R v Mustapha Eniola Aminu

On 15^th May 2026 we dismissed this appeal against sentence. We announced our reasons for that decision would be given at a later date. We now give our reasons.

This is an appeal against sentence brought with the leave of the single judge.

The appellant is Mustapha Eniola Aminu. He is age 36 years. He was aged 34 years when he committed the crimes which are the subject of this appeal. This embraces Robbery and three counts of Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm.

On 18^th October 2024, in the Crown Court at Woolwich (His Honour Judge Gumpert KC), the appellant (then aged 34) pleaded guilty to Counts 1-6. He was later allowed to vacate his guilty pleas on Count 4 (threatening another with an offensive weapon) and Count 6 (having an offensive weapon), which were then ordered to lie on file against him on the usual terms.

On 7^th May 2025 (His Honour Judge David Miller), the appellant (then aged 35) was sentenced to an Extended Determinate Sentence of 10 years pursuant to section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020 with a custodial term of 5 years and an extended licence period of 5 years. That sentence was passed on the count of robbery, which the judge regarded as the lead offence.

The individual sentences were as follows:

The appellant has significant previous convictions for robbery and other highly relevant crimes to which we shall turn shortly.

The appellant had indicated his guilty pleas in the magistrates court. The inevitable sentences of immediate imprisonment were, accordingly, reduced by one-third.

There are four grounds of appeal:

The facts of this case reveal a very serious pattern of offending.

Mr Staples and his partner Ms Wells are in their mid-50s. They live in south east London. They are both slight of stature, both are retired, and Ms Wells has cancer.

During the afternoon of 25^th May 2024 Mr Staples was on the driveway at his home address at Charlton Park Lane in south east London. The appellant approached him, making an incoherent noise. The appellant began swinging at Mr Staples with both of his hands and repeatedly hit him all over, causing him to fall backwards.

The appellant followed Mr Staples after he tried to run away. He continued to swing at Mr Staples towards his face and, at one point, punched him with such force that it knocked him to the ground. Whilst Mr Staples was laying on the ground the appellant continued to punch and kick him all over.

At this point Ms Wells tried to intervene. She chased the appellant. At this point – and very suddenly – the appellant turned on her. She attempted to run away. The appellant ran after her. The appellant was holding something, but she was not sure what it was. Whilst stood over Ms Wells, the appellant punched her multiple times in the head and body. Because he was bigger than her, the blows forced her to the ground. She could feel the appellant punching and kicking her all over her body.

The injuries sustained by each victim were these: Ms Wells sustained various injuries and bruises to her body and arms. Mr Staples sustained bruising and a torn ligament in his shoulder. Both were taken to hospital for treatment. In their personal statements both suffered from panic attacks, anxiety, difficulty in sleeping and nightmares. Both had made significant changes to the way they lived their lives, and had feelings of being unsafe.

The events relating to count 3 and 5 occurred 4 months later.

On 12^th September 2024 Mr Mathurin, then aged 17, was at Meridian Sports Centre on Charlton Park Lane when the appellant approached him trying to make general conversation. Mr Mathurin responded and left.

Approximately ten minutes later the appellant returned and snatched Mr Mathurin’s mobile telephone from his hand. Mr Mathurin grabbed the appellant’s jumper and a scuffle ensued. The appellant swung his arm trying to punch Mr Mathurin. The appellant then moved away but Mr Mathurin had fallen off the bench as a result of trying to avoid the punch.

He asked for his telephone back. At this point the appellant approached him, holding the strap of his bag, which was later discovered to contain a metal bar. The appellant said words to the effect of he would take something out of his bag and hit Mr Mathurin in the face with it. Mr Mathurin backed off because he did not want to be hurt.

He went to cool off in the lavatory as he was upset and angry at the incident. His telephone was later retrieved but was damaged as the appellant had thrown it down on the ground to smash it.

Count 5 relates to an incident a short while later involving one of one of Mr Mathurin’s friends.

Mr Eccleston ascertained the robbery had taken place and approached the appellant.

The appellant pushed Mr Eccleston, who could tell from the body language of the appellant he was aggressive. The appellant took off his bag and was swinging it around. Mr Eccleston tried to avoid the swings, but one of them caught him in the face, hitting him on the left side, and he felt something hard. He sustained a cut to the bridge of his nose as well as pain and swelling.

