Darren Osment v R

This is an appeal against conviction with leave of the single judge who gave leave to appeal on what was Ground 7 of the Perfected Grounds of Appeal He refused leave on grounds 1-6. The appellant now renews those applications for leave to appeal on grounds 1-4 and does not renew the applications in respect of grounds 5 and 6.

On 11 December 2023 in the Crown Court at Bristol, before Mrs Justice Cutts the appellant (then aged 41) was convicted by a majority of 10 to 2 of the murder of Claire Holland. On 20 December 2023 he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 20 years, less 503 days spent on remand.

Claire Holland, was not seen alive after 6 June 2012, when she was 32. Her body was never found. Her phone was not used again after that time, and her bank was not accessed. There was no evidence to suggest that she was still alive. The prosecution case was that she was dead, having been murdered by the appellant on the night she disappeared. She had spent much of the evening at the Seamus O’Donnell’s public house in Bristol. She left there at closing time and, so far as the evidence revealed, was never seen again. The prosecution case was that she was planning to meet the appellant when she left the pub, and that she did so. It was alleged that the appellant had killed her and in some way disposed of the body. The prosecution adduced evidence that he had admitted as much to a number of people on different occasions over a number of years. Much of that evidence was not disputed.

Ground 7 contends that there was a significant disclosure failure that only came to light post-conviction. The prosecution failed to disclose that a male called Charles Franklin, who was present in the Seamus O’Donnell’s on the night when Claire Holland went missing, and who was known to have bought her a drink, was subsequently convicted of rape. The victim of the rape had been a lone female who was vulnerable due to excess drinking, was threatened during the rape and thought she would be killed. The rape occurred on 4 November 2012 in a part of Bristol not very far from the Seamus O’Donnell’s. Franklin was convicted following a trial in 2014 and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The facts of that offence were known to the police investigating the appellant, but not disclosed prior to his trial. This ground contends that had they been known, evidence of Franklin’s conviction would have been adduced before the jury under section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) as bad character evidence of a non-defendant and that the absence of this evidence renders the conviction unsafe.

The renewed grounds are as follows:-

Ground 1 – The judge erred in failing to exclude evidence from an undercover police officer, known at trial as ‘Paddy’, in whole, or in part, following a lengthy voir dire. As the trial progressed, the grounds for excluding the evidence were strengthened by the evidence called during the trial.

Ground 2 – The judge erred in not admitting the expert evidence of Professor Ghisli Gudjonsson, a clinical psychologist during the voir dire. The evidence was directly relevant to the consideration of the reliability of the confession evidence obtained by ‘Paddy’.

Ground 3 - The judge erred in not admitting the expert evidence of Professor Gudjonsson during the trial itself. The evidence was directly relevant to jury’s assessment of whether the confession evidence obtained by ‘Paddy’ was or may have been unreliable in its nature.

Ground 4 – The judge erred in refusing to admit any expert psychological evidence based upon joint reports of Professor Oxburgh and Professor McManus during the trial.

In cases where the alleged victim of murder has never been found, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that she is dead and that she did not die by her own hand, nor by accident, nor of natural causes. Proof of these matters is often by inference from the known circumstances. Once those facts are established the enquiry turns to show who killed her. There was therefore a body of evidence about events leading up to her disappearance.

Claire Holland had four children, one with the appellant and three from other relationships. At the material time her relationship with the appellant had come to an end. The child she shared with the appellant (“C”) is the one who features prominently in the case. The prosecution case was that the appellant was angry with Ms Holland because C had been taken into care and removed to live with Ms Holland’s aunt many miles away on 28 May 2012, a week or so prior to her disappearance. She no longer had care of any of her children at the date of her disappearance. One of them, not C, lived with her mother, “D”.

Evidence from her family about Ms Holland’s plans and hopes as at June 2012 was adduced to show that she was not suicidal. She had just moved into a new flat and hoped that eventually she could have care of her children again. She was an alcoholic, but had begun a programme to help stop drinking. Her mother had last seen her on 2 June 2012. Her mother was due to meet her on 7 June at the contact centre. Ms Holland had supervised visits to see D. She did not arrive. A social worker called her, but she did not answer.

Her sister, Sarah, last saw her on 5 June, the day before her disappearance. Sarah said she was happy and optimistic. She was happy she was talking to their mother again and proud that she was going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and getting certificates. They spoke about C and who he would live with. Ms Holland told her sister that the appellant blamed her for not knowing where C was going to live, or that he was being taken into care.

Ms Holland’s other sister, Rachel, visited the new flat in May. Rachel said that Ms Holland was excited about getting new furniture. Rachel was due to spend the night at the flat on 8 June and messaged Ms Holland on 4 June to check it was still ok to visit. She replied on 5 June that she was looking forward to it. On 7 June Rachel contacted her sister but got no reply. Rachel travelled to the flat the next day, but no one was there.

Ms Holland was due to visit the contact centre to see D on 12 June and again she failed to attend. On 14 June she was reported missing by her sister Sarah.

Ms Holland and the appellant were in a relationship and C was born in November 2010. 10 days later, police were called to their address. Ms Holland told the police that the appellant had pushed her down the stairs. She had slight reddening to her face and a small lump on her forehead. Her eyes were glazed and her speech slurred and had red on her lip from red wine. The officer noticed graze marks on the appellant’s knuckles and arrested him. A few days after the incident, two social workers and two officers attended the address to remove C from the care of his parents. In February 2012 plans were made to place C in the appellant’s mother’s care. However, his mother contacted social services and said she was unable to care for C due to a breakdown in her relationship with the appellant. She described an incident where she had to collect the appellant’s sister, and the appellant asked her to bring him cigarettes on her return home. When she returned without them, he got angry and hit his sister. At trial, the defence called the appellant’s sister who contradicted this and said he had not hit her.

At the end of February 2012, social services spoke to Ms Holland’s aunt, who had volunteered to be C’s long-term carer. Both parents were contacted about the idea and the appellant said he was thinking of putting himself forward. In April, the appellant said he did not feel in a position to comment on the proposed plans, because it was his own fault C was in care.

Ms Holland’s mother explained that when C moved to live with Claire’s aunt, Claire was upset because she did not get to say goodbye and she said she would have to meet the appellant to tell him about it. Phone records for 29 May, the day after C was moved to Torquay, showed that Ms Holland had tried to call the appellant, but she had no credit on her phone.

Ms Davies, a social worker, was responsible for assisting when C was first taken into care. She supervised some contact sessions for C with his parents. She described their relationship as very volatile, involving domestic violence. After they split up, Ms Holland started a new relationship and went on to give birth to a fourth child. Ms Davies helped her get her flat and described her as very happy. She recalled her telling her that she was going to meet the appellant to discuss C. Ms Davies advised her to meet in public due to their history.

CCTV footage obtained as part of the investigation showed Ms Holland outside the pub at 15:47 on 6 June. It provides timings for some of the events described by witnesses. The landlord of the pub, Paul Bayford, said the appellant was a regular and that when he and Ms Holland were together, they used to visit most days after work. Once they split, the appellant remained a regular, however she did not visit the pub again, until the afternoon of 6 June. He described her as happy, if a bit over the top. She told him she was meeting the appellant that evening and was going to buy some nice clothes to make herself look nice for him. During the course of the afternoon, she drank a pint of Guinness and glasses of wine. CCTV also showed her purchasing a phone top up at a close by newsagent at 16:07. Phone records showed that she made a two-minute call to the appellant at 16:09 after she had returned to the pub. Thereafter she made a seven-minute call to her sister, Rachel. During the call she told Rachel that she was at the pub and was going to meet the appellant later to discuss C. Rachel said she sounded happy and positive. She did not respond to any other attempt to contact her and the last activity on her phone was at 16:47 that day.

Emma Walters, the barmaid, arrived at the pub at 17:30. She had known Ms Holland from when she and the appellant used to attend the pub while they were together. Ms Holland said she had got a flat and that she was meeting the appellant after he finished work. She left the pub at 18:34 and returned shortly after 21:30. While away, other evidence showed her near some shops and making the last ever withdrawal from her bank account at 20:44. The bank continued to receive routine payments, but Ms Holland never sought to access any of this money.

When she returned, Ms Holland asked Emma Walters to look through her bag because she had lost her purse and keys. Emma Walters did, but did not find the keys or a phone in the bag. By that time, Ms Holland only had some change on her and others in the pub advised her to save the money for a bus home. One regular, Charlie Franklin, bought her a drink. Mr Bayford said she left the pub alone around 23:00 to 23:15, closing time, as did Charlie Franklin; prior to leaving she said she was going to meet the appellant.

Two regulars of the pub also remembered her in the pub that evening. One bought her a drink and described her as chirpy and excitable, if a little annoying. She told both regulars that she was meeting the appellant later that evening.

The next day, 7 June, the appellant went to the pub. Paul Bayford told the appellant that Ms Holland had been in the night before and said she was meeting the appellant. The appellant said he had no intention of meeting her and did not meet her, he had been working late. The appellant was described as light-hearted and happy. Other people in the pub spoke to the appellant after she was reported missing and asked him if he had heard anything. The appellant said he had not and denied meeting her on 6 June.

