R v Jack Garwell

His Majesty's Solicitor General applies for leave to refer a sentence which she regards as unduly lenient. The sentence was one of 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment in respect of a charge of causing death by dangerous driving to which the offender had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity. The sentence was imposed by the Recorder of Sheffield (HHJ Jeremy Richardson KC) on 28 November 2025. We give leave.

Before we embark on the substance of this Reference, it is important to remember at all times that, as with any case of this sort, the facts that underlie the case represent a tragedy at many levels. First and foremost, we do not forget for a moment the ultimate tragedy that has befallen the family of the offender's victim. That said it is also a tragedy for the offender who, as he realised immediately after the accident, has ruined his life.

At approximately 7.45 pm on 16 January 2024 the offender was driving a Skoda Octavia car on the A18 at High Levels Bank, Doncaster. High Levels Bank is a single carriageway road with a speed limit of 60 miles per hour. The weather was fine and clear with freezing conditions. The offender was travelling with his partner from Scunthorpe to Doncaster to go for dinner. The offender attempted to overtake three vehicles travelling ahead of him. To do this he drove onto the wrong side of the road. He was driving at a speed of between 76 and 88 miles per hour. Analysis of the car's computer indicates that he was driving in third gear with his foot on the floor.

The deceased, Mr Alexander Anderson, had turned 20 that day. He was riding his motorbike travelling in the opposite direction to the offender. The offender's vehicle collided head-on with Mr Anderson while the offender attempted to overtake the other vehicles. The offender lost control of his vehicle, and it landed in a ditch adjacent to the road.

Witnesses described hearing a "loud bang" or a "crash" at the time of the collision. A witness who stopped to help stated that the offender said: "I thought I saw a motorbike", "I heard a bang and then I was in a ditch", "I thought there was a bike but there was no lights", "I'm sure it was a bike. I'm sure it was a bike. I didn't see any lights". Mr Anderson suffered catastrophic injuries and was pronounced dead at the scene. The offender provided a breath test at the scene which was negative and bloods were taken but nothing was found. The offender and his partner had minor injuries and were transported to the Doncaster Royal Infirmary for treatment in an ambulance. While in the ambulance the offender said to a police officer: "I've ruined my life, it's all over. I've ruined my life."

The offender was interviewed twice, first on 1 March 2024 and then on 3 February 2025. In the 2024 interview the offender said that he had moved into the other lane to overtake a lorry after seeing other cars overtake it. The road had looked clear when he pulled out and it was a straight road. He did not realise he had hit a bike. He thought he had driven too far and ended up in a ditch. He said he was travelling at below 60 miles an hour at the time of the collision. He did not see any headlights and closed his eyes at the time of the crash.

In the 2025 interview he said that he did not know the sunshield or window tint on his windscreen were illegal. The sunshield that he had did not affect his visibility. He was at the side of a truck not cars when the collision occurred. He did not think he was traveling as fast as 76 to 88 miles an hour and he would have described his driving as somewhere between careless and dangerous. In due course he was charged and indicated at the first opportunity that he would plead guilty.

We come to the facts of the sentencing hearing. The judge had three victim impact statements to which he clearly paid close attention. Two were from Mr Anderson's parents. The third was from a police officer who was traumatised by his attendance at the scene. Mr Anderson's father spoke of the enormous gap he had left in their family and his pride in the impact his son had made on others in his tragically short life. His mother spoke of overwhelming grief, sleepless nights and a pain that lingers in every moment.

The offender is 24 years old and of previous good character. He is consumed by remorse, shame and guilt. Numerous character references, all of which we have read, speak of his personal qualities. The judge said that he was in many respects a thoroughly decent young man. That assessment was fully supported by the pre-sentence report and other evidence going to his character.

The judge also had the benefit of a psychological report and a psychiatric report. They supported a diagnosis of ASD and identified that the offender was in the severe range of social deficits associated with it. The writer of the psychological report expressed concern that the offender would be at risk of bullying, exploitation and manipulation in prison and at an increased risk of harm from others. He finds crowded places difficult and would not be able to rely when in prison on the strict routines that he could apply when at liberty.

The prosecution provided a note for sentence that was in some respects detailed. However, when dealing with categorisation it did so briefly. The prosecution submitted that whilst it could be said that there were features of category A which it identified as being a highly dangerous manoeuvre and disregard for the risk of danger to others, the case ought to fall into category B as falling between categories A and C. It is to be noted that the prosecution did not identify either the deliberate decision to overtake or that his speed was significantly in excess of the speed limit in that assessment. In this respect the judge was not assisted by the prosecution's analysis and submission.

