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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WOOD GREEN (HHJ T GODFREY) [01YE1025923] CASE NO 202602287/A5 [2026] EWCA Crim 1300 |
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before:
LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE
MR JUSTICE BRYAN
MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS
REX
V
WSE
_________
MR L ORRETT appeared on behalf of the Applicant
_________
APPROVED JUDGMENT
MR JUSTICE BRYAN:
The provisions of section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 are engaged in this case because the victim (who we shall call "R") was aged 3 at the time of the offending. No matter relating to the victim may be published that would identify them, including their name, address, any educational establishment or any workplace they attend, and any picture of them. This order lasts until they reach the age of 18. This judgment has been anonymised, as necessary, accordingly.
On 26 March 2026 in the Crown Court at Wood Green (His Honour Judge T. Godfrey) the applicant (then aged 27) was convicted of Counts 2 and 3 on the indictment (respectively cruelty to a person under 16 contrary to section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933) and causing or allowing serious harm to a child contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. She was acquitted of Count 1 (causing grievous bodily harm with intent).
On 18 June 2026 (before the same judge), the applicant was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment on each of Counts 2 and 3 concurrent, a total sentence of 24 months' imprisonment. However, it then emerged that the applicant was in fact pregnant (a fact that she had not disclosed at the sentencing hearing). The case was re-listed on 19 June 2026 under section 385 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and following further mitigation the sentence was varied to 21 months' imprisonment on each count, a total sentence of 21 months' imprisonment.
A co-defendant, who we shall refer to as "S", was convicted of Count 1 (causing grievous bodily harm with intent) and Count 2 (cruelty to a person under 16) and was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.
An application for leave to appeal against sentence (on amended grounds) was referred to the Full Court by the Registrar who also granted a Representation Order for trial counsel, Mr L. Orrett. In referring the application to the Full Court, the Registrar stated, "It has now been confirmed that the applicant is no longer pregnant, having suffered an ectopic pregnancy, which required surgery. In the circumstances it is appropriate that the Court considers the amended grounds lodged by counsel".
Turning to the facts. The applicant and S were in a relationship for 8 years and had three children together. On 15 January 2023 the applicant telephoned the emergency services because their 15-week-old son, R, was unresponsive and not breathing properly. The applicant and S both administered CPR as directed by the call operator. Paramedics arrived and established that R was having seizures. R was taken to hospital where it was found that he had a bleed on the outer lining of his brain. Other injuries were identified including bleeding to the lining of the spine, widespread bleeds on the back of both eyes, a torn lip frenulum, and a broken collarbone estimated to have occurred 10 days earlier.
A doctor reviewed the injuries and concluded that the force required would have been equivalent to a traffic accident or a multi-storey fall. In the absence of a skull fracture, it was determined that the injuries would most likely have been caused by non-accidental shaking. It was confirmed by medical evidence that the injuries would have been of a type that would be intentional and nonaccidental.
Police officers spoke to the applicant and S at the hospital. The applicant said that S had been changing R at around 6:00 am. The applicant went into the room and found that R had stopped crying and was not breathing. When asked about her relationship with S she said it was "fine". S told the police that he heard R screaming, went to change his nappy and found him blue in the face and stiff.
The applicant and S were arrested and interviewed. The applicant gave a prepared statement in which she denied injuring her son. S answered "no comment" to all questions.
Investigations established that the applicant and S had a turbulent and abusive relationship. Text messages exchanged between them showed that there was significant violence in the household, primarily by S. This included him making threats of violence towards R.
R's broken collarbone was caused sometime between 3 and 6 January 2023. His low haemoglobin levels showed that he was subjected to violence on more than one occasion. On 5 January 2023 the applicant identified that R was in significant pain and that his left shoulder was soft. When she confronted S, he responded in abusive terms, saying that he "scratched the prick by accident", that he did not care, and that R was, in his words, "a dickhead waste of sperm who was starting to piss him off". Neither of the defendants sought medical attention for their son.
The applicant was of previous good character. The judge had the benefit of both a pre-sentence report and a psychological report.
