R E X v TERRI MARIE WOOD

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1266

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R E X v TERRI MARIE WOOD

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1266

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[2026] EWCA Crim 1266
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL Royal Courts of Justice
CRIMINAL DIVISION The Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT STAFFORD

(MR JUSTICE CHOUDHURY) [21GS308821]

Case No 2026/01080/A5 & 2026/01081/A5Friday 18 September 2026

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE BEAN

MR JUSTICE JAY

MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS DBE

____________________

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFERENCE

UNDER SECTION 36 OF

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988)

____________________

R E X

- v -

TERRI MARIE WOOD

JACK WILLIAM DAVIES

_____________________

Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

_____________________

Miss A Husbands appeared on behalf of the Attorney General

Mr J Walkling KC appeared on behalf of the Offender Terri Marie Wood

Miss R Wade KC appeared on behalf of the Offender Jack William Davies

____________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________

Friday 18 September 2026

LORD JUSTICE BEAN:

1.

The Attorney General (who at the time of this Reference was Solicitor General) applies, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for leave to refer to this court sentences which she considers to be unduly lenient.

2.

On 24 February 2026, in the Crown Court at Birmingham, the offenders, Terri Marie Wood (then 23 years of age) and Jack William Davies (then 26 years of age), were sentenced by Choudhury J to 20 months' imprisonment and two years' imprisonment respectively.

3.

The offence of which they had been convicted by a jury was one of "causing or allowing a child to suffer serious physical harm".

4.

The offenders were the parents of Tara Willow Davies, who was born on 10 November 2020. She died on 5 February 2021. It was not the prosecution case that either offender was responsible for causing her death. However, on the post-mortem examination, Tara was found to have suffered earlier injuries. The prosecution case was that one of the two offenders caused the injuries while the other was aware of what was happening and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the baby from serious physical harm. It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove which of the two offenders caused and which allowed the relevant injuries.

5.

When Tara died, she had suffered 14 rib fractures and a fractured skull in the weeks before her death. We set out more details later in this judgment.

6.

At about 8.30 am on 5 February 2021, Jack Davies called the emergency services. When paramedics arrived they found baby Tara lying on her back on the floor of a room off the hallway. She was pale. Her eyes were open. She was warm to the touch but was unresponsive. She was not breathing and had no pulse. She was in cardiac arrest. Emergency medical treatment was administered, but was sadly unsuccessful. She was less than three months old when she died shortly before 9.30 that morning.

7.

Both Tara's parents were present at the flat. As police arrived, they spoke to Ms Wood. She said that she had checked on Tara earlier that morning; she had been breathing. Then Tara had stopped breathing. She could not think of anything that had happened which could have caused the problem. She said: "I'm not going to get arrested am I, because this wasn't my fault".

8.

At the hospital, M Davies told an officer that he had woken at 8 am and found Tara in her Moses basket. He was immediately aware that there was something wrong, so had called to Ms Wood and then phoned for an ambulance.

9.

Investigations then began into Tara's death. At the hospital, CT scans were taken. On review of the images, a Consultant Paediatric Radiologist observed numerous rib fractures and a fracture of the skull. These bony injuries had been sustained on at least two separate occasions. The doctor also observed that Tara's bone density was normal; she was no more or less prone to fractures than anyone else.

10.

On 19 February 2021, Dr Randall, a Consultant Forensic Pathologist, performed a post- mortem examination. This confirmed that Tara had sustained a skull fracture and a number of rib fractures in the weeks prior to her death. However, those injuries did not cause her death. The cause of her death was unascertained.

11.

Further investigation continued. A consultant histopathologist and osteoarticular pathologist agreed that Tara had 14 rib fractures at the time of her death. Twelve of these had occurred between four and eight days prior to her death, while two had occurred earlier, namely three to six weeks prior to her death. The rib fractures would have been caused by forceful chest compression, with at least an element of side-to-side compression.

12.

Dr Randall excluded chest compression at the time of resuscitation as being the cause of the rib fractures. She expressed the opinion that in a non-mobile infant of this age, fractures could not have occurred as a result of unwitnessed events, and in the absence of a clear and satisfactory account of the mechanism of trauma or a medical explanation for the fractures, inflicted injury must be considered.

13.

It was further agreed by the medical experts that Tara had suffered a 6 centimetre long fracture to the left parietal bone (the bone forming the left side and top of the skull). The skull fracture showed features indicating that it had occurred between three and seven days prior to death.

14.

Dr Randall observed bruising on the undersurface of the scalp. The fracture was just behind the bruising. Extradural haemorrhage (bleeding between the fibrous membrane lining the inside of the skull cavity and the skull bone) was found by a Consultant Neuropathologist. This had occurred more than three or four days, but less than a week, prior to death. This correlated with the timing of the skull fracture. Both were likely to have occurred at the same time, as the result of blunt force trauma to the head on the left side. There was no suggestion of shaking.

