R v Arun Drewett

The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against sentence following refusal by the single judge on the papers. The applicant is represented by Ms Gardner who appears pro bono. We are grateful for her assistance particularly as we understand she is not feeling well.

In June 2025 the applicant was sentenced to a total of 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment in relation to attempting to cause a 13-year-old girl to engage in sexual activity, breach of a notification requirement, four breaches of a sexual harm prevention order and activation of a suspended sentence order. The original sexual harm prevention order was revoked and reimposed in identical terms for an indefinite period.

The background facts and grounds of appeal are set out in the detailed note produced by the Court of Appeal office and which we do not propose to repeat.

Turning to our views on the application.

Having considered Ms Gardner's submissions, we are in agreement with the single judge for the reasons she gave. In our view it is not arguable that a sentence of 2 years and 6 months for the attempt to incite a child to engage in sexual activity was manifestly excessive. The judge was entitled to categorise the offending as A2, including finding that this was deliberate and targeted activity for the reasons she gave. We bear in mind that as trial judge she was well placed to make that assessment.

The judge expressly made a downward adjustment to the categorisation to reflect the attempt with a decoy.

It is apparent that the judge was aware of the applicant's mental health issues and mitigation, having set that out in her sentencing remarks.

For the reasons that she gave, the judge was entitled to categorise the breach of sexual harm prevention orders in the way she did. She considered the breach, particularly the first breach, as a serious and persistent breach with a flagrant disregard for a court order, and we agree.

It is no longer argued that the judge erred in activating the suspended sentence in full, so we do not consider that point further.

In our view, given the serious and concerning conduct of the applicant during the period of a suspended order, the judge was entitled to impose the sexual harm prevention order for the length that she did. As she explains in her ruling, she considered the risk posed by the applicant could be met by a lengthy custodial sentence and by extending the sexual harm prevention order in the terms she did. As the single judge observed, if she had not adopted this approach, it may be that the applicant could have faced an extended sentence order.

As Counsel accepted before us the judge was entitled to consider that the failure to register the new bank card was not significant to the sentence given the relevant sentence was imposed concurrently.

Stepping back and looking at the sentence in the round, we are not persuaded that it is arguable that it was manifestly excessive, and therefore we refuse the renewed application for leave.

Given our views on the merits of the application, it is unnecessary for us to consider the application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave.