R v Vivienne Taylor

On 12 March 2026, in the Crown Court at Isleworth, the appellant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Curtis-Raleigh to 14 months' imprisonment for one offence of stalking involving serious alarm or distress, contrary to section 4A(1)(a)(b)(i) and (5) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. She had previously pleaded guilty to that offence in the magistrates' court. There is no challenge to that sentence of imprisonment.

The appeal concerns the Restraining Order to which the appellant was made subject. The appellant has been granted leave to appeal in respect of that Order, not as to its terms, which were agreed between the prosecution and on behalf of the appellant during the sentence hearing, but as to its indefinite duration.

The appellant is now aged 28, but was aged 24 at the beginning of the period during which her stalking of the complainant began.

In 2021 the appellant underwent two major surgeries under the care of the complainant, who is a urological surgeon, involving gender affirming procedures. The complainant worked at Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, but also undertook surgery at Parkside Hospital. The complainant had taken over the appellant's care following a complication during treatment at Parkside Hospital in about 2020. After the complainant had treated her in 2021, the appellant became obsessively fixated on the complainant. Her behaviour included purchasing a cake for the complainant after she had returned from annual leave; and having a number of photographs of the complainant on her mobile phone which she had downloaded from the internet.

Shortly after her discharge, the appellant was re-admitted to Charing Cross Hospital, where she threatened to kill herself if the complainant did not treat her.

On 15 April 2021, while still a patient in the hospital, the appellant joined a Zoom meeting hosted by the complainant for medical students. She was removed from the meeting, and her behaviour was reported to the liaison psychiatrist. A boundary meeting was held on 19 April 2021, upon which the appellant agreed to conditions setting professional boundaries between herself and the complainant.

On 27 April 2021, the appellant was sectioned under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and was transferred to a Mental Health Unit in Liverpool. She told nurses that she knew where the complainant lived. The appellant was sent a letter excluding her from all Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust premises and advised that she would be removed if she attended, unless she was in need of emergency medical care.

For three years there was no further contact, until in 2024 the appellant again began her stalking behaviour against the complainant.

On 24 September 2024, the appellant sent an email to the complainant's work address asking if they could meet in London for dinner as friends. The appellant provided her mobile phone number and signed off the email with three kisses.

On 19 October, the appellant sent the complainant another email in which she apologised for her behaviour and again asking to meet. The complainant did not respond. The appellant then emailed nursed as the hospital where the complainant previously worked, in an attempt to reach her. The hospital managers responded on behalf of the complainant, indicating that the earlier apology had been forwarded.

In March 2025, the appellant's behaviour became more serious and threatening. She attempted to contact the complainant via LinkedIn; she copied the complainant's shared interests and described herself as an aspiring surgeon for gender affirmation.

In May 2025, the appellant attended Chealsea and Westminster Hospital and asked to be placed under the care of the complainant. Another team, unaware of the background, accepted the appellant as an outpatient for a follow-up appointment. That was later cancelled, following which the appellant filed a complaint against the hospital.

On 23 May, 15 June, 18 June and 20 June 2025, the appellant attended Chelsea and Westminster Hospital. On each occasion she falsely asserted that she was under the care of the complainant and that she had an appointment. On 12 July and 22 July, the appellant attended Charing Cross Hospital, claiming to be awaiting surgery under the care of the complainant. In June, July and August 2025 the appellant submitted a number of freedom of information requests relating to the complainant.

On 23 October 2025, the appellant sent an email to the complainant's work address, stating: "Hi Tina, I hope you're good. Let's catch up, girl. I need all the goss and updates while I've been away. Give us a ring anytime, mate." The appellant gave her mobile telephone number, expecting a call. The appellant's email described her as an a "Aspiring Gender Dysphoria and Gender Affirmation Surgeon".

Having received no response from the complainant, the appellant sent a further email on 2 November 2025, which contained threats of violence to the complainant: "I will find you … and when I do, I will hold the both of yous to account. Don't ever fuck with me, girl, and think you'll get away with it. Posh girl…? Well, this isn't North London Private School or UCL now. I'm going to batter both of you … and make you suffer. Both of your posh little lives are going to get a sharp dose of tough reality. When I find your fella … I'm going to shag him and make him fall deeply in love with me, [so] he leaves you all alone. …"

The appellant's behaviour caused the complainant serious alarm and distress, particularly when it became more obsessive and threatening. She had to make significant changes to her day to day life. She used taxis to and from work, so that she would be protected and to ensure that she was not followed. She carried a panic alarm with her at all times. The complainant's previous address in Harrow was visible on the internet. The appellant moved to Harrow after presenting herself to the London Borough of Westminster alleging domestic abuse and seeking emergency accommodation. It was unclear whether the appellant had specifically asked to be placed in Harrow.

The complainant provided a Victim Personal Statement in which she described the extent of the intrusion into her day to day life and the serious distress she had suffered between 2021 and 2025.

