R v Nelia Moreira

On 25 November 2025 in the Crown Court at Woolwich before Her Honour Judge Downing, the applicant (then aged 38) was convicted unanimously along with her co-defendants, Emeka Onyegbula ('D1') and his brother, Chukwuka Onyegbula ('D2') of one count of conspiracy to do an act facilitating the breach or attempted breach of immigration law contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. That act was a sham marriage between the applicant and D2.

On 4 February 2026 the applicant was sentenced to 28 months' imprisonment. D1, who was also convicted of two offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, was sentenced to a total of 5 years' imprisonment, and D2 was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.

The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against sentence following referral of her application to the full court by the Registrar.

The applicant is a Portuguese citizen and has resided lawfully in the UK for many years. She was recruited by D1, a friend and former lover, to participate in a sham marriage to his brother, D2. D1 had resided in the UK lawfully for many years. D2 had entered the country lawfully to study a master’s in accountancy at Dundee; however, that lawful status was due to expire in 2020.

In or around February 2019, D2 applied to join the British Army. Acceptance would have legitimised his status in the United Kingdom. However, due to delays in D2 being accepted into the Army, D2 and D1 (who was employed as an officer in the United Kingdom Border Force) hatched a plan for D2 to enter into a sham marriage to accelerate the progress of legitimising D2's status. D1 selected the applicant as a marriage partner for his brother, and messages were exchanged suggesting that the applicant be paid for her role and giving her instructions on what to do.

The applicant, having applied for and obtained settled status in October 2019, married D2 on 7 March 2020 at the Dundee Registry Office.

On 16 March 2020 (just nine days after the wedding) D2 applied for a UK visa based on marriage. The application was signed by D2 and the applicant.

On 11 October 2020 D2 was accepted for enlistment in the British Army. By a letter dated 29 October 2020, he withdrew his marriage-based application for leave to remain, instead making an application on the basis that he was a member of the UK forces. That application was granted and meant that he was exempt from immigration control until discharged from the Army as a regular soldier.

On 1 December 2021 a search warrant was executed at the applicant's address. She was found to be living at the address with a man called Hugo Miguel de Jesus Semedo and two young children. The children were a boy born in 2010 and a girl born in 2020. When the address was searched, it was evident that the applicant and Mr Semedo were in a relationship. Family photographs were seen at the address including a large picture of the applicant, Mr Semedo and the two children.

On 1 December the applicant was interviewed by the anti-corruption officers. She answered 'no comment' to all questions asked.

At trial each of the defendants maintained that the marriage between the applicant and D2 was genuine. This account was disbelieved by the jury who convicted them.

The judge noted that there were no Sentencing Guidelines for the conspiracy offence but noted that the maximum sentence had increased from 7 years to, at that time, 14 years. She considered the Overarching Guidelines on culpability and harm. She found that the applicant had benefited from D1's actions by being paid £15,000 and it was clear that the applicant's motive was financial gain. The judge opined that the applicant had sold her right to remain in this country and that for that the public would expect a sentence of immediate imprisonment.

The judge considered the applicant's status as a single mother of two children, one of whom was very young. She bore in mind that the custodial sentence was only to be imposed if absolutely necessary. She took account of the fact that the applicant's son had a serious health condition that required assistance with a daily injection, as well as two trips a year to a specialist children's hospital. Notwithstanding that, the judge found that separation from the children would not have a devastating impact on the family and stated that those who commit serious offences should think carefully about what the consequences might be if apprehended. The judge said that this was "not ... a case that could ever be suspended" and sentenced the applicant to 28 months' immediate custody.

The applicant, represented today as she was below by Ms Zentler-Munro, seeks leave in respect of two grounds.

As to Ground 1, Ms Zentler-Munro submits that this was an isolated offence rather than being part of a broader scheme; that it did not involve assisting strangers; that each of the conspirators was in the country lawfully at the time of the offence; the applicant's role in the conspiracy was, as the Crown accepted, a marginal one as compared to the others; the intended harm — the circumvention of immigration laws — did not in fact materialise as the marriage-based application was withdrawn, and there had been significant delay.

