R v Scott Chapman

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this case. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the 1992 Act. This judgment is anonymised accordingly.

The respondent was born on 7 January 2001 and was aged 20 at the time of the offending. On 18 August 2025, in the Crown Court at Worcester, the offender (then aged 24) pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to the offences which we will mention in a moment. On 18 September 2025 he was sentenced by HHJ Cartwright as follows:

His Majesty's Solicitor General now applies, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ("1988 Act"), for leave to refer those sentences to this Court on the ground that they were unduly lenient.

The facts are not in dispute for present purposes and may be taken from the Final Reference submitted on behalf of the Solicitor General. In summary, the offender when aged almost 20 began a relationship with "JB", a 14-year-old girl whom he had met through social media. In early 2021 the relationship became sexual when he had turned 20 but she was still 14. He lied to his parents telling them that she was 16. She was permitted to stay over at his house and he at hers. They had regular consensual sex over the course of 1 year. He would also send her unsolicited photographs of his penis and would photograph her when she was getting changed or was naked, without her permission.

In April 2021, the offender held a party at his house at which he became drunk. After he and JB went to bed together, he told her he wanted sex and, when she refused and despite her resistance, he raped her saying he "wanted to put a baby inside her". The details of the facts are set out in more detail at paragraphs 10 to 23 of the Final Reference.

At his plea and trial preparation hearing on 10 May 2024, the offender entered not guilty pleas to all counts. His trial was fixed for 18 August 2024. In a Defence Statement served on 14 August 2025, the offender set out a defence on the basis that all sexual activity had been consensual and that he had at all times believed JB to have been 16. On 15 August 2025, the Friday before the Monday on which the trial was due to start, the prosecution were notified of the offender's intention to plead guilty. As a result the matter was not listed for trial and the victim was not required to attend court. The offender then entered guilty pleas to counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 on 18 August 2025. As we have mentioned, counts 2 and 6 were ordered to lie on file in the usual terms.

The maximum sentence for the offence of rape is life imprisonment. The Sentencing Council has issued a Definitive Guideline on Offences of Rape. Categorisation must take place under that guideline by reference both to harm and culpability. If a defence falls within category 2B, the starting point recommended is 8 years' custody with a category range of 7 to 9 years. By way of comparison, we note that if an offence falls within category 3B the starting point recommended is 5 years' custody with a range of 4 to 7 years.

The maximum sentence for the offence of sexual activity with a child, contrary to section 9 of the 2003 Act, is 14 years' imprisonment. Where offences fall into category 1A of the relevant guideline on such offences, the starting point recommended is 5 years' custody with a category range of 4 to 10 years. The maximum sentence for sexual communication with a child, contrary to section 15A of the 2003 Act is 2 years' imprisonment. Where an offence falls into category 1B, the starting point recommended is 1 year's custody, with a range of between a high-level community order to 18 months' custody. Account must also be taken of the Definitive Guideline on Totality.

The offender had no previous convictions. The sentencing court had, as this Court has, before it two victim personal statements in which JB described the impact of the rape on her. She had suffered with anxiety and depression, had suicidal thoughts and feelings of worthlessness. She began to self-harm. She had been admitted to hospital. She dropped out of school and her social life suffered drastically. In her second statement, made a year after her first, she said that all the people of her age knew her as "that girl". She was not making friends with anyone from school as they always seemed to bring this up. She worries about making other friends or talking to people and she does not want them to know. She says that she has no friends and has lost the friends she did have.

The sentencing court, like this Court, also had a pre-sentence report in which the following observations were made. The offender's presentation was that of a much younger man; he presented as extremely immature. There are concerns that he does not fully comprehend the consequences of seriousness of the current matters. The offender admitted that whilst he knows there is an age of consent, he does not understand why this is in place. He denied any sexual interest in children but the author of the report said the index offences clearly demonstrate otherwise. The offender was assessed to pose a high risk of serious harm to JB, on the basis that any further encounter with her would likely serve to retraumatise her. The offender was also assessed to pose a high risk of serious harm to children should he develop any form of intimate relationship with a child in the future and also a high risk of serious harm to the public, specifically female adults who may enter into a relationship with him. The report said he poses a risk of sexual harm again ranging from sexual assault to the possibility of rape.

At the sentencing hearing the court was assisted by written submissions on sentencing from the prosecution. There were character references on behalf of the offender and letters from his parents, and medical information was provided showing that the offender suffers from colitis. In respect of the count of rape, the prosecution submitted that the offence fell into category 2B. It was argued that the victim had suffered severe psychological harm and/or she had been particularly vulnerable due to her personal circumstances. The defence invited the judge to place the harm into category 3 for the offence of rape.

