R v Sabrina Latty

LADY JUSTICE YIP: We have had written submissions from both sides which we have considered in advance and in those circumstances I am going to ask my Lady, Heather Williams J to give a judgment first.

MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS: On 15 November 2024 having entered a guilty plea before the Bromley Magistrates' Court, the applicant was committed for sentence in reliance upon section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 for an offence of burglary of a dwelling with intent to cause damage, contrary to section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968.

On 24 January 2025 in the Crown Court at Woolwich, Her Honour Judge Downing sentenced the applicant to three months' imprisonment consecutive to a sentence of six years and nine months that she was already serving.

Leave to appeal against sentence was refused by the single judge and the applicant renews her application to the full court. The hearing before us today was listed to hear that application. However, the position is not so straightforward.

In 2008 the applicant received a suspended sentence for an offence of burglary of a dwelling and in 2014 she was sentenced to 28 months' imprisonment for two offences of dwelling burglary.

The offence we are concerned with occurred on 22 February 2023. The applicant was arrested on 16 June 2023 and she first appeared at the Bromley Magistrates' Court on 7 October 2024 when the case was adjourned until 14 October for her to take legal advice. In the meantime, on 9 October 2024 she appeared before Snaresbrook Crown Court for sentence in relation to two counts of robbery, one count of non-dwelling burglary, one count of burglary of a dwelling, one count of attempted dwelling burglary, two counts of theft and one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Concurrent sentences of three years nine months' imprisonment were imposed in respect of the robberies and a consecutive sentence of three years was imposed in relation to the burglary of a dwelling offence. Shorter concurrent sentences were passed in respect of the other offences. The Recorder recognised that as the applicant was being sentenced for her third domestic burglary conviction, section 314 of the Sentencing Act 2020 applied.

There were then further Magistrates' Courts hearings in relation to the present case on 14 and 28 October 2024. On 15 November 2024 the applicant entered a guilty plea and the case was committed to the Crown Court, as we have indicated. However, neither the Magistrates' Court nor the Crown Court appreciated the effect of section 314(4) of the Sentencing Act, namely that because the applicant fell to be sentenced on a three strikes basis if convicted, the burglary charge was triable only on indictment. Accordingly as it was an indictable offence, the applicant should have been sent for trial pursuant to section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. We are grateful to the lawyers of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division for drawing this to our attention.

In light of this procedural difficulty, we directed that the prosecution be represented at this hearing, that a representation order be granted for junior counsel for Miss Latty and that she was to be produced for this hearing via a video link. We indicated we would require assistance from counsel on the validity of the committal and the steps that may be taken to address any unlawfulness.

In his helpful submissions, Mr Blick accepted that the sentence imposed on 24 January 2024 was unlawful as the applicant had not been arraigned as required. In his helpful submissions Mr Manning agreed with this proposition and with the course that Mr Blick proposed.

There is no dispute that the Magistrates' Court had no power to convict the applicant upon her guilty plea and to commit the case to the Crown Court for sentence, as the offence was indictable only. Where the consequence of a procedural error is not spelt out in the legislation, the question is a matter of statutory construction to determine whether the legislature intended the procedural error in question should nullify further steps in the proceedings or, if not, in what circumstances the error can be remedied: Butt [2023] EWCA Crim 1131 at [80] referring to [82] to [86] of Gould [2021] EWCA Crim 447, [2021] 1 WLR 4812. The former position will apply where the defect is so fundamental as to deprive the court of jurisdiction.

The error here went to the root of the respective jurisdictions of the Magistrates’ and the Crown Court. Section 51(1) is in imperative terms, where the conditions identified in subsection (2) apply, including that the offence is triable only on indictment.

We are satisfied that a committal under section 14 of the Sentencing Act where the court had no power to do so, is an error so fundamental that nothing can then happen which gives jurisdiction to the Crown Court: and in support of this see [81] and [91] in Butt citing [96] and [103] in Gould; and also [82] in Gould.

Accordingly, we are quite clear that the procedural error in this instance nullified the committal to the Crown Court and in turn invalidated the proceedings in the Crown Court that followed. In short, the Magistrates' Court had no jurisdiction to proceed to the plea and conviction stage. The plea was unlawfully entered and the committal under section 14 of the Sentencing Act was unlawful.

Whilst it is possible the situation could have been addressed by the Circuit Judge sitting as a District Judge of the Magistrates Court, pursuant to section 66 of the Courts Act 2003, this did not occur as the invalidity was not appreciated at that stage.

In the circumstances, the appropriate course is for this court to now sit as a Divisional Court, pursuant to section 66 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and deal with this matter as an application for judicial review of the Magistrates' Court decision to commit for sentence: see Gould at [77] and [88].

Sitting in that capacity, we dispense with the service of the claim form, extend time for making the application and consider the matter as a “rolled-up” hearing. In that capacity we grant permission to the applicant to apply for judicial review and we quash the applicant's committal for sentence and set aside her conviction for the reasons we have already indicated.

We nominate Goose J to sit as a District Judge of the Magistrates' Court pursuant to section 66 of the 2003 Act to reopen the case under section 142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 and to send the case for trial pursuant to section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Pursuant to section 8 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, Goose J will then sit as a judge of the Crown Court for the arraignment of the applicant and the steps that follow.

