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NETRAL CITATION NUMBER: [2026] EWCA Crim 1291 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WORCESTER (HHJ LOCKHART KC)(22TP1339323) CASE NO 202602284/A3 |
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before:
THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
(LORD JUSTICE EDIS)
SIR GARY HICKINBOTTOM
MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH
REX
V
ARCHIE MORGAN
_________
Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
________
MR J DYE appeared on behalf of the Appellant
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JUDGMENT
MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH:
This is an appeal against sentence with leave of the Single Judge.
On 29 April 2026, on Day 2 of his trial at Worcester Crown Court, the appellant pleaded guilty to one offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. On 17 June 2026, at the same court, the appellant was sentenced to 38 months' imprisonment for this offence. He was also disqualified from driving for 55 months, comprising a 3-year discretionary period and a 19-month extension, imposed pursuant to section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Before he can drive again he must pass an extended driving test.
The appellant also pleaded guilty to the alternative offence of causing serious injury by careless and inconsiderate driving and was given no separate penalty for this offence. We will address the way in which this second offence was dealt with at the end of this judgment.
The grounds of appeal, in summary, are as follows:
The judge wrongly placed the appellant's offending in category A1 rather than category B2 of the relevant sentencing guideline.
Even if the offence was properly characterised as falling within category A1 the sentence was manifestly excessive and
The appellant invites this Court to substitute a sentence of 3 years or less and to suspend that sentence.
The appellant makes no objection to the discount for his late guilty plea of 5 per cent which reduced the sentence from 40 months to 38 months.
The facts
The offending took place on the evening of 24 June 2023 on the B4204 between Clifton Upon Teme and Martley in Worcestershire. The stretch of road was winding and undulating with many bends including sharp bends that needed to be navigated with care. It was a single carriageway in each direction with broken white lines separating the lanes. The road passed through a rural landscape with many openings and entrances to farmland at the side of the road.
The collision took place in daylight in fine dry weather. The site of the collision was shortly after the road speed limit had changed from 30 miles per hour to 60 miles per hour. It was on a descending sharp left-hand bend, described by the judge as "a blind bend", that was marked with warning chevrons and the word "SLOW" marked in the road just after the entrance to a farm called Pitland Farm and near to the entrance to another farm called Nook Farm. Visibility around the bend was restricted due to the sharpness of the bend and high foliage.
The appellant was driving a red VW Golf. He was the sole occupant. The occupants of the other car (a Kia Sportage) were Nigel Turner (the driver) and Mara Turner, his wife (the front seat passenger). Mr Turner had driven along the road many times and knew that there were bends that needed to be navigated carefully. When Mr Turner approached the bend where the collision took place he took his foot off the accelerator and the speed of his car reduced to 30-35 miles per hour - well below the speed limit. On the bend he was suddenly confronted by the appellant's VW Golf travelling at speed from the direction of Clifton. When Mr Turner saw the Golf it was already completely on his side of the road. He was unable to take evading action and less than a second later the collision took place. It was a head-on collision.
There were witnesses to the appellant's driving immediately before the collision. They were members of the Fox family which had just had a meal at the restaurant at Pitland Farm and were waiting to turn onto the B4204. They saw two cars go past them on the road travelling east. One was the appellant's red car and the other was a black estate-type vehicle. The appellant's vehicle attempted to overtake the other vehicle which meant that he was on the wrong side of the road, travelling side by side with the other vehicle. This manoeuvre was attempted despite the presence of a sign which said "SLOW" and another sign which said "WARNING". It was made at or very close to the 60-mile per hour speed limit. For a while the two cars travelled side by side. Then finally the appellant realised he would not possibly be able to overtake the other car before he came to the bend and at the very last moment made a decision to pull back in. By that stage however, he was going so fast that he could not control his car. The appellant slammed on the brakes, lost control of the car which veered into the other carriageway, and the impact occurred.
The judge summarised the situation in his sentencing remarks as follows:
"I am completely clear that you began an overtake manoeuvre when there was no chance of it being completed by the corner. You were doing close to 60 or more when you did that evidenced by the fact when you eventually realised you could not make it and as you sought to round the turn the speed was close to 50, even after braking at impact. Looking at the evidence of the point when you decided to pull back in, it is plain to me that anybody doing that would have had a loss of control. It was imminent and likely to be catastrophic, so it proved. You had failed to heed the numerous warnings that were apparent coming up towards those bends and you carried out a very dangerous manoeuvre which was this attempted overtake."
