R E X v FRANCK PONZI

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1384

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R E X v FRANCK PONZI

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1384

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WOOD GREEN

(HER HONOUR JUDGE GREENBERG KC) [01YR1243924]

Case No 202503259/A1

[2026] EWCA Crim 1384

Royal Courts of Justice

The Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Thursday 15 October 2026

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE

and

HER HONOUR JUDGE LEIGH

(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)

____________________

R E X

- v –

FRANCK PONZI

____________________

Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

Miss J Morris appeared on behalf of the Appellant

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

Thursday 15 October 2026

LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE:

1.

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

2.

On 14 February 2025, following a trial in the Crown Court at Wood Green before Her Honour Judge Joanna Greenberg KC and a jury, the appellant was convicted of a single count of rape. On 19 August 2025, he was sentenced by the trial judge to seven years' imprisonment. He now appeals against that sentence with the leave of the single judge.

3.

The complainant "C" was a vulnerable person who used Class A controlled drugs. She had limited hearing and required hearing aids. On 16 January 2024, C travelled to London to meet up with her sister. They both went to meet a friend of her sister at an address in Wood Green. The property was a semi-derelict house with boarded up windows and a padlock on the front door. C did not know the property. There were drug users coming and going to buy cocaine. C and her sister were taken to a bedroom where they saw the appellant, a person whom C did not know. He was one of the visitors to the premises. The appellant and C smoked some crack cocaine together.

4.

At some point in the early hours of the morning, C was left alone with the appellant in the room. He blocked the door to the bedroom and demanded sexual intercourse from C. She froze. The appellant turned C around, pulled down her trousers and penetrated her anus from behind. The rape had lasted around 30 seconds and was very painful for C.

5.

C subsequently managed to get away from the house using some form of subterfuge and sought help from staff in a local supermarket. They contacted the police.

6.

The appellant was subsequently arrested for the rape. A DNA sample was taken from semen found on C's hoodie which matched the appellant's DNA. After the appellant was arrested, in his police interview on 17 July 2024 he gave a prepared statement in which he denied any sexual encounter with C. He then answered "No comment" to questions asked. However, later on in his defence statement, and in his evidence at trial, the appellant said that there had been sexual engagement with C but that it had been consensual.

7.

The appellant was aged 45 at sentence. He had one conviction for an unrelated offence for which he had been given a community order. There was no pre-sentence report, but we consider that for the purposes of section 33 of the Sentencing Act 2020 no such report was necessary either for the sentencing or for dealing with this appeal.

8.

The defence provided the judge with a report by a consultant forensic psychiatrist. The appellant had a long history of trauma related symptoms consistent with PTSD and depression. His mental health problems went back to the violent events that he had witnessed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the death of his father. However, the author stated that there was no sign of significant mental disorder or acute psychiatric disturbance immediately preceding or during the rape. The appellant had consumed alcohol and drugs that day, but neither they nor any mental illness impaired his ability to understand the nature of his actions at the time of the offence. They were not linked to the commission of the rape.

9.

We have read C's victim personal statement in which she describes how her life has changed for ever. She feels like an object, a broken shell, rather than a person. She many sleepless nights, with nightmares. She is afraid of being left alone with men. She is also afraid of the night.

10.

We note that both counsel submitted to the judge that the rape fell within category 3B on the basis that C was not a particularly vulnerable victim. In the sentencing note of the appellant's counsel, who was newly instructed for the sentencing hearing, it was accepted that C was vulnerable in that her mental health was poor and she was addicted to drugs. But it was submitted that she was not "particularly vulnerable".

11.

In her sentencing remarks the judge said that C was a particularly vulnerable person. She was a Class A drug addict and was under the influence of drugs when the rape was committed. She also suffered from a hearing disability. The judge was sure that the appellant had realised C's vulnerability, not least because of his awareness that she was under the influence of drugs at the time. The judge said that the appellant had committed the rape under the influence of alcohol and crack cocaine, which was an aggravating factor. The matters addressed in the psychiatric report and the appellant's difficulties in the past did not provide any mitigation for the offence.

12.

The judge said that the harm was a low category 2 case, or a high category 3 case. The sole category 2 factor was the particular vulnerability of the victim because of her personal circumstances. There were no category A culpability factors.

13.

The starting point for category 2B was eight years' imprisonment, within a range of seven to nine years. The starting point for category 3B was five years' imprisonment, within a range of four to seven years.

14.

The judge allowed "some mitigation" for the appellant not having any relevant previous convictions and also for his mental health difficulties to arrive at a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. She decided that the appellant should not be treated as dangerous for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

15.

In the grounds of appeal it was submitted that the sentence of seven years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive because: firstly, the judge erred in finding that C was particularly vulnerable; secondly, she failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant's mitigation; and thirdly, she took too high a starting point on the particular facts of the case because the rape had been brief in duration and had not involved any higher culpability or harm factors.

16.

We are grateful to Miss Jo Morris, who is newly instructed to appear on this appeal, for her written and oral submissions. She does not pursue grounds 2 or 3. Instead, she submits that the sentence was manifestly excessive because the offence should not have been placed into category 2 harm on the basis that the victim was particularly vulnerable. She relies upon Attorney General's Reference (R v Boltaev) [2025] EWCA Crim 207; [2025] 2 Cr App R(S) 9, for the proposition that the threshold for particular vulnerability is "high". Although the judge did not describe the impact that the drugs had had on C, counsel accepts that she was vulnerable because she was under the influence of drugs, but not particularly so. She submitted that, for example, C had not been insensible because she had been able to describe the pain of the penetration. Her hearing disability had not been a relevant factor because there was no evidence to suggest that that had rendered her more vulnerable than any other person on this occasion.

Discussion

17.

In Boltaev this court said that the phrase "particularly vulnerable" is to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words used, although it does connote a "high threshold". The court said that plainly a female who is alone at night and is intoxicated may be particularly vulnerable. Whether or not that is so will depend on the particular circumstances. The court also added that it will not interfere with the judge's evaluative findings of fact when sentencing if that judge has conducted the trial, except in limited circumstances: see [31].

18.

We have also noted the observations of this court in Attorney General's Reference (R v Greenaway) [2025] EWCA Crim 1568; [2026] 1 Cr App R(S) 42. Firstly, the facts of other cases should be treated as no more than examples of particular sets of circumstances, where a victim has been treated as particularly vulnerable or not. Secondly, the decision in R v Sabato [2021] EWCA Crim 940 should not be treated as having decided that a finding of particular vulnerability cannot be made in cases of intoxication, unless an intoxicated person was incapable of looking after themselves by reason of drink: see [47] – [49].

19.

Plainly, as counsel implicitly recognised in her written submissions, and was accepted orally this morning, vulnerability involves questions of degree. In the present case, the judge in fact placed C's vulnerability, and hence the level of harm, on the cusp of categories 2 and 3. In our judgment, the judge was well placed, as the trial judge, to come to that view, having heard all the evidence.

20.

In addition to the effects of the drug taking and poor mental health, C was in a building that she did not know; it was the middle of the night; and she was alone in a room with a stranger who blocked her way out. Even if C's vulnerability did not qualify as outright category 2 harm, these circumstances did aggravate the offence to slightly over the top of category 3. In our judgment, given that the mitigation advanced attracted relatively little weight, the sentence of seven years' imprisonment, albeit possibly severe, cannot be regarded as manifestly excessive.

21.

Accordingly, for these reasons the appeal against sentence must be dismissed.

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