Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. | R v Hindley |

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ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT LIVERPOOL
HER HONOUR JUDGE PIERPOINT
07NZ0964623
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before :
LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE
MR JUSTICE GRIFFITHS
and
MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS
Between :
REX | Respondent |
- and - | |
CHRISTOPHER HINDLEY | Appellant |
Mark Barlow (instructed by Advocate) for the Appellant
Siôn ap Mihangel (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent
Hearing date : 10 September 2026
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at noon on 16 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
.............................
LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE :
The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with s.3 of the Act.
Introduction
The appellant stood trial in the Crown Court at Liverpool, before Her Honour Judge Katherine Pierpoint, on an indictment containing 17 counts relating to the historic sexual abuse of the complainant, to whom we shall refer as “C”. On 9 June 2025 the appellant was convicted of all 17 counts.
The appellant was sentenced on 21 July 2025. The most serious counts, 16 and 17, related to attempted buggery. On the lead offence, count 17, the judge imposed a special custodial sentence under s.278 of the Sentencing Act 2020 comprising a custodial term of 12 years and an extended licence of 1 year. A concurrent s. 278 sentence was passed on count 16 with a custodial term of 8 years and an extended licence of 1 year. The judge passed concurrent s.278 sentences for indecency with a child contrary to s.1(1) of the Indecency with Children Act 1960 on counts 8, 9, 13 and 15 comprising in each case a custodial term of 1 year and an extended licence of 1 year. The judge passed concurrent determinate sentences on all the other counts. For offences of indecency with a child she imposed terms of 2 years on counts 6, 7, 10 and 11 and terms of 1 year on counts 12 and 14. For offences of indecent assault on a male contrary to s.15(1) of the Sexual Offences act 1956 the judge imposed a term of 3 years on count 4 and terms of 2 years on counts 1, 2, 3 and 5. Thus, the overall effective sentence was a custodial term of 12 years with an extended licence of 1 year.
He appeals against conviction with the leave of the single judge. On 22 June 2026 the Criminal Appeal Office wrote to the parties to point out that although counts 16 and 17 had alleged attempted buggery contrary to the common law, it appeared that they could or should have referred instead to s 12 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. The parties were given an opportunity to make representations but they have not done so. It has not been suggested that this aspect affects the present appeal or the safety of the convictions.
The appellant was a family relation of C. The prosecution case was that when the appellant was aged between 21 and 27 years of age, and C was aged between 6 and 12, the appellant repeatedly sexually abused C. According to the indictment the offending took place between October 1989 and October 1995.
In summary, the prosecution relied upon the following evidence in order to prove its case:
C gave evidence. In May 2023, when he was aged 39, C made a report to police that he had been sexually abused as a child. He took part in an ABE interview on 7 May 2023. He said that at weekends he would stay overnight at his grandparents’ home. At that time the appellant still lived at that address. C would sleep in the appellant’s bedroom. He was around 6 years old when the abuse first started. It happened repeatedly until he was about 12, around the time he started high school. The first incidents involved the appellant masturbating him (count 1 and multiple incidents count 2). The abuse developed and the appellant would suck C’s penis (count 3 and multiple incidents count 4). The abuse also happened when they went on camping trips and he would share a tent with the appellant. C described a specific incident recalling that the appellant masturbated him in a jacuzzi (count 5). He used to masturbate the appellant (count 6 and multiple incidents count 7). The appellant also put his penis into C’s mouth (count 8 and multiple incidents count 9) and would make C put his penis into the appellant’s anus (count 10 and multiple incidents count 11). C described some abuse taking place in a van. His grandparents were in the front of the van and C and the appellant were in the back, where the appellant asked to be masturbated (count 12) and put his penis in C’s mouth (count 13). C described an occasion in the back of the family’s shop when he masturbated the appellant (count 14) and sucked the appellant’s penis (count 15). The shop incident probably took place on a Sunday before 10am when the shop opened. When C was getting older, towards the end of the period of abuse, there were 5 to 7 occasions when the appellant attempted to penetrate him anally (count 16 and multiple incidents count 17). C said it was the appellant’s decision to stop the abuse and this was when the appellant met his wife. Over the following years C and the appellant saw each other occasionally at family events, but they never spoke about the abuse. The first person C told was his ex-wife. He then told his current wife. He also told his mother and sister a few days before he went to the police. C said the appellant had a birthmark high up on his leg. He indicated its position and size.
