R v Mark Roberts

On 4 February 2026 in the Crown Court at Teesside, the appellant was convicted of an offence of causing death by dangerous driving and an offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, arising out of the same tragic accident which occurred on 8 July 2022. Alternative counts of causing death by careless driving and causing serious injury by careless driving, to which he had entered guilty pleas on 17 January 2025, were ordered to lie on the file.

On 7 April 2026 he was sentenced by His Honour Judge Francis Laird KC to a total of 27 months' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for a period of 5 years 1 month. This comprised a notional disqualification period of 4 years and an extension period of 13 months pursuant to section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. An interim disqualification order had been made on 5 February 2026.

The appellant's application for leave to appeal against sentence was referred to the Full Court by the Registrar, who pointed out that the period of disqualification was unlawful: see R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455. The obligatory disqualification period for offences contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is a minimum of 5 years unless there are special reasons, and the extension period does not count towards the minimum term (Needham para 39). The extension period should have been half the custodial sentence imposed, and therefore is a little shorter than it should have been.

The grounds of appeal are arguable and accordingly at the start of the hearing we gave leave to appeal.

The appellant was a serving police officer with Northumbria Constabulary and a trained response driver. Shortly before 3 pm on 8 July 2022 he was dispatched to a grade 1 emergency. The report was of a 5-week old baby experiencing respiratory problems. The appellant understood that an ambulance would not be able to reach the location within the 15-minute target time set for responding to such emergencies. He left the police station in his police car, activated the siren and the lights, and travelled along the Whickham Highway through Park View and across the bridge over the A1 which leads into Dunston Road.

There are traffic lights controlling both the entry to and exit from the bridge. The appellant drove through the first set of red traffic lights without incident, and crossed the bridge at approximately 56 mph. On approach to the second junction he reduced his speed to approximately 43 mph. He saw a van that was about to pull out but noted that it had stopped at the junction. He drove through the second set of red traffic lights without reducing his speed. On entering the junction, his car collided with a motorcycle which had driven through green traffic lights from a slip road on to the junction, intending to turn right on to the bridge travelling towards Park View, and therefore was directly in the path of his vehicle.

We have viewed the footage taken from the dashboard camera on the van, which shows the police car approaching the junction with its lights flashing and siren activated. The impact with the motorbike is audible but mercifully outside the angle of the camera. There was evidence that the police vehicle was braking heavily at the point of impact and was by then travelling somewhere between 25 and 27 mph. The judge found that the motorcycle would have been in the appellant's line of vision but that he failed to notice it because he was too intent on responding to the emergency.

The motorcyclist, Mr Ronald Pinkney (aged 77), and his wife Muriel (aged 74), who was the pillion passenger, were thrown off the motorcycle. The appellant stopped his vehicle immediately and got out to try to help them. Both the Pinkneys were badly injured and sadly Muriel Pinkney died in hospital from her injuries on 17 July. The post-mortem examination revealed that the cause of death was blunt force head and neck injuries. Mr Pinkney suffered a bleed on the brain and fractures to his shoulder blade, pelvis, right leg and ribcage. He was not discharged from hospital until 5 August 2022. His injuries caused him a great deal of pain. They have left him with a permanent limp.

The judge heard, and we have read, a dignified and moving victim personal statement from the couple's daughter Dawn Hunter describing the impact of the fatal accident on the family. It is clear that no sentence passed on the appellant could compensate them for the tragic loss of a beloved wife and mother, and for the significant change in the quality of life of Ronald Pinkney, who lost his life partner of 56 years. This was rightly acknowledged by the judge, and this court wishes to associate itself with his expressions of sympathy. The family indicated that they understood the circumstances in which the accident occurred and that they did not want the police officer to go to prison. The judge acknowledged and paid tribute to their magnanimity, but as he explained, it was his duty to pass a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines and legal principles.

In sentencing notes prepared by the prosecution and the defence there was agreement that the offence of causing death by dangerous driving fell within Category C for culpability in the sentencing guidelines, on the basis that the standard of driving was just over the threshold for dangerous driving. Harm was of the utmost seriousness. The starting point was 3 years, with a category range of 2-5 years' custody. For the offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, the culpability was again C and harm Category 1, with a starting point of 2 years and a range of 1-3 years' custody. The judge accepted those categorisations and in our judgment he was right to do so.

Apart from the serious injury to Mr Pinkney, which was the subject of a separate count on the indictment, the sole statutory aggravating factor was that the victims were vulnerable road users.

