REX v RAIGAL SHUKRI AHMAD

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1265

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REX v RAIGAL SHUKRI AHMAD

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1265

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT LIVERPOOL

(MR RECORDER COOPER) [07NZ0202425]

CASE NO 202602401/A3

[2026] EWCA Crim 1265

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Friday 4 September 2026

Before:

LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE

MR JUSTICE BRYAN

MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS

REX

V

RAIGAL SHUKRI AHMAD

_________

MS S GARCHA appeared on behalf of the Appellant

_________

APPROVED JUDGMENT

MR JUSTICE BRYAN:

1.

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. This judgment has been anonymised accordingly.

2.

On 11 May 2026, in the Crown Court at Liverpool before His Honour Judge Cummings KC, the appellant pleaded guilty on re-arraignment on the first day of trial to two counts of sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 each against a separate complainant.

3.

On 9 June 2026, at the same court and before Mr Recorder Cooper, the appellant (then aged 35) was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment on each count consecutive, a total sentence of 14 months' imprisonment.

4.

The appellant appeals against sentence by leave of the Single Judge.

5.

Turning to the facts of the appellant's offending. On 20 July 2024 Complainant 1 ("C1") was out with her daughter and niece in Warrington town centre. They had been in PJ's Bar and then moved to the Reef nightclub. Inside the club the appellant approached them a few times and they indicated that they did not wish to speak with him, although he persisted. The appellant was someone they had seen before, and C1's daughter recalled him using a bird noise to attract the attention of women inside the club and had seen him dancing and trying to engage with them on the dance floor.

6.

Whilst C1 was dancing, the appellant came up behind her and placed his hand on her bottom. As C1 moved away the appellant did not move his hand but ran his fingers up her back. C1 was in disbelief, and felt extremely uncomfortable, having not given any indication that she wanted to engage with the appellant in any way. She confronted him. C1's daughter had captured the incident on her mobile telephone, and this was provided to the police. The footage showed that the appellant's hand had been around C1's side and low down in front of her abdomen.

7.

The appellant was interviewed on 13 February 2025 and accepted that he had been in the club on the relevant date. He said he danced with everyone but never touched anyone without their permission.

8.

On 26 January 2025 Complainant 2 ("C2") was out with her friend in Warrington town centre. At around 4.00 am they were in the Reef nightclub and noticed the appellant watching them from across the room. He approached, and he gave C2’s friend a bottle of alcoholic drink, which they did not consume. He approached them a few more times before they left the club and made their way to get some food from the Best Kebab takeaway on Bridge Street. The appellant followed.

9.

Inside the takeaway he was stood next to C2 as she was trying to pay for her food. Words were exchanged. The appellant appeared to be offering to pay for C2's food and took cash out of his pocket. C2 said that the appellant kept asking her to go home with him and she was saying "no". The appellant then stroked the right side of C2's hip and bottom. She told him to get off. Her friend then began arguing with the appellant and also hit him. The incident was captured on CCTV. Afterwards C2 and her friend left the takeaway to get a taxi. They described the appellant as persistent and arguing with the taxi driver. When the police arrived at the location, they informed officers of what had happened. The appellant was arrested and cautioned on suspicion of assault, to which he replied, "Yes I know."

10.

In interview on 26 January 2025, he explained that he had been at the takeaway to get food. C2 had asked him to pay for her food and when he refused, she slapped him. He said that he was drunk and a bit angry and he slapped her but he denied any sexual touching.

11.

The appellant was 35 years of age at the time of sentence, and was of previous good character in this country since his arrival as an asylum seeker from Kurdistan 3 years ago. His antecedent history before such arrival in this country was unknown.

12.

There was a pre-sentence report before the court. The author noted that there was a consistent theme across both incidents. In each case the appellant displayed persistent and unwelcome behaviour towards women, including touching without consent, ignoring verbal and physical cues to disengage, and acting in a manner which was described as unsettling. Footage and witness accounts indicate he appeared to find the behaviour amusing despite the distress caused. Across both incidents, there was a consistent pattern of Mr Ahmad approaching women in social settings, failing to respect personal boundaries, and continuing contact despite clear verbal and non-verbal indications that the behaviour was unwanted. In the author's view, this undermined his claim that he did not understand the actions to be sexual in nature. The behaviours described- touching of the hips, lower torso, and buttocks would reasonably be understood as intimate and requiring consent.

13.

He told the author that he was unaware that such actions would be considered sexual or constitute sexual assault and whilst he said that he was sorry and would not engage in such behaviour in the future, this expression of remorse was qualified by a continued denial of key aspects of the offences, including denial of conduct that was captured on CCTV which limited the extent to which his remorse could be considered indicative of full insight or accountability in the view of the author.