The judge appropriately identified the relevant sentencing guidelines and imposed a sentence of 14 months' imprisonment, which is not the subject of this appeal.

The court was provided with a psychiatric report from Dr Phoebe Collins, a forensic psychiatrist, dated 10 March 2026, in which she principally addressed the appellant's mental health. Further, a pre-sentence report, dated 1 February 2025, was provided, which included a risk assessment.

The judge was informed that there was no dispute that a restraining order was appropriate; and the terms of the order were agreed between the prosecution and on behalf of the appellant. Those terms were as follows:

The judge was required to consider the duration of the agreed Restraining Order. He concluded that it was appropriate to make the order indefinite – that is until further order. The judge stated that the facts of the case justified such a duration because of the appellant's fluctuating attitude towards the complainant. Whilst there had been an interval from 2021 until 2024, that suggested a future and not a waning risk of stalking behaviour at any time.

Counsel on behalf of the appellant then made further submissions in support of the contention that the order should be time limited. Having heard that argument, the judge stated as follows:

On behalf of the appellant, Miss Baggaley, for whose submissions we are grateful, argues that it was inappropriate and disproportionate for the judge to make the restraining order indefinite; that it should have been time limited. Miss Baggaley submits that the circumstances of this case readily identify an offender who does not present a sufficient risk as to require an order of the duration made by the judge; that the appellant is of previous good character; and that the period of offending does not warrant an indefinite order. Whilst the total period of offending was over four years, there was a significant gap between April 2021 and September 2024, during which there was no contact. It is submitted that the two distinct periods might have been charged as separate offences, rather than a single offence over a four year period.

Whilst the complainant reported the offending to the police in 2021, there is no evidence that the appellant was aware of that report by the time that she was sectioned under the Mental Health Act. Reliance is also placed upon the fact that the appellant does not have a history of breach of court orders. It is also argued that the appellant experiences genuine and persistent mental health difficulties which are confirmed within the psychiatric report. Miss Baggaley submits should not have considered the possibility of later applications to vary or discharge the order; rather that the judge should have confined himself to whether the order being imposed was itself proportionate.

The prosecution, in a well reasoned response to the appeal, argue that the key factors which demonstrate that an indefinite order is necessary include:

The power to impose a Restraining Order on conviction is contained within sections 359 and 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which provide:

Restraining orders are commonly imposed following conviction for intimidatory offences. The guiding light when making such orders is that of proportionality between the restrictions imposed and the harm it is sought to prevent in the future.

In R v Khellaf [2016] EWCA Crim 1297, this court, differently constituted, identified the following principles which the court should have in mind, and we summarise them, where relevant, as follows:

In passing sentence, the judge described an indefinite order as being "exceptional or rare". That was an appropriate observation and highlighted the need to consider carefully whether such an order should be made in the circumstances of this case. It was clear to the judge, and accepted on behalf of the appellant, that there was a continuing risk of harm in the form of serious alarm and/or distress caused by the appellant. The need for an order was not in dispute.

In seeking to protect the complainant from such harm in the future, the judge was required to balance the restrictions that were being imposed on the appellant in the form of the order, the terms of which were agreed, with the need to protect the complainant. Were those terms proportionate to the harm that they were sought to prevent, both in their scope and duration?

The effect of the restraining order was to prevent contact between the appellant and the complainant, directly or indirectly, save in controlled circumstances. As the judge stated, the appellant had no reason to have further contact with the complainant professionally or privately. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what significant interference for the appellant could be caused by the order. The risk of further harassment is ongoing, and it is not possible to say on the available evidence that the risk will ever be reduced to such an extent that the restraining order is no longer necessary.

Balancing the effect of the order with the substantial harm caused to the complainant led the judge to conclude that an indefinite order was not disproportionate.

The submissions made on behalf of the appellant of previous good character, the significant interval between 2021 and 2024, the appellant's mental health disorder and the absence of breaches of court order are appropriately made. However, the appellant's mental health assessment, as described by Dr Collins, and the risk assessment in the pre-sentence report show that the appellant is part resentment-motivated because she feels rejected, which can persist for long periods, as well as intimacy seeking and being linked to mental health instability. The long-term prognosis, with fluctuating insight and a trigger which may recur at any time evidenced by the gap in the offending, demonstrates the long-term and indefinite period of the risk and the necessity for the order and its need to be indefinite. Therefore we are not persuaded that the duration of the order should not have been indefinite.

Nor are we persuaded that the terms of the restraining order, even for an indefinite period, are not proportionate. They are aimed at protecting the complainant from any contact when there is no sensible reason why there should be any. We find ourselves in agreement with the judge that the restraining order imposed until further order was proportionate and neither wrong in principle, nor excessive in length.

Accordingly, we are satisfied that the order made by the judge was neither wrong in principle, nor excessive. This appeal against sentence is therefore dismissed.