As part of the missing person inquiry in 2012, telephone and other evidence was gathered, including statements from Ms Holland’s family and CCTV footage. Her flat was visited by the police on 15, 18 and 29 June, she was not there. The flat was ordered and tidy and there was no sign of a struggle or blood. The appellant was spoken to, and he confirmed that he had not met her: he had a call from her but did not know where she was. The officer noted that phone data showed she had called the appellant at 16:09 on 6 June and the appellant confirmed that she had then asked to meet him, and he declined. The appellant spoke to the police again a few days later and confirmed that he had spoken to her on 3 June about their son. He said again that she rang him on 6 June to meet but he was working and that he then called her at 22:00 when he finished work and received no answer. As a result, he walked back home alone.

The Seamus O’Donnell’s is very near the river. On 20 June a search was carried out by specialist divers but nothing of relevance was found. The police divers, a harbourmaster, a chartered marine biologist and a pathologist gave evidence at trial as to how and where a body might end up if it fell into the harbour and the likelihood of it being found. One officer said in his experience, there had never been an occasion when a body had gone into the floating harbour and not been found. If someone fell into the New Cut, a tidal river, the body could flow out towards the sea and might never be found; however, the harbourmaster gave evidence that he had never known either a body or pet, that had fallen into the harbour and then into the river, get carried out to sea and thought it very unlikely a body from the main part of the harbour could be dragged out to sea.

On 14 August, the appellant attended the police station at their request and provided a statement. Within it he said he worked at the Richmond Pub, but that Ms Holland did not know that. He said that he kept in contact with her for the sake of their son C, but that he last saw her in February 2012 and last heard from her on 6 June when she called him and asked to meet. He said that he did not meet her and walked home after work.

On 3 September the police returned to the flat. There were no signs she had returned and none of the clothing she was seen wearing on CCTV was there. The officer noted that the evidence suggested that she had left the flat on 6 June and never returned.

The case was reviewed again in December 2013, and it was noted that the likely explanation was that she fell or jumped into the docks and the body had not been found.

In the years that followed Ms Holland’s disappearance, the appellant made several confessions to people as to what had happened to her, including to the police in 2019. The ‘confessions’ were as follows:

In early 2013 or 2014, the appellant told Adrian Mulcahy, a man who he was sharing a house with at the time, that he killed Ms Holland by strangling her and disposing of her body off the docks in Avonmouth in Bristol because he was unable to see his son. He showed Adrian Mulcahy a picture of his son, C, and said he strangled her at a flat in Filton, borrowed a car and dumped her body. He said he drank a lot on a regular basis because he could not deal with what he had done. The appellant later went on to have a relationship with Adrian Mulcahy’s sister, Selina, and they had a child together. Adrian Mulcahy said he did not speak to the police about the incident until the police asked to speak to him in 2019.

At the end of 2018, the appellant used to frequent the Nelson Pub in Topsham with his then partner, Selina. One of the regulars at the pub was Michael Salway. One evening whilst drinking, Mr Salway told the appellant about a false allegation a woman had made. Mr Salway said that the appellant then told him that he (the appellant) had paid someone £500 to execute the mother of his child. Mr Salway thought the appellant was boasting in drink and did not believe him.

On 28 July 2019 the appellant made a 999 call to the police in the early hours of the morning. During that call the appellant said he wanted to hand himself in for murder; said he wanted it off his back as it had been years. He said he had a child with a woman and they had had a row and he was struggling. He said he drank every day to bury it, and that he was not a bad person but his “missus” had the child taken off her and he was working as a chef at the time and he had taken the law into his own hands. She had taken his son away so he took her life from her. Police attended the scene, and the appellant again said that his missus had his son taken away seven years ago in Bristol, she was not right in the head and when asked what he had done said “I had her killed”. The appellant then told the police that he gave some money to someone, and they killed her.

The appellant was arrested and taken to the police station where he was seen by a social worker and a nurse. He told the social worker that he had nothing left to lose, hence disclosing what he had done. The nurse noted that he was of sound mind and had capacity to make decisions and understand the consequences. The appellant reported that his mood had dropped in the last six to eight weeks, when his relationship with his current partner ended and that he turned to alcohol more. The appellant said that he and his former partner were both alcoholics and their son was taken into care. He said he knew by telling the police he had murdered her that he would be arrested, and at the time of the call he was in a state of distress and made the statement about murder purely to get arrested to keep himself safe.

The appellant was interviewed several times on 28 and 29 July 2019. He told the police he did not remember speaking to the officers, said he called 999 for his own safety because he was going to kill himself and wanted someone to speak to and to get off the streets so he could sleep without fear of being stabbed. His life was falling apart because he was drinking too much. He was out of a job and unable to see his son. He then said that he did not pay to have her killed. He said he had had little contact with her once they broke up. He said that on 6 June he was working at the Richmond pub from 10:00 to 22:00 as a chef and lived around a 25-minute walk away. After finishing his shift he would have a pint and then walk home. He drew his route on a map. He said he did not have access to a car. He did not remember speaking to Ms Holland on 6 June, and if he did it would have been short conversations because he would have been busy. He would not have given her the address where he worked, he did not know why she wanted to meet him and did not arrange to meet her. He said he had moved to Exeter to be closer to C.

