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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT CAMBRIDGE (HIS HONOUR JUDGE ENRIGHT) (35NT1847622) CASE NO: 202400422 B5 NEUTRAL CITATION NO: [2026] EWCA Crim 691 |
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before:
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
(Lord Justice Edis)
MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH
MR JUSTICE EYRE
REX
v
SMITA BHAYANI
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Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
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Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
_________
The applicant appeared in person
_________
JUDGMENT
(Approved Transcript)
MR JUSTICE EYRE:
On 4 January 2024 the Applicant was convicted at Cambridge Crown Court, sitting in Peterborough, before HH Judge Enright and a jury, of one count of causing serious injury by careless driving contrary to s2C of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Before us the Applicant seeks an extension of time to renew her application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against conviction following a refusal by the single judge.
The Applicant’s conviction related to a collision which took place on 5 August 2023 between 7.00pm and 7.30pm on Royston Road in Harston.
The Applicant was travelling along that road and was intending to turn right into Church Street. Two motorcyclists, Zach Stephens and Jordan Cook, were travelling along Royston Road in the opposite direction to the Applicant.
The prosecution case was that the Applicant pulled across the path of the motorcyclists when it was not safe for her to do so. In moving across their path, the Applicant collided with Mr Stephens’s motorbike causing injury to Mr Stephens. There was then a further collision between the Applicant’s vehicle and Mr Cook who was not able to avoid hitting that vehicle.
The evidence of Mr Cook was that immediately after the accident the Applicant had said, “The sun was in my eyes. It’s all my fault.”
Brian Cooper had been driving in the same direction as the Applicant and was one car behind her. His evidence was that he spoke to the Applicant immediately after the accident and that she said, “I couldn’t see. I couldn't see.”
When police officers attended the scene of the accident the Applicant told PC Chance that she was going to turn right adding “The sun was just in my eyes. I saw a blur and I think that there was a sound.”
The Applicant’s case as set out in her Defence Statement had been that she had been able to see that no vehicle was approaching her as she began her right turn and that it was only after she had begun to turn that she was blinded by the glare of the sun. It was said there that the accident must have been caused by the motorcyclists travelling too fast.
However, in her evidence at the trial, as set out in the summing-up, the Applicant said:
“’I was going to turn right at Church Street. It was a clear day. I’ve done this many times. There’s nothing now I can hold onto in terms of what I recall about the other cars. I do recall slowing down. I don’t know if I indicated. I don’t recall where I positioned my car to turn. I recall a blur and was surprised to see something coming past at speed’, over her right shoulder, she said. ‘I didn’t understand what it was. I looked to my left and was blinded, a horrible shocking sound and then another sound. I don’t know what happened. I can’t put together what I saw. I got out. I spoke to the officer and the account he gave is accurate’, she said. ‘… I don’t think it’s possible I hit Mr Stephens. I just recall the blur. The van was not moved from where the incident took place. I drove with absolute care.’
Cross-examined, she said, ‘I don’t really recall what happened. The sun was there in an instant and what I said to the officer, though, is a sum of what I remember. The sun was in my eyes. I had a clear access to turn. [As to] the first rider, I don’t know what happened; it’s all a blur, but I wouldn’t have moved unless safe to do so’. She was asked about saying, ‘It was my fault’ to people at the scene. She said, ‘I don’t think I said those words. An accident is possible …when things come together’.”
The Applicant advances four grounds of appeal:
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Improper representations
Lack of sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict
Incomplete and incorrect jury instructions.
The Applicant supported those grounds by an appeal bundle, two further bundles, a “statement of truth”, and “points of consideration”. In addition, she applied for permission to call fresh evidence. This was to take the form of sundry documents and the evidence of a person whose name the Applicant does not know who spoke to her after the collision. The Applicant says that this person was a man and that he told her that the collision had been an accident and that he lived nearby.
The Applicant also set out a number of points of detail in support of her grounds. Those points were unfocused and disjointed. They included criticisms of the judge’s decision to allow a police officer to serve on the jury and his acceptance of a majority verdict. The Applicant asserted a number of failures on the part of her lawyers including a failure to track down and obtain evidence from the unknown local resident who had spoken to her after the accident. In addition, she advanced sundry points of peripheral detail about the evidence. It is of note that neither in the grounds themselves nor in the points in support of them did the Applicant address the contrast between, on the one hand, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as to the movements of the vehicles and as to the Applicant’s comments at the scene and, on the other, the absence of a coherent contrary account on her behalf.
