R v Ronique Kyla Belfon

Ronique Belfon (“RB” in this judgment) and her co-accused are charged on an indictment with three counts. At count 1 they are both charged with murder, and, in the alternative, at count 2 with manslaughter. The co-accused is also indicted at count 3 with having an article with a blade or point, contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

They are currently standing trial on this indictment in the Crown Court at Southwark, where, at the conclusion of the prosecution evidence, a submission of no case was made on behalf of RB that she had no case to answer under either limb of Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, on counts 1 and 2.

On 1 May 2026, the trial judge acceded to the submission on count 1, but refused it on count 2.

The prosecution seek leave to appeal against the ruling in respect of count 1, pursuant to section 58 of the Criminal Appeal Act 2003.

It is common ground that the prosecution has complied with the necessary procedural provisions and in particular has provided the acquittal agreement. The trial judge ordered expedition of the appeal, under section 59, and has adjourned the trial pending the outcome of the appeal.

We remind ourselves that in accordance with section 67 of the Act, we may only reverse a ruling under appeal if we are satisfied that the ruling was wrong in law, that the ruling involved an error of law or principle, or that the ruling was one that it was not reasonable for the judge to have made.

The prosecution case as opened before the jury, was that the deceased operated a car rental business, together with his girlfriend. The finance and most of the cars came from business partners, who included RB and the co-accused, who was the father of her two young children, both of whom were under two years of age. RB had purchased two Mercedes vehicles on finance which she supplied to the deceased, whilst the co-accused had provided the deceased with finance for car repairs.

The agreement was that the deceased would be responsible for the monthly finance charges on the two Mercedes, and he would split any profits from hiring them out with RB. However, it appears that the agreement broke down as he defaulted on payments and he also defaulted on the payment of parking tickets which customers had incurred on the vehicles, which went directly to RB as the registered keeper of the vehicles. This caused friction between them, and RB complained to the deceased's girlfriend about the situation.

It would appear that the pressure of running the business became too much for the deceased and, in April/May 2025, he transferred the business to a third-party.

About two months prior to the murder, the co-accused contacted the deceased's girlfriend asking for the deceased. When his girlfriend said that he was out, the co-accused replied, "So he's out yeah. So nigga's lying to me." About an hour later the deceased's girlfriend got a text message from RB which read, "That's just a warning."

In other WhatsApp messages, RB complained to a friend of hers that the vehicles were being repossessed due to failed finance payments and she explained that she was also in debt with the insurance policies.

RB also complained to the deceased's girlfriend that the deceased had been ignoring the co-accused, to which the girlfriend replied, "He's been belling off my phone like he's on violence or something." RB accused her of being sarcastic, and said, "Remember he owes him 3k."

It was apparent that RB and the co-accused continued to try and get in contact with the deceased, and on 14 July 2025, RB complained to someone else that, "He's apparently in jail and is airing me….Then others are saying he's cappin [lying]…." These were some of the events which led up to the day of the deceased's murder on 2 August 2025.

WhatsApp messages which were being exchanged that day showed that RB was still annoyed about the debt owed to her by the deceased and had been provided with the postcode for the deceased's address in South London. RB indicated that she might drive down to London that day and asked for directions.

So it was that on the afternoon of Saturday 2 August 2025, RB and the co-accused commenced their journey from Bedford where RB lived, down to where the deceased lived with his girlfriend in New Cross. RB was driving the car, and the co-accused was the front seat passenger. It is apparent that he was armed with a 10" combat knife, and their two very young children were in the back seat.

When they arrived in New Cross, RB drove her vehicle slowly along Monson Road, which is where the deceased lived. It would appear that although RB and the co-accused had been to his house before, they could not recall his exact address and she sent a message to someone called "Kubie" to the effect that she could not recall the colour of his front door, but "if I find them I'll let you know cause I don't believe he's in jail."

CCTV footage showed that RB brought her vehicle to a halt on Monson Road and her co-accused alighted from it, walked past the deceased's address and then got back into the front seat of the vehicle. A couple of minutes later the co-accused alighted again and went to the deceased's front door and knocked on it.

The deceased and his girlfriend who had been asleep upstairs were awoken and the deceased went downstairs. His girlfriend overheard the front door open and the deceased asking, "What are you doing here bro?" Footage from a Ring doorbell was later obtained and it would appear that the co-accused replied that the deceased had been avoiding him and said, "I'm not doing nothing. Come chat to me though init." The deceased did not immediately go outside, but first of all walked back upstairs, put on his trainers, and would appear to have armed himself with a knife, before walking back downstairs.

