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London
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT SHEFFIELDWC2A 22LL
(HER HONOUR JUDGE WRIGHT) [T20227469]
Case No 2025/01670/B2 & 2025/02261/B2Wednesday 4 March 2026
B e f o r e:
THE LADY CARR OF WALTON-ON-THE-HILL,
THE LADY CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES
MR JUSTICE JAY
HIS HONOUR JUDGE LEONARD KC
(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
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R E X
- v -
LOUIS JAMES
DERECK OWUSU
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Mr S Wood KC and Miss E Embleton-Brown appeared on behalf of the Appellant Louis James
Miss K Lumsdon KC appeared on behalf of the Applicant Dereck Owusu
Mr D Temkin KC appeared on behalf of the Crown
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J U D G M E N T
(Approved)
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Wednesday 4 March 2026
THE LADY CHIEF JUSTICE:
In order to avoid a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in any retrial, the publication of any report of these proceedings shall be postponed until the conclusion of any retrial or further order.
Introduction
On 5 April 2023, in the Crown Court at Sheffield, Louis James (then aged 47) and Dereck Owusu (then aged 40) were convicted of the murder of Reece Radford ("the deceased") on 29 September 2022. On 4 May 2023 the trial judge sentenced James to imprisonment for life with a minimum term of 25 years (less 216 days spent on remand) and Owusu to imprisonment for life with a minimum term of 15 years (less 216 days spent on remand).
James now appeals against his conviction with the leave of the single judge. His appeal raises the question of when the absence of an interpreter renders a trial unfair and so a conviction unsafe.
Owusu applies to vary his original proposed grounds of appeal so as to raise a fresh ground which overlaps with and is parasitic upon James' appeal. Subject to the outcome of that application, and the outcome of James' appeal, Owusu also renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction, following refusal by the single judge.
The Facts in Summary
James was born in Nigeria and came to the United Kingdom in 2005. He claimed asylum, which was refused in 2012. His health was poor and he was granted discretionary leave to remain. He formed a relationship with a woman in 2012 and the couple have two children. His first, native language is Edo. Owusu was born in Ghana.
In the early hours of 29 September 2022, a fight broke out involving James, Owusu, and the deceased. Both James and Owusu were out together in Sheffield city centre. At 0.53 am they arrived on Arundel Gate at a bus stop where they met Emily Bamford-Thompson (then aged 17) who was out with her friend Courtney Stacey. Stacey had introduced Bamford-Thompson to the deceased earlier that night.
The deceased had been out with his friends. He was intoxicated and had consumed drugs. Shortly after 9 pm, South Yorkshire Police attended Carver Lane in the city centre following reports that the deceased was shouting, swearing and throwing tables in a bar. He was detained and searched. No weapons were found. Witness evidence from his friends indicated that at other times in the night he was carrying a knife in his bag. He was driven back to the Hillsborough area by police and told that no further action would be taken against him, provided that he did not return to the city centre. The deceased then went to the Rawson Spring public house, where he was witnessed by bar staff behaving towards a homeless man and a female customer in an aggressive and abusive way. When he was asked to leave, he was aggressive to staff.
At 2.16 am the deceased and his friends, Paul Taylor, Sakena Karim, Ethan Hartmann and another female, arrived on Arundel Gate. They were speaking with Bamford-Thompson outside a shop adjacent to the bus stop, before Bamford-Thompson returned to James and Owusu. CCTV footage captured the following events. At 2.21:45 am Bamford-Thompson threw Owusu's hat into the road, which James retrieved. At 2.22:46 am the deceased walked towards the bus stop. At 2.23:30 am Bamford-Thompson was knocked to the ground. It was the prosecution's case that she had been punched or pushed over by Owusu.
A fight then broke out between James, Owusu and the deceased, which spilled out into the road. At some point during the fight, the deceased fell to the ground and, whilst on the ground, he was kicked by Owusu. Taylor tried to intervene and break up the fight. The deceased crossed the road and collapsed. He told Taylor that he had been stabbed, and Taylor rang the emergency services.
James and Owusu walked off. They returned after a short while. The deceased was still lying on the ground. Owusu removed the belt from his jeans and began whipping it in the air. As he did so, James was heard to say "Leave it. Come on. Let's go".
The deceased was conveyed to hospital where he underwent surgery to repair the wound to his heart. He sadly died on 4 October 2022.