The judge identified a significant amount of mitigation both relating to the offences themselves and personal mitigation. As he said, the appellant had served in the Army with distinction, including in combat zones; he retired as a Colour Sergeant after 22 years of service; he was awarded a Certificate of Commendation whilst he was a soldier; he had then served as a police officer since 2017. There were character references from a work colleague, Police Inspector Geoff Dench, and from the applicant's father, the Reverend Colin Roberts (himself a former police officer) which, as the judge said, attest in glowing terms to the appellant's exemplary character and his life of service.

In terms of statutory mitigating factors, the appellant had no previous convictions. He had a good driving record and he was responding to a genuine grave emergency. The consequence of not arriving at that emergency might have been the death of, or at least severe brain damage to, a very small child. He tried to assist the Pinkneys at the scene. He had expressed genuine remorse for his actions and their consequences. He pleaded guilty to causing death and serious injury by careless driving at his first appearance at the Crown Court and he did not dispute the substance of the prosecution evidence.

The appellant is a 56-year-old family man with an adult daughter who has severe learning difficulties. She lives with another young woman with special needs around 2 miles away from the Roberts' family home, but the two young women have limited care, particularly at weekends, due to funding cuts. The appellant's wife does not drive and therefore his mandatory disqualification from driving will have a serious impact on their ability to continue to care for her at the weekends, particularly on Sundays when they have been bringing her home to spend the day with them.

The judge was faced with a very difficult sentencing exercise. He treated the offence of causing death by dangerous driving (Count 1) as the lead offence. He elevated the starting point of 3 years by 9 months to 45 months to reflect the count of causing injury by dangerous driving (Count 3), passing a shorter concurrent sentence of 12 months on that count to reflect totality. He reduced the sentence on Count 1 by 18 months to reflect the mitigation, thereby reaching a sentence of 27 months, which could not be the subject of a suspended sentence order.

It is important in cases of this kind to stand back and remind ourselves that the task of the Court of Appeal is to consider whether the sentence passed was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, not whether the members of the court might have passed a different sentence had we been in the position of the judge. We must also bear in mind that he had all the advantages of hearing the evidence at trial.

However, this was an unusual case. The appellant did not give evidence in his own defence and the facts were not contested. The sole issue for the jury was whether the standard of driving was dangerous rather than careless. Mr Harrison KC, on behalf of the Crown, has told us today that the jury came back and made a decision on that matter fairly rapidly, within the space of an hour, which he indicated came as something of a surprise to all concerned at the trial. However, having seen the video footage, one can see how the speed at which the car was travelling may have influenced their assessment.

On behalf of the appellant, Mr Ponte KC submits that the sentence was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. In his written submissions he contended that the starting point was increased by too much, that insufficient reduction was made for mitigation and that there should have been a further downward adjustment to reflect totality. The resulting sentence should have been within the range which was capable of being suspended, and if it had been, then all the factors in the Definitive Guideline on Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences which pointed in favour of suspension were present. There were none of the factors which indicated that only immediate custody would serve to mark the gravity of the offending.

Although the Crown served a Respondent's Notice in opposition to the appeal, submitting that the sentence was severe but neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive, that approach was tempered somewhat in the oral submissions that we have heard this morning.

In his oral submissions, Mr Ponte submitted that the highly exceptional circumstances of this case indicated that it was a case in which mercy should be shown. He pointed in particular to the fact that the family of the victims had sought leniency.

Mr Ponte also drew the court's attention to something of a disconnect between the judge's reading of the pre-sentence report and the contents of that document. In his sentencing remarks the judge accepted that the appellant was entitled to employ the exemption from observing the speed limits and red lights, but rightly said that he should have reduced his speed to a level where he could stop should another motorist enter the junction as his training had taught him. He then said this:

In fact what the appellant said to the Probation Officer was not, and could not fairly be characterised as, an admission that he deliberately ignored his training or disregarded the law. He said that he was aware that police officers must regard red lights as if they are ‘give way’ or ‘stop’ signs but that there is "somewhat [of] an unwritten rule amongst all emergency services that this is not completely abided to". That was obviously a comment about what is common practice. Indeed it is something that one regularly observes with emergency vehicles in everyday life.

The author of the pre-sentence report did not understand this to be an admission by the appellant that he had deliberately ignored his training or broken the law. He characterised it as "a naïve expectation" that other road users would see his vehicle approaching the junction and stop. The probation officer's assessment was that the appellant's urgency to get to a serious incident potentially led him to taking greater risks than he usually would. In any event, what made the appellant's driving dangerous was not the fact that he drove through the red light, nor that he relied on other vehicles to give way to his vehicle — the motorbike could not have given way as it had already passed the green light and entered the junction — it was that he did not slow down sufficiently before he drove through the red light.