There was evidence that the appellant knew the driver of the other car, the black car. Earlier that day another witness had seen the appellant's car and the black car (an Audi A5) parked together in the car park of the New Inn pub in Old Road. They were part of a group of three cars which were seen to leave the car park together at speed and travel downhill towards the direction of Martley.
A joint expert report concluded that there were no contributory defects with either vehicle. Mr Turner's Kia Sportage was entirely on its correct side of the road. There was no suggestion that Mr Turner was driving in anything other than a proper, careful and considerate manner at any stage and there was nothing Mr Turner could have done to avoid the collision.
The damage to the cars was, as the judge said, enormous. Both bonnets were completely smashed. Both Mr and Mrs Turner were injured. Mrs Turner was much more seriously injured than her husband. She read a victim personal statement to the court at the sentencing hearing. The judge gave the following description of the injuries to Mrs Turner and their lasting effects in his sentencing remarks:
"She gives a graphic description of the events leading up
to the crash and the horrific moments of the impact and then her treatment and transfer to hospital at the QE where she was operated upon as an emergency patient. She was to awake some days later in the intensive care unit having lost 20 centimetres of bowel, her appendix and attended to many internal lacerations to her kidneys. The surgeons had that job. They had to attend to lacerations to her spleen. There was the avoidance of a stoma but she had a punctured lung, a broken ankle, the abdominal operation was four and a half hours, and she was in the intensive care unit for five days and in induced coma. Five days in the military wing and two weeks in a high dependency unit. Five days rehabilitation
before going home. She had nurse visits for six weeks. She lost a stone and a half in weight having been fed in bed with a tube. She had to learn to walk again and there is severe scarring to her abdomen and residual deformity. She has post-traumatic stress
disorder, an extra cranial aneurysm in all likelihood caused by whiplash requiring careful management. She constantly feels vulnerable. She has high blood pressure.
Three years after the accident she is suffering terrible anxiety as a result of this collision and she writes, 'We've been impacted emotionally, physically, financially and psychologically. I feel I've aged prematurely. I'm 62. My quality of life has reduced
immeasurably.' She can no longer drive anywhere alone. She finds herself a recluse. She found that there was a virtually non-existent social life. They no longer go to the theatre. She has a scar, a vertical 21-centimetre scar and several other scars on her belly. Bumps and lumps to her abdomen which will not go away, she says, 'not a pretty sight.' She finds it hard to wear the clothes she wants to, she cannot do activities such as clean the
house, which is something anybody should be able to do, and that cleaners had to be employed.
Standing for long periods, she says, 'Is no longer possible. I have nerve damage in my left leg.' She underwent five months of intense physiotherapy, respiratory, pelvic and leg. She has lost muscle mass. She is unable to go for walks. She tires easily, has regular pain in her back and thigh. She gets nerve tingling in her leg. She has bowel problems. She has changes to her diet. She has a constant merry-go-round of hospital and clinic
visits. It has been a living hell. Her stress was increased immeasurably by your unwillingness to accept responsibility. She says their lives have been devastated by your decision to drive at speed. She says the last three years of her life have been taken from her."
As for Mr Turner, he had bruising in his groin, his chest and feet. He had a broken toe and walking was painful. In addition he had to care for his wife, going everyday with her to the hospital for treatment. He has permanent nerve damage in the groin or the L3 vertebrae. He has borne the burden of caring for Mrs Turner and told the court of the huge impact on her life. He speaks of the distress of seeing the impact on his wife and her reduced mental state.
As for mitigation, the appellant was 22 years old at the time of the collision and 25 at the time of sentence. He was of positive good character with a supportive family and positive character references. He had a good work record. He lost a good and responsible job as a result of the loss of his licence but had found part-time work. At the time of the collision the appellant had only held a full driving licence for 2 months.
The appellant was himself injured in the collision, suffering two broken feet and a fractured collar bone. His mother had been badly injured in a road accident in the past, resulting in having to use a wheelchair. The appellant provided care for her but was not the sole or primary carer.
In mitigation, counsel said that the appellant showed remorse but the judge noted that he had not admitted the offence until Day 2 of the trial after three witnesses had given evidence, and had not admitted the lesser offence of careless driving until Day 1 of the trial.