James and Owusu were located separately, a short distance from the scene. They were arrested and searched. Owusu was found holding his belt in his right hand. He had a broken beer bottle in a rear pocket of his jeans. He was conveyed to a police station, and was found to be in possession of a wallet belonging to the deceased. He told police that he had not seen the wallet before, and he could not explain why it was in his possession. No knife was recovered from either James or Owusu.
On 1 October 2022 the police located a knife inside a drain under a bridge on Shude Hill. It was the prosecution's case that it had been disposed of by James. CCTV footage from the area was obtained during the police investigation and police were able to trace the movement of James from the scene to Shude Hill shortly after the incident.
The Trial
The prosecution case was that James was armed with a knife which he used to stab the deceased and that Owusu participated in a joint attack, knowing that James had a knife.
The defence case for James was that he was acting in lawful self-defence. He gave evidence. He said that the deceased was the aggressor. He accepted that he had a knife on his person but stated that he only took the knife out when he thought that the deceased was about to produce a weapon. He said that he had no recollection of using the knife. In his evidence he said that the relevant events unfolded as follows. The deceased punched him with force and so he retaliated. He saw the deceased's right hand go inside his bag and so he (James) retreated, with his back against the railings. The deceased did not remove his hand from the inside of his bag. James then pushed the deceased away and blacked out. He did not know that the deceased was injured when he left the scene. He only returned because he had lost his phone. He disposed of the knife in the drain but denied cleaning it, stating that he had no idea that the knife had been used to stab anyone.
The defence case for Owusu was that he was acting in lawful self-defence or in defence of James, and that he was unaware that James had a knife. Owusu also gave evidence. He stated that the events unfolded as follows. After he had pushed Bamford-Thompson, the deceased came over and repeatedly accused Bamford-Thompson of having sex with James and Owusu. The deceased went towards James with his hand next to his bag. When Owusu tried to separate them, the deceased punched him in the jaw. Owusu then pushed the deceased away. At some point, the deceased went to the ground. When the deceased got back up and started fighting James again, he kicked the deceased because of concerns that the deceased might use a weapon on James. He did not know that James had a knife, he said, and did not see him use it. Having left the scene, Owusu said that he returned as he realised that he had lost his phone. Bamford-Thompson began to threaten him, and so he hit his belt on the bus stop to scare her off.
The Interpreter Issue
At the plea and trial preparation hearing on 4 October 2022, the court was informed that it would be necessary for James to have an Edo interpreter at trial. On the first day of trial, 16 March 2023, the court was reminded of this. It was explained that, whilst defence counsel were confident that James would be able to follow the prosecution case without an interpreter, an interpreter would be needed when James was giving evidence (in both chief and cross-examination). Junior defence counsel emailed the court on 27 March 2023, the day before James was due to give evidence, by way of repeat reminder.
James began his evidence at 3.23 pm on Tuesday 28 March 2023, immediately after Owusu had given evidence (for all of the Monday and into Tuesday). There was no interpreter at court. Counsel were informed for the first time that the court had been unable to locate an Edo interpreter. Leading counsel for James then took the decision to continue and not to apply for an adjournment. James proceeded to give evidence in chief which lasted until around noon the next day, Wednesday. Cross-examination followed and lasted the rest of the day until around 4 pm.
During a break in James' cross-examination, the absence of an interpreter was raised again with the judge. Leading counsel for James states that he and his junior had become very concerned at James' ability to understand and respond to questions. His evidence in chief had been punctuated repeatedly by reminders to slow down as his evidence became very difficult to follow.
In that break, the judge responded that she had been told by court staff that they had been unable to locate an Edo interpreter. The cross-examination continued. Leading counsel explains that it may be that he was at fault for not submitting that there should be an adjournment once all could see James' difficulties in comprehension and explanation. But, he says, there was no indication of when the absence of an interpreter might resolve, if at all.
The judge delivered her legal directions on Friday 31 March 2023. She had been invited to give a direction about the difficulties of both James and Owusu in giving evidence in a language that was not their first language, but did not do so. Prosecution and defence speeches followed, with defence counsel finishing on Tuesday 3 April 2023. James' leading counsel noted in his address that two jurors had openly laughed at some of James' answers, and submitted that in fairness the jury might, amongst other things, take into account the stress of giving evidence in English when English is not one's first language.