15.

Ms Wood and Mr Davies were both interviewed by police on 24 February 2021. They gave some explanation which were plainly found to be untrue. Ms Wood said that she had no idea how Tara had sustained the serious injuries. She knew of no incident in which Tara could have sustained injury. In interview she said that she did not really like to touch Tara and had hugged her only once. She then said, "I could have dropped her by accident". When pressed about that, she asked "If I tell you the truth, will you put me in prison?" Asked if she had dropped Tara, she said that she had accidentally done so, but only from about five inches above the floor onto a playmat. She said that she had told Mr Davies that she had dropped Tara.

16.

Mr Davies was interviewed on the same day. He said that Tara had never had a fall nor been dropped. He said that he had never seen her in pain.

17.

Another expert, Professor Freemont, commented on the constellation of Tara's injuries. He formed the opinion that posterior rib fractures, skull fractures and the fractures of multiple bones at different times were all red flags for non-accidental injury. In the absence of significant reported accidental injuries at different times within a few days, it was "not possible to envisage a scenario where the number, type and distribution of fractures is not abusive". He concluded that the rib fractures were caused by forceful chest compression with at least an element of side-to-side compression.

18.

Dr Randall's view was that the rib and skull fractures would have required "a significant degree of force, in excess of rough handling". After sustaining such injuries, Tara would have been immediately and obviously distressed, which would have been noticeable to those caring for her. She would later have been irritable, off her feeds and distressed when being handled.

19.

Another expert witness, Professor Mangham, expressed the opinion that the amount of force required to have caused the rib injuries would have been "substantial", and certainly alarming to an observer. Some of the rib fractures were complete, indicating a higher level of delivered force.

20.

The trial before Choudhury J and a jury began on 20 October 2025. On 31 October 2025 the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty against both offenders. Each side submitted a sentencing note. After referring in some detail to the expert evidence, the prosecution sentencing note included the following paragraphs on the culpability part of the relevant sentencing guidelines:

"Culpability B (High) factors include:

•

multiple incidents of serious cruelty, including serious neglect

•

Use of very significant force

•

Deliberate disregard for the welfare of the victim

•

Failure to take any steps to protect the victim from offences in which the above factors are present."

21.

Referring to the issue of the force used, paragraph 37 of the sentencing note reads:

"The force required to have been used was said to have been 'substantial' – query does that equate to 'very significant'? It is submitted that it does equate to 'very significant' in this context of violence against a baby of only a very few weeks of age.

Neither [offender] took any action to seek medical or other carer assistance for Tara even though frequently involved with caring professionals, indicating deliberate disregard."

22.

The note went on to refer to factors listed in the guideline as indicating culpability level C:

" Culpability C (Medium):

•

Use of significant force

•

multiple incidents of cruelty, including neglect"

23.

It was submitted that if the experts' phrase "substantial force" does not equate to "very significant", it certainly equates to "significant".

24.

At paragraph 42 the note states:

"It is submitted therefore, that there are present in the offences factors of Culpability B (High) and that the case properly falls within that category. If the court does not accept that submission then the case falls within Culpability C (Medium), having in mind the first two factors noted in paragraph 38 irrespective of whether the third factor noted has any relevance. Moreover, having in mind the factors noted in paragraph 37, it is submitted that if the case falls within Category C, then it is at the higher end of culpability in that Category."

25.

As to the level of harm under the guideline, the prosecution accepted that since Tara died from unascertained causes shortly after the incidents of violence, it was not possible to ascertain the prognosis. They accepted that the appropriate harm category was 3, but submitted that it was at the upper end of that category.

26.

The sentencing note submitted by Mr Walkling KC, on behalf of Ms Wood, accepted that the harm level was category 3. It was submitted that the culpability level was C and that category B ought to be reserved for cases involving a weapon or sadistic behaviour, or those with a disregard for serious harm of which the offender was definitely aware. The sentencing note also suggested that Ms Wood's responsibility was substantially reduced by a learning disability and a lack of maturity.

27.

In her sentencing note on behalf of Mr Davies, Ms Wade KC focused almost entirely on the question of whether the force used was "significant" rather than "very significant". It was submitted that the court should reject the suggestion that it could be sure that the use of force was very significant and added that "if that is right, then culpability should be assessed as medium". Ms Wade submitted that the sentence could properly be suspended on the ground that there was expert evidence that Mr Davies' intellectual functioning was in the below average range.

28.

The sentencing hearing took place on 24 February 2026. The judge had received the sentencing notes. He heard brief oral submissions and then adjourned from 10.30 to just after 11 am to consider his decision.

29.