Police spoke to Selina Mulcahy, as a witness, on 30 July 2019. She said the appellant was not in a good place at the time; he was homeless with no job and drinking and they had split up. The appellant knew that she was going to get a court order against him; he drank a lot and often got heavy handed. He would often drink at 07:00 and was a different person when drinking. They had been in a relationship for five years. In 2015 an incident occurred where he trashed her flat. He told her that if she contacted the police that would be it. She said she never called the police about him because he told her that if anyone took him away from his son, they would not be around much longer. He told her it would be easy to get rid of her body, and no one would ever find it. He also told her that he could get someone to do to her what had been done to Ms Holland. All of it was said in drink. She had never really spoken to him about Ms Holland but had heard him on the phone to his mother saying that if she stopped him seeing their son she would ‘go down exactly the same way as she went’.

The police spoke to her again in August 2022, after the appellant had been arrested and charged with murder. She was asked what the appellant had told her about Ms Holland. Selina told the police that she was told by a family member that the appellant may have killed her and when she asked him about it, the appellant said why would he get his own hands dirty when he could pay someone to do it. On another occasion, when he was drunk, she asked him where Ms Holland was, and he said he had paid someone to kill her. She did not believe him because he had been drinking. She said she knew the appellant was hiding something from her throughout their relationship, but she was not sure what it was.

Selina was spoken to a final time in March 2023. She told the police that throughout their relationship the appellant said he had visions of putting her in a box and twice said she could end up where Ms Holland was. He said that he could get the person to do to her what he had done to her. She described several occasions when the appellant was violent towards her, including strangling her with a tea towel. On that occasion the appellant had called the police himself because he said he was worried about what he might do. She said after the incident in Exeter in 2019 they got back together, and she continued to see him until their son was born in February 2021. In June 2021 they split up again. Due to the ongoing investigation about the appellant’s involvement in Ms Holland’s disappearance, social services became involved when she got pregnant, and in June she was told she should have no contact with the appellant.

Following the account given by the appellant as to his route home on 6 June, CCTV footage that had been gathered as part of the missing person investigation in 2012 was reviewed; however, it did not assist with the appellant’s movements and Ms Holland was not identified on it.

Ms Holland’s mobile phone activity showed that she had one phone and most activity on it stopped on 6 June at 16:34. The handset was never recovered. Banking activity was also obtained. It showed several withdrawals from her bank account on 6 June but no further activity on her account after 20:44. The fob for the laundry room in her flat was last used at 13:30 on 6 June. At 14:08 Ms Holland messaged her half-sister on Facebook, and said she was buying a new bed.

In December 2020 Paddy O’Hara, an undercover officer (“UCO”), was deployed in the investigation. Between December 2020 and July 2022 the UCO spent a lot of time with the appellant and recorded each interaction. Their interactions involved criminal enterprises, set up by the UCO and more social interactions. The relationship was designed so that the UCO presented as a friend and someone the appellant could trust. Over 1,275 hours of interactions took place. These involved the UCO befriending the appellant and providing him with financial support. The UCO purported to be linked to an organised crime group which was involved in counterfeit goods, stolen vehicles, hiding and retrieving firearms and pretending to have been involved in an assassination in the past.

These conversations took place between the UCO and the appellant:

On 22 March 2022 the appellant went to the police station as arranged and was arrested and cautioned for the murder of Claire Holland. The appellant said that he had a drink and drug problem at the time, he did not remember what he said in Exeter or how he had got to Bristol. He was interviewed later in the presence of a solicitor and provided a prepared statement, thereafter answering no comment to all questions asked. Following the interviews, he was bailed. On 14 June he was told that he had been released under investigation and was no longer on bail. Both his arrest and release were orchestrated events timed when he was known to be with Paddy to encourage possible ‘leakage’ He was arrested again in August 2022 and interviewed a further three times. At the point of his arrest, he nominated ‘Paddy’ as the person he would like to be informed. The appellant provided three prepared statements and answered no comment.

Daniel Lewis, who was on remand at Bristol Prison with the appellant in summer 2023, gave evidence that whilst on remand together, the appellant discussed his impending trial. Daniel Lewis said he asked the appellant if he loved his ex, and the appellant said he could not stand her as she was an ‘alcoholic cunt’. When asked if he had killed her the appellant shook his head and shrugged his shoulders. Daniel Lewis said he told the appellant that his body language would give him away if he stood trial. The appellant later approached Daniel Lewis and asked if he could make him look less guilty and they discussed matters further. Daniel Lewis said the appellant said matters caught up with him because a few years back he had argued with his then girlfriend’s brother and during the argument he said he would make Adrian disappear because he had done it before; the appellant also said he had told an undercover officer some stuff thinking the officer was a friend.

