R v Martin Thomas

On 12 January 2024, having pleaded guilty before Bromley Magistrates' Court, the appellant was committed for sentence pursuant to section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 in respect of one offence of possession with intent to supply a Class A drug, contrary to section 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The appellant was sentenced on 7 July 2025 in the Crown Court at Woolwich to 10 years' imprisonment. Ancillary orders were made. The appellant now appeals sentence with leave of the Single Judge.

On 10 January 2024 at around 6.20 pm police officers saw the appellant (then aged 51) leaving an address in Croydon carrying a large black holdall. The appellant placed the holdall in a Transit van and drove away. Officers then saw him again a few roads distant. This time he was out of the van carrying the holdall. He was stopped by police and when asked what was in the holdall the appellant initially said it was post and then subsequently changed that to books. The holdall was opened and found to contain six 1 kilogram bags of cocaine. Officers then went to the address at which they had first seen the appellant and there they found the appellant's female co-defendant, Yasmin Ryan, and her 14-year-old son. The property was then searched. Further significant quantities of cocaine in 1 and 3 kilogram bags and drug-related paraphernalia including a hydraulic press, a tablet press and a bucket agent were discovered and seized together with £785 in cash.

The total amount of cocaine seized from the appellant's holdall and the property was stated at sentence to be 14.2 kilograms. However, this was based on a mathematical error and the correct total was over 17 kilograms with a street value of between £1.2 and £1.7 million.

The appellant was arrested and in interview answered "no comment" to all questions put.

On 9 December 2024 the appellant submitted a basis of plea, by which he asserted that in or around 2022, he had acquired a number of debts arising from a court case. Due to the debts he had built up he had sought and received a loan from a man who persuaded him to repay the debt by storing and transporting cocaine to third parties as directed. He was engaged in such activity when stopped with a holdall of drugs by the police. He accepted that he held a significant role, albeit "at the lower end of the guideline."

The prosecution submitted a Sentencing Note by which they made clear that they did not accept that the appellant was a mere courier or custodian forced to store and transport cocaine to pay off a debt and invited the court to hold a Newton hearing. However, in advance of the sentencing date, in a ruling dealing with an application made on behalf of the appellant to be sentenced in advance of his co-defendant's trial, the judge observed that by his basis of plea the appellant:

The prosecution subsequently withdrew their application for a Newton hearing and the sentence proceeded on an agreed categorisation under the Sentencing Guidelines of category 1 significant role. The starting point for a Class A category 1 significant role is 10 years' imprisonment based on an indicative quantity of 5 kilograms of drugs with a sentencing range of 9 to 12 years. The guidelines make it clear that where the operation is on the most serious and commercial scale, involving a quantity of drugs significantly higher than category 1, sentences of 20 years and above may be appropriate depending on the offender's role.

In passing sentence, referring to the large quantities of cocaine involved, the presence of the hydraulic press and the appellant's maturity and experience, the judge commented that the appellant knew what was going on. She dismissed the suggestion that he was ever just a courier, or that he fell into the lower range of significant role. Rather she said, the appellant fell "fairly and squarely" into the significant role category. She considered that the quantity of drugs found required an uplift from the starting point beyond the top of the sentencing range to 15 years. She identified no aggravating factors. The only factor that she identified in mitigation was the appellant's caring responsibilities about which she expressed some scepticism. She made no additional adjustment from the 15-year starting point that she had identified but allowed the full one-third reduction for guilty plea, resulting in the 10-year sentence passed.

Ms Clegg, who appears before us as she did in the court below, argued firstly, that the sentencing judge erred in increasing the starting point from 10 years to 15 years. Whilst she realistically accepts that an increase above the specified starting point was justified, she argued that the uplift applied was manifestly excessive. An uplift of this degree, she submits, is more appropriate for cases involving quantities of drugs in the region of 50 kilograms or more or whether there are additional features of criminality such as the use of EncroChat or previous like offending. Further, she submits that as she did in the lower court, that on balance the appellant should be categorised at the lower end of the significant category as he had no operational or management function.

Secondly, she submits that the judge was wrong to dismiss the appellant's personal mitigation and that a failure to allow any reduction in sentence to reflect that mitigation was wrong in principle. On his behalf she maintains the mitigation advanced at the sentencing hearing, namely the fact that the appellant shared caring responsibilities for his children (one of whom is disabled), that the appellant's remand into custody has had a significant effect upon his family, that he had a good work record and although not of good character he had committed no similar offences in the past, and his last conviction had been nearly 20 years previously in 2006.

In our judgment and as agreed by the judge and all parties in the lower court, the appellant fell to be sentenced in category 1 as a significant role offender. We agree with the sentencing judge's analysis that the appellant fell "fairly and squarely" within this category. Although it was not suggested that he held an operational or management function or that he had involved his co-defendant or any other person through pressure, influence, intimidation or reward; on his own basis of plea and taking account of the sheer quantity and high value of the drugs about which the appellant could not have been other than wholly aware, he must have had an expectation of significant financial or other advantage, whether direct or indirect, and awareness and understanding of the scale of the operation. As the sentencing judge observed, those who are entrusted with drugs of this quantity and value do not fall into the category of mere couriers or custodians.

Insofar as harm was concerned, we agree with the sentencing judge that a significant uplift was required from the starting point due to the far greater quantity of drugs involved. As already noted, where the operation is on the most serious and commercial scale, involving a quantity of drugs significantly higher than category 1 starting point, the sentencing guideline states that the sentences of 20 years and above may be appropriate depending on the offender's role.

In this case the quantity of drugs involved does suggest a commercial operation but given the wide range of quantities of drugs involved in cases that come before the courts, absent any specific guidance as Ms Clegg accepts, there can be no hard or fast mathematical rule about what the appropriate figure should be for any particular quantity of drugs above 5 kilograms compared with any other. We recognise the difficulty that this can present even for experienced judges.

In our judgment whilst the uplift was arguably a severe one, it is not one which in of itself can be said to be manifestly excessive. Whether that was for the 14 kilograms of cocaine, which was the quantity mistakenly calculated to be involved in this case when the case was listed for sentence and upon which the appellant was sentenced, or 17 kilograms.

Turning to additional matters, there were no additional aggravating factors. Insofar as mitigating factors were concerned, it is not asserted that the appellant was a sole carer and given the inevitable length of sentence, this is not a case in which the principles set out in the well-known case of Petherick, upon which Ms Clegg placed reliance in the court below, have any direct relevance. That is not to say that the fact that the appellant's family life will or may be adversely affected by his lengthy custodial sentence should be ignored but they carry comparatively little weight. Of more relevance in our judgment is the appellant's work record and the absence of any recent or relevant offending.

Taking those matters into account, we agree that some reduction should have been made for the appellant's mitigation and we apply a reduction accordingly of 1 year to reflect that limited mitigation that we have outlined to reach a sentence of 14 years, to which then apply the one-third reduction to which he is entitled for his early guilty plea. That results in a sentence of 9 years and 4 months' imprisonment, and to that extent this appeal succeeds. All other ancillary orders however remain unaffected.