The judge told the offenders that during the time she had spent in their care, Tara had suffered "catastrophic injuries", including 14 rib fractures, two of which dated from four to six weeks before Tara's death, and the remainder between four and eight days before the death. Some of the rib fractures had been caused by compression or squeezing of the rib cage with a degree of force that would be alarming to an observer. Tara had also suffered the serious skull fracture which was dated to between three and seven days before her death. That meant, the judge said, that there were at least two incidents during which sufficient force was applied to Tara to break her ribs and crack her skull. She would have been in agonising pain after each episode, "and yet neither of you could give any credible explanation for how Tara could have suffered these injuries".

30.

The judge noted the untruthful suggestions that the offenders had put forward as to how the injuries might have occurred. He said that the jury's verdict confirmed that "you either inflicted the injury yourself or you knew of the risk of injury but failed to take steps to prevent [Tara] from being injured".

31.

Addressing Ms Wood, Choudhury J said this:

"I deal first with culpability. The prosecution contend for high culpability on the basis of prolonged and multiple incidents of serious cruelty or neglect and the use of 'very significant force'. The [offenders] contend that the force was significant rather than

very significant. The evidence as to the force required to cause these fractures was as follows."

The judge then referred to the evidence of Dr Randall and Professor Mangham as to the degree of force, and then continued:

"Taking all of that in the round and having regard to the Guidelines, in my judgment, the appropriate categorisation is that the force was significant, rather than very significant. Even significant force used against an infant that young would be alarming to an observer and there are indications such as the undisplaced nature of the skull fracture that the force used was not at the higher end of the scale. That in conjunction with the fact that there were multiple, at least two, separate incidents of cruelty towards Tara lead to a categorisation of medium culpability."

He then referred to the submission on behalf of Ms Wood that lesser culpability (i.e. category 3D) should be considered, having regard to her lack of maturity and/or her reduced intellectual capacity. Unsurprisingly, he rejected that submission. He said:

"Your learning difficulties did not impair your ability to understand the nature and consequences of your action or your inaction."

32.

The judge then continued:

"As to harm, the fracturing of ribs and the skull would clearly amount to serious physical harm under category 3. The question is whether such harm can be said to have a substantial and/or long-term effect to place it in a higher category. As Tara died from an unknown cause a short time after the injuries, it cannot be said with any certainty whether the injuries would have had a substantial and/or long-term effect.

There is no evidence of prognosis arising from these injuries. One must be cautious of assuming that a skull fracture has a substantial effect, in circumstances where the fracture was undisplaced. There is no evidence of what consequences there were for Tara beyond the fact of the fracture. Of course, when assessing harm, it is necessary to have regard to intended harm. Given my findings as to the force necessary to inflict such harm, which was significant, it may be said that that reflects an intent to cause harm having a substantial effect. Thus, whilst the harm is assessed as falling within category 3, it does lie at the upper end of that category."

33.

The judge noted that the starting point for a category 3C offence under the guideline was one year and six months' custody. He then made the following adjustments:

(1)

First, a downward adjustment of three months to reflect the lower maximum sentence applicable at the time of the offence which was before promulgation of the guideline. By the time of the guideline the maximum sentence had been increased from ten to 14 years.

(2)

Secondly, an upward adjustment of nine months, to take account of the higher degree of harm within category 3 that he had found to have occurred.

That brought the figure in the case of Ms Wood to two years.

34.

The judge then turned to consider aggravating and mitigating features. He said that one aggravating feature was the failure to seek medical help. He noted that "all the experts gave evidence that Tara would have been in considerable distress after these injuries". He also took into account as an aggravating feature the extreme vulnerability of the victim in that Tara was only weeks old at the time of the offences.

35.

As to mitigating factors, the judge listed the absence of previous convictions, the positive character evidence speaking to a caring and considerate young woman who was trying to come to terms with what happened. He said that he should make some allowance for her lack of maturity and lack of intellectual capacity. The five years that had passed since the commission of the offences were also a factor.

36.

The judge found that the mitigating features outweighed the aggravating features, to the extent that he should reduce the sentence on Ms Woods from two years to 20 months' imprisonment. He said that the seriousness of the offence was such that a community order or a fine could not be justified. Nor could he suspend the sentence, given that this was "very serious violence perpetrated by at least one of you against a totally defenceless baby", and that "you have not been truthful and open about what you did and what happened". Plainly the offence was so serious that appropriate punishment could only be immediate custody.

37.

The judge found that the relevant culpability factors were the same in the case of Davies as for that of Ms Wood. The culpability was therefore medium and the category of the offence was 3C, with harm assessed at the upper end of category 3, as with Ms Wood. Taking the category 3C starting point of one year and six months' imprisonment, the judge made the same downward shift of three months to take into account the lower maximum sentence at the time, and an upward adjustment of nine months, to take account of the higher degree of harm within category 3, making two years at that stage.

38.