Daniel Lewis said that the appellant then explained that Ms Holland had called him one day when he was at work and asked him to return because their son C was being taken into care. When he arrived home his son was taken away and placed with Ms Holland’s aunt. Soon after that he was working in a pub when she called him to explain the placement in Bristol had broken down and C was being relocated. She wanted to speak to him, but he initially told her he was busy. She then called again, and he said he would meet her after work. The appellant said he knew in drink Ms Holland would not be able to give him a fight. They arranged to meet by a park. When they met, they argued, and she struck him. The next thing he knew, he strangled her. The appellant then explained that they did not have the body due to ‘knife skills’. The reference to ‘knife skills’ was not contained within Daniel Lewis’ witness statement - but had been widely reported by the media following the prosecution opening, see [38(vi)].

Daniel Lewis accepted he had an agreement with the prosecution for giving evidence. He had spoken to his lawyers about the likely sentence for his drug charges, he had already served a lot of time on remand and there may be a reduction in his sentence, but he did not think by lots.

Dr Krljes, a clinical psychologist instructed by the prosecution, said the appellant had a below average IQ of 82, but not in the learning disability range. Dr Halsey, a clinical psychologist instructed by the defence, said the appellant’s IQ was 79. Both agreed the difference was not significant. Both psychologists found that the appellant’s responses to the Gudjonsson test for suggestibility were in the normal limits. He was not therefore susceptible to “yield”, i.e. to give in to another’s leading questions. He was susceptible to “shift”, when a person is put under pressure within a police investigation, they will change their answers in response to the questioner.

Dr Krljes assessed the appellant against the Paulhus Deception scale. The appellant’s score on the self-perception score was average (i.e. whether the individual lies to themselves). His score on the impression management score was much lower than average, indicating that he would fake a bad profile and presented himself as particularly bad to others, unfeeling and unlikeable.

Other tests indicated that the appellant presented himself in a particularly negative way and his score on one subscale, which looked at exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms, the appellant’s score was significantly higher than one would expect. Other tests related to attempts to underperform and symptom validity testing. The psychologist said that the suggestibility test was the only one and was designed for police interviews. She had looked at three transcripts of the appellant’s conversations with Paddy and said she could see no example of a classic interrogation scenario.

Dr Halsey was instructed on behalf of the appellant. He had considered the IQ scores and an additional test used by Dr Krljes, a premorbid test. The appellant’s score on that test raised questions of whether the appellant was underperforming, because there was a difference in scores. However, that could be due to long-term misuse of alcohol, use of cannabis and because at the time of the test, the appellant had been prescribed antidepressant medication which often results in lower scores on cognitive tests. On another test the appellant’s score indicated a high level of depression, which was unsurprising as he had been diagnosed with depression and was on medication. As to suggestibility, Dr Halsey found the same suggestibility shift as Dr Krljes and said the appellant had a heightened tendency to alter his previous answer due to interpersonal pressure. Dr Halsey’s view was that when considering the exchanges between Paddy and the appellant, one should look for when Paddy asked a question, obtained an answer, indicated it was wrong, then repeated the question and obtained a different answer from the appellant. His view was that the appellant was anxious in interview and vague. He was not overtly acquiescent to suggestive questions but tended to shift to negative feedback and interpersonal pressure and Dr Halsey’s opinion was that there was considerable doubt as to the reliability of the comments made by the appellant to the UCO.

Dr Jayawickrama and Dr Sandford, consultant forensic psychiatrists, examined the appellant and agreed he did not suffer from a major mental illness, a neurodevelopmental disorder or significant personality disorder. He did suffer from alcohol dependency disorder with associated depression and anxiety. Dr Jayawickrama’s opinion was it was highly likely that, over the operative period of the undercover operation, the appellant was suffering from depression and anxiety, was dependent on alcohol and using illicit drugs. The combination of that, with social isolation triggered the appellant to be more vulnerable to alter his behaviour when faced with interpersonal pressure. It was also possible that alcohol alone contributed to the way the appellant interacted with others, including providing false disclosures about his involvement with Ms Holland. Based on the results of the suggestibility test administered by Dr Halsey, Dr Jaywickrama was of the view the appellant had a heightened vulnerability to suggestibility.

Dr Sandford’s opinion was that because there was no mental illness or state other than produced by alcohol or drugs, there was no role for a psychiatrist in the case. The suggestibility test results, and other factors were for a jury to consider. The anxiety and depression were relevant factors in considering the appellant’s reliability, but there was no research that said people with alcohol dependency and anxiety and are more likely to give unreliable accounts than others.

