REX v MARK ACKLOM

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1240

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REX v MARK ACKLOM

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWCA Crim 1240

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 1240

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION )

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT BRISTOL

(HHJ PICTON)(T20190119)

CASE NO 202600284/B4

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Wednesday 30 September 2026

Before:

LORD JUSTICE FRASER

MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER

MS JUSTICE NORTON

_________

REX

V

MARK ACKLOM

_________

Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

________

MR M SHARPE appeared on behalf of the Appellant

MR J HARDY KC and MS F JACKSON appeared on behalf of the Respondent

_________

JUDGMENT

(Approved)

LORD JUSTICE FRASER:

1.

This case concerns the proper statutory construction of section 9 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which defines the definition of "available amount" in confiscation proceedings following a conviction. That point arises on an application for leave to appeal on sentence, which is limited to an appeal in respect of the confiscation order that has already been made and no other part of the sentence. The applications have been referred to the Full Court by the Registrar. We say "applications" (plural) because a short extension of time of 3 days is also required. Because there does not appear to be authority on the point in issue, we give leave and the necessary short extension of time, and this is the judgment on the appeal itself. For that reason we refer to Mark Acklom as "the appellant" in the usual way. We observe at the outset that the argument advanced by the appellant is one of somewhat limited arguability. Our grant of leave should not be taken as indicating that we consider this to be a finely balanced point, or otherwise a difficult exercise in statutory construction. We have granted leave and heard the appeal in order that there is appellate authority to assist should the point come up in the future in another case.

2.

The appellant pleaded guilty on 25 March 2019 to five counts of fraud in the Crown Court at Bristol. He was sentenced on 7 August 2019 by HHJ Picton KC to a period of 68 months' imprisonment. Other orders were also made, including a confiscation order under section 6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which was made on 19 December 2025 after a two-day hearing. That was in an agreed amount of £125,000. That amount was to be paid within 3 months, or in default of payment a further term of 2 years' imprisonment was to be served.

3.

The facts of the offending can be outlined briefly. The appellant is a fraudster who in 2012 met and befriended a woman. He lied to her about his name, his marital status, and numerous other significant matters concerning his life and background. He also convinced her of what she believed to be his genuine feelings of love for her, and his interest in making a life together with her. He told her certain things about his life - for example that he worked for MI6, that he had to spend time abroad on business, and that he also was of considerable financial depth - that now, with hindsight, may appear to be ridiculous However, doubtless at the time these facts appeared completely plausible. There is nothing an innocent person such as his victim can really do when they come to trust someone. Usually the things that are said to them are taken at face value, and sophisticated fraudsters such as the appellant can be very convincing. The appellant said he wanted to marry her, and she made preparations for that marriage to take place. Having duped her in this way, he took advantage of her trust and he systematically defrauded her of very sizeable amounts of money, which he used a number of devices, and false stories, to obtain. The total loss which the prosecution accepted on the counts to which he pleaded guilty was just over £300,000. He left the country in 2013 without marrying her, and went abroad.

4.

Even then he committed the most cruel acts by continuing to claim he loved her and that he would see that “everything was all right”. He remained in touch with her. She even left England and flew to Nice at one point to meet him to discuss matters and their relationship.

5.

She eventually realised his true nature, his real name and that she had been defrauded.

6.

She contacted the police and after an International Arrest Warrant was issued he was eventually arrested in Geneva in 2018. He was extradited from there in 2019. He had, in 2015, been subject to criminal proceedings in Spain which had resulted in his conviction in Spain for similar matters of a fraudulent nature. He was extradited to Spain to serve an outstanding prison sentence of 3 years there, which is partly why the confiscation proceedings in this jurisdiction were not resolved until the end of 2025. The appellant is currently in Spain where we are told he resides. He did not appear on the video link today during the appeal, and made no application to do so. We were told by his counsel, Mr Sharpe, that that was entirely expected and the appeal took place in his absence.

7.

We have Perfected Grounds of Appeal and a skeleton argument in the usual way for the appellant, supplemented by able oral submissions from Mr Sharpe; we also have the benefit of a Respondent's Notice and a skeleton argument drafted by Mr Hardy KC and Ms Jackson for the respondent.

8.

It is the way in which the orders of the Spanish court fall to be dealt with in the calculation of "available amount" under section 9 of the Proceeds of Crime Act that lies at the heart of this appeal. Spanish courts have a similar confiscation proceedings regime to those here. The evidence before us makes clear that the appellant, who under Spanish law is also responsible for legal costs, is now liable for orders in that jurisdiction for a sum of approximately €423,000 or (dependent upon the exact exchange rate) about £370,000.

9.