The judge found that as of 16 January, the applicant knew her partner's character intimately. They had three children together and they had been together, at least on and off, for approximately 8 years. She was aged 24, he was aged 23. By the jury's verdict on Count 3, the applicant allowed serious harm to her child, at the hands of her partner. She knew his tendency to be violent and aggressive. It was apparent from exchanges between them, that in the short time between R's birth, on 29 September 2022, and 16 January, there was significant violence in the household. On the whole of the evidence, it was primarily S that was being violent towards property, towards the applicant and her dog, and he was also making threats with respect to what he would like to do to or happen to, R. The applicant felt conflicted and struggled with whether to remain loyal to S, despite his appalling treatment of her but the fact was that a responsible mother would have removed herself and her child, yet the applicant remained even after she had identified the shoulder injury, and she went on to maintain that everything was fine in their relationship when the police were asking her about it at the hospital, after the grave injuries had been caused to R.
The judge considered the applicable Guidelines in relation to Count 2. He found that both defendants were aware that R was in severe pain, yet they did not seek medical assistance. The applicant gave their son Calpol, but that was plainly a wholly inadequate response, and she showed a deliberate disregard for R's welfare, which was a high culpability factor under the Guideline. The judge concluded that S bore high culpability, but in the case of the applicant he balanced that factor against the lower or lesser culpability factor that she was a victim of domestic abuse, as was apparent from the evidence at trial, and as was expanded upon in the psychiatric report, concluding that, overall, her culpability fell into level C medium culpability. The broken clavicle consisted of serious physical harm, so it was Category 1 offending.
C1 offending has a starting point of 3 years' custody with a range of 2 to 6 years' custody. In relation to the applicant and Count 3 there was the high culpability factor of very significant force being used against R, but again there was the lesser culpability factor that she was the victim of domestic abuse. Balancing those factors the judge considered that it was medium culpability level C, and the level of harm might be regarded as falling into Category 3 rather than Category 2 since R had made a very good recovery (with a starting point of 18 months' custody with a range of 6 months to 3 years' custody).
No aggravating factors were identified, and in relation to the applicant, and the mitigation he referred expressly to the fact that she had been the victim of domestic abuse and he had express regard to the psychiatric report, each of which he had had substantial regard to when categorising the offences. He had express regard to the available character references, and noted that her remorse and as a victim of domestic abuse might have been more powerful had she accepted her guilt. The judge also had express regard to totality.
The judge identified that he had carefully weighed all that the applicant's counsel had advanced (which has been repeated before us) and the content of the pre-sentence report, which included an assessment that the applicant currently posed a low risk of re-offending or to others. The judge considered whether the applicant might properly be dealt with by way of a suspended sentence order, and stated that he had looked at all the factors going to that in the Imposition of Custodial Sentences Guideline. However ultimately, he concluded that notwithstanding the mitigation available to the applicant, the offences were so serious that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody, which outweighed the factors pointing the other way, and he passed a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment on each of Counts 2 and 3.
At the slip rule hearing the judge noted that he had already given the applicant substantial credit for the mitigating features of her case but remained of the view that her offending had to be marked by an immediate custodial sentence which he considered was unavoidable. He stated that he was, however, prepared to make a further modest adjustment to the length of sentence to 21 months' imprisonment with a view to reducing the prospect of her having to give birth in prison. Tragically as we have noted, it subsequently transpired that the pregnancy was ectopic, and following necessary surgery, the applicant is no longer pregnant.
The amended grounds of appeal which have been referred to the Full Court by the Registrar are that the sentence of immediate imprisonment was wrong in principle for the following reasons:-
The applicant was of good character.
The offending was in 2023 and there had been no offending since.
The applicant was the victim of domestic violence.
The applicant had a chronic back injury which restricted her ability to move. This would make any term of imprisonment more arduous than normal.
The applicant had been pregnant when sentenced. While in custody she suffered vaginal bleeding and was transferred to an outside hospital after it was established that she had an ectopic pregnancy. She underwent a right salpingectomy on 7 July 2026.