In refusing the extension of time the single judge said:
“The Prosecution case was straightforward and compelling. You turned into the path of two motorcyclists who had the right of way. The overwhelming evidence was that you hit both of them. There was no evidence that they were travelling at an excessive speed; but even if they had been they were there to be seen and you still turned directly into their path. Their experience as motorcyclists was irrelevant to the issues before the Jury.
The evidence was fully tested at the trial and the witnesses were cross-examined by your experienced Counsel in line with your statement and instructions. As for the potential for glare this was raised as an issue, but if you were temporarily struggling to see you should not have started to execute the manoeuvre across the carriageway.
Your Counsel confirms that you had ample time to give instructions and this is corroborated by Prosecuting Counsel. You raised an issue in respect of the accuracy of the transcripts of your interviews, and they were checked and the content agreed (interviews are often edited by agreement to exclude irrelevant detail).
It is difficult to see how any potential witness could have been traced if he/she did not stay and give an address to the police officers. There was an independent witness and to the extent that he could assist his evidence was contrary to your case.
The Judge correctly ruled that no proper objection could be taken to a police officer who was not a traffic officer being a juror.
The Judge’s directions to the jury were entirely proper and adequate. There were no complex legal issues.
The Court is entitled to take majority verdicts.
Your grounds amount to no more than unhappiness with your conviction. Taken individually and cumulatively the issues/complaints raised do not reveal any realistic prospect of successfully arguing that your conviction was unsafe.
If there had been any merit in your grounds I would have extended time.”
In renewing her application the Applicant put forward further submissions with supporting documents. Those documents include data as to the number and cause of accidents in the vicinity of the Royston Road and Church Street junction and more generally. The submissions appear to make the following points:
There is criticism of the single judge’s failure to address each of the points advanced in support of the appeal.
It is said that the Applicant’s guilt was assumed by her lawyers and by the prosecution with the consequence that the latter did not investigate the possibility that Mr Stephens and Mr Cook had been speeding.
The Applicant takes issue with the prosecution account of how the accident occurred and says that “there were no witnesses to the actual events”.
She points to her good character, driving experience, occupation, and to the fact that she has a motorbike licence.
Before us, the Applicant submitted a further document and made oral submissions. Those repeat in slightly different words the points already made, albeit adding a contention that the accident assessors should have addressed the speed of the vehicles at the scene.
We agree with the single judge’s analysis of the issues and of the absence of any realistic prospect of the Applicant succeeding in showing that her conviction was unsafe. That assessment is not altered by the further points which the Applicant has made and in respect of those:
It was neither necessary nor proportionate for the single judge to explain why each peripheral point of detail put forward by the Applicant failed to advance matters nor is it necessary or proportionate for this court to do so.
It is apparent that the Applicant was properly represented at trial and that the prosecution evidence was tested on her behalf. In particular it was put in terms to Mr Stephens that he had been travelling too fast, and the jury were able to assess his evidence as to his speed and the circumstances of the accident.
The Applicant’s contention that there were no witnesses to the events appears to be a reference to the fact that Mr Cooper said that he had not seen the collision itself and only gave evidence of what happened after it. However, this contention overlooks both the direct evidence of Mr Stephens and Mr Cook as to how the collision occurred and also the inferences which the jury were fully entitled to draw from the evidence of her comments at the scene.
The judge gave the jury the appropriate good character direction in the Applicant’s favour and the invocation of that and of the Applicant’s driving experience does not advance matters further.
Both in writing and before us today, the Applicant’s submissions still did not address the core difficulty for her case arising from the stark contrast between the evidence for the Prosecution and her evidence at trial, and the opportunity for the jury to assess that evidence and reach a conclusion based on it.
It follows that the single judge’s assessment of the matter remains persuasive. As he said, there is no realistic prospect of the conviction being shown to have been unsafe and in those circumstances there is nothing to be gained by granting an extension of time and the application is refused.
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