The judge had before him a pre-sentence report. The author of that report was of the view that the appellant had learned his lesson and was extremely remorseful. We have been provided with a prison report which states the appellant has been settled since starting his time in prison and has engaged well with his key worker.
Discussion
The first ground of appeal is that the judge should not have placed the appellant's offending in category A1 of the sentencing guideline for this offence. At the sentencing hearing both prosecution and defence submitted that the case fell within category B2, the prosecution saying that the case came at the top end of both categories. But this does not mean that the judge was precluded from taking a different view. Mr Dye, counsel for the appellant, in his succinct and helpful submissions, did not suggest otherwise.
As for the appropriate culpability category, we consider that the judge was plainly entitled, and indeed right, to place the offending in category A. The judge heard evidence from three prosecution witnesses before the appellant changed his plea. These were Mr Turner and two members of the Fox family who had witnessed the appellant's driving immediately before the collision when he attempted the overtaking manoeuvre on the black Audi. The judge was therefore well placed to assess the circumstances of the offending.
The judge said in his sentencing remarks that two of the factors that drove this case into culpability A were present. These were an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre and a driving speed that was highly inappropriate for the prevailing road or weather conditions. These factors meant that the case was properly placed in culpability category A. Indeed the judge might have found that there was a third factor, namely the appellant had been involved in racing or competitive driving against another vehicle, although this was not a point put forward by the prosecution.
The grounds of appeal point out that evidence of the witness, Janine Fox, was to the effect that the appellant's vehicle had pulled back in behind the dark vehicle, but this does not alter the position that he had undertaken a highly dangerous manoeuvre. He should not have embarked upon overtaking on a winding single lane road such as this, at a speed at or close to 60 miles an hour, with a bend coming up, and by the time he abandoned the manoeuvre it was too late and he lost control of his car. The factors set out in the guideline for culpability category B were not present in this case.
As for harm category 1, the judge was again fully entitled to conclude that this was the correct category. One of the factors that takes a case into harm category 1 is that the offence results in a permanent irreversible injury or condition which has a substantial and long-term effect on the victim's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities or on their ability to work. That factor was present in this case. As the judge said in his sentencing remarks:
"It is harm category 1, because it has resulted in a permanent condition which has had a substantial and long-term effect on the victim and Mrs Turner's ability to carry out the normal day to day activities. The plainest evidence of that comes from her statement. She cannot walk as she did. She cannot stand for long periods. She cannot clean the house. She cannot drive alone, and she has PTSD."
On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that whilst the injuries were very unpleasant, category 1 harm should be reserved for the very worst injuries that are permanent and irreversible and akin to the other two examples set out in that category, namely particularly grave and/or life-threatening injury and injury resulting in physical or psychological harm that results in a life-long dependency on third-party care or medical treatment.
In our judgment, the judge in this case was entitled to come to the view that the relevant harm factor for category 1 was present. The judge carefully considered the evidence given by Mrs Turner herself and the other relevant evidence. As the judge said, the plainest evidence came from Mr Turner's statement. The evidence of the impact upon her was detailed and graphic. Mrs Turner is heavily scarred and this affects her bodily image. She cannot walk as she did; she cannot stand for long periods; she cannot clean the house; she cannot drive alone and she has PTSD. As a result of the effects of the collision she has become a recluse. She has aged prematurely. She has low energy and has difficulty sleeping. She has to be careful what she eats. She still suffers pain. When she travels she is hyper-vigilant. She is, as she put it, on a constant merry-go-round of hospital and clinic visits. Her life has been very gravely and permanently affected and this has had a very damaging effect on her husband's life also.
The grounds of appeal point out that Mrs Turner was able to stand for 20 minutes in the witness box while she read out her victim impact statement but this does not come anywhere close to undermining the conclusion that she cannot stand for long periods. Nor does the fact that Mrs Turner is now retired mean that her injuries have not, and do not continue to have, a substantial and long-term effect on her ability to carry out her day-to-day activities as she described.
Mr Dye referred us to the case of R v Howdle (Nicholas John) [2025] EWCA Crim 789. This was also a case of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. In that case this Court allowed an appeal against sentence, on the basis that the judge had been wrong to place the harm suffered by the other driver as being at category 1. We do not derive any assistance from this authority. This was a decision on different facts. There is nothing in the judgment in that case to indicate that the conclusion reached by the sentencing judge in this case was wrong.
