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London
WC2A 2LL
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT ST ALBANS
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE SHERIDAN) [43SS0165922]
Case No 2024/04241/B3Tuesday 6 October 2026
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE DOVE
MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER
THE RECORDER OF MANCHESTER
(His Honour Judge Dean KC)
(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
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R EX
- v –
EDWARD DREDGE
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Mr D Wood appeared on behalf of the Applicant
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J U D G M E N T
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Tuesday 6 October 2026
LORD JUSTICE DOVE:
The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this case. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the 1992 Act.
On 12 November 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at St Albans before His Honour Judge Sheridan and a jury, the applicant was convicted of a single count of rape, but acquitted of a second count of which he was accused, after he had stood trial. He was subsequently sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment.
The applicant now renews his application for leave to appeal against his conviction following refusal by the single judge. There is one proposed ground of appeal.
The circumstances of the offending were as follows. The applicant and complainant shared a workplace and had been having an affair which they had kept secret from their families and colleagues.
On 10 December 2021 they both attended a staff party, during which there were difficulties between the applicant and the complainant. Later in the evening a group, including the applicant and the complainant, went to a nightclub, where the applicant sought out the complainant in the ladies toilet and shouted at her. He threw a glass and he kicked open doors. He came to be evicted from the club by the security staff.
When the complainant returned to the hotel where all of the staff were staying for the purposes of the party, the applicant was in the reception area and he followed her to her room. In fact when they reached the applicant's room he dragged the complainant into the room and there was a struggle in which the applicant grabbed her around the throat. She thought that he was going to kill her. The applicant held the complainant down whilst she was sobbing and forced vaginal sex on her. The complainant got away, dressed and returned to her room.
Subsequently, the following morning, the applicant obtained a key to the complainant's room from reception and accessed it. Sexual intercourse occurred which was the subject matter of the count of which the applicant was acquitted.
Following a conversation with a friend, the complainant reported the matter to the police, and the applicant was arrested. When he was interviewed, he explained that he was in an on-off relationship with the complainant and that he recalled parts of the evening in question, along with flashbacks of consensual sex with the complainant. He believed that all his actions in relation to the complainant had been consensual, and indeed that was his defence at trial.
The prosecution, based on the evidence of the complainant which has already been rehearsed, contended that the sexual intercourse in the applicant's room was not consensual, and that the applicant was well aware of that.
Thus, the issue for the jury was whether they could be sure that the complainant had consented and, if they were sure that she had not consented, whether they were also sure that the applicant had not reasonably believed that she had consented.
In order to assist the jury, they were provided with agreed directions by the judge. These were directions which had been the subject of discussion between trial counsel and the judge prior to them being delivered.
In the course of his helpful submissions this morning, Mr Wood, on behalf of the applicant, has drawn attention to what he submits are a number of frailties of the judge's summing up. The first of those is how the judge treated those agreed directions and the way in which he presented them to the jury. During the course of his summing up, he provided parts of the agreed directions but interpolated other directions that related to the evidence in the case. In particular, in presenting the direction in relation to demeanour and the need to have caution when considering issues related to demeanour, the judge directed the jury in the following terms:
"When judging allegations of sexual abuse, experience has shown that it is necessary to keep a cool head. It is easy to feel
indignant at the idea of this sort of thing happening, and easy to be sympathetic to a witness who seems to be showing difficulty, or distress, at having to recall, or recount an incident which is distressing and unpleasant. In this case, may I also add you need to determine whether the distress is because of a breakdown of what was once apparently – there is no question about it, it was an extramarital affair at least on one side, but whether or not she is still upset emotionally because of the person that she was engaged in romantically and loved, apparently. So, you have got to distinguish whether the breakdown is partly to do with that. If it is that, then it is understandable what you – if the breakdown is because she is recounting something that happened that was horrible but true, then you would obviously attach different weight to it. Do you follow the difference? So, please be alert to that in this case. These are perfectly proper normal emotions, but they do not assist you in deciding whether these allegations are satisfactorily proved. You must judge this case on the evidence that you have heard. You must put aside any feelings that you have about cases such as these, and review the evidence you actually have. Take into account if you wish the emotions and demeanour of the witnesses, but do not allow your own emotions to take over. You are concerned only with a fair trial, that is a fair evaluation of the evidence."
Mr Wood draws attention to what he submits was an overly succinct way in which in his summing up the judge summarised the evidence of both the complainant and the applicant. This, he submits, provides context to his later submissions in relation to what emerged after the jury had retired.
Whilst they were in retirement, the jury sent through a note to the judge in relation to the complainant's evidence and the evidence of another prosecution witness. The judge clarified with the jury in open court that they wished to have the video of the complainant's ABE interview played back to them in order to judge her demeanour, rather than to be reminded of what she had said. The jury were asked to clarify which part of the complainant's account they wished to review on the Achieving Best Evidence interview, and they confirmed that it was in relation to the complainant's evidence on count 1, the activity in the applicant's hotel room.
After hearing the submissions of counsel, the judge concluded that there were exceptional circumstances in the case which justified the playing of the ABE interview to the jury. They were, he thought, that the applicant had no recollection of the first rape at all. This, in the judge's experience was exceptional. He considered that it was understandable that the jury would wish to review the recording, bearing in mind all of the points which had been made to the complainant in cross-examination in relation to exaggerations in her account and the like.
A debate occurred in which Mr Wood, on behalf of the applicant, was reluctant to engage in detail in relation to the parts of the ABE interview which should be played in order to meet the jury's enquiry.
In due course, the judge identified the portions of the ABE interview which he considered it was appropriate and fair for the jury to review in relation to their query about how the complainant had given her evidence.