The appellant has previous highly relevant previous convictions. In 2017 the appellant was outside the Palace of Westminster and was found in possession an offensive weapon. He asserted he wished to kill himself. Police officers intervened and the appellant was disarmed. Due to the location of the offending, there was a high level of publicity and press interest. The appellant was made the subject of a Hospital Order. In June 2023 the appellant committed a robbery in an attack upon a customer outside a late night shop. He brandished a knife. The appellant was made the subject of a community order with a mental health requirement and a curfew.

The judge had the benefit of a PSR when he passed sentence as well as a psychiatric report – albeit the latter was from mid-2023.

The medical report prepared by Dr Hundel set out how the appellant had been admitted to mental hospitals in the past and in her opinion he suffered from two mental illnesses: (1) Schizoaffective Disorder, and (2) a Mental and Behaviour Disorder secondary to polysubstance misuse involving cannabis, opiates and cocaine. There had also been issues with poor compliance; and levels of engagement with the clinical team was erratic. It was also noted there was repeated misuse of cannabis.

The PSR prepared for the Crown Court hearing was insightful and helpful. It set out how the appellant put a different gloss on the facts and lost his temper when he was unable to control his rage. It also set out his family background and described the appellant as impulsive. It described him as a man who could not think through the consequences of his actions.

There is then this important passage when the probation officer stated:

“4.2

my assessment, the nature of the index offences can be viewed as an escalation in terms of offending behaviour and potential harm posed. Furthermore, the nature of today's matters would not in my opinion, represent a continuation of his previous medium risk of harm assessment. As such, the defendant has been assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm to members of the public. That risk involves the potential use of weapons he may possess, such as knives or metal poles, to inflict potentially life threatening or fatal injuries. The risk also encompasses impulsive and unprovoked violence that has the potential to cause serious and lasting injury, as well as long term psychological harm. That risk appears most prominent and heightened during violent acquisitive offences, as well as during conflict situations, where he is unable to regulate his anger and temper. The risk is also heightened when Mr Aminu may be experiencing mental health problems or a deterioration in his mental health, when he may disengage with his anti-psychotic medication, alongside periods of illicit drug use. As there have been gaps in his offending, the risk that he poses is not deemed immediate at this stage.

4.3

Historically, Mr Aminu has been assessed as posing a medium risk of harm to staff (police, mental health professionals, and ward staff), as well as known adults (his parents), due to his aggressive and violent type behaviour and presentation at times. At this stage, those previous assessments of him will remain. He is not assessed as posing a risk of harm to other identifiable groups such as children, or prisoners. Due to his previous suicidal ideation, he is assessed as posing a medium risk of harm to himself.

4.4

Should Mr Aminu complete offending behaviour work that aims to improve his poor thinking skills, alongside maintaining his mental health regime, as well as refraining from misusing any illicit substances, then this has the potential to reduce the risk of harm that he poses.”

The judge set out his conclusions and analysis with some care. He set out the facts of the case and described the first incident as an entirely unprovoked attack where the injuries and consequences were serious in the context of Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm. It involved a prolonged and persistent attack where there was punching a kicking on the ground with serious physical and psychological sequelae. He placed the case in category 1A of the relevant guideline.

The judge also described the second tranche of offending as a street robbery with significant force where there was a threat of violence with a weapon. He placed the case in category 2A of the robbery guideline. It is in respect of this finding there is a challenge in this appeal.

Thereafter he addressed totality by obvious reference to the guideline on that subject. He also covered the fact the appellant struggled with mental health problems, but there was no suggestion in this case the offending had been caused, or contributed to, by his mental health problems.

The judge indicated the total sentence following a trial would have been 7 ½ years imprisonment; and due to the full credit, the sentence would be reduced to 5 years.

At that stage the judge addressed the issue of the dangerous offender provisions. He concluded the appellant was a danger by reference to his previous offending, the circumstances of this case, and the contents of the PSR. The judge plainly had in mind the entirety of the facts known to the court.