The other main ground of appeal is that even if the judge was right to place the offending in category A1 a sentence of 40 months before credit for plea was manifestly excessive.
We cannot accept this submission. The starting point for category A1 is 4 years and the range is 3 to 5 years. Forty months (or 3 years 4 months) is therefore close to the bottom of the sentencing range, even though there was an aggravating factor in that there were two injured victims.
Mr Dye refers to four matters which he submits should have reduced the starting point. These are that he had no previous convictions, his good driving record, his genuine remorse and the point described as arguable that the offence was due to inexperience rather than irresponsibility. It is clear that the judge took the first three factors into account, albeit that the credit available for remorse was limited by the fact that the appellant did not acknowledge his guilt until the second day of his trial after three witnesses had given evidence. It is also clear that the judge was not persuaded that the offence was due to inexperience. Rather it was the result of irresponsibility - to put it mildly. The judge also took account of the appellant's age at the time of offending. There was no evidence that the appellant was more than usually immature for a 22 year old. The pre-sentence report writer assessed the appellant as having a reasonable level of maturity for his age.
As the judge was entitled to impose a sentence of more than 3 years, no question of suspending the sentence can arise either at the sentencing hearing or in this Court. We note that the judge said in his sentencing remarks that given the sentence was just above the maximum threshold for a suspended sentence, he had considered carefully whether he could reduce the sentence to 36 months and then suspend it. He decided that he could not and indeed has stated that even if he had imposed a sentence of 3 years or less, he would not have felt able to suspend it.
For these reasons the appeal is dismissed.
We should mention one final matter which has been drawn to our attention by the Registrar. The appellant was charged with two alternative counts in relation to the same offending, one count of causing serious injury by dangerous driving and one count of causing serious injury by careless and inconsiderate driving. The latter is of course a less serious charge. The appellant entered a guilty plea to the lesser offence on Day 1 of the trial. This was not accepted by the prosecution and the appellant then pleaded guilty to the dangerous driving count on Day 2. As we have said, the judge imposed no separate penalty for the lesser offence. In R v Butler [2023] EWCA Crim 676; [2023] 2 Cr App R(S) 46 at [9] and [10], Dingeman LJ stated:
"We should record that the Registrar has in a helpful note drawn the court's attention to Archbold 2023 at 5A-169c, which provides:
'Where a defendant is charged with alternative offences, and in circumstances where they plead guilty to the lesser offence but are subsequently convicted of the more serious offence, the proper approach appears to be for the court to order the lesser offence to lie on the file, rather than to impose no separate penalty on the offence.'
This is because in R v Cole [1965] 2 QB 388, it was held that a guilty plea does not amount to a conviction unless and until a sentence is passed, and when a defendant pleads guilty to the lesser offence and the more serious alternative proceeds to trial, the correct practice is to record the guilty plea. If the defendant is acquitted of the more serious offence, he can then be sentenced on the count to which he had pleaded guilty, which ranks as a conviction from then on; but if convicted of the more serious offence, he will be sentenced on that matter and the court should consider that the alternative offence should lie on the file. That practice avoids a defendant being convicted of two alternative offences for the same criminal conduct.
In these circumstances, we do consider that the judge was wrong to order no separate penalty on the count for possession, which the applicant had, as already indicated, pleaded guilty to on 30 July 2020...."
We agree that this is the correct approach for the reasons given by this Court in Butler. It has been approved in other cases such as R v Bebbington (1978) 67 Cr App R 285; R v Ismail [2019] EWCA 290 at [20-23] and R v Bottarelli [2026] EWCA Crim 383 at 54. In R v Ford [2026] EWCA Crim 666, a division of this Court agreed that this was the better course but added that it is not the case that by deciding to impose no separate penalty for the lesser offence the judge imposed a sentence which can sensibly be described as unlawful.
We do not have to decide in the present case whether the imposition of no separate penalty for a lesser offence arising out of the same facts in circumstances such as these was positively unlawful rather than an incorrect practice. It is not a point that has been raised in the grounds of appeal or argued before us and, as in virtually all cases where this arises, nothing turns on it as the imposition of no separate penalty has not increased the sentence that must be served by this appellant.
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