In addition, Professor McManus and Professor Oxburgh had reviewed the undercover material on behalf of the defence and reported jointly. Professor McManus gave the evidence on the voir dire. They were both academics, rather than clinical psychologists. Neither had examined the appellant, however they had access to the vast quantity of recorded material between the appellant and Paddy. Professor McManus’ view was that there was a risk of confirmation bias on the part of Paddy because the use of tactics were specifically designed to extract admissions from the appellant; there were significant similarities with the risks identified in R v Stagg WL 17112471. Because the Codes of Practice did not apply, there was a risk in using closed, forced choice, leading and multiple questions, and those were used in the course of the exchanges; that the appellant needed a sense of belonging, had low self-esteem and was lonely and isolated were features that should be considered when considering how the appellant was impacted by his relationship with Paddy; three forms of false confessions had been identified and it was the second, ‘coerced-compliant false confessions’ which applied to the case.

The defence case was that the appellant did not kill Ms Holland and that the jury could not be sure that she was even dead. She had gone missing before, her passport was not recovered, and it was not unknown for a person to disappear and subsequently reappear later. Even if they concluded that she was dead, the evidence did not exclude the possibility of suicide, accident or murder by an unrelated third party. The confession evidence was unreliable and untrue.

The appellant gave evidence that:

The appellant’s mother and sister also gave evidence at trial about the appellant’s relationship with Ms Holland, social services’ involvement with C and events leading up to the disappearance.

There was also evidence of a sighting of Ms Holland on 6 June 2012 which did not fit with the prosecution case, from a witness who said that Ms Holland was in a good mood that evening.

Dr Fegan-Earl, a pathologist, was also called on behalf of the defence to establish how difficult it would be to dismember a body and leave no trace and to establish how a body could decompose in open water.

On the voir dire it was submitted that the appellant’s confessions to the UCO Paddy should be excluded under section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the confessions having been obtained by oppression and that any confession was likely to be unreliable as a consequence of what was said and done by the UCO in the circumstances of the time, including that the appellant suffered from alcohol dependency syndrome with associate mixed depression and anxiety disorder. It was further submitted that the undercover operation was fundamentally flawed and this should lead to the exclusion of the confession evidence. Several experts had been relied on, including Dr Jayawickrama, Dr Halsey and Professor McManus.

In addition, the defence sought to call Professor Gudjonsson, a forensic clinical psychologist.It was said that his evidence was admissible in relation to the reliability of the appellant’s confessions. His expertise was different to that of the other experts; he was a clinical forensic psychologist and was uniquely placed to consider the matters reported by the other experts. It was his definition of vulnerability that was relied on by others and thus he could assist on the way the test was developed.

The Prosecution had relied on Dr Sandford and Dr Krljes. They objected to the admissibility of Professor Gudjonsson’s evidence. His eminence was irrelevant in the case. He had been given too little material to enable him to provide expert evidence. He had not examined the appellant and had not listened to any of the recordings of the meetings with Paddy. Conducting a peer review did not make his opinion admissible. In addition, it was said the Professor had addressed topics within his report that were less about the psychology and more his theories about them.

The Judge ruledthat the evidence of Professor Gudjonsson was inadmissible. Professor Gudjonsson, who had devised the suggestibility test applied to the appellant in the case was unable to accept instructions at the start of the proceedings because of time constraints. Closer to the trial, he indicated he could conduct a peer review of the expert reports obtained. He had not interviewed or conducted tests on the appellant, and his conclusions and opinions were based on his reading and review of the reports and documents provided

The legal framework on expert evidence was set out in the Criminal Practice Directions, paragraph 7.12. Several cases had considered the admissibility of evidence from experts, including R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555 and Pora v New Zealand [2015] UKPC 9. Pora involved the admissibility of a report by Professor Gudjonsson in relation to confessions which the appellant sought to introduce into the appeal as fresh evidence. Whilst Professor Gudjonsson was eminent in the field of suggestibility and police confessions, he had been given insufficient material upon which to base his opinion. The defence had called two psychologists and a psychiatrist who had either examined the appellant and conducted tests upon him or had considered a substantial amount of material. His evidence would not add to the psychological material before the court. No one had suggested that the suggestibility test was wrongly applied and both prosecution and defence psychologists found the appellant susceptible to ‘shift’, but not ‘yield’.

This ruling applied equally to evidence from Professor Gudjonsson on the voir dire and before the jury during the trial. In the result, he did not give evidence at all.

The single judge said this about Grounds 2 and 3:

You submit that the Judge erred in not admitting the expert evidence of Prof Ghisli Gudjonsson, a clinical psychologist. However:

(i)

Leaving Prof Gudjonsson aside, you had obtained evidence from a psychiatrist and three psychologists (one clinical psychologist Prof Halsey, and two academic psychologists Profs Oxburgh and McManus). The psychiatrist and the clinical psychologist examined you: the other two psychologists did not examine you, but were provided with a large volume of transcripts of the contact between you and the UCO. The Crown instructed a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist, both of whom had examined you.