As for the offences of sexual activity with a child, the prosecution submitted that these fell into category 1A, category 1 harm because there was penetration of the vagina and category A culpability on the basis of grooming behaviour and/or sexual images of the victim being recorded and/or significant disparity in age.

In his sentencing remarks the judge said that there had been an element of grooming in this case; the offender had lavished his victim with money and gifts. The judge was driven to find that the offending had had a profoundly damaging consequence on the victim. He found that the harm caused did amount to severe psychological harm but with contribution from factors which were not attributable to this offending. Turning to the guideline, the judge placed the case into category harm 2 and culpability category B. There was the aggravating feature of the location. The victim was a guest in the offender's parents' house on the occasion of the rape and she should have been safe there. He was under the influence of both drink and drugs and it was an aggravating factor, the judge said, that the offender had used words that he wanted to "put a baby in her", in other words, to make this 14-year-old girl pregnant.

The judge then turned to the mitigation available to the offender. He had no previous convictions. He had been able to hold down a series of jobs most recently in the care industry and he took that into account as a positive feature of the offender's character. He also took into account his serious condition – the colitis. He had regard to the prison population being high, which means any time spent in custody is harder. But the most powerful mitigating factor, the judge said, was the offender's lack of maturity. Although he was biologically 20 at the time of the offending the judge accepted he was immature for his age and noted that the author of the pre-sentence report had said that he presented during interview as a much younger man than his biological age. The offender's father had said that he came across as more of a 16 year old in terms of maturity and the author of the pre-sentence report seemed, in the judge's view, to have agreed with that.

On the basis of all the material that the judge had before him, he concluded that it ought to be a very significant reduction indeed compared to an adult with maturity. The judge then turned to the guideline in relation to counts 3 and 4. This was harm category 1 and culpability category A. The judge concluded that there was a significant disparity in age. There was also the fact that sexual images were recorded and/or solicited, in other words requested by the offender.

On the final count the judge noted what the guideline recommends and we have mentioned already. The judge then explained that he was going to structure the sentence so as to make count 1 (the offence of rape) the lead offence and make the other sentences concurrent. In relation to rape, a starting point in the guideline is 8 years' custody. The judge said that if the offender had been a mature adult at the time of the offence, the very least sentence that could be imposed would be 7 years after trial. His significant immaturity meant that that was reduced to 4 years on count 1, that is after a trial. In relation to the other sexual activity reflected in counts 3, 4 and 5, the judge concluded that that required at least an additional year on top making 5 years in total. The judge then considered the discount to be given for the plea of guilty which he concluded should be 15 per cent because notice had been given of the intention to plead guilty a week before the trial date and this had avoided the need for the victim to attend for trial. That resulted, as we have mentioned, in a total sentence of 4 years and 3 months' imprisonment.

On behalf of the Solicitor General, Mr Emlyn Jones KC takes no issue with the credit which was given for the guilty plea in this case which was 15 per cent. He also accepts that the judge was correct to impose the lead sentence on count 1, that is the offence of rape, and make the other sentences run concurrently. He accepts that the judge was correct to find that the rape fell into category 2B by reference to the Definitive Guideline on rape with, as we have mentioned, a recommended starting point of 8 years' custody and a range of 7 to 9 years.

However, Mr Emlyn Jones submits that there were two factors placing the offending into category 2 harm, severe psychological harm and the victim's particular vulnerability due to her personal circumstances, chiefly but not exclusively her age, that is 14. He submits that her previous vulnerability, contrary to what the respondent may submit, is not a mitigating factor. To the contrary, an offender must take his victim as he finds her. He also submits that there were other aggravating factors: the location of the offence and the fact that the offender acted under the influence of alcohol and drugs. Further, he had expressed his intention to impregnate his victim although it is not known whether he did ejaculate. Mr Emlyn Jones therefore submits that the seriousness of the offence and its aggravating features called for an upward adjustment from the 8-year starting point before considering mitigation. A notional sentence of 7 years was in itself simply too low.

He further submits that the downward adjustment for mitigation was too great. It is accepted that the offender's youth and immaturity does afford significant mitigation but Mr Emlyn Jones submits the reduction of almost half from 7 years, which itself was too low, to 4 years, was too great a reduction. He observes that 4 years is below the lower end of the applicable category in the Definitive Guideline for a Category 2B offence, which is 7 to 9 years' custody. He observes that in fact 4 years is at the very bottom of the category range if an offence falls within category 3B.