Given the time the applicant had spent in custody and the traumatic nature of what had happened the court could impose a conditional discharge.
The first four grounds were known about at the time of sentence. The judge was well aware that the applicant was of previous good character and had not offended since, and the fact that she was a victim of domestic abuse. Indeed, that latter factor had been instrumental in reducing her culpability and the characterisation of her offending (compared to S's case) which would otherwise have resulted in a very substantially greater custodial sentence. The judge was also aware of the applicant's health conditions (as he confirmed at the slip rule hearing) and he acted compassionately in reducing the sentence to 21 months' immediate imprisonment in the light of the applicant's pregnancy in circumstances where he remained of the view that the offending was so serious that only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate.
In R v Price [2023] EWCA Crim 1060 Lavender J, giving the judgment of the Full Court, said this at [12]:
"We acknowledge that the decision whether or not to suspend a custodial sentence is often the most difficult decision which a sentencing judge has to make. In many cases, and certainly in most cases which come before this court, there are things to be said for and against suspending the sentence. The guideline is helpful insofar as it identifies relevant factors, but it is not simply a matter of counting the factors on one side or the other which apply in a particular case. Moreover, the competing factors are incommensurable. Weighing the competing factors can never be an arithmetical exercise. The question of which factor or factors should prevail in any particular case is necessarily a question of judgment and, moreover, a judgment of the kind which sentencing judges are experienced in addressing. This court will not lightly interfere with judgments of that nature. Appellants in such cases will not succeed unless they can show that the decision not to suspend their sentence was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle."
The extension of the power to suspend introduced by the 2026 Act has not altered that approach (see e.g. R v Aliaj [2026] EWCA Crim 1141 at [14]).
Whether to suspend the sentence was an evaluative judgment for the judge. We do not consider that the judge erred in principle by giving overriding weight to the serious nature of the offending as requiring immediate custody. His reasoning contains no error of principle. Nor can it be argued that he reached a conclusion on the striking of the balance between factors for and against suspension which was not reasonably open to a judge.
Indeed, we consider that the judge was right to conclude that the applicant's offending was so serious that only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate having had proper regard to the Imposition Guideline and the factors in favour of a suspended sentence. He also had express regard to the Guideline that custody should not be imposed on an offender who is pregnant where the impact on the offender or dependants, including unborn children, would make a custodial sentence disproportionate to achieving the purposes of sentencing. However, he remained of the view that the offending has to be marked by an immediate custodial sentence.
This was very serious offending against a very young baby over an extended period of time culminating in violence upon the baby that would in all likelihood have been fatal absent prompt emergency treatment. The applicant had been aware of the abuse before the shaking took place, had been aware of S's violent attitude, and his attitude towards R, and she had not taken her son to a place of safety and away from harm. Only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate in such circumstances.
The final two grounds of appeal relate to subsequent events. It is tragic that the applicant suffered an ectopic pregnancy and we have no doubt that she has suffered a traumatic time in prison in the context of that condition, and the surgery that followed. Whilst in HMP Bronzefield she was in intense pain and suffered vaginal bleeding for which she received no medical treatment. She was transferred to HMP Downview as they had better medical facilities, and from there she was transferred to hospital where she underwent the surgery that we have noted.
We have the benefit of a prison report which makes encouraging reading. During her time in custody the applicant's behaviour has been exemplary, and she has received 3 positive comments regarding her willingness to help staff as well as displaying polite and respectful conduct whilst admitted into hospital. She has received no negative incentive warnings during her sentence, and she became enhanced status on 10 August 2026. Due to her complex health issues and recovery therefrom she has, understandably, not been able to undertake any treatment programmes but instead has been working on her wing as a servery worker fulltime and is due to take part in Choice's counselling through Mental Health focussing on child loss and separation. All these bode well for future rehabilitation.
However, we do not consider that the judge arguably erred in principle in concluding that the applicant's offending was so serious that only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate. We have given anxious consideration as to whether the sentence passed is nevertheless manifestly excessive having regard to all that is now known, but we have concluded that the same is not arguable.
We accordingly refuse leave to appeal against sentence.