Whilst all of this was going on, RB was keeping an eye on what was happening from where she was sat in the driving seat of her vehicle, which was parked across the road with the window down, and she sent Kubie a message saying that they had "found him." RB could also be seen with her hand out of the window at some stage tapping on the roof and appearing to gesture towards the co-accused.

The footage showed that there came a point when the deceased emerged from his house onto the pavement and a scuffle took place between him and the co-accused, in the course of which the co-accused stabbed the deceased in the heart. By then, RB had alighted from her vehicle, and would have been able to see the deceased slowing down and looking at his chest before collapsing to the ground in his garden.

The co-accused ran straight towards RB, who did not appear to be surprised by what was happening, and instead the two of them got back into the vehicle and RB drove away from the scene, only stopping to enable the co-accused to run back to where the deceased was lying in order to retrieve his mobile phone which he had dropped.

Neither RB nor the co-accused called the emergency services, and instead drove away from the scene and into Central London. En route, RB accidentally phoned Kubie, who said that she could not talk at the moment, and asked whether she was with him, to which RB replied, "No he just left….just closed the door."

Others had in fact called the emergency services who arrived shortly after and, despite efforts to revive him, the deceased was declared life extinct shortly afterwards. The cause of death was a catastrophic heart trauma caused by a single stab wound to his chest which had perforated the left ventricle of his heart.

Due to the police being able to swiftly view the CCTV imagery from the area, the registration number of RB’s vehicle was circulated and the vehicle was stopped near Waterloo Bridge. The co-accused ran from the vehicle carrying the combat knife, but was brought to the ground by the police. He was initially arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm, and replied that "I didn't kill no one, it was self-defence." When the police were informed that the deceased had died, both the co-accused and RB were arrested on suspicion of murder.

In subsequent interviews, both gave "no comment" interviews, but RB provided a short written statement in which she denied any involvement in the murder and stated that she was not aware that such an offence would take place.

At the commencement of the Crown Court trial, those appearing for RB objected to a passage in the prosecution's opening which read:

It was submitted by those representing RB that this passage should not form part of the opening as there was no or insufficient evidence that she had knowledge that the co-accused had possession of the combat knife before he used it to stab the deceased.

The judge indicated that he would allow the prosecution to include the passage in their opening, on the basis that it was supported by a "constellation of circumstantial evidence."

After summarising the various arguments from counsel, he stated that:

Thereafter, the prosecution presented their evidence to the jury which included all aspects of the prosecution opening, save for the reference to RB having sent the deceased's partner a message, "that's just a warning."

As we have already observed, at the close of the prosecution's evidential case, those instructed on behalf of RB made a submission of no case to answer on counts 1 and 2, and the judge ruled that whilst there was a case to answer on count 2 (manslaughter), there was no case to answer on count 1 (murder).

Although reference to a number of authorities about joint enterprise had been made by the parties, it was accepted that RB's liability to be convicted of murder depended upon whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that she was aware that the co-accused was in possession of the knife prior to getting out of the vehicle in New Cross. If there was sufficient evidence of RB’s knowledge of the knife, then she had a case to answer on count 1. If there was insufficient evidence of RB's knowledge of the knife, then that count 1 had to be withdrawn from the jury.

The judge rehearsed the evidential matters upon which the prosecution relied as follows:

The judge concluded that these pieces of evidence were sufficient to enable a jury to conclude that there had been an agreement between RB and the co-accused to go and confront the deceased with the use of physical violence.

However, having looked at the CCTV footage a number of times, he was unable to see the outline of the knife on the co-accused's person, or in his pocket, and that:

Before us Mr Brown KC, on behalf of the prosecution, submits that sufficient circumstantial evidence has been provided, during the course of the prosecution case, from which the reasonable inference could be drawn by the jury that RB had knowledge of the knife being carried by the co-accused prior to the co-accused alighting from the car on Monson Road. He points out that at the beginning of the trial, the judge had accepted that that was the situation and that in reality, little, if anything, had changed in the evidential landscape between the prosecution opening and the close of the prosecution’s evidence.

Mr Brown submits that in the course of his half-time ruling, the judge inappropriately focused his attention on whether or not the knife would have been observable by RB, and in particular focused upon what could be seen on the CCTV imagery immediately leading up to and at the time of the killing. He submits that this was an unreasonable approach taken by the judge and that in view of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the appeal should be allowed and the ruling reversed.