The witness statements of C’s ex-wife and his current wife were read to the jury. They said that in around 2021 C told each of them that he had been sexually abused as a child by the appellant. He also told them some of the acts alleged to have taken place.
C’s mother and sister also gave evidence that in 2023 C had told each of them that he had been sexually abused by the appellant when he was a child, including some of the acts which had taken place.
The appellant was arrested on 14 May 2023. He was interviewed that day and again, at his own request, on 15 June 2023. In interview the appellant answered questions by denying the allegations. He said that C’s account was a lie and there had never been any sexual activity between them.
The appellant gave evidence. He described his background and family. He was aged 56, had no previous convictions and had never been in trouble with the police before. A good character direction was given. He married his wife in 2001 and had two sons, one aged 21 and the other nearly 19. He worked for the Ambulance Service in the Estates and Facilities team.
The appellant denied that any sexual activity with C ever took place. He said that C stayed at his grandparents’ home only occasionally. C would usually sleep in the spare room rather than in the appellant’s room. He said that there had been only two or three occasions when C had come into his room at night saying that he was scared. The appellant let C sleep in his single bed and he slept on a sofa in the room. The appellant thought they had been on family camping trips on one or two occasions, and that he had shared a tent with C. But they had never been alone in the tent as his sister and her partner also slept in the same tent. The appellant and C had slept in separate individual sleeping bags. He denied ever being in a jacuzzi with C or travelling in the back of a van with him. He said that C may have been in a shop while he was working, but he was never alone with him. There would have been two other people working in the shop, the appellant’s mother and his sister. The shop never traded on a Sunday.
The appellant said he did not have a birthmark as alleged by C. Evidence was admitted as an agreed fact of a medical report on the appellant’s skin which concluded “that it is unlikely that he has ever had a birthmark”.
The appellant’s sistergave evidence that she was living at the grandparents’ home at the relevant time when C came to stay. She said that C had his own room, but she was aware that C went into the appellant’s room when he was scared. But she only knew about that because the appellant had told his mother and her. They did go on camping trips but she would sleep in the tent with the appellant and C. She described the tent as having two separate sleeping pods. The appellant and C would share one, and she and her partner would have the other. The family shop did not open on a Sunday. She would travel in the grandparents’ van but did not think that the appellant ever did. The back of the van was always full of clothes so that no one could fit in there. Over the years she never saw anything that gave her any cause for concern.
The appellant’s wife and the manager for whom he had worked for 9 years gave good character evidence. His wife said that he was a kind, dependable, supportive and hard-working family man. His manager said that the appellant was a valued member of the team, professional, warm, sincere and an active member of the community. He had worked for the Cub Scouts for 13 years up until his arrest.
The issues
At the hearing the appellant rightly withdrew the application for a disclosure order.
The central issue is whether the appellant had a fair trial. This turns entirely on the adequacy of the legal directions given by the judge in relation to the delay of between 30 and 36 years between the alleged offending and the trial and the appellant’s good character. No criticism is made of any other part of the summing up (including the summing up of the evidence and the issues in the case) or the conduct of the trial.
The legal directions
The judge provided the jury with written legal directions. She also gave those directions orally in essentially the same terms and did so before counsel made their speeches to the jury.
The judge gave uncontroversial directions in relation to:
The need for the jury to put aside emotions and to assess the evidence objectively;
Avoiding judgments based on stereotypes or assumptions, including the reactions of complainants;
The treatment of C’s complaints to other persons;
The issue raised by the defence as to whether C did not make those complaints for many years because his allegations against the appellant were untrue;
The reasons given by C for not complaining at the time and for doing so later;
The need to assess the matters in (4) and (5) above and to consider whether they affected C’s reliability as a witness.
The judge pointed out to the jury that this was not a case where there was independent evidence to support the allegations. It was essentially the word of one person against another. The judge directed the jury that the issue for them was whether they were sure that C’s account of the sexual abuse was true, accurate and reliable. If they were, then they could rely upon that evidence even though there was no other supporting evidence. But:
“If you think he has not or might not have told the truth or his account might be unreliable then you must find the defendant ‘not guilty’.”
As to the appellant’s good character, the judge said this:
“The defendant is 56 years old. You have heard that he has no previous convictions or cautions. You have also heard evidence read from 2 witnesses who speak of his positive personal qualities.
