R v Prosper Matthew

On 13 March 2025 in the Crown Court at Wolverhampton the appellant changed his plea to guilty to four counts of assault with intent to rob, robbery and theft. Various other counts of robbery were ordered to lie on the file against him in the usual terms. On 12 May 2025 in the Crown Court at Birmingham the appellant changed his plea to guilty to two further counts of robbery arising out of different facts. These various counts related to incidents on 9 January 2023, 15 January 2023 and 27 January 2023. On 14 November 2025 in the Crown Court at Wolverhampton the appellant was sentenced to a term of 19 months' custody in a Young Offender Institution, which took account of the totality of the offending.

The facts in relation to the events of 9 January 2023 can be summarised as follows. On the evening of 9 January the complainant Jack Ward was out with friends in Halesowen town centre. At about 9.30 p.m. they saw a group of approximately 15 young men acting rowdily on a bus as it passed by. The appellant was part of that group. The group alighted from the bus and sprinted towards the complainant and his friends. They became surrounded and were roughly handled by the group. They were pushed up against the shutters of a shop. The appellant and two others isolated the complainant as his friends were robbed of their property. One of the group tried to snatch the complainant's phone and shoulder bag. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the neck shouting, "Give me all your shit". He then forced the complainant to the ground by tripping him. He got on top of the complainant and slapped his face six times, causing a black eye and grazing. The appellant then tried to pick the complainant up and demanded that he fight with him. The complainant refused. He managed to free himself and he ran to a nearby pub, where staff called the police. The complainant later identified the appellant in an identity parade.

We turn to the events of 15 January. At about 4.00 p.m. the complainants Lewis Probin and Ellis Cooper were at Dudley bus station. They were approached by five black males, including the appellant. They demanded that Probin hand over his coat and phone and security PIN, which he did, fearing that if he declined he would be beaten. He also handed over his phone and security code.

The coat was valued at £130. The phone was valued at £230. The complainant Cooper was also robbed of his coat valued at £120 and his phone valued at £300.

The appellant and the group of which he was a part then got on to a bus and the complainants were forced to walk home. The incident was caught on the bus station CCTV. Police identified the appellant as the male carrying the coats on to the bus. After boarding the bus, the group, including the appellant, travelled to a branch of JD Sports. The appellant was now wearing one of the newly acquired coats. He and the group entered the store and stole two jackets valued at £260. The appellant was detained by store security.

He was interviewed about all matters on 15 February 2023 and answered "no comment" to all questions.

We turn to the events of 27 January 2023. Sam Cox and Bailey Acklin, both 16 years of age, were in Birmingham city centre. They boarded the 997 bus, went upstairs to the top deck and sat on the back row. After 10 minutes, three males, including the appellant, came up the stairs from the bottom deck and approached them. An unknown male said to Acklin, "Where are you from?" The complainant replied, "Streetly". The appellant then said, "give me your phone." The complainant refused, and the appellant threatened to punch him. The appellant said, "That's a nice jacket. Send it me now." The complainant refused. The appellant then said, "If you don't give it me now, I'll batter you", and, "Give me the jacket or I'll wet you." The complainant understood this to be a threat that he was going to be stabbed. The appellant reached into his right jacket pocket, where the complainant thought he had a knife concealed, so he took off his fake, black Moncler puffer jacket, costing £70, and handed it to the appellant.

The co-defendant, Jess Bonneau-Taptue, approached the complainant Cox and said, "What phone is that?", and then said, "Give me your phone." The complainant was very scared, so gave him the phone. The phone was a black phone, iPhone 13, worth £800. The co-defendant asked for the phone's password, which the complainant gave him. The co-defendant then said, "Give me your Air Pods", so the complainant gave them to him. They had cost him £170. The co-defendant then said, "Give me your coat", so the complainant handed this over. This was a black Calvin Klein coat worth £120. An unknown male in the appellant's group then told the complainant Acklin to hand over his phone, saying, "Pass me your phone or I'll batter you." The complainant handed over his phone which had cost around £700. The male told the complainant to put in the phone's password, saying, "I'll punch you up if you don't put it in." The complainant put his password into the phone and unlocked it. After the robbery, either the appellant or an unknown male said, "Don't call the police. We know what you look like and where you live. We will find you and we will kill you."

The incident lasted for around 10 to 15 minutes before the appellant and his group got off the bus. The complainants got off the bus later and went home to inform their parents about what had happened. Approximately five hours after the offences, just after 2.00 a.m. on 28 January, the complainant Cox's Air Pods were tracked to the co-defendant's home address. Inquiries with West Midland Travel showed that the appellant had used the bus pass to get on the bus with an email address linked to his college account.

On 15 February police officers attended the appellant's home and arrested him. He was wearing the same coat as he could be seen wearing on the CCTV footage. He gave "no comment" answers to interview questions.