The following morning, before the jury returned to court, counsel were informed that a juror had sent a note ("the juror note") to the judge asking:
"As both defendants have English as a second language, are you able to tell us if they were offered the opportunity to access an interpreter to assist when giving their evidence/during cross- examination? Thank you."
The underlying premise of this question was of course mistaken: the absence of an interpreter had not been a position of James' choosing; in fact, quite the reverse.
In the normal way, the note was read out by the judge to counsel in court. Defence counsel for James stated that there was no evidence on the point, but that the judge knew the position. There followed this exchange:
"JUDGE: I am conscious as to Mr James' position, that there was to be an interpreter but one was not available. But, nevertheless, Mr Wood, you took a decision to go ahead without an interpreter?
DEFENCE LEADING COUNSEL: Yes. It is a difficult situation because, of course, the – I do not mean this in a pejorative sense, but the responsibility to obtain an interpreter fell upon the court. The court could not do it, for very obvious reasons, because there are so few people who are available to speak the Edo language.
JUDGE: Yes.
DEFENCE LEADING COUNSEL: I am obviously anxious that the jury do not, in any sense, hold it against the defendant when a decision to go ahead was made because we simply could not find anyone, and it would have caused enormous delay."
The judge then put forward a form of wording to be delivered to the jury in response to the jury note, with which wording counsel agreed, and which the judge faithfully gave to the jury when they returned to court:
"Well, quite simply the answer to this is neither defendant did have an interpreter to assist. You will bear in mind that English is not their first language and you will have to make such allowances as you see fit in respect of what they had to say."
On 18 April 2023, after the conclusion of the trial, the same juror who wrote the jury note wrote a letter to the judge ("the juror letter"). The juror letter stated materially as follows:
"I wanted to raise with you the issue of interpreters in court as the main case in point. You may remember that I asked this question during the trial. While clearly the defendants had lived in the UK for more than 10 years, could speak English and indeed hold down jobs, it is another matter as to whether they are able to access the level of English language used by a highly educated prosecution barrister including idioms of the English language. I just cannot see how it is fair to expect someone to respond to questions that he clearly didn't fully understand. In my work setting, we would always use an interpreter if we felt the person would not fully understand the conversation or be able to express themselves satisfactorily, or to be able to access the right support. As a juror, simply being asked to take the fact that English was a second language into consideration when considering their evidence, I found deeply unsatisfactory and unfair."
The Grounds of Appeal
James raises two grounds of appeal, as follows:
James' right to a fair trial is said to have been infringed because his first language was Edo and the Crown Court failed to provide an interpreter at trial. Trial leading counsel for James accepts that he may have been at fault in failing to request an adjournment pending the provision of interpretation. James' evidence was hampered by the lack of an interpreter and it was only during his evidence that trial counsel became concerned about James' ability to understand and respond to questions. At one point during his evidence at least one juror laughed openly. One of his answers in cross-examination, relating to an important issue as to whether the knife was a folding lock-knife, was misunderstood by the judge. The judge's direction about the lack of interpretation for James did not resolve the underlying unfairness to James;
The judge erred in failing to give a direction to the jury in the appellant's favour in respect of the appellant's previous character.
Owusu renews his application for leave to appeal on four proposed grounds, subject, as we have indicated, to the outcome of James' appeal, as follows:
There was no sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the stabbing took place when the deceased was on the ground rather than when James was trapped against a grit bin (i.e. before Owusu became involved).
The route to verdict should have included a question which incorporated the temporal requirement identified in the first ground.
Owusu's conviction for an immigration offence should not have been admitted. There was racial prejudice within the jury.
Owusu has now obtained a psychological assessment which indicates that he has autism. Without this fresh evidence, the jury may have made assumptions about his plausibility and credibility without bearing in mind the allowances that they should have made.
Owusu also applies to vary his grounds to include a new ground, namely that the court's failure to provide an interpreter for James affects the safety of Owusu's conviction. Owusu's conviction was intimately bound up with that of James, such that they stood and fell together.
Discussion: James
Lack of Interpreter
The provision of an interpreter for a witness or a defendant in a criminal case when required is an obligation of the state which is regarded as an integral part of its obligations to provide a fair and just system of criminal justice (see, for example: In Re Applied Language Solutions [2013] EWCA Crim 326; [2013] 1 WLR 3820 at [13]).
Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights also provides as follows:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
…
to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court."
