R v Bradley Christie

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. We have been careful in this judgment to avoid any reference to names or facts which might lead to any identification of the complainant.

This is a renewed application for leave to appeal against a sentence passed in respect of historic sexual offending, following refusal by the single judge.

On 13 November 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne before Her Honour Judge Sarah Mallett and a jury, the applicant was convicted of 14 counts of indecent assault on a male, contrary to section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 ("the 1956 Act), and two counts of rape, contrary to section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

On 30 January 2025 the applicant, then aged 36, was sentenced to six and a half years' imprisonment on the first of the rape counts (count 17 on the indictment), with a series of shorter, concurrent sentences on the remaining counts, giving a total sentence of six and a half years' imprisonment. The usual notification and barring provisions applied. These are not the subject of any appeal and we need say no more about them.

The detailed facts of the offending are set out in the Criminal Appeal Office Summary; it is unnecessary to repeat them all here. In short, the applicant was convicted of a series of repeated sexual assaults on a younger boy when that boy was aged between 6/7 and 13/14, and the applicant was aged between 10/11 to 17. The assaults started with touching the younger boy inappropriately and kissing him; the applicant then moved to putting his penis into the younger boy's mouth; getting the younger boy to masturbate him; and on one occasion putting his tongue into the younger boy's anus. The majority of the later offending involved putting his penis into the younger boy's mouth – hence the charges of rape under the 2003 Act.

As the offending all occurred when the applicant was a child himself, starting when he was aged just 10 or 11, and as, by the time of sentence he was an adult living an apparently blameless life, with a wife and daughter and his own business, the sentencing exercise which the judge had to undertake was not at all straightforward. The offences were committed many years ago, most of them at a time when the provisions of the 1956 Act applied. It is plain that the judge was fully alive to the complexity and that she was at pains to ensure that she took the right approach, according to the principles set out by this court in the case of R v Ahmed and Others [2023] EWCA Crim 281. To this end, the judge took the novel, and in our view sensible, course of sending to counsel a sentencing note which she had prepared, giving an advance view of what she understood the correct approach to be and giving them the opportunity to correct her. Counsel themselves produced sentencing notes. We have seen and read them all.

Ahmed requires the court, when sentencing an adult for offences committed as a child, to consider what sentence would have been passed on a child of the age the person was when the offences were committed. This requires the court to have regard, amongst other things, to the maximum which would have applied in respect of the particular offence (most of the offences here were of indecent assault under the 1956 Act), as well as the type of sentence which would then have been available. In Ahmed, having reviewed all the relevant authorities, the Lord Chief Justice, giving the judgment of the court said this, under the heading "The Proper Approach":

The judge was assisted by a detailed pre-sentence report from the Probation Service and by the sentencing notes from counsel which we have mentioned. There was a victim impact statement from the younger boy, now a man, speaking about the profound harm which the repeated violations during his childhood had had upon him. The judge had of course heard from the complainant and from the applicant during the trial and was able to form her own view as to the harm done and the proper assessment of culpability, given the applicant's age at the time of the offending.

Having summarised the details of the offending, the judge set out the principles derived from Ahmed which she had to apply. She noted that the applicant was at school at the time and had been doing well, and that he was relatively mature for his age. She said that she would approach his culpability accordingly. She noted that the harm was very high. The psychological impact on the complainant had been considerable and was likely to be life-long. She described the complainant as "particularly vulnerable due to his age at the beginning of the offending and then due to the ongoing offending". She set out and followed the guidance given in the Sentencing Council overarching guidelines Sentencing children and young people andSexual offences – Sentencing children and young people. She particularly noted the guidance that children and young people are generally less emotionally developed and that offending can arise through inappropriate sexual experimentation or a lack of understanding.

The judge referred to the guidance given in the Children guideline when assessing the appropriate length of a custodial sentence: "broadly within the region of half to two thirds of the adult sentence for those aged 15 to 17".

The judge referred to the delay in the case coming to court and to the impact of the conviction and sentence on the applicant and his family. She said that she had reduced the sentences for offences when the applicant was aged 10 to 12 by two thirds, by half when he was 13 to 14, and by one third when he was older. She took his age as the youngest he would have been within the indicted date ranges for each count. She then went on to pass the sentences we have indicated.

The advice and grounds, settled by leading counsel who represented the applicant at trial and sentence, advance two criticisms in support of the proposed appeal: first, that the starting point was too high, failing to give sufficient weight to the principles set out in Ahmed; second, that the sentence failed adequately to reflect the mitigating factors and future risk.

A sentence of six and a half years' imprisonment is a severe sentence for a boy aged 17, as this applicant was at the time of the latest offending. But his offending had been persistent and continuous over a seven-year period, causing very serious and enduring psychological harm to the younger complainant. There were additional and weighty aggravating circumstances identified by the judge. In sentencing the applicant, the judge was, as we have said, at pains to ensure that she applied the correct principles from Ahmed, going so far as to prepare her own sentencing note for counsel. Her approach was conspicuously careful.

We agree with the observations of the single judge that the sentencing judge appropriately took account of all the mitigation, including the applicant's lack of any subsequent offending, his role as a devoted and caring parent, the assessment by the author of the pre-sentence report of his future risk as low, and the impact of conviction and sentence upon him and his family. In our view, the final sentence which the judge passed cannot be criticised; it was severe, but it is not arguably excessive.

Accordingly, this renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.