A detailed Pre-sentence Report was prepared. This is a balanced document which emphasises the previous good character of the appellant, his remorse and demonstrates an understanding on his part as to the seriousness of the offending. The author does, however, conclude that the index offending is of such a serious nature that it is indicative of a serious risk of harm to members of the public in the community. The considered opinion of the author was that the appellant represented a medium but not a low risk of reconviction for seriously harmful offences. The offending was committed in the company of others. It involved threats to use physical violence and deploying of weapons. In relation to sentencing, the author concluded that the offending met the threshold for a custodial sentence. The author observed, "Due to the serious nature of his index offences a custodial sentence seems inevitable."

Nonetheless, the author stated that:

In sentencing the appellant, the judge addressed himself to the overarching guidelines for sentencing children and young people and the guidance given about sentencing young people in the judgment of this court in R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596, paragraphs 49, 52, 55, 61 and 82 to 88.

He also recorded that case law made clear that the approach should focus on a young person and be individualistic in nature, but also that where a defendant who is 17 had committed offences, deterrence and the need for deterrence was relevant. He cited in this regard section 57 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

The Judge then observed that he sentenced upon the basis of totality. He considered the individual position of the appellant. He accepted that there was remorse and an acknowledgement of responsibility. He observed that the appellant no longer associated with the co-defendants. He took into account supportive references from family and others and that the appellant was a student studying for a degree in pharmacology. On the other hand, the Judge took into account the prevalence of these sorts of robberies, where young lads were strong armed by the use of superior numbers with severe threats of violence into parting with coats and phones. These crimes were not isolated incidents but were part of a sequence of offending.

The Judge made clear that he had read extensively about the appellant, including from the Probation Report. On page 2, paragraph F of the Sentencing Remarks the judge observed that the seriousness of the offending was such that only a custodial sentence was appropriate, bearing in mind section 230 of the Sentencing Act 2020. This is a clear reference to the choice facing the Judge between a custodial and a non-custodial sentence. On page 3, paragraph A he observed that in the final analysis he took the view that the totality of the offending had to be marked by immediate custody. After a trial the sentence would have been one of three years' custody. The judge then reduced the sentence to two years to take account of the age of the appellant and all the other mitigating factors applicable to him, and this was then further reduced by 20 per cent to take account of the late plea of guilty. This resulted in the sentence of 19 months in a Young Offender Institution.

In this appeal it is accepted by Mr Singh for the appellant that the Judge correctly identified a custodial term of 19 months. In his persuasive and cogent submissions before us today, Mr Singh argues, however, that the Judge failed to address the imposition of community and custodial sentence guidelines, contrary to section 230(2)(b) of the Sentencing Code. It is argued that the case fell four square within the criteria for a suspended sentence. The appellant demonstrated a realistic prospect of rehabilitation, having stayed offence free for almost three years, and he had built a stable and law abiding life. There was strong personal mitigation arising from his age, including immaturity at the time of offending and subsequent reform. Immediate imprisonment caused significant harm to his father with whom the appellant shared a close bond. The term was capable of suspension, yet no, it is said, structured explanation was given in the sentencing remarks as to why immediate custody was required. The failure to engage the guideline rendered the sentence wrong in principle. Because the applicant was 17 at the time of the offending, the Sentencing Council guideline for children and young people made clear that youth and immaturity could reduce culpability and emphasised the importance of rehabilitation as a sentencing aim. Properly applied, these principles strongly supported the imposition of a suspended sentence. For these reasons Mr Singh has argued that the sentence was wrong in principle and manifestly excessive.

We turn to our conclusion. We remind ourselves that this is not a re-sentencing exercise. We have to identify an error in the approach adopted by the judge, bearing in mind that the sentencing judge has a proper discretion as to the sentence to be imposed. The issue on this appeal is quite narrow. The starting point is that there is no challenge to the correctness of a 19-month custodial sentence. The issue is whether the judge erred in law in failing to consider and apply the imposition guidelines. As to whether the judge did ignore the imposition guidelines, it is true that the sentencing remarks made no explicit reference to those guidelines. However, reference to section 230 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is made and the remainder of the sentencing remarks, read in the round, make clear that the Judge had well in mind the possibility of a non-custodial sentence, not least because it was canvassed as an option in the Probation Report, which the judge had self-evidently read and considered.

Under section 230 a court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offending was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence could be justified. This is the essence of the question that the appellant argues the Judge did not consider.

In the circumstances, it is not open to the appellant to argue that the Judge failed to address himself to the possibility of a non-custodial sentence or as to the legal divide between a custodial and a non-custodial imposition. The simple fact that there is no express reference to the guidelines does not in these circumstances imply that the judge ignored them or the principles they propound. Standing back and considering the approach of the Judge in the round, he was, in our judgement, entitled to impose a custodial sentence for this sequence of criminal events.

For these reasons we dismiss the appeal.