Good character is not a defence to the charges but it is relevant in two ways. First, the defendant has given evidence. His good character is a positive feature which you should take into account in his favour when considering whether you accept what the defendant told you. Secondly, the fact that he has not offended in the past may make it less likely that he acted as the prosecution alleges in this case.
What importance you attach to his good character and the extent to which it assists on the facts of this particular case are for you to decide. In making that assessment you may take account of everything you have heard about the defendant.”
The judge dealt with delay in two passages of her legal directions. First, she said this:
“The witness has given accounts of events that they say occurred many years ago. Bear in mind that the passage of time is likely to have affected the memory of the witness. A person describing events long ago will be less able to remember exactly when they happened, the order in which they happened or the details of what happened than they would if the events had occurred more recently. You must consider carefully whether the passage of time has made the evidence about the important events given by the witness less reliable than it might otherwise have been because they cannot now remember particular details.
On the subject of memory, just because a witness is vague or inconsistent about some of the details of their alleged abuse or the surrounding circumstances, that does not necessarily mean that their evidence is untrue. Experience has shown that inconsistencies or vagueness in accounts can happen whether a person is telling the truth or not. This is because if someone has an experience of the kind alleged in this case, their memory may be affected in different ways. It may affect that person’s ability to take in and later recall the experience. Also, some people may go over an event afterwards in their minds many times and their memory may become clearer or can develop over time. But other people may try to avoid thinking about an event at all, and they may then have difficulty in recalling the event accurately.
It is a matter for you, but you may think our memories of events, whether traumatic or otherwise, all vary, and it depends on so many different things. Memory is the ability to store events, retain those events and thereafter have the ability to retrieve those events from your mind and memory. It may be a person can remember certain things, not others, or remember events but not actually in the sequence they occurred. These will be all matters for you to consider when assessing the truthfulness of the Complainant who is remembering events from some time ago.”
The judge also dealt with delay in a subsequent passage of her directions upon which the submissions for the appellant focused:
“The events this case concern occurred over 30 years ago. The defendant was first interviewed about these matters in May 2023.
As I have already mentioned the passage of time is likely to have affected the witnesses. Similarly, the defendant is now having to recall events that took place some time ago and that may have put him at some disadvantage. For example the defendant may not now be able to recall details that could have helped his defence. Because, after all this time, the complainant has not been able to state exactly when an incident took place the defendant has not been able to put forward defences, such as showing that he could not have been present at a particular time, which the defendant may have been able to put forward but for the delay. Other material such as CCTV from the gym which may have had relevance is no longer in existence.
A lengthy delay between the time when an incident is said to have occurred and the time when the complaint is made and the matter comes to trial, is something that you should bear in mind when considering whether the Crown has proved its case or not. Necessarily, the longer the delay the harder it may be for someone to defend themselves because, as I have already said, memories will have faded and some evidence may no longer be available. If you find that the delay in the case has placed the defendant at a material disadvantage in meeting the case against him, that is something that you should bear in mind in his favour.”
Representation
On 7 July 2025 the appellant submitted grounds of appeal against conviction of his own composition. We are told that as a result, his trial counsel, Ms Gemma Maxwell withdrew from any further representation of the appellant.
Mr Mark Barlow was instructed on the proceedings in this court. He prepared an advice and grounds of appeal dated 18 September 2025 for the application for leave to appeal and the appellant abandoned his own grounds of appeal.
The appellant waived his professional legal privilege and Ms Maxwell provided information on her representation of the appellant, the issues in the case and the overall conduct of the trial. We have not been shown that material.
We are grateful to Mr Barlow and to Mr Siôn ap Mihangel (who appeared for the prosecution at trial and on appeal) for their clear and helpful written and oral submissions.
A summary of the appellant’s submissions
Mr Barlow submitted that, because of the long delay, this was a case where effectively the appellant in his defence was only able to deny the allegations made against him and rely upon his own good character. Accordingly, the judge ought to have referred to the impact of the delay on the preparation and conduct of the defence and the discharge by the prosecution of the burden and standard of proof. It was insufficient for the judge simply to recite standard directions set out in the Crown Court Compendium. The judge ought to have reminded the jury of the particular issues arising from the long delay and that the prosecution case depended upon C’s memories from a time when he was 6 to 12 years of age. The judge did not refer to the difficulties encountered by the defence such as lines of inquiry which had become closed off by the delay, for example, the loss of records or the non-availability of witnesses.
The agreed evidence on the absence of a birthmark went directly to C’s reliability as a witness and supported the contention that the jury could not be sure that the abuse had happened. But the judge did not explain that evidence in the context of the delay which had occurred and its effect on the reliability of memories.
In support of the above submissions, the appellant placed particular reliance upon R v Percival (Court of Appeal, 19 June 1998) and R v PS [2013] EWCA Crim 992.
In relation to the appellant’s good character direction, Mr Barlow said that in order to ensure a fair trial, the judge should have added a further limb based upon Percival:
“Having regard to what you know about this defendant you may think that he is entitled to ask you to give considerable weight to his good character when deciding whether the prosecution has satisfied you of his guilt.”
Here the appellant had led a blameless life during the 30 or more years which had elapsed since the alleged offending and there was also his positive good character as a family man and employee, together with his work in the community.
Discussion
Percival involved allegations of sexual abuse against 5 complainants at an approved school which had taken place some 30 years before the trial. The court pointed out that, in contrast to many cases of abuse within the family, the adverse impact of delay was made more difficult by the fact that the appellant had had no involvement with the school or any of the complainants for nearly 30 years. Furthermore, potential witnesses who might have helped the defence refute the prosecution case were untraceable or had died (pp.7-8).
This court rejected the appellant’s contention that this had been one of those exceptional cases where the trial should have been stayed as an abuse of process. But fairness and the safety of the conviction depended on the judge directing the jury as to the potential impact of delay on the preparation and conduct of the defence and the prosecution’s discharge of the burden of proof. The judge had failed to emphasise the importance of that burden in this context. This was compounded by his statement that the effect of delay on memory applied to prosecution witnesses as well as the defence, implying a balancing between the position of the prosecution and the defence, referred to as “two sides of the same coin”. But as this court pointed out: “Each side did have its problems, but they were different in nature and importance”. In other words, their functions in the trial were completely different. In addition, the judge had dealt with delay largely by reference to the submissions of counsel rather than as a direction from the court itself. As to good character, the court accepted that in the circumstances of the case the judge ought to have included in his direction the additional limb referred to in [28] above. The court concluded that viewed as a whole the summing up had not been effective to achieve a fair trial.
In PS Fulford LJ (as he then was) reviewed authorities which followed on from Percival. In R v Graham W (1999) 2 Cr. App. R. 201 Lord Bingham LCJ, whilst accepting the correctness of the ruling in Percival, emphasised the difficulties faced by the appellant in that case as a consequence of the delay, and stated that the decision was to be read in that context. He went on to approve a passage in R v Lloyd (Court of Appeal November 30 1998) stating that the need to guard against prejudice in cases of long delay is real, the trial judge is generally in the best position to judge what direction to the jury is called for. It would be unduly prescriptive for appeals to succeed by pin-pointing some omission or lack of emphasis in the trial judge’s direction.
Similarly, in R v Brian M [2000] 1 Cr. App. R. 49 Rose LJ stated that Percival should not be treated as laying down principles of general application for summing up in cases of delay, or as a blueprint. In cases of delay, a clear warning will usually be desirable as to its potential impact on the memories of witnesses and difficulties caused for the defence. But the precise terms of the warning and its relationship to the burden and standard of proof should be left to the good sense of trial judges with assistance from what is now the Crown Court Compendium.
As Fulford LJ emphasised in PS at [21] and [24], whether a direction on delay is given and, if so, its formulation and the matters to be included will depend upon the circumstances of, and the issues arising, in the trial (see also R v HenryH (1998) 2 Cr. App. R. 161).
Mr Barlow referred to PS at [35] where Fulford LJ set out four elements which, on the facts of that case, the direction on delay should have covered:
“i) delay can place a defendant at a material disadvantage in challenging allegations arising out of events that occurred many years before, and this was particularly so in this case when the defence is essentially a simple denial (the defendant was saying that he had not acted as alleged);
ii) the longer the delay, the more difficult meeting the allegation often becomes because of fading memories and evidence is no longer available — indeed, it may be unclear what has been lost;
iii) when considering the central question whether the prosecution has proved the defendant’s guilt, it is necessary particularly to bear in mind the prejudice that delay can occasion; and
iv) a summary of the main elements of prejudice that were identified during the trial.”
At [37] he added that the direction should relate to delay as it affects the defendant. This may often be “best-addressed” by “a short, self-contained direction that focuses on the defendant rather than amalgamating it with other aspects of the relevance of delay, for instance as regards the victim or victims”. It is plain from the last sentence of [37] that this concern about amalgamation or interweaving was a reference to “putting the other side of the coin”. (i.e. the effect on the prosecution’s case), thereby diluting the protection given by the direction to the defendant (see Percival above).
Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the direction given in PS did not amount to a misdirection or a basis for treating the conviction as unsafe (38]-[39]).
We do not accept Mr Barlow’s submission that the defence in the present case was simply one of denial, coupled with good character (see the second part of PS at [35(i)]). The defence also relied on a number of additional points of significance. First, the defence relied on the long delay in C making complaints to other persons. That resulted in a separate legal direction to the jury which included the need to assess the explanation given for C not having made any complaints sooner. The jury was told to consider whether these matters affected C’s reliability and truthfulness as a witness. No complaint is made about that direction. Second, the judge summed up to the jury the conflicting evidence on the birthmark issue. Third, the judge summed up the evidence supporting the appellant’s evidence from his sister in relation to the opening times of the family shop, the sleeping arrangements for the camping trips and the use of the family’s van, to show that there was no opportunity for alleged offences to have occurred in those locations. Fourth, the judge summed up the cross-examination of C, testing his account of what he alleged to have taken place.
The judge’s direction expressly dealt with the increasing difficulty of meeting an allegation the longer the delay (PS at [35(ii)]).
The judge directed the jury that they should bear in mind the length of the delay and its effects on the appellant’s ability to defend himself against the allegations when considering whether the Crown had proved its case or not. In other words, the judge explained the importance of those matters to the issue of whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proof to the criminal standard (PS at [35(iii)]).
As to PS at [35(iv)] on specific elements of prejudice, the judge expressly directed the jury that material which could have been relevant to the defence case no longer existed, such as CCTV material from a local gym. In addition, the lack of detail in C’s evidence as to when incidents took place had prevented the appellant from putting forward potential defences, for example, that he had been elsewhere at the relevant time. Mr Barlow has not identified any other “main element of prejudice” through delay upon which the appellant’s counsel relied at trial but which the judge failed to include in her directions.
Although Mr Barlow suggested that the delay may have resulted in lines of inquiry becoming closed off, such as records and/or witnesses which were no longer available, he did not point to any relevant source of that kind, which was raised during the trial and which the judge failed to address in her legal directions. For example, it was not suggested that the delay had prevented C’s grandparents from giving evidence. Mr Barlow said that they were still alive at the time of the trial.
Mr Barlow faintly suggested that the judge had committed the error identified in Percival of treating the effects of delay in this case as “two sides of the same coin”, rather than directing the jury separately on delay as it affected the defence. This submission was based on the following sentence in the direction on delay:II
“As I have already mentioned the passage of time is likely to have affected some witnesses.”
However, the judge went on to explain how the effect of delay on the memories of prosecution witnesses adversely affected the appellant’s ability to defend himself. The judge did not suggest that this was a balancing factor as between prosecution and defence, or “two sides of the same coin”. The judge did not suggest that difficulties on the part of prosecution witnesses to recall past events assisted the Crown to discharge its burden of proof to the criminal standard. Therefore, the delay direction was not diluted in the way Mr Barlow submits.
The judge did not refer to the birthmark issue in the delay direction. Instead, she dealt with it in her summing up of the evidence. In addition, Mr Barlow told us that this was one of the main issues in the trial and was emphasised in the speech of the appellant’s counsel to the jury. It must have been obvious to the jury that this was one of the matters they needed to take into account when assessing C’s reliability as a witness. In our judgment the fact that the birthmark issue was not also included in the delay direction in this case did not amount to a misdirection.
We turn to consider the judge’s direction on good character. There is no dispute that the direction she gave complied with the standard requirements for both the propensity and credibility limbs. In addition she summed up the evidence on the appellant’s positive good character. We do not consider that the judge erred by not including the further limb referred to in [28] above. As we have explained, the circumstances in Percival were very different. Furthermore, the court held that the only active line of defence open to the appellant in that case was his good character and in that respect the evidence was found to be “strong”. Even so, the court stated that, on the evidence and submissions in that case, the omission of the additional limb from the good character direction would not by itself have rendered the conviction unsafe. This underscores the fact-sensitive nature of the issues raised by the appellant’s appeal.
Counsel did not cite any authority on this point apart from Percival. However, we have noted three additional decisions, JS v R [2008] EWCA Crim 2788 (sometimes referred to as Small v R), GJB v R [2011] EWCA Crim 867 and R v BZ [2017] NICA 2, which we have drawn to counsel’s attention.