Miss Papamichael made four basic submissions in her grounds of appeal which she advanced further in oral argument. Her main point was the judge misapplied the robbery guideline (Definitive Guideline of the Sentencing Council on Robbery – Street and Less Sophisticated Commercial issued in 2016 which came into effect on 1^st April 2016). She submitted the judge was wrong to place the robbery in A2 within the robbery sentencing guideline. The starting point was therefore too high. She argued the judge had utilised facts subsequent upon the act of robbery to elevate the case into category A2.

She further submitted the judge should have ascertained the correct level within the relevant guideline for each individual crime and then, if he had chosen to construct the sentence by way of imposing a sentence upon a lead offence, increase the lead sentence by a proportionate amount. She asserted, that whichever way the judge acted it was simply out of proportion to inflate the sentence to the level the judge did. Consequently, she contended, the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Miss Papamichael argued the case fell in to category C3 for robbery as there was hardly, if any, injury to Mr Mathurin. She did accept, when pressed, the circumstances of the case were in the upper echelons of the range open to the court if it fell within category 3 – namely up to 3 years custody.

Submissions were made that the judge had also misapplied the totality guideline. She submitted a sentence less than 4 years should have been imposed and, if so, the judge would not have been able to pass an Extended Sentence Order.

Finally, if the sentence was longer than 4 years she argued there was sufficient material for the judge to reach a finding of dangerousness, but he should not have exercised his power to extend the sentence. If, he chose to do so, she submitted, in the alternative, it should have been for a shorter period.

It seems to us there is force in the submission the judge miscategorised the robbery standing alone.

It is important we make this overarching observation. A guideline of the Sentencing Council is exactly what it purports to be – a guideline. It must, of course, be followed unless it is unjust to do so. The helpful categories which have certain factors within them to assist judges evaluate a case before them, are not hermetically sealed or watertight compartments. Judgment as to culpability and harm in order to assess the seriousness of a crime are matters for the judge to evaluate by reference to the guideline. It is a form of holistic evaluation of seriousness. Indeed the Robbery guideline expressly says:

“The court should determine the offence category with reference only to the factors in the tables below. In order to determine the category the court should assess culpability and harm.”

It goes on to state in relation to culpability:

“Where there are factors present from more than one category of culpability the court should weigh those factors in order to decide which category most resembles the offender’s case.”

In relation to harm this is stated:

“The court should consider the factors set out below to determine the level of harm that has been caused or was intended to be caused to the victim. Where there are factors present from more than one category of harm, the court should weigh those factors in order to decide which category most resembles the offender’s case.”

It is critical, in respect of all decisions about sentencing, that the guideline is not approached with artificial analysis in an endeavour to lever a factual scenario into a particular category. It is necessary to look at all the circumstances when making a judgment of this kind.

In this case, the sequence of events in this fast unfolding event was:

It is our judgment when analysed in this way, the culpability of the appellant – when viewed holistically – and with a sense of realism – falls into category B because “the offender’s culpability falls between the factors as described in A and C”. Artificial dissection of an event is not a helpful exercise for the purposes of sentencing. The whole event must be evaluated in order to assess culpability.

The threat of force to prevent him getting back the items after the actual act of robbery, is part of the seriousness of the whole situation. The victim was aged just 17 years. His telephone was destroyed deliberately. The appellant was also subject to a community order for robbery at the time. The consequences, although unpleasant for the complainant, were not great – in the sense he was affected by what occurred to him, but he was not injured – hence category 3 for harm. This offending is additionally aggravated by the previous convictions. This places the case in B3 where there is a starting point of 2 years with a range of 1 to 4 years. Plainly the case move upwards from the starting point. A sentence of at least 3 years could easily have been justified for that crime.

We simply note – even if the argument of Miss Papamichael had been accepted (and we make clear we do not accept it) and the case fell into C3 – the sentence could have been increased to 3 years as it was a serious case within the confines of that category.

In the result in respect of the robbery standing alone, we accept the submission the judge placed the robbery into the wrong category. But, that is not the end of the matter; because it is always a matter for a judge as to how he or she structures the sentence. In this case the judge chose to treat the robbery as the lead offence. He would in those circumstances be entitled to enhance that sentence to take account of the other offending providing there is not a simple addition of all the other sentences and the judge has a clear eye on the principle of totality.