(ii)

The clinical psychologists tested you for suggestibility using the Gudjonsson test, a test devised by Prof Gudjonsson. You were found by them to be susceptible to “shift” (i.e. to change your responses following consistent negative feedback to previous answers), but not to “yield” (i.e. to leading questions).

(iii)

It was common ground, accepted by the Judge, that Prof Gudjonsson is pre-eminent in the field of confessions and suggestibility.

(iv)

Prof Gudjonsson was unable to take instructions earlier because of other work, but was asked to peer review the work of the other experts. He did not interview or conduct any tests on you. He did not review the undercover documents or recordings. His report was based on the other expert reports, the defence skeleton argument for the applications concerning the admission of his evidence, and a summary of the UCO material.

(v)

It was your case on the application that the nature and depth of Prof Gudjonsson’s expertise was different from the other experts, and he was uniquely placed to assist the court in understanding the importance of the “shift” reading identified by the other experts on which, in his view, there had been too “narrow” a focus.

(vi)

However, the Judge was unarguably entitled to conclude (as she did) that the jury, as arbiters of fact, had to consider the agreed view of the clinical psychologists – that you were susceptible to “shift” – in the light of all the evidence, and Prof Gudjonsson’s view on that (essentially jury) question took the matter no further and was inadmissible. His proposed evidence either (a) covered the same ground as the experts already instructed, or (b) trespassed on the domain of the jury.

We agree. The judge was clearly right for the reasons she gave.

Counsel for the Defence submittedthat the 16 ‘confessions’ to Paddy should be excluded pursuant to s.76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence act 1984 on the basis the confessions were or may have been obtained by oppression and/or in consequence of anything said or done which was likely in the circumstances existing at the time to render unreliable any confession which might have been made by him in consequence thereof. In addition, it was submitted that the covert operation involved significant and substantial breaches of proper police conduct such that the admission of evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it, section 78 of the 1984 Act. It was submitted that the police were aware that the appellant had made four alleged confessions and that their inconsistency and lack of detail must have raised concerns as to their reliability; they were also aware of the appellant’s vulnerabilities; Paddy in effect interviewed the appellant with none of the usual safeguards and due to their nature and length, they were oppressive; the circumstances around some of the confessions were such that the confessions were likely to be unreliable, for example during a long journey, whilst the appellant had been drinking and mirroring tactics and direct questions were used.

Counsel for the Prosecution submitted that the operation was properly authorised and regularly reviewed. The jury were able to weigh the reliability of the evidence in the context of the relationship as the appellant perceived it. Whilst the appellant was a functioning alcoholic at the time of the operation and had the usual anxiety and depression associated with that, his vulnerabilities had been overstated. The appellant was not isolated, he spent hours playing pool with Paddy, there was evidence he was receiving money from drug dealing (cannabis) and he was often aggressive and had to be restrained by Paddy. On Dr Krjles evidence, there was a question over the validity of the psychological test result and ‘shift’ only became relevant in the context of a police interview where the same question was repeatedly asked with the answer being criticised. That did not happen. Paddy did not interview the appellant. The appellant did not suffer from any severe mental illness or disorder and did not require an appropriate adult in interview. Of note, by 17 May 2022, when the operation tactics were changed, the appellant had already made nine previous admissions.

The Judge ruledthat the evidence was admissible. The facts of Ms Holland’s disappearance and events that followed were set out including that in 2020 the police decided to mount an undercover operation to see what the appellant might tell them about it. The covert operations manager had made a witness statement to assist with the objectives of the operation. The objectives included ascertaining whether the appellant had any information or knowledge about the murder or disappearance of Ms Holland and to establish the location of her body. It was not suggested that the operation was unlawful.

The conversations with Paddy were all recorded and there was no room for doubt about what had been said and the context in which it was said. Paddy was acting under supervision. At an early stage he had wanted to use stronger tactics but was not permitted to do so. The operation lasted 20 months, during which the appellant showed a deep hatred of Ms Holland, blamed her for C going into care, and denied involvement with her disappearance. At other times he referred to her as dead that she would not see the light of day and made references to her and water, saying, for example, that her body was halfway to Spain. Other confessions were made to Paddy up until his arrest and charge, and a further confession allegedly made to an inmate once remanded into custody.

The judge summarised the expert evidence which had been admitted on the voir dire, as we have above. The appellant had been assessed by two clinical psychologists and two psychiatrists. At the voir dire, although not in the trial, there was also evidence from Professors McManus and Oxburgh.

The defence application relied largely on the appellant’s vulnerabilities, and the judge concluded the following:

The single judge said:-

You submit that the Judge erred in refusing your voir dire application to exclude the evidence of the UCO under sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (to which section 82 does not appear to add anything of substance) on the basis that, given your vulnerabilities, the covert operation went beyond the limits of what is permitted such that the material generated was unreliable and ought to have been excluded.