14.

Overall, the author considered that the offending presented as opportunistic but the repeated behaviour in similar contexts, demonstrated poor boundaries, a failure to recognise or respect consent, and limited victim awareness, in circumstances where there remained a significant gap in his acceptance of responsibility and understanding of the impact of his actions.

15.

The author considered that as the two offences occurred within a relatively short timeframe, and in similar social contexts, involving comparable behaviour toward different victims, this might suggest the emergence of a pattern of inappropriate and non-consensual behaviour rather than isolated incidents. He also demonstrated some evidence of victim-blaming and externalisation, particularly in the second incident which suggested a tendency to deflect responsibility rather than fully reflect on his own actions.

16.

The appellant was assessed as presenting a medium risk of serious harm to the public, specifically to adult females in social settings. The appellant's continued denial that his actions were sexual in nature, despite evidence to the contrary, and his limited insight into the impact of his behaviour, increased the risk of further similar offending. The author considered that should the court consider an alternative to immediate custody this would require a highly intensive and restrictive community order.

17.

There was a victim personal statement from C2. In it she noted that she had been put off going out into town and on a couple of occasions when she had seen the appellant that had made her feel sick. She no longer felt able to go into town alone or walk alone, and she was left feeling vulnerable, unable to know who she could trust. Whilst she used to enjoy going out to socialise with friends, she now questioned whether it was worth going out, being in fear of whether something could happen.

18.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge noted that, having viewed the CCTV footage, he considered that the appellant's behaviour was deliberate, persistent and unwelcomed and there was obviously no consent given for what he did. We have also viewed the footage, and agree with the judge's characterisation of the appellant's conduct.

19.

The judge noted that there was no dispute that each of these offences was Culpability B under the Sexual Assault Guidelines because there were no Culpability A factors present. He noted that in relation to harm, the prosecution submitted that it was Category 2 Harm because these were sustained incidents, whereas on behalf of the defence it was submitted that each incident was Category 3 Harm as it was said that they were only fleeting and there was limited contact with the victim. It was noted that a B2 offence had a starting point of 1 year's imprisonment with a range of a high-level community order to 2 years' imprisonment, whereas a B3 offence had a starting point of a high-level community order with a range of a medium-level community order to 26 weeks' imprisonment.

20.

The judge concluded, having heard the prosecution's opening, and having viewed the CCTV footage, that whilst the touching itself was not sustained, each incident was sustained, and accordingly he treated each count as a category B2 case, albeit with a lower starting point than the 12 months' imprisonment indicated in the Guideline.

21.

The judge noted that the offences were each aggravated by the fact that the appellant targeted a vulnerable victim. Both of his victims had been drinking alcohol, and this was particularly obvious in relation to the second incident where the victim was obviously under the influence of alcohol. The incidents took place in a public location where both of the victims would be entitled to feel safe. The judge referred to the contents of the pre-sentence report, and the views of the author as identified already. He also had express regard to the mitigation advanced on the appellant's behalf.

22.

The judge concluded that the least possible sentence he could impose, having regard to the seriousness of the offences, was one of 9 months' imprisonment for each, consecutive to each other, there being two separate incidents. However, having regarding to totality, and perhaps generously, he reduced each to 7 months' imprisonment, a total sentence of 14 month's imprisonment.

23.

The judge stated that he had given very careful consideration as to whether that sentence should be suspended or not, having considered very carefully the Imposition Guideline and the various factors set out within that Guideline. He was not convinced that there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation within the community, given the comments made in the pre-sentence report: there was no strong personal mitigation, immediate custody would not result in a significant harmful impact upon others, and there was a medium risk of reoffending and serious harm to the public. He was satisfied that each of the offences was so serious that only a custodial sentence could be justified, and he concluded that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody.

24.

The grounds of appeal advanced by Ms Garcha, for whom we are grateful, both in terms of the quality of her written, and her oral, submissions were as follows.

25.

It was submitted that the sentence was manifestly excessive and should have been suspended for the following reasons:-

(1)

The judge erred in assessing harm as category 2 in relation to both Counts, as neither offence could be characterised as involving sustained or serious sexual touching.

(2)

The brevity and limited nature of the touching placed the offending at the lower end of seriousness, and this should have been reflected in the assessment of harm.

(3)

In relation to Count 2, the complainant initiated the contact with the appellant in the kebab shop, which undermined any suggestion that the appellant was deliberately pursuing her in the face of repeated refusals, as had been submitted by the prosecution.

(4)

Accordingly, the court erred in its assessment of harm, which resulted in a starting point that was too high on both counts.

(5)

In terms of totality, the overall sentence was not just and proportionate.

(6)

The judge failed to properly apply the Imposition Guideline. If the appropriate sentence fell at 12 months or less then the statutory presumption in favour of suspension applied. In any event the overall circumstances of the case strongly supported the imposition of a suspended sentence.

26.

The central point on this appeal is whether the offending was correctly categorised, which raises issues both in relation to whether it was a sustained incident and also in relation to the second count and whether the overall sentence should have been suspended.

27.

Having considered all the evidential material, including the CCTV footage, and having considered the oral submissions of Ms Garcha, we are satisfied that the judge was right to categorise each incident as a sustained incident. This factor is not directed simply at how long the sexual assault itself lasted but the incident as a whole (see, in this regard, R v Cicis (Ardzis) [2022] EWCA Crim 827 at [13] and R v PD [2022] EWCA Crim 992 at [39]).

28.

As the author of the pre-sentence report and the judge each rightly noted, and as is also apparent from the CCTV footage, these were each sustained incidents with the appellant's unwelcomed attention continuing over a period of time in circumstances where it is clear that his attention was neither welcomed nor reciprocated. Indeed, there are echoes of the offending in this case of the types of offending which were under consideration in the cases that we have referred to.

29.

We would also add that C2 was clearly intoxicated and as such we consider, having viewed the footage, that she was particularly vulnerabledue to her personal circumstances, and accordingly we do not consider that it reduces the seriousness that she engaged with the appellant in the kebab shop having previously made clear that his attentions were unwelcome.

30.

In such circumstances we consider the judge was clearly right to categorise the offending as Harm Category 2, whilst he was also right to move down from the starting point, before consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, given the time period of the actual sexual assaults themselves. However, there were also the aggravating factors that the judge rightly identified, and there was limited personal mitigation.

31.

The judge had express regard to totality and made a significant reduction for totality across each offence. It is important to recognise that the judge was sentencing in respect of two separate offences against two separate victims. The total custodial sentence passed, far from being manifestly excessive, was just and proportionate to the totality of the offending.

32.

In relation to whether the sentences should have been suspended, we remind ourselves of what was said by Lavender J, giving the full judgment of the Court, in R v Price [2023] EWCA Crim 1060 at [12]:

"We acknowledge that the decision whether or not to suspend a custodial sentence is often the most difficult decision which a sentencing judge has to make. In many cases, and certainly in most cases which come before this court, there are things to be said for and against suspending the sentence. The guideline is helpful insofar as it identifies relevant factors, but it is not simply a matter of counting the factors on one side or the other which apply in a particular case. Moreover, the competing factors are incommensurable. Weighing the competing factors can never be an arithmetical exercise. The question of which factor or factors should prevail in any particular case is necessarily a question of judgment and, moreover, a judgment of the kind which sentencing judges are experienced in addressing. This court will not lightly interfere with judgments of that nature. Appellants in such cases will not succeed unless they can show that the decision not to suspend their sentence was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle."

33.

The extension of the power to suspend introduced by the 2026 Act has not altered that approach (see e.g. R v Aliaj [2026] EWCA Crim 1141 at [14]).

34.

In the present case the judge gave very careful consideration to all the factors in the Imposition Guideline. In fact, we do not consider that this was a finely balanced decision at all.

35.

As the judge rightly recognised, many of the possible factors in favour of suspension did not apply. During the course of her oral submissions Ms Garcha invited us to revisit some of the findings made by the judge. We do not consider that is an appropriate exercise for an appellate court to undertake. In any event, having considered the reasons given by the judge for the findings he made, we consider that the judge was well entitled to make the finding of fact that he did. In this regard we consider that the judge was rightly not convinced that there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation within the community given the matters identified within the pre-sentence report, although we understand from Ms Garcha that at the time of the sentencing hearing, and following a conference with her, the appellant had recognised the factual nature of the offences and had recognised that what he was doing was wrong.

36.

Nevertheless, in light of what was set out in the pre-sentence report, the judge was right not to be convinced that there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation within the community. Next, there was also no strong personal mitigation, immediate custody would not result in a significant harmful impact upon others, and there was a medium risk of reoffending and serious harm to the public. The reality is that few, if any, of the factors in favour of suspending as identified in the Imposition Guideline applied. Then, on the other side of the equation there was the serious sexual offending against two separate victims.

37.

In such circumstances we consider the judge was clearly entitled to conclude that the offending was so serious that only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate. He certainly did not err in principle in reaching that conclusion, or reach a conclusion that no reasonable judge could have reached. Indeed, we would agree that only an immediate custodial sentence was appropriate on the facts of the appellant’s offending.

38.

Accordingly, the appeal against sentence is dismissed.

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