In JS the appellant was alleged to have committed sexual abuse against three complainants some 18 to 37 years before the trial. He gave evidence denying the offences, supported by his wife and son. The court held that one part of the standard good character direction given by the judge was unacceptably inadequate. In addition, the judge should have told the jury that in view of the time which had elapsed since the alleged offences and the absence of any similar allegation against the defendant, they might think that they should give considerable or more than usual weight to his good character when deciding whether the prosecution had satisfied them of his guilt. However, a mere failure to follow the Specimen Direction in that respect would not found an appeal, but it contributed to the court’s overall conclusion that the directions on delay had been seriously flawed [30]. Ultimately, the court decided that the summing up had been so defective in a number of respects (including other matters) that, with some hesitation and reluctance, the convictions were unsafe and had to be quashed. However, we note that the directions on delay in the present case did not contain those flaws (set out at [25] to [28]).
In GJB this court decided that in a historic sex case the defendant’s good character is relevant to the propensity limb in two ways. First, where there is an allegation of a recent offence, a person of good character is less likely to have committed that offence. Second, where there has been delay in an allegation of historic sexual abuse, the fact that the defendant has not committed any offence since the alleged offence, let alone one involving such abuse, also goes to the likelihood of his having committed that offence. Such a direction is particularly apt where the delay renders it more difficult for the defendant to defend himself [18]. That direction is simply an adaptation of the normal propensity direction. Where the defence in a historic sexual abuse case is straightforward denial, the defendant may have little more than his good character to rely on and the direction is again apt to address prejudice resulting from the delay [19]. The Court held that in the circumstances of that case the direction on good character should have included the additional propensity limb. However, the court doubted that this criticism by itself would have justified treating the conviction as unsafe. The conviction was quashed because of the cumulative effect of a number of errors [34].
In BZ the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland decided that the question of whether to give this additional limb of the good character direction (and in what terms) is a matter of discretion or judgment for the trial judge ([33]-[36]). That approach is in line with the principles laid down by this court in R v Hunter [2015] EWCA Crim 631; [2015] 1 WLR 5367 (see e.g. [89]-[96]). As in R v Renda [2005] EWCA Crim 2826; [2006] 1 WLR 2948, an appellate court will only interfere with that exercise of judgment if it was not properly open to the trial judge to exercise it in the way they did. The judge is likely to have a far better feel for the dynamics of the trial and the interests of justice than an appellate court ([96]-[97]).
In the present case it would have been preferable for the judge to have given an additional direction that the jury should take into account the evidence of the appellant’s positive good character and the absence of any allegations for 30 or more years and consider whether that made it less likely that he would have committed the alleged offences. However, this court would not be entitled to intervene unless satisfied that the convictions are unsafe. In Hunter the court rejected the notion that if a defendant was entitled to a good character direction and the trial judge failed to give it in a proper form, a conviction will be quashed as a matter of course ([89]-[92]).
We have come to the firm conclusion that the convictions are not unsafe, even if there ought to have been an additional limb in the character direction dealing with positive good character and the absence of any allegations or convictions since the indictment period. This has to be seen in context. There was no flaw or inadequacy in the delay directions. There was no flaw in any other part of the directions or in the summing up or in the conduct of the trial. This was not a case where the defendant simply denied the allegations made against him and relied upon his good character. He made a substantial case that the delay in making the complaints indicated that they were untrue. There was the birthmark issue, the appellant’s account on certain significant issues was supported by the evidence of his sister and weaknesses in C’s evidence were tested in cross-examination. Despite all those matters, the jury must have been sure that C had told them the truth.
Furthermore, if defence advocates do not take a point on character directions at trial and/or if they agree with the judge’s proposed directions which are then given, that is a good indication that nothing was amiss. In other words, the trial was considered fair by those who were present and understood its dynamics (Hunter at [98]). The same approach has been taken in historic sexual abuse cases (see e.g. Henry H and Graham W). Mr Barlow told us that trial counsel in the present case had the opportunity to make submissions to the judge on the content and drafting of the legal directions before they were given. Counsel for the appellant was content with the directions on delay and good character as delivered by the judge. Given the matters referred to in [50] above, we understand why trial counsel did not consider it necessary to ask the judge to make any addition to the good character direction.
Conclusion
For these reasons we conclude that the grounds of appeal must be rejected. We are satisfied that the convictions are safe and that the appeal must be dismissed.