On behalf of RB, Dr Gerry KC, who also appeared below, submits that this is not in effect what the judge did. Although the judge may have taken the view at the commencement of the trial that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reach the reasonable conclusion that RB knew that the co-accused was in possession of the knife, before he alighted from the vehicle on Monson Road, it was open to the judge, having seen and heard the evidence, to change his mind at the close of the prosecution case. It was at that point that the duty arose for the judge to assess whether there was sufficient evidence against RB in relation to the count of murder. Dr Gerry points out that there were some evidential differences from that described in the opening, one of which we have already mentioned, namely the absence of reference to the warning, but she also points out that it was accepted that the view which RB had of the co-accused once he had alighted from the car on Monson Road, was partially restricted by foliage and, in any event, she points out that there was, in her submission, no background evidential material that serious violence was being contemplated by either RB or the co-accused leading up to the fatal incident.

Dr Gerry points out that the knife which was being carried by the co-accused, either in his right-hand pocket or down the right side of his leggings, could not be seen on the CCTV footage and submits there was no reason to think that it could be seen by RB when she was sat next to him over the course of the 2-hour journey from Bedford down to New Cross. She also points out a number of other evidential matters arising from closer examination of that CCTV imagery, in particular that there appears to have been a 12-second delay between the co-accused getting back into the vehicle after the killing and RB driving off from the scene, which it is suggested is hardly a characteristic of a getaway driver.

In the event, Dr Gerry submits that the judge took an appropriate approach to the evidence in the case and was justified in his view that a properly directed jury could not reasonably infer that RB had knowledge of the co-accused's knife prior to the co-accused alighting from the car on Monson Road.

We remind ourselves of the approach to a submission of no case to answer when the prosecution case relies upon circumstantial evidence, as explained by Aitkens LJ in R v G & F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756, at [36]

It is apparent from the ruling, that the judge set much store by what can and cannot be seen on the CCTV footage when the co-accused alighted from RB's vehicle in New Cross, and in particular whether the co-accused can be seen to be in possession of a knife. The judge suggested that anyone who was reconsidering the issue as to whether there was a case to answer in relation to count 1 should look at this footage for themselves, which is an invitation we have taken up, and we agree that the knife cannot be seen, nor can its outline be seen in the co-accused's right-hand pocket or trousers.

However, it was never suggested on behalf of the prosecution that the knife or its outline could be seen on the CCTV footage, and this was not the basis upon which the prosecution had advanced its case at trial. In any event, we note, as did the judge, that after alighting from RB’s vehicle, the co-accused appears to deliberately slouch, with his hands in his pockets, in order to obstruct the outline of the knife being seen. Moreover, whether this was the co-accused's habitual presentation or whether he was doing so on this occasion in order to obscure its presence from the deceased, is something which would be known to RB and would be open for the jury to consider. However, what could or could not be seen on the CCTV footage was by no means central to the prosecution case, rather the inference that RB knew that the co-accused had a knife when he alighted from the vehicle was based upon a far wider spectrum of circumstantial evidence, including:

In our judgment, there was sufficient evidence available to the jury in the course of the trial which would entitle the jury to reach the inference adverse to the case of RB that she knew that the co-accused had a knife in his possession by the time that he had alighted from the motor vehicle that she had driven to the scene on Monson Road in New Cross.

RB and the co-accused were owed a significant sum of money from the deceased and their previous attempts to secure repayment, including visiting Monson Road, had failed. The deceased either was or they believed that he was taking steps to evade them, including lying about his whereabouts. This caused them a considerable degree of annoyance to the extent that violence was being discussed as a way of securing repayment. RB was intimately acquainted with the co-accused and would know what he was capable of doing, and the two of them would no doubt have discussed what was going to happen once they had arrived at Monson Road in order to extract the debt from the deceased. The co-accused had taken a 10” combat knife with him and not only would this be likely to have formed part of the discussions as to what was going to happen once they had arrived in New Cross, but it would have been likely to have been visible to RB as she sat next to him over the course of the 2 hour journey, when he would not have been able obscure its presence in the manner he did so after alighting from the vehicle in Monson Road. Indeed the co-accused would have been likely to have been concerned that if RB had had no knowledge about the presence of the knife, then she may have panicked when she saw him threaten and/or use the knife, and therefore either have left him at the scene and/or inform the authorities about it. Instead, RB was not surprised about the co-accused having stabbed the deceased, and instead of calling the emergency services, she was prepared to drive the co-accused from the scene, after stopping to ensure that he could pick up his mobile phone which would have identified him as being responsible for the stabbing, and lied about what had happened to Kubie.

We consider, with great respect to the trial judge, who we appreciate had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence in the case, that focusing upon what could or could not be seen in the CCTV footage on Monson Road, may have deflected his attention from looking at the whole of the evidence which was available to the prosecution at the close of their evidential case. In our judgement this error of approach has resulted in a ruling that was not reasonable for the judge to have made.

In those circumstances we will grant leave to the prosecution and allow the appeal and reverse the ruling in relation to count 1.