Prior to them watching the selected parts of the ABE interview, the judge reiterated his instruction that they should not place disproportionate weight on the evidence that they were reviewing, on the basis that it was only two small extracts of the interview which they were seeing for a second time. He also reminded them, in advance of the viewing, of the essence of the applicant's case and the fact which the judge described as "exceptional" that the applicant had no recollection of the events.
After the jury had viewed the video footage, the judge proceeded to provide the jury with his note of the evidence which the complainant had given in cross-examination and also all the evidence that the applicant had given about the incident.
The renewed application for leave to appeal is based upon the contention that it was unfair for the judge to permit the video-recorded ABE interview to be played to the jury in circumstances where this did not equip the jury to reconsider her demeanour in cross-examination, particularly in circumstances where the judge had directed the jury not to place undue emphasis on demeanour in their assessment of the witnesses, including the complainant. It is in support of this submission that the demeanour of the complainant in cross-examination could not properly be reflected in the review of the ABE interview and that it was unfair for her demeanour in the ABE interview to be replayed in circumstances where that could not be reflected in cross-examination that underpinned the earlier contextual submissions made by Mr Wood as to what had happened in respect of the judge's directions with regard to demeanour and the way in which he had approached directing and instructing the jury in that connection.
In developing his submissions, Mr Wood emphasised two points in particular as illustrative of the unfairness of which he complains. We have before us a transcript of the complainant's cross-examination. Mr Wood draws attention to two points which he made in cross-examination which the transcript appears to disclose may have disturbed or wrong-footed the complainant when they were put to her and as to which she was unable to provide crisp or coherent answers. The first was the issue of how long she had been in the applicant's room. She expressed surprise that, in truth, the CCTV footage showed that she had been present in his room for over two hours. She was unaware of that when she was asked about it by Mr Wood.
The second was the point in the cross-examination when Mr Wood put to her that she had taken off her own clothes, given the potential difficulty of her being able to do so had she been engaged in a struggle, as she contended. Both of these passages of the cross-examination, Mr Wood submits, shows the importance of her demeanour in cross-examination, which could not be reflected by any review of her evidence by the judge. Whilst the judge faithfully reminded the jury of these points when he reviewed the evidence of the complainant after the ABE interview had been played, that could not fairly and properly reflect the impact of her demeanour when being questioned by Mr Wood in cross-examination.
The legal framework in relation to circumstances of this kind is now well established. In the relatively recent case of R v VJW [2022] EWCA Crim 164, this court provided a clear statement of the correct approach to a question of the kind which the jury raised in this case. At [29] the court identified that the judge has a discretion in relation to whether or not to allow the replaying of an ABE interview, both in relation to what was said by the witness and also in respect of how they said it. This is subject to the three safeguards which were provided for by Lord Taylor CJ when giving the judgment of this court in R v Rawlings and Broadbent [1995] 1 WLR 178. Those safeguards are: first, that the replay should be in court with the judge, counsel and the defendant present; secondly, that the judge should warn the jury that because they are hearing the evidence in chief of the complainant repeated a second time, well after all of the other evidence, they should guard against giving it disproportionate weight simply because of those circumstances, and should bear well in mind all the other evidence in the case; and thirdly, that after the replay of the evidence and in the interests of fairness, the judge should remind the jury of the cross-examination and re-examination of the witness from their notes of the evidence, whether or not the jury has asked for that. On the face of the authorities, there is no requirement that the circumstances of the case should be exceptional. No doubt the judge's discretion as to whether or not to accede to a jury's request in circumstances of this kind will be undertaken having careful regard to ensuring the fairness of the proceedings.
Measured against this case law, and notwithstanding the care with which Mr Wood has advanced the case on behalf of the applicant, we are in no doubt that the single judge was correct to refuse the application for leave to appeal.
We deal, first, with the contextual points which Mr Wood has raised. We put to one side the absence of complaint about the judge's summing up or his presentation of the legal directions to the jury. We are not surprised that the judge presented the question of demeanour and the agreed legal directions in the way in which he did. What he did in the passage which we have quoted above was to place those agreed legal directions properly, fairly and squarely in the context of the issues which they had to resolve; but, more pertinently, in the context of the evidence in the case which they had heard. There is, in our judgment, nothing particularly unusual or critical in the way in which that point was presented to the jury.
The procedure which the judge adopted was one which, in our judgment, faithfully reflected the authorities which we have already summarised. In truth, he did not need to find exceptional circumstances, although he embarked upon that exercise of his own volition. But it is clear that he considered and exercised his discretion with a clear eye to ensuring that the extent of the replay was all that was required to meet the jury's enquiry, and that the replay was placed in the context of the evidence in cross-examination and the applicant's evidence in order to ensure that there was fairness in the trial.
The feature which is relied upon by Mr Wood and is illustrated by him in the context of the two points he made in cross-examination is, in truth, a feature of the impact of the authorities which provide for the question of discretion. There may be cases where the fairness of the trial and the absence of the ability to replicate the demeanour of a witness during cross-examination could give rise to unfairness, but this was not, in our judgment, even arguably such a case. It was a case in which the jury had a proper reminder of the points which had been taken in cross-examination and that cross-examination had occurred in the relatively recent past.
It follows that the safeguards which were provided by the judge in the way in which he provided the jury with all of the surrounding evidence in terms of cross-examination and re-examination, ensured that there was no unfairness or irregularity in the trial and no reason for the jury's request in the circumstances of this case to be declined. We are satisfied that the judge's handling of the jury's question in this case was lawful and that the approach which he took was fair to the trial's participants.
In these circumstances, and notwithstanding the helpful submissions advanced by Mr Wood, we are of the view that the renewed application is not arguable and that leave to appeal must be refused.
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