and for her very careful and clear submissions before us today.

Turning to the assault occasioning actual bodily harm against Ms Khan.

Ms Davis submits that the judge was wrong to place that offending in Category 1B. It is accepted that there was a feature of Category A culpability, in that Ms Khan was vulnerable, but it is also submitted that there were Category C factors to the offending, in particular that the assault was short lived. Further, it is said that the appellant's culpability should be reduced because of his mental disorder or learning difficulties. However, that is not borne out by the medical expert reports adduced on his behalf.

A psychological report prepared by Dr Beigi dated 9 December 2022 opined that the appellant presented with significant symptoms of ADHD but not autism. Significantly Dr Beigi did not consider that ADHD was a causative factor in the offending:

“The report will also show that in my clinical opinion Mr Froom is a vulnerable gentleman based on his mental health history. He has also been a victim of physical violence in the past. In my clinical opinion the likely presence of ADHD is not as informative as a causal factor for his presentation than the presence of potential personality disorder, depression and dysregulated emotional control/impulse control problems. I would view any potential ADHD as an exacerbating factor to these other underlying conditions/traits."

A psychiatric report was prepared by Dr Khisty dated 2 March 2025, which concluded that the appellant did not have a learning disability, autistic spectrum disorder, traumatic brain injury or neurodegenerative disorder. There was no evidence that the appellant suffered from a psychotic illness, paranoid schizophrenia, delusional disorder, bipolar disaffected disorder or mania.

Dr Khisty's assessment was that the appellant's presentation was affected by ADHD and substance misuse. The appellant was fit to plead and stand trial.

Dr Khisty's recommendations were as follows:

Regardless of this issue, in relation to the assaults against Ms Khan it does not seem to be disputed that the judge was entitled to conclude that this was Culpability B, with which we agree.

In terms of harm, it is submitted by Ms Davis that whilst the injury was a fracture, the displaced fracture was of Ms Khan's finger and no treatment was required. As such it is submitted that the harm is Category 2, falling between Categories 1 and 3. We disagree. For the reasons the judge gave, the fracture to Ms Khan's finger, which we note did require a hospital visit, had a substantial impact upon her because it impeded her work in her role as a carer, a job in which she was required to lift heavy equipment and/or patients using a hoist system.

For that reason, we are satisfied that it was open to the judge to find that this was a Category 1B offence.

Ms Davis submits that the judge was wrong to place this offending in Category 2A. It is said that in terms of culpability the offending was Culpability B because it had features of both Culpability A and C. Ms Davis rightly accepts that Ms Connors was obviously vulnerable due to her personal circumstances, namely her disabilities and mental health issues (a Category A factor). However, she submits that the appellant's mental health disorders should reduce his culpability (a Category C factor). The result would be to reduce the offence to Category 2B.

We are unable to accept that submission for the reasons already given above in relation to Ms Khan. The medical expert evidence does not support an argument that the appellant suffers from any mental disorder that would reduce his culpability. He suffers from ADHD for which he has medication, but the main factors in the appellant's violent outbursts are his alcohol and drug abuse.

Ms Davis submits that the breach of the restraining order is Category 3C of the Sentencing Council's relevant guidelines and that the judge was wrong to place the offending in 1A. It is said that the culpability is Category C by reason of the breach being short of a reasonable excuse. Ms Khan and the appellant had resumed their relationship. Further, it is submitted that the breach of the restraining order caused little or no harm and distress because Ms Khan wanted to resume her relationship with the appellant, therefore it should have been categorised as Category 3.

We acknowledge that the judge found that there was, what he described as, a degree of complicity on the part of Ms Khan in the breach but we cannot ignore the context of the domestic abuse by the appellant towards Ms Khan. In particular when the police arrived at her home on 3 September 2024, initially she was too scared to answer the door or tell them what was wrong. She eventually disclosed that the appellant had been physically and verbally abusive to her. He refused to leave when she asked him to and she was afraid of him. In our view that falls far short of reasonable excuse and it was open to the judge to find that there was very serious distress. It is of note that at the sentencing hearing, when Ms Khan was asked whether she wanted the restraining order to continue she said yes, it was something that she wanted in place.

Ms Davis submits that the judge gave insufficient weight to the appellant's personal mitigation. However, the judge considered all of the materials put before him as mitigation, including the medical expert evidence. The submissions that the appellant was engaging well with probation and partially complied with his community order are simply not supported by the evidence of his persistent offending in breach of any court orders.

As the judge stated in his sentencing remarks:

For those reasons, despite the careful and compelling submissions by Ms Davis, we do not consider that the custodial element of the overall sentence could be said to be manifestly excessive.

I turn then to the second ground of appeal, which is that the extended sentence was wrong in principle.

Ms Davis has helpfully set out the relevant principles in her Advice and Grounds. In relation to the availability of an extended sentence, that is available if the offence is a specified offence, the offender is aged 21 or over when convicted of the offence, the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified offences, the court is not required to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life, and the earlier offence condition or the 4-year term condition is met (section 280 of the Sentencing Act 2020).

It is accepted on behalf of the appellant that assault occasioning actual bodily harm is a specified offence, as per section 306(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020, being an offence listed in Part 1 of Schedule 18 of the Sentencing Code. It is further accepted that the appellant was over the age of 21 when convicted of the offence. Furthermore, it is accepted that the court was not required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.

Ms Davis submits that in the event, as we have found, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive and therefore a sentence of 4 years’ custody was justified, nonetheless the judge was wrong to find that the appellant poses a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission of the offender of further specified offences. She states that the judge accepted that the physical assaults had not yet crossed the threshold for serious harm, although he did of course also identify the risk of psychological harm.

Reliance is placed by Ms Davis on the case of R v Lang & Ors [2005] EWCA Crim 2864 at [17 (iv)]:

We recognise that the court is obliged to carefully assess each case on its facts when addressing the question of dangerousness and when considering whether to exercise its discretion to impose an extended sentence. On the facts of this case however, there was ample evidence before the judge that entitled him to conclude that this appellant posed a high risk of causing serious physical and psychological harm to women by the commission of further specified offences. The appellant has an appalling history of violence against women with whom he has a relationship, including another victim prior to Ms Connors. There are no convincing indications that he has the desire and capacity to change. Although we accept that he has shown some remorse and embarked on courses, those have not been completed in accordance with the terms of the community order.

We are also of the view that this was a case in which it was open to the judge to decide that an extended sentence was necessary and proportionate. As the judge noted, and in accordance with the terms and conclusions of the pre-sentence report, this appellant has flouted every court order made with a view to supporting him to address his substance abuse and to control his anger. In those circumstances we can find no error of principle in the judge's exercise of his discretion.

Accordingly, for the above reasons, the appeal is dismissed.