He submits that it was then necessary to increase the sentence on count 1 to reflect the overall gravity of the offending. Counts 3 and 4 were multiple incident counts representing an entire year of repeated, frequent, penetrative sexual activity with a vulnerable child. The offending falls into category 1A by reference to the relevant guideline, so even a single offence of that kind would have attracted a starting point of 5 years' custody. Given that these two counts represented repeated offending and given the aggravating features it is submitted the offending called for an upward adjustment from the starting point before considering mitigation.

Mr Emlyn Jones therefore submits that the combined impact of the judge's approach to first, the seriousness of count 1, second the reduction for mitigation and third the adjustment for totality, led to a total sentence which failed to reflect the seriousness of the offending overall and is unduly lenient.

On behalf of the respondent, we received written submissions from Mr Davidson and have heard oral submissions from Mr Majid, to whom we are grateful for attending at short notice in the light of the unavailability of Mr Davidson. Mr Majid submits that the sentence in this case was not unduly lenient, it was a considered and fair sentence. It reflected adequately the offending in a balanced way. It is submitted that the judge in fact took a high starting point for the offence of rape. Mr Majid submits that the exercise is not one of simply ticking boxes by reference to various culpability factors in the guideline. He invites our attention particularly to the sentencing remarks at pages 14 to 15. He submits that it is arguable that the harm in this case could have been placed in category 3.

It is also submitted that the victim had a very troubled past even before meeting this respondent. Her age of 14 does not, he submits, in itself necessarily mean that she was particularly vulnerable by reason of age alone. Her parents were in the house at the time. He accepts that the victim was vulnerable to an extent but he submits not "particularly vulnerable".

It is accepted that the judge then made a significant mitigation for mitigation and made a small increase on count 1 to reflect the totality of the offending because other counts had to be taken into account. He submits that the judge correctly focused on the defendant's own significant immaturity. He had been assessed in the pre-sentence report as being immature. Further he had positive good character references. Mr Majid reminds this Court that reaching the age of 18 is, on the authority of this Court not to be regarded as a "cliff edge" for the purposes of sentencing.

In conclusion, Mr Majid submits that the judge was best placed to assess the right balance, and took into account the competing factors to reach what was a fair sentence in all the circumstances.

The principles which govern an application under section 36 of the 1988 Act are well established and were summarised by this Court, for example, in Attorney-General's Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; [2023] 2 Cr App R(S) 16 at [3-6] by reference to the earlier decisions of this Court in Attorney-General's Reference No 4 of 1989 (1990) 90 Cr App R(S) 366, in which the judgment was given by Lord Lane CJ, and Attorney-General's Reference No 132 of 2001(Bryn Dorian Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41, in which the judgment was given by Potter LJ.

As Potter LJ said at paragraph 24 of Johnson, the purposes of the system of Attorney-General's References include:

As this Court explained at [3] in Egan, the principles established by the authorities can be summarised as follows:

Turning to the application of those principles in this case, in essence, we accept the submissions which have been made on behalf of the Solicitor General and have reached the conclusion that these sentences were unduly lenient. It was proper to make the rape offence the lead count and make the other sentences concurrent so long as the total sentence was just and proportionate and reflected the overall gravity of the offending as a whole.

Taking the offence of rape, the starting point for a mature adult would have been 8 years' custody according to the Definitive Guideline. But, in the circumstances of this case, in our judgment, this had to be increased to a notional sentence of 9 years because of the aggravating factors, especially grooming. For the other offences the notional sentence after trial for a mature adult should have been 6 years in view of the aggravating features and the fact that there was multiple offending. That is again above the starting point recommended in the guideline.

Bearing in mind totality, one could not simply add those two figures together but there had to be an appreciable increase on the rape offence in the notional sentence of 9 years. In our judgment, that should have been at least 12 years. That is for what the judge described as "a mature adult". We accept that some reduction was called for to reflect this respondent's immaturity but this should have brought that notional sentence of 12 years down to 8 years' custody. Then one has to give credit for the guilty pleas of 15 per cent about which no complaint has been made. That results in a sentence of 6 years and 8 months' custody on count 1. In those circumstances, we do not think it necessary to alter the other sentences, as they were made and will remain concurrent.

For the reasons we have given, we grant the Solicitor General's application for leave to refer these sentences to this Court under section 36 of the 1988 Act. On that Reference, we alter the sentences in the following way. On count 1 (the offence of rape), we quash the sentence imposed and substitute one of 6 years and 8 months' custody.