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Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 1388 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT INNER LONDON (MR JUSTICE LAVENDER) (01MP1363523) CASE NO: 202504504 A5 | Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Friday 9 October 2026 |
Before:
LORD JUSTICE DOVE
MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER
RECORDER OF MANCHESTER
(His Honour Judge Dean KC)
REX
v
MOHAMMED KABIR HOSSAIN
(Section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies)
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MR SHAHNAWAZ KHAN appeared on behalf of the Appellant
MS JENNIFER NEWCOMB appeared on behalf of the Crown
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JUDGMENT
LORD JUSTICE DOVE:
The provisions of section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 are engaged in this case in that it involves a person under the age of 18 as part of the family of the victim. No matter relating to that person may be published which would identify them, including their name, address, any educational establishment or any workplace they attend, or any picture of them, and this order will last until the person concerned reaches the age of 18.
On 25 November 2025 in the Crown Court at Inner London, the appellant, who was then aged 48, was convicted of an offence of unlawful act manslaughter. He was sentenced on 28 November 2025 to a period of 9 years' imprisonment. He appeals against that sentence with leave of the single judge.
The facts of the case are as follows. On 10 June 2022 the appellant was at home with his wife and child, who at the time was 2 months old. The appellant's wife left their home, leaving him alone with the victim (the child) at about 12.04. The appellant was left in sole charge of his baby son at that time.
At 12.23 the appellant dialled 111, which was converted into a 999 call and related to a medical emergency in relation to his baby son. Prior to this call, from around 12.17 onwards, the appellant had been in communication with his wife, and the prosecution's case was that these calls were consistent with injury having been sustained by the victim prior to the calls being made. The victim sustained an extreme whiplash-type injury caused by his head moving backwards and forwards, giving rise to catastrophic injury to the soft structures inside his head.
The whiplash caused bleeding within his skull in the three membranes enclosing his brain, together with bleeding within his eyes and optic nerves, causing his retinas to be detached. The whiplash also caused injury around his neck/spinal cord and created catastrophic pressure on his brainstem and medulla which impacted his cardiorespiratory function and caused him to go into cardiac arrest and stop breathing. This in turn led to a catastrophic loss of oxygen in his brain, and ultimately the cardiac arrest and head injury he sustained in the shaking resulted in his death. He was maintained on life support machines until 7 October 2022, when that was withdrawn and the victim died.
Following his arrest the appellant initially maintained that on 10 June 2022 he had fed his baby son and placed him in his cot but later noticed that he was floppy and unresponsive. He said that he had then telephoned for an ambulance, and he said he had no idea how the victim had come by any of the injuries which were found following his collapse.
This was an account which was maintained in his defence statement. It appears that on the eleventh day of the trial the appellant changed his account and accepted that on 10 June 2022 he had shaken his baby son, but he continued to maintain that he was not guilty of manslaughter. Ultimately that was a position which the jury were unable to accept.
The extensive medical evidence which was placed before the jury by the prosecution demonstrated that the appellant's contention that he had shaken the victim in an attempt to revive him could not be accepted, and indeed the judge concluded that this was a lie. The medical evidence demonstrated that the force which had been used upon the victim was significant, and both the prosecution's pathologist and their paediatric neuroradiologist concluded that the shaking was well in excess of that which would arise from normal handling or rough play.
The judge concluded that he was sure that the appellant acted out of anger or frustration when the victim would not stop crying. However, although the judge was convinced that the appellant's main thought was selfishly his desire to silence his baby son, he was not sure that he intended to harm the victim or indeed gave any conscious thought to the risk that harm would be caused.
The judge noted that there were aggravating features in the circumstances of the case. The first and obvious feature was that the victim was vulnerable; secondly and equally obviously, the offence involved an abuse of trust, in that the appellant was the victim's father and that he had been left alone in his sole care. However, the judge was careful to observe that those two factors were in truth embedded within the categorisation which he arrived at in relation to this offence: it fell within category B for the reason that very limited force would have caused serious injuries to such a fragile person as the victim was at the time.
Turning to mitigating factors, the judge noted that the appellant was a man of good character who had remained in work in the UK for the last 19 years. He took account of the serious impact which the appellant's imprisonment would have on his wife and his other young son. It was clear to the judge that the appellant had been greatly impacted by the loss of his son and the recognition that he was the person who had caused his death. He also accepted that the appellant's conduct was not premeditated but done on the spur of the moment. Once the appellant realised that the victim had sustained a serious injury, he called the emergency services for assistance.
The prosecution submitted that the appellant's case fell within category B of the unlawful act manslaughter sentencing guidelines on the basis that death was caused in the course of an unlawful act "which carried a high risk of death or GBH which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender". That provided for a starting point of 12 years' imprisonment and a category range of 8 - 16 years' imprisonment. The judge accepted that characterisation but considered that the offence fell "in the lower half of that range" on the basis that a short period of shaking would have been sufficient to cause the victim's fatal injuries in the light of the fact that he was a very young baby. As has been previously observed, the aggravating features of the victim's vulnerability and the abuse of trust were noted by the judge to have been taken into account in his assessment that this was a category B case.
The judge concluded that having regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors engaged in the case the least possible sentence that he could impose was one of 9 years' imprisonment.
This appeal is advanced by Mr Khan, in his helpful submissions this morning, on the basis that the judge took too high a starting point bearing in mind the appellant's culpability and that as a consequence the sentence was manifestly excessive.
It is submitted that virtually all cases involving children in non-accidental head injury will fall within the categorisation of culpability B and therefore there is a risk that they will be sentenced in a way which is manifestly excessive. It is submitted that there are features of this case which may bring it more properly within category C and should have reflected in a sentence right at the very bottom of the category B range. Even if the case were therefore properly within category B, it ought to have led in this case to a starting point right at the bottom of the bracket, prior to the application of such reduction as was appropriate to reflect the personal mitigation available to the appellant.
We have reflected carefully on the submissions advanced by Mr Khan on behalf of the appellant but we are unable to accept them. The judge's assessment properly reflected the sentencing guidelines, not simply in the sense that the starting point which he deployed was within the scope of the sentences indicated by the guidelines. The fact that most non-accidental head injuries caused by the shaking of a baby of the age of the victim in this case will fall within category B is not, in our judgment, a sensible or sufficient reason to depart from the guidelines. The definition of 'high culpability' within the guidelines and the fact that infant non-accidental head injury will fall within that definition are a feature derived from the fragility of a very young child such as the victim and the potentially catastrophic impact of the use of even relatively minor force upon such a child. The way in which the judge approached this, reflecting both the vulnerability and abuse of trust in placing the case in category B and concluding that the sentence should be in the lower part of the category range, was in our judgment an entirely legitimate and appropriate approach.
Another way of assessing these issues is that there is simply no basis to exempt or except from category B cases involving the death of children by shaking. The judge made, as we have observed, sensible adjustments to reflect the arguments which are advanced in this appeal and it was appropriate for him to take a starting point in the lower half of the category range below the starting point, to reflect the extent of the use of force which would be sufficient to cause the kind of catastrophic injuries which killed the victim in this case. It is clear that some adjustment was made by the judge in order to reflect the mitigating features and the personal mitigation which was available to this appellant.
Overall in the circumstances we are not satisfied that the sentence in this case is either manifestly excessive or in any way wrong in principle, and this appeal must be dismissed.
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