As to Ground 2, Ms Zentler-Munro submits that the absence of any other family members in the UK means that the consequences of separation are likely to be devastating, and that whilst offenders should consider the impact on their children before committing an offence, that does not obviate the court's responsibility to consider the rights of dependants. Furthermore, it is said that the judge seems to have concentrated only on the seriousness of the offence in deciding not to suspend rather than all other relevant factors such as the low risk of reoffending and harm.

Immigration offences such as this one involving sham marriages are very serious. However, each case must be considered on its own facts with the sentence being tailored accordingly, and the court should not approach such cases on the basis that they can never, due to their seriousness, be suspended.

The judge considered the applicant's culpability in respect of count 3 as being equal to that of D2, who benefited from the sham marriage whereas she benefited financially. However, it is clear that whilst she did gain financially, her role in the conspiracy was, as the Crown put it, somewhat marginal in terms of organisation and planning, much of which was orchestrated by D1 with D2's assistance. Moreover, there were factors, as identified by Ms Zentler-Munro but not mentioned expressly by the judge in dealing with the applicant, which reduced the seriousness of the offending. In particular, the one-off nature of the offence committed by people known to each other is to be contrasted with situations where the offending is more wide-ranging and involves offering a sham marriage service to strangers who may have entered the country unlawfully.

However, the more significant feature in the applicant's case is that she is the mother of two children - one of whom has very serious medical needs and the other of whom is aged only 5 - and has no close family members to care for them in her absence. As stated in the pre-sentence report, which was before the judge, the applicant has "no supportive network in this country and the removal of her liberty will undoubtedly risk the likelihood of her children being placed in care". It would appear that Mr Semedo, who is caring for the children currently, has expressed some reluctance to continue with the arrangement indefinitely, and there is a suggestion that care could be transferred to a cousin of the applicant within Peterborough. A move of that nature will inevitably be hugely disruptive for the children. This is more than merely, as the judge found, a case of the children "missing" their absent mother. The maternal bond may be irrevocably damaged if the children were taken into care. On any view, the risk of that occurring would amount to a devastating impact on their lives.

In R v Oliveira(2013) 2 Cr App R (S) 4, the court expressed the following view as to the range of sentences in such sham marriage cases:

However, what is clear is that sentences for the type of offending involved may straddle the 2-year limit below which the court would have the option to suspend. It would be wrong in our view to impose an artificial fetter and to treat such cases as always so serious that they can never be suspended. Furthermore, the courts have repeatedly emphasised the need to consider the interests of children in any sentencing decision:

It was also said in R v Petherick that the question that the court should ask is whether the sentence contemplated is or is not a proportionate means of balancing the effect on children with the legitimate aims that sentencing must serve (see 20), and that it would be:

In our view this is such a case. Taking account of the applicant's lesser role in the conspiracy, her previous good character and the devastating impact that prolonged separation could have on the applicant's children, it was incumbent on the judge to consider whether the sentence of 28 months, which might otherwise have been proportionate, was disproportionate in these circumstances and ought to be reduced further to bring it within scope for suspension. In our judgment, a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment is the shortest sentence that could be imposed to reflect the overall criminality in this case.

As to whether the sentence should be suspended, we bear in mind a factor to be taken into account as set out in the overarching guidelines on the imposition of community and custodial sentences. Whilst the seriousness of the offence is a factor that indicates that suspension may not be appropriate, there are several factors going the other way. These include: the view expressed in the PSR that the applicant presents a low risk of reoffending and a low risk of harm; and more significantly, that immediate custody would result in a significant harmful impact on dependent children. We note in this regard that not only is one of the applicant's children very young, but the other is in need of daily assistance with critical medical treatment. The combination of these factors, in our judgment, indicates that suspension is appropriate in this case.

As such, we conclude that by taking a blanket approach to such cases and by in effect refusing to countenance anything but immediate custody, the judge did impose a sentence that was manifestly excessive in the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant leave and we allow the appeal. The sentence of 28 months is quashed, and is replaced with a sentence of 24 months, which is suspended for 2 years on count 3. As to the conditions of that suspended sentence order, we take account of the recommendations in the pre-sentence report and we consider it appropriate to impose an unpaid work requirement of 100 hours and a rehabilitation requirement of 20 days.