In passing sentence, the judge rightly said that the sentence he imposed would in no way reflect the value of the life of Mr Anderson. We echo that sentiment. Instead, it had to reflect the offender's criminality. He described the offender's driving as "truly deplorable". He identified the central features of the offender’s deplorable driving: overtaking when he should not have done; overtaking three vehicles when it was "pitch black"; failure to observe or react to the approaching motorbike; travelling too fast and colliding with it head-on. In the light of the features he had identified he said that the case "arguably" fell within category A because it was "bordering a highly dangerous manoeuvre". Despite that, he held that it was fair to place it "firmly" in category B noting that Mr Anderson was "highly vulnerable". He then continued:

The Solicitor General's submits that the judge mischaracterised the offence in placing it in category B. It is submitted that there were multiple category A factors which meant that the case could not properly be placed in category B. Those factors were (a) a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risk of danger to others; (b) undertaking an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre and (c) speed significantly in excess of the speed limit and highly inappropriate for the prevailing road or weather conditions, namely a single carriageway road in pitch darkness. The starting point should therefore have been 12 years. Although the offender is entitled to a significant reduction for the very significant personal mitigation available to him and to a full one-third reduction on account of his guilty plea, the Solicitor General submits that the sentence of 3 years and 6 months cannot be justified. It is not merely lenient but unduly lenient.

Mr Bryan, who represents the offender before us as he did in the court below, repeats the essence of the submissions he made to the judge. He draws attention to the impact of the offender's mental disorder. He goes on to submit that this was a piece of driving of very short duration that unfolded in a matter of seconds and that the judge paid close attention to the terms of the guideline while noting that the various sections are not to be regarded as hermetically sealed and that the judge had to exercise judgment. Mr Bryan submits that the judge was entitled to take the view that he did and did not fall into "gross error" (see Attorney General's Reference (Azad) [2021] EWCA Crim 1846 at [72]). Neither did he depart to a substantial extent from the norms of sentencing (see Attorney General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418 at [24]). He seeks to challenge a conclusion that the offender deliberately ignored the rules of the road or that the manoeuvre was highly dangerous.

In our judgment, the judge's view that this was a category B case cannot be justified. This was an absolutely shocking piece of driving, with multiple culpability A factors which in combination placed the case unequivocally in category A. First, he decided to overtake three vehicles in succession when he could not see or judge the way ahead and whether it was safe to attempt his manoeuvre. It is clear from his interview that when he first pulled out behind the lorry he realised that there were two cars in front of it. Had it been during the day his visibility ahead would have been better but it was after dark which made matters much worse. His can only be described as a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road as to overtaking and disregard for the risk of danger to others. It may have been uncharacteristic of the offender to drive in such a manner but that goes to mitigation and not to the quality of his decision making and driving on this occasion. Second, it was obviously a highly dangerous manoeuvre. He was overtaking three vehicles when (a) he could not tell whether the road was clear and (b) it would be difficult or impossible to judge the speed of an oncoming vehicle if one happened to be there. Third, as the judge recognised, his speed between 76 and 88 mph on a single carriageway was significantly in excess of the 60 mph speed limit and highly inappropriate for the prevailing road conditions. Once one accepts, as we do, that his speed was significantly in excess of the speed limit and highly inappropriate for the prevailing road conditions, no culpability B factors were present. In those circumstances, the starting point should have been 12 years, with a category range of 8 to 18 years. Two guideline aggravating factors were present, which need to be taken into account as exerting upward pressure on the starting point. First, Mr Anderson was a vulnerable road user because of being on a motorbike. Second, the offender had a passenger in his vehicle at the time. Conversely there are no features of the driving that call for a significant downward adjustment from the starting point. Viewed overall and before considering the offender's personal mitigation, we take the view that despite the aggravating factors to which we have referred it is not necessary to apply an upward adjustment to the starting point and there is no justification for applying a reduction.

Turning to mitigation. The judge allowed a reduction of 2 years for the offender's personal mitigation. In our judgment, the maximum allowance that could be made for personal mitigation given a starting point of 12 years would be 3 years. A reduction of the order though possible would be generous. It would fully reflect not merely the offender's remorse and previous good character, his many personal qualities and relative youth but also the delay in bringing this case to judgment, the continuing impact this sentence will have on his future employment prospects and the difficulties he is likely to face in prison as a result of his mental health complications. On that last score a note of optimism is struck by a prison report commissioned for this appeal which, while not removing the underlying concerns expressed in the two reports that were before the judge, evidenced that he is doing well in prison.

It follows that in our judgment the least sentence that could properly have been imposed after a trial would have been in the region of 9 years. Allowing for a reduction of one-third on account of his plea of guilty, that would indicate a sentence in the region of 6 years. As did the judge, we emphasise this is not a mechanically mathematical exercise. We therefore stand back to consider whether a sentence of 6 years would be a proper and proportionate sentence and the least that reasonably reflects both the seriousness of the offence and the offender's substantial mitigation. We consider that it is.

Three things follow from this conclusion. First, the sentence of 3 years and 6 months imposed by the judge is not merely lenient but unduly lenient. Second, the disparity between the sentence imposed by the judge and the conclusion we have reached persuades us that we should intervene. We therefore quash the sentence of 3 years and 6 months and substitute a sentence of 6 years. Third, it is accordingly necessary to adjust the period of disqualification in accordance with the principles outlined in Needham. The result is that we quash the period of disqualification imposed by the judge and substitute a period of disqualification comprising 5 years plus 3 years extension making 8 years in total. All other orders remain as before.