The aggravating factors were the same as those for Ms Wood, namely the failure to seek medical help and the extreme vulnerability of the victim.

39.

Mr Davies, like Ms Wood, had the mitigating factors of no previous convictions, positive character references, and the five year delay since the offences were committed. The judge made a small allowance in the offender's favour for lack of maturity, but not for lack of intellectual capacity, which he said was not of the same order as in Ms Wood's case. He held that the aggravating and mitigating factors in Mr Davies' case balanced each other out, which resulted in a sentence of two years' imprisonment. As in Ms Wood's case, and for the same reasons, only a term of immediate imprisonment would suffice.

40.

Ms Husbands, who appears for the Attorney General, submits that the judge was in error in classifying the culpability level as C (medium), rather than B (high) for at least two reasons. She did not press the submission advanced before the judge and which also appears in the written Reference, that the judge ought to have found that the force inflicted was “very significant”, and not merely “significant”. Ms Husbands submitted that in this case there were multiple incidents of serious cruelty – not simply of cruelty – and that this was borne out by the nature of the injuries suffered and the manner of their infliction.

41.

Secondly, although she did not place much emphasis on this in oral argument, she submitted that given the very obvious pain and distress which baby Tara must have shown after these incidents, there was a deliberate disregard for the welfare of the victim because the offenders did nothing about it.

42.

Mr Walkling KC, for Ms Wood, submitted that the judge was entitled to conclude in his overall evaluative assessment that the present case fell within category 3C, rather than category 3B. He pointed out that it was now conceded by the Attorney General that the judge was entitled to find that “very significant” force was not used. It followed that the infliction of “significant” force was a category C factor. Mr Walkling submitted that the Attorney's contention that the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained meant that it was necessarily a case of "serious cruelty" overstated the position because, he pointed out, if this was correct it would mean that all cases of causing or allowing a child to suffer serious physical harm would fall within category B, irrespective of how much force was applied.

43.

Mr Walkling submitted that the judge determined that this was a case of cruelty, rather than serious cruelty and was entitled to make that assessment. Overall, he submitted that the judge's approach in bringing this case within category 3C and then treating the failure to seek medical attention as an aggravating factor was permissible and did not result in an unduly lenient sentence.

44.

Ms Wade KC, for Mr Davies, submitted that this should be seen as a classic case of judicial instinct or judgment, rather than a mechanistic application of the guideline. She submits that the judge's conscientious approach to all the evidence cannot be impugned.

45.

We note that before the judge the main focus of the arguments – certainly the almost exclusive focus of Ms Wade's sentencing note on behalf of Mr Davies – had been whether the force used in inflicting the injuries was "significant" or "very significant". We accept that the judge could properly find that he could not be sure that the force used was "very significant". Indeed, in oral argument Ms Husbands effectively conceded that it was open to the judge to do so.

46.

The next issue is whether the judge was wrong to describe the incidents as being of cruelty, as opposed to serious cruelty. There is no dispute between the parties that two separate incidents are enough to constitute multiple incidents for the purpose of the guideline.

47.

We accept the submission of Mr Walkling that since all incidents of this offence by definition involve the infliction of serious injury on a child, “serious cruelty” in this guideline must mean something which is exceptionally serious by comparison with other cases of this offence.

48.

The two offenders were to be sentenced on the basis that it could not be proved which of the two of them had inflicted the injuries. The gravamen of what was proved by the verdict of the jury was that each of them took no steps to prevent the incidents before they occurred, or while they were occurring, and failed to seek help afterwards, even though baby Tara must, as the judge found, have been in agonizing pain.

49.

These failures could have been treated as the category B factor of "deliberate disregard for the welfare of the victim", but we are not satisfied that the judge made an error of principle when, instead, he treated them as aggravating factors later in his sentencing exercise.

50.

In any event, even if this culpability B factor should have been found to have been established, that had to be set against culpability C factors of the use of significant (but not “very significant”) force, and the incidents of cruelty (but not, as a matter of interpretation of the guideline, “serious cruelty”). On that basis, the case would lie on the borderline between categories 3B and 3C. In those circumstances, a starting point of two years, rather than the 18 months selected by the judge, might well have been appropriate. After the further adjustments made by the judge, which Ms Husbands does not criticise, that would have led to slightly higher sentences in each case.

51.

However, in a case where the sentences are imposed after a trial in which the judge has seen and heard the evidence, particular deference is due to the judge's evaluative assessment.

52.

It is well established that the test on a reference by the Law Officers is not whether we would have reached the same result. Rather, it is whether the sentence imposed was outside the range which a judge could reasonably impose.

53.

After careful consideration, we do not find that this test is met in this case. The sentences were perhaps lenient, but they were not unduly lenient. The judge evidently considered the matter with great care.

54.

We give leave to refer the sentences in each offender's case, but we decline to alter the sentences imposed by the trial judge.

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