During the confiscation proceedings in Bristol, which as we have observed were extremely delayed, the parties agreed a benefit figure of £710,000. One component of the calculation required in the confiscation proceedings is what is called the "available amount". One component of that calculation is the value of what is called "tainted gifts". These were in the sum of £125,000. The parties, after legal argument before HHJ Picton KC, and a ruling from him, agreed that the available amount under section 9 was in that sum of the tainted gifts, namely £125,000. The calculation to which we refer is performed under Section 9(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

10.

Subsection 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 at the time this order was made states as follows:

"Available amount

(1)

For the purposes of deciding the recoverable amount, the available amount is the aggregate of—

(a)

the total of the values (at the time the confiscation order is made) of all the free property then held by the defendant minus the total amount payable in pursuance of obligations which then have priority,

(b)

the total of the values (at that time) of all tainted gifts

(2)

An obligation has priority if it is an obligation of the defendant—

(a)

to pay an amount due in respect of a fine or other order of a court which was imposed or made on conviction of an offence and at any time before the time the confiscation order is made..."

11.

That section was amended in 2026, by adding a new sub-section at 9(1)(c) which required the value of “hidden property” also to be added, but that provision was not in the statute at the time that this order was made. We deal further with the amendments in 2026 below.

12.

It is said for the appellant that the amount of his priority obligations in Spain exceeds the amount of his available free property under the first component element of the exercise required under section 9(1)(a). The argument is therefore advanced on his behalf that the resulting negative figure under 9(1)(a) should be taken account of when considering the values of the tainted gifts, with that figure for tainted gifts under 9(1)(b) reduced as a result when calculating “available amount”. This would mean so that no order, or only a nominal order, should be made. In other words, even though the tainted gifts made by him are valued in the agreed sum of £125,000, that figure does not of itself fall to be considered as the "available amount" due to the way that section 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) are said to work together. It is said that “available amount” should more properly be calculated taking into account the negative figure under 9(1)(a) such that available amount should be reduced down to a figure of nil.

13.

This point was argued before the judge below who ruled in favour of the prosecution. Because he ruled that the figure under 9(1)(b) did not fall to be reduced by any negative figure under 9(1)(a), it was not necessary to perform any calculation under 9(1)(a) as the parties were agreed available amount would be in the amount of tainted gifts only. It is a point of law which is effectively free standing. It is said on behalf of the appellant that there was a concession below by the prosecution that orders of the courts of Spain are to be considered as priority obligations under section 9, even though overseas courts are not there specifically listed or referred to in that section. Whether that is a concession or not properly so called does not matter, because the value of the tainted gifts represented the amount agreed by the parties as a positive figure to be taken into account when calculating “available amount”. In other words, as the judge rejected the argument about reducing the value of tainted gifts under (b) if (a) were a negative figure, there was no need for any analysis of the calculation under subsection (a) taking into account the Spanish court's orders and any free property that might be available to satisfy them or it. It would not matter if that figure under subsection (a) resulted in a zero or negative balance.

14.

We therefore proceed on the following basis. The confiscation orders of the courts in Spain (or compensation orders if they are called "compensation orders" in Spain) did not come into the calculation of “available amount” because all that was ordered by way of available amount was the full value of the tainted gifts.

15.

There were agreed facts in relation to the Spanish orders but it is not necessary to recite them, although they appear on the DCS system at POCA 4875 at paragraph 28-132.

16.

Given that the expression "available amount" was both assessed and agreed in the amount solely of the tainted gifts, the issue on this appeal can be expressed as follows. Is the amount to be included in the calculation of "available amount" is the gross value of tainted gifts; or only the net balance of tainted gifts, if any, after the calculation under subsection (a) has been done with a negative figure under subsection (a) being taken away from the value of the tainted gifts? Another way of expressing this is whether the value of the tainted gifts go towards making up any "shortfall" in free property which is insufficient to pay or meet the priority obligations under 9(1)(a)?

17.

In his oral submissions today Mr Sharpe has submitted that it is an extremely narrow point. He concentrates on the word "aggregate" at the beginning of the section in the introductory wording and relies on what he says is the meaning of "and" between subsection 9(1)(a) and subsection 9(1)(b). He also relies on the definition of "priority" in 9(2). He submits that effectively the agreement that lead to the confiscation order that was made was, as he put it "something of force majeure" because once the judge had ruled on the point about there being no mechanism to apply a negative figure under (a) to reduce the value under (b) there was nothing to be gained by any other further dispute in terms of the calculation.

18.

He also relies on section 6 of the same Act and the discretion that is given to the court. He says that this is sufficient safeguard to protect against what might be seen as the unfair operation of section 9(1), if his proposed construction is correct. He says that the point about the discretion of the court was never considered below. He said that it is not the case that the proper definition of "tainted gifts" should be dealt with in the same as "free property" under section 9(1). However, when the calculation is performed in accordance with the two subsections in the way that he urges upon us, he says that the value of the tainted gift should be reduced by any negative figure under 9(1)(a). He has also explained that although the prosecution - and we will come on to their submissions in a moment - rely upon section 5A primarily, that was added in the middle of 2026 and was not in the statute in 2025. That section should therefore be put to one side but if the meaning of section 9 is to be construed by taking account of section 5A, it should be interpreted consistently with the way in which he says the construction should be applied.

19.

For the respondent, Mr Hardy KC submits that section 5A was brought to the Court's attention out of an interest of completeness and comprehensive was effectively a codification provision in any event. He submits that the objective of the Act has now been codified: section 5A has been inserted by section 255(1) of and paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 21 to the Crime and Policing Act 2026. It was brought into force on 29 June 2026. We deal with this further at [31] below.

20.

He also explains that the purpose of the Act would be defeated and rendered entirely inoperable if the appellant was right. Mr Hardy drew attention to what would happen if there was, as he put it for example, a negative figure under subsection (a) of £1 million. It would be in the defendant’s interests if that were the case to make tainted gifts up to the value of those existing priority obligations with the intent or effect of defeating any sum being decided to be worth or calculated as the available amount. As a matter of arithmetic and analysis, Mr Hardy is right about that. If the proper calculation under section 9(1) were that any negative figure under (1)(a) were taken off a positive figure for tainted gifts under (1)(b), that would be the effect in any case where priority obligations exceeded free property.

21.

It really can be encapsulated in the following simple manner. When calculating "available amount", does section 9 of the statute require the value of tainted gifts to be reduced in the amount of any shortfall there might be under subsection (a), if a defendant’s obligations that have priority exceed the total of the appellant's free property?

22.

We are confident that the answer to that issue is "no", for the following three reasons:

(1)

The meaning of the words themselves;

(2)

The purposive construction exercise of the section;

(3)

The nature of tainted gifts.

We shall deal with each of these in turn.

23.

The words of the section themselves. These make clear that there were two component parts to the calculation of the aggregate under section 9(1), namely the total under (a) AND the total under (b). Since the 2026 amendments, there are now three, but for the purposes of this case, we can concentrate on the two at the time. There is no provision in the words for a negative total to be calculated either under (a) or (b). The correct total for the calculation of “available amount” if the priority obligations exceed free property under (a) would be zero, not a negative figure.

24.

Synonyms of aggregate are collective, combined or summative. Although a calculation under (a) could potentially result in a negative figure or amount, there is nothing to suggest that when weighing up how much on the one hand should be totalled under (a), and how much on the other should be totalled as tainted gifts under (b), any shortfall in the former should first be remedied or accounted for from the value of tainted gifts, with only any resulting surplus of tainted gifts being valued as available amount. There would be no reason why tainted gifts should have their own free-standing sub-section if Parliament intended that to be the case. Tainted gifts could or would have been included in (a), with free property, against which the word “minus” would be applied for priority obligations.

25.

Therefore on the words of the section themselves we are clear that the way the calculation is suggested to work by the appellant is not justified.

26.

The purposive construction exercise. The Proceeds of Crime Act is a statute specifically designed to help remedy a situation whereby criminals benefitted from their criminality. Earlier versions of the statute related simply to the proceeds of drug dealing and drug trafficking, but over time the the jurisdiction has widened. The ability of the court to make confiscation orders is more prevalent than it was before. The Act enables the court to make an order that recovers from criminals funds or benefits that they have acquired from criminal activity, so that there is no financial benefit to the criminal from that offending.

27.

The Explanatory Notes within the statute itself to section 9 state as follows:

"Section 9 explains how the available amount is to be calculated. It is calculated in the same way as 'the amount that might be realised' in the earlier confiscation legislation. The available amount is the value of all the defendant's property, minus certain prior obligations of the defendant's such as earlier fines, plus the value of all tainted gifts made by the defendant. Tainted gifts are described in section 77."

We would emphasise the use of the word ALL when those Explanatory Notes in the statue explains that "available amount" takes into account the value of "all tainted gifts", after assessing value of property minus prior obligations.

28.

That statutory purpose would be entirely undermined if the construction urged upon us by Mr Sharpe were correct. It would mean that it could potentially be in the interests of a criminal to increase the amount of tainted gifts, knowing that any shortfall in the amount of their free property to satisfy prior obligations such as fines or other court orders would work to their benefit, or at least not to their disbenefit. Their available amount would be reduced by the amount of tainted gifts up to the figure of the shortfall (if there were one) under subsection (a). This would provide either an incentive, or no disincentive, to distribute tainted gifts up to the level of a shortfall. This is because "available amount" would not be increased by the value of those tainted gifts , and would effectively remain at zero. That cannot be the way that the section is designed to work.

29.

Also, tainted gifts would not ordinarily be available to satisfy priority orders. Priority orders will be paid, or allowed for, out of free property when calculating the amount under subsection (a). We know of no ordinary principle in this jurisdiction whereby, for example, outstanding fines or other priority orders against a defendant can be paid by enforcement proceedings commenced against someone who has received a gift from the person the subject of the fine. That would make the third party directly liable for a priority obligation of the criminal. There are some cases, such as breach of trust, where tracing of funds is permitted, but in the ordinary course of events an order against a defendant is not enforced against a third party who may have received a gift from that defendant. Yet, if Mr Sharpe is correct, even though tainted gifts cannot be legally used to enforce payment of an outstanding fine against a criminal, section 9 would work to reduce the calculation of "available amount" by the sum of any unpaid priority orders. That also cannot be how the section is intended to work. In our judgment, it is certainly not how the section is drafted.

30.

Finally, we turn to the nature of tainted gifts themselves. These are defined in section 77. A gift is tainted if it is made by the defendant after the relevant day. It applies in a case such as this if the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which was the determination made here.

31.

Mr Hardy and Ms Jackson drew our attention to section 5A of the Act which explains the principal objective of the Act. That section is a codification section which has been inserted by section 255(1) and paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 21 to the Crime and Policing Act 2026. It was brought into force on 29 June 2026. It therefore was not in force at the date that the confiscation order was made in this case. However, although there was an amendment to section 9 by the insertion of a new subsection 9 (1)(c) dealing with hidden property, 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) remained unamended when this insertion took place. Therefore it is safe to assume that section 5A as currently drafted now does two things. It codifies the position as it was prior to its insertion in the Act in 2026. Secondly, it is drafted consistently with section 9 as it was prior to the addition of 9(1) (c). Section 5A states:

"(2)The principal objective in exercising a power to which this section applies in relation to a defendant is to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.

(3)The defendant’s means are to be taken to include any tainted gifts made by the defendant."

We draw attention to the phrase in section 5A(3) "any tainted gifts".

32.

That express statement makes it clear that "any tainted gifts" are to be taken into account when assessing the defendant's means, and NOT just a balance after other negative figures were put into a calculation. This is in contrast to how the expression "all the free property" is to be dealt with under subsection (a), which is expressly to be reduced by the amount of priority obligations. The figure of £125,000 was the value of the tainted gifts shown by the schedule on the DCS system at POCA 9948. That comprised significant money transfers by the appellant to different third parties and other expensive items such as gifts of jewellery made also to other third parties. For the appellant's construction of section 9 to be correct, section 5A would have to be significantly reworded.

33.

The construction contended for by the prosecution in this case is the only way that is consistent with the wording of each of section 77, section 9 and also section 5A which was added by amendment in 2026. If Parliament had intended the value of tainted gifts also to be potentially reduced by the amount of priority orders, there would have been no need for tainted gifts to have appeared separately in subsection 9(b); and further, section 5A(3) would have to be worded differently, as the defendant's means could not sensibly include "any tainted gifts". This construction is also consistent with the phrase “all tainted gifts” in the explanatory notes to the statute as we have observed.

34.

Finally, our view of the operation and meaning of the statute matches the views of the editors of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2026. This states at E19.54 that the total value of all tainted gifts is to be included in the calculation of available amount. Although the view of the editors is not determinative of the process of statutory construction, it does serve as a useful sense-check of how tainted gifts are supposed to be dealt with in the exercise required under section 9.

35.

Each of these three reasons, or routes of analysis, which we have undertaken, all lead to the same result. That result is that the construction contended for by the prosecution is correct, and the judge was correct in his ruling. The appellant’s construction is not correct in law, and therefore this appeal fails.

36.

We have not addressed the issue that the confiscation order was in any event made by agreement. Although this was emphasised in the respondent's skeleton argument, it is very sensibly accepted before us today that the agreement was effectively done in the light of a ruling that had already been made by the judge on how section 9 should operate. It is not necessary to resolve the question of agreement in these circumstances, given the result of the statutory construction exercise we have undertaken. Had the result of that exercise been otherwise, we would have had to embark upon consideration of whether the agreement should be set aside or not, but in the event that point does not arise.

37.

Finally, this judgment exhausts any right of appeal that the appellant has in respect of the confiscation order. There is no longer any ability to appeal against that order. We are going to order expedition of the transcript of this judgment in order that this judgment can be lodged with the National Archives as soon as possible.

Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof.

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: Rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk

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