The other sentences need to be analysed in order to judge whether the total is manifestly excessive.

The The two assault counts which resulted in actual bodily harm to Mr Staples and Ms Wells were, of their type, serious crimes. The crimes albeit perpetrated as part of the same incident, were two separate attacks on two individuals. The assaults were persistent and had a substantial impact on two middle aged people – one of whom had cancer. Each count fell into category A1 where there is a starting point of 2 ½ years with a range of 1 ½ years to 4 years imprisonment. Given the previous offending and the nature of the criminality each one of those crimes warranted a sentence of between 2 ½ years to 3 years. It must be remembered this was an unprovoked attack in the street perpetrated with a high level of violence and, when chased away by the partner of the first victim, the appellant set about attacking her, pushing her to the ground and kicking her. The consequences of this has changed the lives of each of the victims. The judge was generous in his application of the principle of totality to this aspect of the case.

The other crime of Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm was perpetrated in the immediate aftermath of the attack involving the robbery. It was separate and not part of the robbery. A bag with a lump of metal in it was used to perpetrate the crime. An injury to the bridge of the nose of the victim was sustained. This case is properly in category B2 where there is a starting point of a community disposal through to 1 ½ years imprisonment. It is also aggravated by previous offending. This is a crime perpetrated immediately after the robbery and was a determined attack. It would have warranted a sentence standing alone of at least 1 year moving towards the maximum allowed within the category.

Plainly those individual sentences cannot be simply added up. Judgment must be exercised as to totality as between the first tranche of offending and the second.

We can see nothing wrong with an assessment that the total sentence following a trial having regard to the circumstances would have been 7 ½ years. In fact it might have warranted 8 years absent the limited mitigation. It is clear to us the judge had the principle of totality front and centre of his consideration when he made his decisions. We do not accept the proposition the judge inaccurately evaluated totality.

This was persistent violent offending on two separate occasions involving four separate victims, where the appellant lost his temper and was unable to control his violent rage.

There then had to be a reduction to 5 years given the stage at which the guilty pleas were indicated.

Some judges would have passed consecutive sentences for the individual crimes and ratioed them accordingly to take account of totality. Judge Miller chose to pass a lead sentence on one crime and pass individual appropriate concurrent sentences on the other crimes.

In our judgment it cannot be said he failed to take into account totality, nor can he be criticised for enhancing the sentence on the lead offence to 7 ½ years before reduction for the guilty pleas. We accept the criticism the judge miscategorised the robbery, but, given we have approached the matter in the correct way, we achieve the same result – which does not render the sentence manifestly excessive.

We do not accept the second and third grounds of appeal. The judge balanced the aggravating and mitigating features appropriately in our judgment. Given our analysis, which we have fully explained, the third submission is adequately covered by what we have already stated.

We turn to the fourth ground of appeal relating to the imposition of an extended sentence. It was conceded there was sufficient information before the judge for him to adjudge the appellant to be a dangerous offender. It is argued the judge, notwithstanding that finding, should not have passed an extended sentence. It is further argued, in the alternative, the extended licence period of 5 years is excessive. Miss Papamichael contended there was no circumstances in this case which warranted an extended sentence. It is argued the Judge failed to properly consider how long it would take for the appellant to complete the necessary offender programmes to manage his risk within a shorter timescale. We disagree.

The whole point of an extended sentence is to enhance public protection from further risk of serious harm by the offender committing other serious crimes. The imposition of the extension period is not referable to a period of time in which the offender may be treated. It is intended to protect the public. We accept the judge was entitled to form the view a 5 years period was just and proportionate to protect the public given the backdrop of his previous offending, this offending, his erratic engagement with mental health services, and his drug related problems. This not only warranted the imposition of an extended sentence, but also the length of the extension period.

In all circumstances of this case, we do not consider the sentence taken as a whole to be manifestly excessive. We are persuaded the judge mis-categorised the robbery, but that is irrelevant when he was entitled to enhance that sentence from where it would have been given the other offending and his decision to treat that count as the lead offence. The structure of a sentence is a matter for the sentencing judge. We make no criticism of him for the way he structured the sentence.

It is for these reasons the appeal was dismissed.