R v OGM

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to the offences to which this application relates. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the Complainant of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with Section 3 of the Act.

On 5 February 2024 in the Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne, the Applicant was convicted by a majority of the following two counts and on 7 May 2024 sentenced as follows:

At the time of the offending his daughter was 10 or 11 years old. She did not make a complaint to the police until many years later when she was an adult and a married woman. His daughter’s evidence was that count 1 had taken place when the family were visiting her aunt and uncle and she was sleeping in her cousin's bedroom. Count 2 took place in the family home. She said that she had eventually spoken to various people including her husband about what had taken place and had sought to meet her father but had received no response to her messages.

Matters finally came to a head at a family party in December 2021, when the Victim refused to stay over at her family home. When pressed for a reason she said that her father knew why and that he had come into her room when she was 10. The police were then called.

At his trial the Applicant was represented by solicitors and counsel. His defence was that there was no truth in the allegations, his daughter was lying and the incidents complained of had never taken place.

He renews his application for an extension of time of 164 days in which to apply for leave to appeal against conviction and seeks leave following refusal by the Single Judge.

He advances three grounds of appeal which broadly concern:

He applies for leave to adduce fresh evidence under Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and has lodged an application for leave to call witnesses but has not provided any witness statements or documents in support. From the short details provided, his application relates to:

The overall thrust of this proposed evidence, therefore, is that the Victim herself identified another person consistently as the perpetrator of the offences.

In view of the complaints made about his representation at trial, the Applicant waived privilege. The responses of his trial counsel and solicitors have been obtained together with the Applicant's comments. The Applicant also lodged further submissions in a letter received on 16 July 2025, which we have read.

We turn then to the proposed grounds of appeal.

The Applicant contends that trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses on his behalf. The material before the court, including counsel's detailed notes, makes plain that this was a tactical decision reached after careful and repeated discussion between counsel, the Applicant and the potential witnesses themselves. Counsel explored the proposed evidence, identified material risks to the defence case including the potential to bolster the Crown's position, consulted with her instructing solicitors and discussed the issue with the Applicant over a period of days. On 2 February, the Applicant signed a written note endorsing the decision.

The proposed witnesses included the Applicant's wife and other daughters. The Applicant's wife was nervous and reluctant to give evidence. Had she done so she would have had to explain why her immediate reaction when the allegations were made in her presence was to call the police. One of the daughters recalled an occasion on which the Victim had discussed an incident involving her father, which she had dismissed at the time but which would have amounted to an earlier complaint about the same type of conduct relied on for the offences. There were also text messages going back to 2019 between this witness and the Victim referring both obliquely and expressly to incidents of sexual abuse by the Applicant. These were before the jury but would plainly have been explored further in cross-examination had the witness been called.

These witnesses themselves expressed the view that they did not wish to give evidence because of the risk that they would make matters worse for the Applicant. It was entirely reasonable of counsel to advise that there was a significant risk that calling these two witnesses would provide support for the prosecution case rather than assist the Applicant. Equally, seeking to cherry pick evidence by calling some potential witnesses and not others would have been the subject of obvious adverse comment and had to be weighed against the limited assistance which the witnesses could give on the central issues in the case.

Nothing in the material suggests that counsel acted incompetently, improperly or without the Applicant's informed agreement. Tactical decisions of this nature fall squarely within counsel's professional judgment. They do not give rise to arguable grounds of appeal. Ground 1 therefore does not disclose any basis on which the conviction could be regarded as unsafe.

The Applicant next relies on three individuals said to provide fresh support for an alternative suspect theory, namely that a friend (now deceased) was responsible for the offending. Investigations after trial revealed that only one of these witnesses offered any degree of support and even then, only in vague and general terms. The other two provided nothing capable of advancing the defence case. In fact, this alternative suspect theory was well known prior to the trial, it was investigated by police at the time, and the Victim expressly denied any inappropriate conduct by the individual concerned. It is not therefore new evidence in the relevant sense. Further, both incidents of offending were said to have occurred within family homes. The suggestion that they were perpetrated by an outsider is inherently unlikely. The Applicant has never offered any coherent basis for explaining how misidentification might plausibly have occurred. The Victim had identified the Applicant as the perpetrator of the abuse to family members and others. The proposed new evidence individually or collectively falls far short of satisfying the criteria for the admission of fresh evidence under the Criminal Appeal Act (Section 23). It could not reasonably bear on the safety of the convictions.

The remaining ground consists of a series of challenges to factual conclusion said to have been reached by the jury including as to the Victim’s recollection of dates, statements she made during counselling and messages exchanged. Each of these matters was explored in evidence and addressed in cross-examination. The Judge in his summing-up directed the jury's attention to those areas which were in dispute including the working pattern of the Applicant's wife, which had become an issue. A disagreement with the jury's assessment of factual issues cannot, absent some irregularity or perversity, found a proper ground of appeal. No such irregularity is alleged nor is any apparent from the transcript or documentation. This ground too is unarguable.

The Applicant was convicted on 5 February 2024 and sentenced on 7 May 2024. His notice of appeal was not sent until 3 December 2024. The delay is therefore substantial. The explanation advanced for this delay is, in essence, that he was not properly assisted by his legal representatives. The contemporaneous documents do not support that assertion. Trial counsel advised the Applicant on the procedure for appeal on the day of conviction, and further provided written advice eight days after sentence. Nothing in the papers explains, let alone justifies, the prolonged delay that took place thereafter.

The principles governing extensions of time are well established. An extension will be granted only where there is a good reason for delay and where refusal may result in significant injustice. No such reason has been demonstrated here and there would not be any injustice given our conclusions in relation to the other grounds. The application for an extension of time is therefore refused.

The Applicant has provided no adequate explanation for the very substantial delay in bringing this appeal. The criteria for an extension of time are not met and the application is therefore refused. Even if time were extended none of the grounds advanced disclose any arguable basis upon which this Court could properly conclude that the convictions may be unsafe. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is refused and leave to appeal is also refused.