R v Sophie Stamper

LORD JUSTICE FOXTON: On 5 September 2025 in the Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester, the appellant pleaded guilty to being concerned in supplying class A drugs.

On 25 November 2025 the appellant pleaded guilty at the Manchester City Magistrates' Court to assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which she was committed for sentence to the Crown Court under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

On 9 February 2026 the appellant was sentenced to 26 months' imprisonment (20 months for the drugs offence and a consecutive sentence for the assault). She now appeals against that sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive with the leave of the single judge. Her appeal today has been advanced with commendable clarity and precision by Mr O'Leary and we are grateful to him for his submissions.

We can state the facts of the offence shortly. The drugs conviction arose from a police operation called Operation Ibex. As part of that operation search warrants were executed at three addresses including the appellant's where she lived with her young son. Mobile devices and small amounts of class A and class B drugs were found, namely 13 wraps of cocaine and two snap bags of cannabis. Analysis of the mobile devices revealed evidence of drugs supplied by the appellant in small quantities to friends and neighbours and the facilitation of supply to others.

Turning to the assault. On the evening of 8 June 2024 the complainant and her boyfriend were in the Prince of Wales Public House on Abbey Lane. The appellant was in the same pub with her mother and some friends. At some point everyone ended up in the same area of the pub, but the appellant, who was described as being very drunk, started to become aggressive and the complainant and her boyfriend moved away from that group to the pool table area.

Later, the appellant and her group moved to the same part of the pub and at some point the appellant confronted the complainant in an aggressive manner. That led to them standing face to face a few centimetres apart with the appellant slapping the complainant's face. The appellant was also shouting at the complainant. She was dragged away by her mother continuing to shout as that happened. However the appellant managed to break away from her mother, pick up a ball from the pool table and hit the complainant hard in the face while holding the pool ball in her clenched fist. The complainant required stitches just above her left eye and was understandably shaken by the assault.

The appellant was of previous good character and aged 27 at the time of the offences.

In careful sentencing remarks the judge classified the appellant's involvement in the drugs offence as being a lesser role and hence a category 3 offence for sentencing guideline purposes with the aggravating factor that the appellant's child was living at the address where the drugs were found. The judge found the appropriate starting point was three years with a range of between two years and four years six months. Taking account of the appellant's previous good character, her remorse and her sole caring responsibilities and, after granting a 20 per cent credit for plea, the judge concluded that the sentence of 20 months was appropriate.

The judge held that the assault fell into category B1 because of the use of the pool ball as a weapon and the serious physical injury inflicted when judged in the context of actual bodily harm. The sentencing guideline suggested that for such an offence a one year six month starting point was appropriate with a range of 36 weeks to two years six months. The judge noted that the offence was committed when the appellant was drunk and while there were ongoing investigations relating to the drugs offence. However, the judge held that personal mitigation justified a sentence of 15 months before credit for plea, then reduced to 10 months.

The judge specifically directed himself by reference to the principle of totality to allow for the fact that as the sentences arose from separate and unconnected offending they would have to be served consecutively. He reduced the assault sentence by four months to allow for this factor. The resultant sentence of 26 months was not one which could in law be suspended but the judge stated that in his opinion the assault required an immediate sentence of imprisonment. He concluded that in these circumstances he could not further adjust the sentence for the purpose of making it eligible for suspension, while stating he would not have suspended it in any event.

It is these last aspects of the sentencing reasoning which are the specific focus of this appeal. First, it is suggested that in failing further to adjust the sentence to make suspension a possibility the judge failed properly to consider the option of a rehabilitative sentence. It is also said by way of an alternative ground that the adjustment made by the judge to take account of the principle of totality was insufficient.

We think it is fair to say that the principal thrust of ground 2 is that an adjustment should have been made of such a kind as to make the sentence eligible for suspension, or alternatively to significantly reduce the likely term of custody.

In our view the judge's conclusion that a sentence of 26 months was appropriate was fully open to him and he had regard to all relevant criteria. The sentence necessarily had to reflect that the judge was sentencing for two independent offences. Given the facts and circumstances of the assault a four month reduction in the length of that sentence on grounds of totality cannot be described as manifestly inadequate. Nor can the judge be criticised for deciding that given the circumstances of that offence it was not appropriate further to reduce the sentence for the sole purpose of making suspension an option. For those reasons, and despite Mr O'Leary's commendable submissions, we dismiss the appeal.