This unqualified right applies only where the accused cannot understand or speak the language used in court. In A v France (1984) 6 European Human Rights Reports CD 371, the European Commission of Human Rights made clear (at [8]) that it is not a right to have proceedings conducted in the language of the accused's choice.
The submissions for both James and the respondent have focused on the extent of James' ability to understand and communicate in English. However, the prior question is who must make the assessment as to whether or not an interpreter is needed.
The answer to that question is clear. It is for the judge to make that assessment, and the judge's duty positively to do so.
In Cuscani v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 2, the applicant was an Italian speaker on trial for fraud. When concerns arose over the applicant's ability to follow the proceedings, his advocate explained that they would "make do and mend", and that the applicant's brother was in court and could translate (though he was never called upon). The court held (at [38]) that, notwithstanding the trial advocate's decision, "the onus was on the judge to reassure himself that the absence of an interpreter at the hearing … would not prejudice the applicant's full involvement in a matter of crucial importance for him." Further, at [39], it held:
"It is true that the conduct of the defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and his counsel … However, the ultimate guardian of the fairness of the proceedings was the trial judge who had been clearly apprised of the real difficulties which the absence of interpretation might create for the applicant."
The above is reflected in the Crown Court Compendium (at 3-38) which provides:
"Where it is suspected that lack of understanding of the language of the court would interfere with D's participation in the trial, the judge has a duty to verify the need for interpretation facilities with the defendant, and to satisfy themselves as to the adequacy of the arrangements made; failure to do so is a violation of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Art. 6(3)(e) ECHR."
The duty of the trial judge is to assess a defendant's ability to understand and communicate in English. That duty survives any decision by a defendant's barrister to continue without the assistance of an interpreter. Once James requested an Edo interpreter and it became clear that one was not available, it was the judge's duty to assess whether the absence of an interpreter would prejudice James' full involvement in the proceedings.
We have been shown (and can find) nothing that indicates that the judge made the requisite assessment either before James gave evidence or when the issue was revisited during cross- examination. As set out above, in exchanges with counsel concerning the juror note, the judge commented to defence counsel: "Nevertheless, Mr Wood, you took a decision to go ahead without an interpreter?" This would suggest that the judge approached the issue as if it was one that could be delegated to counsel. There appears to have been no judicial enquiry before James went into the witness box as to James' linguistic ability in a highly pressurised environment or into the reasons why it was thought from the outset (from the PTPH onwards) that an interpreter was necessary.
The position that we now reach can then be summarised as follows. Whether this trial was unfair, and so the conviction unsafe, depends on whether James actually needed an interpreter in order to participate effectively in proceedings as both defendant and witness. That was an assessment for the judge, which she failed to make.
In order to uphold James' conviction we would have to be satisfied that the trial was not, in fact, unfair because James' language skills enabled him to participate effectively in proceedings as both defendant and witness without an interpreter. If there is no sufficient material on which to reach that conclusion, then the conviction cannot be regarded as safe.
We identify first the context for the assessment. James was facing a charge of the utmost gravity, namely murder. His defence was one of self-defence. His case was that he believed that the deceased was going to attack him with a weapon. The credibility of that position was dependent heavily on his ability to articulate his belief.
We have the following material to inform us, alongside the background information that James had been in the UK since 2005: the transcripts; the conduct of the judge and counsel; laughter from the jury during James' cross-examination; the juror note and the letter.
The reaction of the jury, the juror note and the letter do not advance matters much beyond the existence of a real suspicion that James needed an interpreter when giving evidence. But it is right to say that they provide no comfort on the question of fairness.
It is also right that the judge did not intervene at any stage to stop James' evidence and halt the trial. But she gave no indication during his evidence of her thought process. That was so even when there was a clear opportunity to do so, namely when leading counsel raised the absence of an interpreter with her during James' cross-examination. The only clear judicial indication came after the juror's note; and, as already explained, that suggested mere reliance on counsel.
It is also right that leading counsel decided not to apply for an adjournment. But it is hard to square that decision with a willingness to continue with the application for an interpreter in the first place, an application made in the full knowledge of James' personal history and background. These positions cannot both be soundly based. The strong impression from the original grounds of appeal, and from what we have heard from Mr Wood today, is that leading counsel elected to take a risk on fairness in order to avoid delaying the proceedings.