It appears that this mischaracterisation of what was said in the pre-sentence report coloured the judge's attitude when he came to sentence, and it led to him sentencing on a basis which was factually inaccurate. The contents of the report did not establish to the criminal standard that the appellant had deliberately ignored his training. The inference that he did was unfair, especially as the appellant did not give evidence and had no opportunity to answer that criticism.

The judge was entitled in principle to reflect the overall criminality in the sentence he passed on the lead offence and thus to elevate the starting point of 3 years to reflect the fact that Mr Pinkney was seriously injured by reason of the same dangerous driving that had led to the death of his wife. However, even if in combination with the statutory aggravating factor this justified an increase of up to 9 months (as the judge considered that it did) we accept Mr Ponte's submission that, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, there was an insufficient downward adjustment to reflect the considerable mitigation that the judge acknowledged, including mitigating factors which he did not mention.

There was no reference in the judge's sentencing remarks to the toll that the accident had taken on the appellant's own mental health — he has been diagnosed with PTSD and depression; nor of the fact that he was facing the loss of his job and the financial impact that this would have on him and his family; and most importantly, there is no mention of the impact upon his disabled daughter of the fact that he would be disqualified from driving.

We have read a prison report which indicates that, happily, since his incarceration the appellant's mental health has improved in consequence of developing appropriate coping strategies and that he is now more emotionally stable.

Standing back and balancing all the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, including the factors that the judge did not expressly mention, having regard to the fact that the judge did make a factual finding which was not open to him and which appears to have coloured his approach, and having regard to the need to produce an overall sentence that was just and proportionate, we consider that this was an exceptional case which by reason of the number and strength of the mitigating factors warranted a sentence on Count 1 which fell at the bottom end of the range in the guidelines. The shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence and reflecting the culpability and harm caused by both offences and taking into account the principle of totality would have been one of 24 months' custody. We see no reason to adjust the length of the concurrent sentence imposed in respect of Count 3.

Turning to the question whether the sentences could be suspended, the relevant sentencing guideline requires the court to weigh certain factors in considering whether it is possible to do so. In the light of the contents of the pre-sentence report, the prison report and all that is known about the appellant, it is plain that there is no real risk of reoffending or harm. There is no history of poor compliance with previous court orders and no reason to fear future non-compliance. The appellant is of previous good character. There is, as the judge acknowledged, strong personal mitigation, and we accept that there is a considerable prospect of rehabilitation, as is shown by the positive prison report. This indicates that whilst in custody the appellant has obtained employment as a healthcare social worker and has received five positive entries highlighting occasions when he has gone above and beyond expectations. He has received no negative case notes or adjudications. His conduct has remained consistently positive throughout his time in custody. He has also started to work towards achieving enhanced status within the incentive scheme.

It is also a significant factor that the appellant's incarceration has had a detrimental effect upon his wife's ability to provide care for their daughter, who they used to collect to spend the day with them every Sunday.

We have considered whether the offences were so serious that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. Although tragically the appellant's driving led to the loss of one life and serious injury to another, this was not a case of prolonged dangerous driving but a momentary fatal error of judgment in an otherwise blameless driving history by a serving police officer who had responded to similar emergencies on a virtually daily basis without incident. Taking all these factors into account, we have concluded that the sentences can and should be suspended.

We therefore allow the appeal. We quash the sentence of 27 months on Count 1 and substitute for it a suspended sentence order of 24 months suspended for 18 months. We quash the sentence on count 3 and substitute for it a suspended sentence order of 12 months, suspended for 18 months, those sentences to run concurrently.

The obligatory period of disqualification from driving was 5 years. As we have mentioned, the judge erred because he imposed a period of only 4 years' disqualification and an extension period of 13 months, treating the extension period as counting towards the 5 year minimum period of disqualification. Although there has been no appeal against this aspect of the sentence, it was unlawful and must be quashed. However, as a result of the fact that the custodial sentence on Count 1 is now suspended, there will be no extension period under section 35A. Therefore we substitute for the 5 years and 1 month disqualification period which was unlawfully passed the mandatory 5-year period of disqualification from driving. The 2-year period of concurrent disqualification imposed in respect of Count 3 will remain undisturbed, as will the requirement to pass the extended retest.