LADY JUSTICE YIP: Thank you. As far as the judgment of the Divisional Court is concerned, we record that that was a judgment of the court with which the other members agree. I shall hand over to my Lord, Goose J, to deal with the steps that are required now.

MR JUSTICE GOOSE: In accordance with the order that this court has just made, I now sit as a District Judge in the Magistrates' Court pursuant to section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 on the application of the prosecution in relation to these proceedings since they are indictable only. I direct therefore that they be sent to the Crown Court pursuant to section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Having completed that process, I now sit as a judge of the Crown Court and will now hear that case having been sent to this court and indeed invite on the prosecution's application for the defendant to be arraigned.

MR JUSTICE GOOSE: Sabrina Latty, you are aged 45 and have pleaded guilty to an offence of burglary of a dwelling with intent to cause damage, contrary to section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968. You now fall to be sentenced by this court after being sent here from the Magistrates' Court.

The facts of the offence can be shortly stated. On 20 February 2023, when you were aged 42, you went to 53 New Acres Road in South London where the complainant lived. You knocked on the door and the complainant answered, to see you asking to be allowed to go into the property because you said you were a former tenant. That was a lie. The complainant asked you to wait while he went to check, after you told him that the landlord had agreed that you could enter the property. When the landlord confirmed it was untrue and the complainant returned, you had entered that complainant's home and shortly afterwards you were followed by a man. You went into the kitchen the both of you, and you began to rip it apart, pulling out the units, pulling out the sink area, causing damage which we have seen in photographs. Effectively you destroyed the kitchen, after which you left the property. Subsequently you were arrested after your fingerprints were discovered within the kitchen.

In your interview with the police you admitted that you had gone to the property but you denied that you barged your way in and denied causing any damage. Ultimately you have accepted that was untrue, because you have entered your guilty plea to this offence on a previous occasion and again today; we shall give you the appropriate full discount.

You have an unenviable antecedent history: 52 convictions for 138 offences, 88 of which are for theft or other dishonesty offences, many for burglary either of dwelling-houses or other property.

On 9 October 2024 you entered guilty pleas in Snaresbrook Crown Court to two offences of robbery, three of dwelling-house burglary, one of attempted dwelling-house burglary, two of theft and one of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. You were sentenced on 24 January 2024 to a total of six years and nine months' imprisonment. You had two previous burglary offences, which led to a minimum term of three years for those three further burglaries under section 314 of the Sentencing Act.

This court is now required to sentence you for this additional offence of burglary, which was an offence committed before your sentence on the 9 October. We must determine what the overall sentence would have been if it had been sentenced on the same date as those Snaresbrook offences.

The prosecution submits that this is a domestic burglary of high culpability in category 1 with an element of threat. The aggravating factors are your extensive previous convictions. The guideline provides for a starting point of three years and a category range of two to six years, and the mandatory minimum term of three years applies. That is a requirement of the Act in circumstances where you have, as you have, previous convictions for dwelling-house burglary, such that a three year term is required unless there are circumstances which in the opinion of this court mean that a lesser sentence can be imposed. It is also right to say because you pleaded guilty, that you will receive a discount for that plea. That must be 20 per cent because the Act requires it, which in the normal course would lead to a sentence of 876 days.

There are two further aspects which we must take into account, having listened to the mitigation made on your behalf by Mr Manning, for whose submissions we are grateful. First, the question is whether that sentence must be served concurrently or consecutively. We have considered with care that question . We have in mind that the offence with which this court is sentencing you was committed over 19 months before you were sentenced on the 9 October 2024 and also it is now some three years ago. Whilst there are reasons for the delay, some of which you have contributed to yourself, it is accepted on behalf of the prosecution that there is no good and proper reason for a substantial part of it. We take the view therefore that the sentence that we must impose should be concurrent rather than consecutive.

Mr Manning has raised a further point on your behalf and that is the effect that a sentence, even made concurrent, of 876 days will affect your release date. That has been confirmed to this court. In order to prevent that being extended unnecessarily and also to take account of the fact that the release date includes the three-month consecutive sentence which we have quashed , we have to determine what your sentence should be because we cannot backdate this sentence.

In our judgment the appropriate term therefore, exceptionally in the circumstances of this case, mean that rather than 867 days your sentence it will be 426 days. We calculate that that will not affect your release date and reflects the sentence in respect of this burglary.

Accordingly, that is the sentence that we impose.

LADY JUSTICE YIP: Mr Manning, you have followed what Goose J has done in sentencing there. Practically speaking it has the effect of backdating it as though that sentence was imposed on the date when she was originally sentenced. Are you content that that has dealt with matters appropriately?

MR MANNING: Backdating it to the date when she was originally sentenced by Her Honour Judge Downing, yes, I understand. Thank you for explaining that.

LADY JUSTICE YIP: That does not extend her release date, does it?

MR MANNING: That is my understanding, yes. Thank you.

LADY JUSTICE YIP: Importantly, 426 days concurrent to the sentence that she is already serving.