That leaves us with the transcripts. Submissions from both sides have identified numerous examples in the transcripts which either indicate moments of misunderstanding or moments of comprehension. Court transcripts alone are not a reliable basis on which to assess whether a defendant was capable of participating fully in the proceedings. It is a much more nuanced exercise, based on a number of factors, including demeanour and timing.
Counsel for the respondent also points to other examples for evidence of James' understanding in English, including his ability to engage in conferences without an interpreter. We note in passing that the applicant in Cuscani could also communicate without interpreters in consultations. However, the ability to communicate effectively in a conference or, for example, to understand a caution, is very different to an ability to communicate in the witness box on a charge of murder before a jury.
In conclusion, having reflected carefully on the material before us, we do not consider that we can safely assess whether James required an interpreter in order fully to participate in his murder trial, let alone conclude positively that his trial was fair in the absence of an interpreter. We conclude that there was a material irregularity in the trial process that could not be and was not cured by judicial direction, and we are unable to conclude that the trial of James was fair.
James' conviction for murder is unsafe, and we allow his appeal on this ground.
For the sake of completeness, we record that we would dismiss James' second ground of appeal. The judge was invited to give a modified good character direction. She was entitled to refuse to do so. James complains that her direction failed to explain how the jury could take James' character into account in his favour. However, the judge reminded the jury of James' character references in detail.
R v Hunter [2015] EWCA Crim 631 does not require that a defendant with a previous conviction is entitled to the propensity limb of a good character direction on the basis that they have no previous convictions that are similar. It was for the judge to decide whether to give such a direction and we see no basis for criticism of the course that she took, particularly in the light of James' previous convictions and reprehensible conduct as set out in the agreed facts.
Discussion: Owusu
Given our decision on James' appeal, we turn first to Owusu's application to vary his proposed grounds of appeal. It is well known, as a general rule, that all proposed grounds of appeal must be lodged with a Notice of Appeal in order to go before the single judge. The filter mechanism provided by section 31 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 is a very important stage. Fresh grounds advanced by fresh counsel must be "particularly cogent", and the hurdle for an applicant seeking to introduce new grounds after refusal on the papers by the single judge is high: see R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 WLR 2749 at [38].
Owusu was convicted on a joint enterprise basis. It was not the prosecution's case that Owusu stabbed the deceased. Rather, it was that Owusu participated in a joint attack knowing that James had a knife. James was convicted as the principal offender and Owusu was convicted as his accessory. Owusu's conviction is parasitic on James' conviction.
It follows that Owusu could only be convicted of murder if James' defence of self-defence failed. As stated in Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law (13th edition) at pages 239 to 240, it would be inconsistent for a court to hold at one and the same time that (i) the principal is, in law, not guilty, but that (ii) the assister is guilty as an accessory of the principal's crime (see also: Surujpaul v R [1958] 1 WLR 1050).
Thus the defence cases were intimately bound up. If James did not receive a fair trial, Owusu's conviction is also affected, for James' conviction was required in order for Owusu to be convicted. It would be inconsistent for James' conviction (as the principal offender) to be quashed, but Owusu's conviction (as James' accessory) to remain safe. Therefore, in the particular circumstances of this case, we allow Owusu's application to vary his grounds of appeal, we grant leave and we allow Owusu's appeal on his fresh ground.
In the circumstances, Miss Lumsdon KC for Owusu does not pursue her renewed application for leave to appeal on other grounds, and we do not address them.
Conclusion
The present pressures in the criminal justice system are obvious to all, but James had a basic right to full involvement in his trial. It was made clear on his behalf at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and repeatedly thereafter, that, in order to exercise this right, he required the services of an Edo interpreter when giving evidence.
We do not know when the wheels were put in motion by HMCTS to source an Edo interpreter or precisely what steps were taken to find one, and we recognise that the number of suitable interpreters may have been small. We also understand all too well the desire of counsel to avoid causing potentially significant delay through an adjournment. But pragmatism cannot be allowed to trump fairness.
Once it became apparent that an interpreter had not been found, it was the judge's duty independently to assess whether it was fair to allow James to proceed to give evidence. That was not a duty that could be delegated to or discharged by counsel. It does not appear that such an assessment took place. We are unable safely to carry out the assessment ourselves or able to conclude that the trial of James was fair and his conviction safe.
In the result, James conviction must be quashed. Given that Owusu was convicted on the basis of an accessory liability contingent on James' conviction, Owusu's conviction must also be quashed.
In the normal way, we will now invite submissions on any application for a retrial.
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