R v Kevin Wall

On 14 August 2025 in the Crown Court at Cambridge, the appellant pleaded guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing to two offences of burglary in a dwelling, contrary to section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968. On 17 October 2025 the appellant was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment for each offence, the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. He now appeals sentence with leave of the Single Judge.

At 19.47 on 12 July 2025 police were called to an address in Parr Close in Northstowe. The householder informed officers that they had left the property locked and secured at 10 o'clock in the morning. They returned that evening to find that someone had smashed the rear bifold doors to gain entry. The rooms were ransacked and a garden shovel had been removed from a shed and left on the lawn. Blood was found on the kitchen floor and upstairs. Samples of that blood were sent for analysis and matched to the appellant. The following items had been stolen: car keys for a BMW motor vehicle; a woman's 22 carat gold diamond ring; a men's 22 carat gold diamond ring; two 22 carat gold chains; four 22 carat gold earrings; a diamond bracelet; a bread box; keys to the garage; keys to a bicycle and foreign currency with an approximate value of $1000. Much of the jewellery had been gifted as wedding presents and was thus of sentimental as well as financial value.

At 23.35 that same evening police received a call from a second property located a short distance from the first. That property had also been burgled. The occupants had left the address at 18.10, and upon their return found the patio door had been smashed. The front door had been left wide open and there had been a messy search of the house. Blood belonging to the appellant was found inside the address. A Louis Vuitton handbag, £6,000 in cash and jewellery were stolen. The money that was stolen had been savings for what was described as a "once in a lifetime" family trip with the victim's elderly mother.

Footage from a video doorbell captured the appellant walking along a road in possession of the Louis Vuitton handbag. The appellant was seen to take items out of the bag and put them in his pockets. He was also wearing a hat and blazer belonging to the victim's family. Some of the items were subsequently found discarded in a nearby garage. The appellant was in due course arrested on 15 July 2025.

Victim impact statements were obtained from the occupants of both properties. Each described the significant effects that the burglaries have had upon them and their young children. The blood that had been left spread around each property caused particular anxiety and increased the feeling that they had been violated.

The appellant was 34 years old and was heavily convicted, with 28 convictions for 76 offences, many of which were for burglaries of dwellings. The appellant was aged 34 at the relevant date. He has an extensive criminal record with 28 convictions for 76 offences as stated. Of note on 12 June 2024, he was sentenced to a term of 4 years' imprisonment, which included 3½ years' imprisonment for two offences of dwelling burglary. Having been released on licence on 12 May 2025, he was subsequently recalled to prison for 28 days for failing to attend a probation appointment. He was rereleased less than a week before the instant offences. As a result of these offences his licence was again revoked and he was again recalled to prison.

Because the appellant had previously been convicted of at least two domestic burglaries, minimum sentencing provisions applied, whereby in accordance with section 314 of the Sentencing Act 2020 the judge was obliged to impose an appropriate custodial sentence of at least 3 years for each offence unless the court was of the opinion that there were exceptional circumstances not to impose such sentences.

There was no application for a pre-sentence report and none was ordered. We agree that a pre-sentence report was not necessary in this case. The judge did have the benefit of a psychiatric report prepared for previous proceedings by a consultant psychiatrist, Dr Hafi, dated 4 October 2023. Dr Hafi concluded that the appellant suffered from mixed anxiety and depressive disorder resulting from his traumatic childhood experiences linked to polysubstance misuse and alcohol addiction.

It was, and is, common ground that both offences were harm category 1, due to the extensive soiling and disturbance of each property, the substantial psychologic and emotional impacts on the victims and the theft of sentimental items and it was medium culpability B. A category 1B offence has a starting point of 2 years and a category range of 1 to 4 years. As already noted however, sentences were subject to the minimum sentencing provisions in section 314 of the Sentencing Act. The judge found that the aggravating factors were the appellant's extensive previous convictions and the fact that at the time of the commission of the offences, he had recently been released on licence for identical offending.

In mitigation he took into account the appellant's difficult childhood and the effect upon him of a number of bereavements. However, he concluded that the appellant was a persistent burglar, with no real remorse or intention of stopping his offending behaviour. The judge stated that these aggravating factors took each offence outside of the sentencing range for a category 1B offence and the top of category 1A, that is 6 years for a single offence. He stated that he was applying the guideline in relation to totality but took the view that it would be contrary to the interests of justice if he were bound by that maximum in the guideline of 6 years. Taking into account all the aggravating and mitigating factors, he stated that the least sentence he could impose for both offences would have been 8 years after a trial. Allowing 25 per cent reduction for the guilty pleas entered at the PTPH the sentence ultimately passed was one of 6 years' imprisonment on each offence, those sentences ordered to run concurrently with each other.

Mr Lyons, who appears before us today as he did in the lower court and who has addressed us succinctly, accepts that the judge correctly categorised each offence as a category 1B offence. Further, he realistically accepts that given the aggravating factors the judge was entitled to increase the appropriate sentences substantially above the starting point. However, he submits that notwithstanding those factors there was no justification for increasing the sentence for an individual offence to 6 years, that being three times the starting point for a category 1B offence or indeed to pass a sentence outside the top of the sentencing range at all. Further, given the close proximity in both time and place of both burglaries, an additional increase of 2 years for the second burglary took insufficient, if any, account of the principle of totality.

Offences of this type are not merely offences against property but offences against people which can and, in this case did, have a lasting effect on the victims. As one of the victims said in their victim impact statement:

As the sentencing judge observed, the appellant is a persistent offender, who has committed multiple offences of domestic burglary. Prison does not seem to have any effect on his offending behaviour.

Nevertheless, we agree with Mr Lyons's submissions that there was no justification to go outside of the relevant range in the sentencing guidelines and certainly not to the extent that the judge took the sentences in this case which we agree were manifestly excessive.