R v Amran Naaim

The applicant is now 32. On 17 May 2025 at Wolverhampton Crown Court, he pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery, two counts of theft and two driving offences. He was sentenced to a total of 27 months' imprisonment.

He now seeks to renew his application for permission to appeal against conviction in relation to the robbery counts only, following refusal by the single judge. His application to renew was made 19 days out of time.

In relation to the three counts of robbery, the applicant's modus operandi was broadly the same each time. Each of the complainants that he targeted were elderly men or women. They endeavoured to use the ATM at Lloyds Bank in Wednesfield. The applicant would typically come up very close to them, intimidate them into using their bank card, only for them to then find that there was a problem with the machine. In each case, they subsequently discovered that substantial sums of money, totalling just under £3,000 for the three robberies, had been removed from their accounts by the applicant.

The original application for leave to appeal raised various points about the inconsistencies between the CCTV footage and what the complainants said in their statements. As the single judge pointed out, there could be nothing in any of those complaints, because the applicant had been legally represented when he had pleaded guilty to the three counts of robbery. In addition, again as the single judge pointed out, the applicant had not waived privilege, so it was not possible to see what advice the applicant had been given by his lawyers.

The single judge therefore had no hesitation in refusing permission to appeal.

The applicant has now waived privilege and we shall return in a moment to what the applicant's counsel and solicitors advised about the case against him. But before we do that it is necessary to put that material into context.

In one of his submissions to the Court the applicant said this:

The clear inference from that is that the applicant was not properly advised by his lawyers, that they made mistakes which he has been obliged to sort out, and that he should have been advised that it was at least arguable that the robbery counts would not succeed because of the potential absence of evidence as to violence or the threat of violence.

We have now seen what is said by his counsel and solicitors. In particular, there is a very useful note prepared by Ms Chloe Ashley of No 5 Chambers dealing with a conference that she had with the applicant on 17 May 2024 prior to the PTPH. From her attendance note, it is clear that Ms Ashley firmly advised the applicant against pleading guilty to robbery because of the arguable absence of violence or the threat of violence. However, as the note makes plain, the applicant insisted that he wanted to plead guilty to all the charges on the indictment. So despite counsel's advice, that is what happened.

In our view, the applicant's belated decision to waive privilege has helped to clarify the issue identified by the single judge. The information from his previous solicitors, and in particular his previous counsel, makes plain that, in our view, the applicant was properly advised throughout. He was advised not to plead guilty to the robbery of offences because it was at least arguable that the threat of violence was missing. He overrode that advice, as he was entitled to do, and pleaded guilty to all the charges.

Furthermore, although the applicant had the benefit of a psychiatric report on which he relied at the sentencing hearing, there was never any suggestion that the applicant was not fit to plead or give instructions to his counsel. The report makes no mention of any suggestion to that effect, and it has never been a point advanced on behalf of the applicant.

In our view, these considerations mean that the applicant's plea of guilty was unequivocal and the convictions must therefore be regarded as safe. After all, the applicant knew better than anybody else what he had done. He had been properly advised throughout as to the state of the evidence, and he deliberately chose to plead guilty.

We should make three final observations. First, whilst we understand why counsel advised as she did, we consider that, if there had been a trial on these issues, it is more likely than not that the applicant would have been convicted on the robbery counts in any event. That is because the statements of the individual complainants indicate that, as a result of his conduct, they each felt physically intimidated. In that way the element of violence or, in this case, the threat necessary for a robbery conviction, would probably have been made out each time.

Secondly, the sentence imposed for the robberies was at the very low end of the applicable scale. That indicated that the court saw the use or threat of force in this case as minimal. That in turn means that the applicant would not have received very much less if he had pleaded guilty to three thefts rather than three robberies.

Finally, we note that the applicant has made much throughout these applications of his lack of legal support, and that his current predicament arose because his lawyers made mistakes and should have made "a more appropriate decision". Now that the relevant waiver of privilege has been granted and the contemporaneous advice provided, it can be seen that that criticism, which lies at the heart of this renewed application, is fundamentally untrue. He received appropriate advice at all times.

For all these reasons, although we grant the extension of time of 19 days in which to renew this application, we refuse this renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction.