
[2026] EWCA Crim 1230 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT ST ALBANS (HHJ CHOUDHRY) [41B22036525] CASE NO:202601835/A1 |
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before:
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
(LORD JUSTICE EDIS)
SIR GARY HICKINBOTTOM
MRS JUSTICE ELLENBOGEN
Reference by the Attorney General under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988
REX
v
JAVIER CASAS-ALVAREZ
__________
Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
_________
MS J NEWCOMBE appeared on behalf of the Attorney General
MR H MARTIN appeared on behalf of the Respondent Offender
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JUDGMENT
THE VICE-PRESIDENT:
This is an application by His Majesty's Attorney General for leave to refer a sentence to this Court, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The Solicitor General submits that a sentence imposed in this case was unduly lenient and that it should be increased by this Court.
The principal allegation to which that contention relates was count 1 on the indictment faced by the offender, which alleged an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship between 29 December 2015 and 2 October 2025. The start date before that very long period of criminal conduct was chosen because that was the date when the Act of Parliament which criminalised it came into force rather than because that was the date upon which the conduct started.
Anonymity
It will be necessary to describe in this judgment something of the family circumstances in which that offending took place. The family circumstances involved the offender and the first victim, who was in an intimate relationship with him over the whole period of the indictment and for some years before that. The second victim was their child. There is an order in place which prevents the identification of the child because he is still under 18 years old. That order was made under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and it continues to apply to the proceedings in the lower court and to this Reference as well. We will therefore not use the names of the two victims in the course of the judgment and will attempt to omit unnecessary material. The order continues to apply to any report of this judgment.
We have had to consider whether the risk of jigsaw identification is such that we ought to anonymise the offender himself. We have decided that we should not anonymise him and therefore any report of these proceedings may contain his name. The reason is that we consider that, if neither of the victims is named, the adverse impact on the child will be limited although not entirely excluded. We consider that in a case of this kind there is a public interest in the identity of the offender. Obviously the victims of the present offending know who he is already. However, he may in the future wish to form relationships with other people to whom his conduct suggests he will be a threat. The fact that his identity is in the public domain and attached to an account of his conduct is therefore a matter of some public interest. It is also the case that his absence from the jurisdiction means that there may in due course be extradition proceedings. Those proceedings will no doubt be facilitated if it is clear from this judgment who it relates to. In those circumstances we consider that we should not anonymise the offender and therefore his name may be reported and will appear in this judgment when it is drawn up, perfected and sent to the National Archives. With that introduction we now turn to the Reference itself.
The proceedings
The offender, who was then 51 years old, pleaded guilty on 16 January 2026 in the Crown Court at St Albans to an offence which was count 3 on the indictment which he faced. That alleged assault by beating contrary to section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. That of course is a summary offence for which the maximum penalty is 6 months.
On 23 March 2026 the other counts on the indictment were listed for trial. On that date the offender pleaded guilty to count 1 on the indictment, as we have said, which was an offence contrary to section 76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015, for which the maximum penalty is 5 years. Two other counts on the indictment, about which it is unnecessary to say anything, were ordered to lie on the file in the usual terms. Sentencing took place in the same Crown Court on 23 April 2026, after the offender had passed his 52nd birthday, before HHJ Choudhry. The judge sentenced the offender on count 1 to a term of 27 months' imprisonment suspended for 3 years. There was a programme requirement for 26 days, a rehabilitation activity requirement for 15 days and an unpaid work requirement for 200 hours. On count 3, the judge decided that the appropriate order was no separate penalty. A victim surcharge was imposed and restraining orders in relation to both victims were made.
The facts
As we have already said, the offending within count 1 took place over the period of a decade. There was a basis of plea which is a short document, which we shall set out in full. It says:
"I wish to plead guilty to Count 1 on the following basis:
•30/09/25 Slapped CK in the face after the Excel visit.
•01/10/25, hit her with the dog chain and after that inside the house slapped her in the face upstairs when he was making her pack a suitcase.
•On unspecified occasions used or threatened to slap her if she did not satisfactorily do the cooking or cleaning. This was a frequent occurrence."
The first two bullet points relate to behaviour at around the time count 3 was committed. The third bullet point relates to the whole period of 10 years comprised within count 1. We interpret that document as meaning that on occasions which were too numerous to count during that decade the offender slapped his partner whenever he was dissatisfied with the way in which she was doing cooking or cleaning or other tasks around the house. That is consistent with her account of his behaviour towards her over that very long period of time.
The relationship between them lasted for about 16 years. Their son (the second victim) is 14 years old. The relationship began when this family lived in Italy. There was an intervention by the Italian criminal justice system, which we shall say something more about later, which culminated in about 2012. That was followed by a brief separation but the couple resumed cohabitation after that and the family moved to the United Kingdom, where it was living at the time when the Serious Crime Act came into force criminalising the coercive and controlling behaviour. Throughout that period the female partner of the offender was exposed not only to the slapping which we have already described but also on even more frequent and innumerable occasions to anger, abuse, shouting and other behaviour creating fear of violence even on those occasions where there was no actual violence.
All of this came to light because of events which began on 30 September 2025 following a visit to a food festival at the Excel Centre referred to in the basis of plea where, once again, the offender slapped his partner in the face as they were getting into their vehicle on their way home after their visit. He believed that she had in some way humiliated him. On the following day (1 October 2025) he demanded £3,000 from her. He knew that she had that money because she had received a loan to pay some credit card bills. She did not give him all that money. He then became aggressive. He took her car keys and prevented her from leaving. He threw her handbag outside the house and when she went to retrieve it, he armed himself with a dog chain and used it to strike her. He also struck the vehicle in the street. He threatened her and he told her that he would hit her. He said things such as: "I don't like anything about you" and "I'll hit you right in the head you idiot". He was threatening and bullying in his behaviour towards her. This was captured on somebody's doorbell camera nearby and there is a recording of it. The offender was using the Italian language but that was translated into English for the benefit of the sentencing judge.
After behaving like that in a public street in a manner calculated to humiliate his victim to the maximum extent possible, he continued to offend when they both went back inside the house, where he slapped her. The victim was so distressed by this incident that in contradiction to the way she had behaved on previous occasions, she immediately messaged friends to tell them about it. One of those friends called the police. This resulted in the offender being arrested and interviewed. He accused his partner of lying and denied ever hitting her or putting her in fear of violence. As the basis of plea accepts, that interview was an entirely dishonest occasion. He was, we should record, remanded in custody where he remained until he was sentenced. He had therefore been in custody for approximately 7 months between the time of his being charged and the time when he was sentenced.
The offender
The offender has no convictions or cautions recorded against him in England and Wales. He has however a conviction for six offences committed in Italy, all against the same female partner who was the subject of the behaviour we have just described. These offences were committed between January 2011 and July 2012, itself a period of 18 months or so. They include three offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (in English terms), an offence of possession of an article with a blade or point and an offence of criminal damage and battery. These offences relate to slaps, punches, objects being thrown and a strike on his partner's leg with a kitchen knife. There was an assault upon her during her pregnancy and another after their son was born. He was a small baby at the time. He threatened her with a knife and struck a man who came to her aid with a car and threatened to kill her. The Italian convictions therefore included behaviour involving individual incidents which were even more serious than those which resulted in the sentence which we are presently considering.
The Guidelines
There are Sentencing Guidelines. There is an offence-specific guideline for controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. It sets out three levels of culpability and two levels of harm. The judge concluded that this offence of coercive and controlling behaviour fell within category A for high culpability and category 1 for harm. That is because category A (higher culpability) includes as a factor, which is undoubtedly present, "persistent action for a prolonged period." It also includes "conduct intended to maximise fear or distress" and "conduct intended to humiliate and degrade the victim." The judge's classification of this as a higher culpability offence is clearly correct and the contrary is not argued.
So far as harm is concerned, the Category 1 factors include these two which we should particularly mention "fear of violence on many occasions" and "significant psychological harm". Plainly those factors were both present and the judge's classification of harm in this case as category 1 was also unimpeachable and, once again, the contrary is not submitted. The category A1 offence has a starting point of 2½ years' imprisonment and a range of 1 to 4 years. There is also a guideline for common assault, but it is unnecessary to say anything about that. There is a Guideline as well for Domestic Abuse Overarching Principles/Sentencing. We do not need to quote from that in detail. It describes a number of relevant considerations found in cases of the present kind which involve domestic abuse. One in particular relates to the relative insignificance of the good character of an offender. Finally, in terms of the guidelines and significantly for the purpose of this Reference, we refer to the Guideline on the Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences. This Guideline deals with the circumstances in which it may or may not be appropriate to suspend a sentence of imprisonment. It has recently been revised so that it deals with the proper approach where a person is convicted of an imprisonable offence on or after 22 March 2026, which was the position here. The Guideline says:
"If the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offending is more than 12 months and no more than 3 years, the court should consider whether it is appropriate to suspend that sentence.
The court should weigh the relevant factors below to consider whether it is possible to suspend the sentence..."
There then follows the Guideline table which is familiar to sentencers having been present in this Guideline in its previous form for some time. The Guideline table includes two columns, one lists factors indicating that it may be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence and the second identifying factors indicating that it may not be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence.
Previous decisions of this Court have indicated that when considering whether to suspend a sentence the sentencer should in the course of their sentencing remarks concisely address the way in which those six different factors are balanced on the facts of the individual case so as to produce whatever the result the sentencer has decided should follow is.
The hearing
The sentencing hearing was conducted in an entirely impeccable manner. Both counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defence had produced helpful Sentencing Notes. This Court acknowledges the assistance that was provided by those documents to the Crown Court judge by both counsel. They were of course particularly useful given the circumstances which prevailed at the time of sentencing, which was that the new power to suspend the sentence in excess of 2 years but less than 3 years had only just come into force, and the judge was entitled to, and did receive in this case, full and proper assistance from counsel on both sides. Counsel for the prosecution was not counsel who now appears for the Solicitor General, Ms Newcombe, but counsel for the offender was Mr Martin who appears before us as he did before the judge. We are grateful to all of them.
Also before the judge was some highly material evidence contained in three documents which we should specifically refer to. There was a victim personal statement from the female victim of count 1, the offender's former partner, as we trust she now irrevocably is. She had felt trapped, powerless and terrified. She says that the effect on her son (the offender's own child) was obviously significant as well. He had difficulty sleeping and had become withdrawn and depressed. He felt alone and she is, and has been, worried about his mental health. She lives with stress, anxiety and fear and worries about their safety and future. She is also desperately worried about their financial situation. She now says that she does not want the offender to contact her, approach her or come near her or her son ever again. There was also a victim personal statement from their son, now aged 14. He says that when they all lived in the same home together he used to avoid his father, and spend a lot of his time in his own room in order to avoid triggering his father's anger. He noticed that his mother did the same thing - staying away to avoid upsetting him, causing violence and threats. The boy began self-harming when he could think of no way of escape. He was particularly distressed by the circumstances in which his father was finally arrested. He witnessed that arrest as he had witnessed so much else of the violence which had originated with his father over such a very long period. His father had originally attempted to talk his way out of being arrested but, when that failed, became violent and hit the police officers resulting in them taking him to the ground and handcuffing him. All of this was very distressing to the boy who saw it happen to his father. He was also worried because over the course of the behaviour of the offender towards his mother he had often threatened to kill her if she contacted the police. She had in fact not contacted the police herself on this occasion either, no doubt because of those threats. He was therefore terribly worried that his father would carry that threat out now that he had been arrested. He has suffered a severe deterioration to the state of his own mental health. He has continued to self-harm and is now receiving some mental health support. The imprisonment on remand of his father has, he says, (to paraphrase) has been a great blessing to him. He has found that he is able to be free around his house. He helps his mother and sees his friends. He is doing better at school. He says that he does not want the offender to return home and he no longer wants a relationship with him. He addressed his father directly in his victim personal statement saying: "I will not allow you to have this power over me. We are now free from you."
The pre-sentence report is the third document which we particularly wish to mention. The offender minimised the conduct to which he had pleaded guilty and denied it. He said he had not committed any of the offences which the victim described and which he had already accepted. He said that he had entered his plea simply to get the situation over with. He did accept that he had used a dog chain but said that he had only used it to frighten his partner. Unsurprisingly the author concluded that his attitude reflected a state of denial, minimisation and a lack of victim empathy. This meant, in the professional opinion of the author of the report, that there was a high risk of serious harm to known adults and to future intimate partners. The author recorded that the offender now had alternative accommodation available to him some distance from what had been the family home. He has a small business which he is able to run which would produce an income for him. The report recommended, as an alternative to an immediate custodial sentence, if appropriate, various means of dealing with the matter in the community.
There was also material produced on behalf of the offender. There were character references. What they show is despite his prolonged behaviour within the family, to all outward appearances the offender is a responsible, considerate, calm man who is able to deal with many situations without any anger, violence or abuse. He therefore reserves that behaviour exclusively for his own family. There were also prison certificates which were seen by the judge and which we have also seen. These show, again, that in a context when he is removed from his family, his behaviour is impeccable. He has done well in prison. All of that means that he is a man who knows perfectly well how he ought to behave, but chooses to behave as he has done only with his own family. It is therefore of very limited mitigating value, and that is a view confirmed by the Guideline on Domestic Abuse.
The judge's sentencing remarks
The judge, as we have said, correctly placed this offence as a category A1 offence of coercive and controlling behaviour. He described the harm as being "at the highest level". He fully appreciated and set out the high level of fear which the offender had induced over such a long period in both of the other members of his small family. The judge therefore said, correctly, that the starting point was 2½ years and the range went up to 4 years at the upper end. He set out the aggravating factors which included the previous convictions, which he thought, correctly, were relevant. The presence of the child and the impact of the offending on him was also a relevant aggravating factor. He said:
"In mitigation, I accept the conclusion of the author of your pre-sentence report: in summary, your attitude reflects a pattern of denial and minimisation, however I note that the materials you provided me today serve as a basis to conclude that you have used your time in custody constructively and positively. That stands in your favour."
The judge then decided that weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors against each other the starting point required an increase. He increased the sentence within the range to one of 30 months' imprisonment and then applied the 10 per cent discount for the very late plea to count 1, which is why the term of the custodial sentence he imposed was one of 27 months.
The judge then turned to the question of whether the sentence should be suspended. He first summarised the Guideline table with its six factors (three in each of the two columns). He referred to each of those at this point in his sentencing remarks. He then turned to the balancing exercise which that table requires. He noted two particular points. First, he identified the risk which the offender clearly poses to other people with whom he is in a family relationship. There is no reason to suppose that this man will behave in any better in any future family than he did in his previous one. He therefore poses a high risk. The second factor which the judge particularly mentioned was the prospect of rehabilitation. The judge decided that there was a prospect of rehabilitation. The existing family relationship had now terminated and restraining orders would be in place to make sure that it did not resume. The risk therefore to those two individuals was capable of being managed. He also referred to the positive attitude of the offender in prison and said that he took that into account because:
"... beyond that, there are no other indicators in your pre-sentence report which demonstrates that any prospect of rehabilitation is a realistic one."
After identifying the material factors in those terms the judge said:
"I conclude that the time you have spent in prison, and the attempts that you have made to positively take up steps to improve your position and be constructive, weighs in your favour as to whether any prospect of rehabilitation is a realistic one. Having weighed all of this, I determine that your case narrowly meets the criteria, and favours suspension."
He therefore made the order which we have identified at the start of this judgment.
The Solicitor General identifies aggravating and mitigating factors which are those referred to in the sentencing remarks. The aggravating factors are the previous convictions and the impact of the offence on others including in this case principally the child as well as the female victim. The mitigating factors which are referred to are the age of the previous convictions, a serious medical condition from which the offender suffers, his prospects in work and his good behaviour in prison. The judge was aware of all those factors and balanced them.
Submissions
The Solicitor General submits in writing and orally, through Ms Newcombe before us today, that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors reveals an error by the judge because it should have led him to increase the sentence from the starting point before applying the plea discount significantly more than he did. The there should have been an increase above the 2½ year starting point. Secondly, the Solicitor General submits that the suspension of that sentence, whatever its length, was wrong in principle because the balancing exercise of the judge was flawed. Although he identified the factors in the table before he moved on to the balancing exercise, he did not explain during that balancing exercise how he treated the seriousness of the offence and the other two factors identified in the right-hand column of the Sentencing Guideline table which would militate in favour of an immediate custodial sentence. The judge identified the risk and said it was manageable in the circumstances, and identified what he described as a realistic prospect of rehabilitation but that is where his balancing exercise ended. The Solicitor General submits that that balancing exercise is flawed because it does not address the risk to future intimate partners. Moreover, the judge fails to explain how he treated the factors on the right-hand side of the sentencing table which were present
In response, in concise, realistic and persuasive submissions Mr Harry Martin accepts that the term of the custodial sentence at 30 months before plea discount was, in his words, "merciful" but submits that it was properly open to the judge and not unduly lenient. Mr Martin makes the point that the judge was clearly influenced in this case by the fact that the offender had in fact spent 7 months in custody before he was sentenced and had therefore been punished to a substantial extent already. That is a factor, says Mr Martin, which judges frequently take into account when deciding to suspend sentences. They take the view that the suspended sentenced, with its additional requirements, will include some positive corrective elements which would be lacking in a prison sentence and given that some immediate imprisonment has already been served, those additional requirements become more attractive. We are grateful to both counsel for the way they have put the case.
Discussion and decision
We approach this Reference on the basis that the real complaint is that this sentence should not have been suspended. We put to Ms Newcombe the possibility that if the judge's sentence of 27 months had been imposed as an immediate sentence it is unlikely that the Solicitor General would have sought to refer it. Ms Newcombe entirely correctly, in our view, accepted that that proposition was probably right.
We will therefore deal first with the second submission that the Solicitor General makes, which is that this sentence, whatever its length, ought not to have been suspended. The judge, as we have said, in summarising the approach to sentence that he took and the submissions that the parties make about it, placed a lot of weight on what he decided were high prospects of rehabilitation. We consider that that assessment involved a somewhat optimistic assessment of the likely behaviour in future times of this offender when he is at liberty. Although judges may be entitled to err on the side of optimism, in a case where the assessment involves the application of the Imposition Guideline, they should, in our judgment, explain why the factors on the right-hand column of the Guideline table do not undermine those prospects of rehabilitation. That did not happen. In our judgment, the judge fell into error in failing to balance all the factors in the Guideline table including in particular those on the right-hand side of the table. These are:
"• Offender presents a risk to any person
• The seriousness of the offence means that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody
• History of poor compliance with court orders AND unlikely to comply in the future."
The first and third of those bullet points directly bear upon whether the prospects of rehabilitation, which are a factor in the left-hand column, are properly determined as being decisive. If the offender continues to present a risk that will undermine any suggestion that rehabilitation is a realistic possibility. Equally, the history of poor compliance with court orders would have the same effect. It is true in this case that there is not a history of poor compliance with any orders made by the courts of England and Wales because he has no previous convictions here. However, his reaction to his convictions in Italy is directly relevant to whether that third bullet point applies or not. It is also highly relevant, in our judgment, to whether his prospects of rehabilitation are strong or not. It was incumbent upon the judge to address those matters. The central bullet point relates to the seriousness of the offence. This was, in our judgment, a very serious offence of controlling and coercive behaviour, as the judge acknowledged. The judge did not explain why that very high level of seriousness did not require an immediate custodial sentence and did not deal expressly with that importantfactor in the Guideline table. We consider, therefore, that the judge fell into error at that point of his sentencing exercise. The court was here dealing with a man with an ingrained way of behaving within his family. He was quite unable to control himself in that environment, even when it must have been clear to him that he was causing a great deal of harm both to his female partner and to their son. He showed by his behaviour outside the family that he knows how to behave but that chooses to act differently with them. This behaviour continued against the same victims even after the significant intervention of the Italian criminal justice system. The fact that he lived an outwardly good life and concealed his criminality within the family from others with whom he dealt does not mitigate the behaviour at all; indeed it tends to undermine the suggestion that he presents no risk and will comply with court orders. The fact that he behaves well when away from the family and when in prison is not a substantial reassurance when considering how he may behave if he finds himself in any further family environment.
In our judgment, this offending was so serious that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate imprisonment. In failing to arrive at that conclusion, we consider that the judge fell into error, which means that we should approach the sentencing exercise afresh and to determine for ourselves what the appropriate sentence ought to be in this case. We acknowledge that the judge was influenced by the relevant fact that the offender had spent 7 months on remand awaiting sentence. The sentence which he imposed would involve release at the 50 per cent point. That is because this offence is excluded from the change in the earlier release provisions which was made by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Requisite and Minimum Custodial Periods) Order 2024 which excludes this offence and any change in the early release provisions from 50 per cent to 40 per cent. The 7 months which the offender had spent on remand therefore equates to a term of approximately 15 months' imprisonment.
We agree that there are cases where this factor may properly tip the balance in favour of suspending a sentence. A judge is entitled in an appropriate case to consider that the immediate depravation of liberty which has already taken place is sufficient to mean that the court may more appropriately deal with the future risk and rehabilitation of an offender by imposing a suspended sentence with various requirements, which is what the judge did in this case. Here however the difference between the time served and the time which would be served under an immediate sentence is such that we do not agree that the judge should have given the weight that he did to the time spent on remand before sentence.
We therefore approach the sentencing of this case afresh, and we begin by considering what term of imprisonment ought to have been imposed in relation to count 1. We have set out the facts of the case and the judge's approach to it and the aggravating and mitigating factors which fell to be balanced. We agree with the judge in all that he said about the seriousness of the offence and about those factors. Where we part company with him at this stage in this Reference is that we consider that there should have been a substantial increase in the starting point. We propose to impose in respect of count 1 a sentence of 3½ years' imprisonment from which a discount for the late plea will be made of 5 months. That means that the sentence will be one of 37 months. A concurrent term of 4 months' imprisonment for count 3 will also be imposed. We do not consider that no separate penalty is an appropriate way of dealing with criminality of this kind. That substantial increase in the starting point has particular regard to these factors which we shall identify again for convenience. First, the duration of the offending. It took place over a decade. It was in reality a continuation of behaviour which had lasted over a period of 18 months before being interrupted by the Italian conviction and the separation which followed that. Secondly, the frequency of actual violence during the whole of that period. Controlling and coercive behaviour as an offence does not require any actual violence at all. As the Sentencing Guideline makes clear, the threat of violence is enough to take the case into a high category. Where there is actual violence and very frequent actual violence, that will place the case in an altogether higher category than otherwise. Thirdly, the very serious harm to both of the victims of the offending. The offender's son’s whole life has been blighted by this behaviour and the effect upon the rest of his life is simply unknowable but may be profound. We must hope not. Fourthly, the previous convictions for offending in precisely the same way against the same woman required a significant increase. Fifthly, the risk that this offender presents to anyone with whom he lives is high. That also should have been reflected in an increase in the custodial term. We hope that his former female partner and their child will now keep well away from him and will be protected by the restraining orders. That does not mean that there will not be other partners and other victims. Sixthly and finally, the sentence for count 1 required significant weighting to reflect the disgraceful behaviour of the final incident which was the substance of count 3. That was dealt with by no separate penalty; we prefer to deal with it with a concurrent sentence. But whichever of those two routes is taken the sentence on count 1 needs to be longer because of count 3 than it would have been if count 3 had not been there. That was itself and on its own a disgraceful effort to humiliate his victim in public and to terrify her. For all those reasons we consider that the sentence on count 1 should have been a term of 37 months with a concurrent sentence of 4 months for count 3. In those circumstances, no question of suspending the sentence arises. We have already explained it would have been wrong to suspend it in any way.
We ought to deal with the question of what is sometimes called "double jeopardy". That was recently considered by this Court in R v X,Y and Z [2026] EWCA Crim 845 at [168]. The Court there considered that in appropriate cases a mitigating factor may be found in any period of delay between the imposition of the sentence and the hearing of the Reference and may be found in the fact that someone may have been given a non-custodial sentence and may now be going into prison, particularly where that is for the first time. This may cause additional distress. Further, where the person has during the period of time before the Reference is determined been subject to the provisions of a community order, then an allowance may be required on that account alone depending upon the extent of any co-operation with the terms of that order. We should therefore address that and in that context we record that we have seen a pre-appeal report from the Probation Service which records that in the first few weeks after the sentence was passed there was a degree of positive engagement by the offender with the Probation Service. However that has now entirely finished and the offender has left the jurisdiction. He appears to have been abroad now for some time and has entirely disengaged with the Probation Service and evinces no intention whatever to complete any of the rest of the terms of that suspended sentence order. In those circumstances, two observations may be made. First, quite clearly, no adjustment should be made to the sentence which we have indicated to reflect this potential mitigating factor which is absent in this case. Secondly, the behaviour of the offender, although obviously unknowable to the sentencing judge, tends to confirm our determination that his assessment of the prospects of rehabilitation was indeed optimistic.
Conclusion
The sentences imposed in respect of count 1 and count 3 of this indictment are therefore quashed. In respect of count 1 on the indictment there will be an immediate term of imprisonment of 37 months. In respect of count 3 there will be a concurrent term of imprisonment of 4 months. All the other orders, in particular the restraining orders made by the judge, are unaffected by the outcome of this Reference.
THE VICE-PRESIDENT: Does that deal with everything that needs to be dealt with?
MS NEWCOMBE: My Lord, I have a custody suite readily to name.
THE VICE-PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
MS NEWCOMBE: Whatever would come from that.
THE VICE-PRESIDENT: It will have to appear in the warrant that the Registrar will have to sign so we do need to know. What is it?
MS NEWCOMBE: It is the Compass House Police Custody Centre in Gloucester.
THE VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you. That can be communicated to the Registrar who will prepare the documentation. What shall thereafter happen we shall wait to see. Obviously there is no purpose in these circumstances of explaining the effect of that sentence to the offender which avoids the necessity to grapple yet again with the early release provisions. Thank you both very much indeed for your help. The appellant is to surrender by 4 o'clock this afternoon.
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