However:

(i)

The Judge clearly had the various statutory tests well in mind: she recited and discussed them at paragraph 49-53 of her Ruling. Rightly, you do not suggest that there were any errors in her approach.

(ii)

Your applications to exclude the UCO evidence were based to a large extent on your “vulnerabilities”, which the Judge dealt with, clearly and comprehensively, particularly in paragraphs 73-74 of her Ruling. She found that the operation was properly authorised, regularly reviewed and lawful. She concluded that you were suffering from no significant mental illness or psychiatric disorder at the material time, but you were suffering from alcohol dependence disorder with related depression and anxiety; but your depression was not severe. Although the Judge accepted that the UCO became a central part of your life – and you were financially dependent upon him, and he bought you drinks – on all the evidence, the Judge concluded, as she was entitled to do, that you were “not… a frail and vulnerable man exploited by the police”. She accepted the Crown case that, your alcoholism and previous mental health difficulties did not make the covert operation inappropriate: and she expressly rejected your contention that insufficient cognisance was given to your vulnerabilities which would make it more likely that you would give unreliable answers to direct or closed questions. On the evidence, the Judge was unarguably entitled to come to those conclusions.

(iii)

Her ruling in relation to sections 76 and 78 were based on, and were driven by, those findings (paragraphs 77-89). The Judge rejected Prof McManus’s evidence that police pressure and coercive interrogation techniques used were such as to cause coerced-compliant false confessions (paragraph 78). She carefully considered the confession evidence after 17 May 2022, when she accepted that police tactics changed to be more pro-active: and she concluded that there was nothing that amounted to improper interrogation or interview, nor anything that would render the confession evidence inadmissible. There is nothing arguably wrong with her analysis or her conclusions.

(iv)

Indeed, in your grounds you do not, with any force, suggest that there is. You rely on the oral evidence of the UCO which, you submit, shows that that evidence was unlawful and/or unfair. However, (a) whilst the UCO accepted that he was unaware of all the specific taskings that were intended to govern his relationship with you, that does not in itself undermine the Crown’s case which was based on the entirety of the engagements between him and you, which were all available to the defence and the court/jury, and (b) you made no further application in relation to the UCO evidence after the UCO had given his evidence.

For those reasons, this ground is not arguable.

We, again, agree. The single judge dealt with this ground comprehensively and we see no point in adding to what he said.

It was submitted on behalf of the defence that Professor McManus’ evidence (which was contained in a joint report signed also by Professor Oxburgh) should be adduced before the jury in relation to several topics: (a) False confessions and factors which increase the risk of false confessions (b) The PACE model of police interviewing and the vulnerabilities relevant to the appellant (c) The absence of the appellant’s vulnerability within the review documentation of the police tactics and the use of higher risk tactics when the appellant was noted to have increased anxiety and vulnerability (d) the meaning of ‘gist’ and consistency and truthfulness. Professor McManus had assisted in covert operations before and was therefore well placed to give an overview of the police operation in the case and consider the actual tactics used in relation to the vulnerabilities the appellant had. Further, it was submitted that the issue in the case was whether the appellant had features which made him more susceptible to the increased risk of false confession and that as an academic chartered psychologist, Professor McManus could assist on the psychological and psychiatric evidence.

It was submitted on behalf of the Prosecution that Professor McManus did not have the requisite expertise; she was not a clinical psychologist, nor had she met or assessed the appellant. Her expertise was in relation to the questioning techniques relevant to dealing with victims of childhood sexual abuse. The proposed evidence was irrelevant in that it predominantly did not touch on the issues the jury were concerned with, and where it did, she did not have the relevant expertise. In support it was said that the Professor had never been in involved in a case involving undercover officers, she held no expertise which would assist the jury in determining the reliability of the confession. The issue in the case was why did the appellant make the incriminating remarks. Two psychiatrists and two psychologists had examined the appellant, and the jury were aware of his vulnerabilities.

The judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible. Professor McManus had given evidence during a voir dire in which the admissibility of the undercover evidence and the confessions were subject to legal submissions. Following that ruling, the defence had indicated they wished to rely on the same experts to give evidence to the jury and, at the court’s request, Professor McManus provided an additional report, to make it clear to all parties what it was the defence wished to adduce from her. All parties agreed the central issue in the case was the reliability of the admissions and the jury would have to assess the admissions based on the interaction the appellant had with the undercover officer, together with any vulnerabilities he had. The psychiatric and psychological evidence was of importance and admissible and the defence were able to rely on the evidence of both a consultant psychiatrist, Dr Jayawickrama, and a chartered consultant clinical psychologist, Dr Halsey. Those experts were properly able to address the vulnerabilities the appellant had at the time of his admissions. The judge was unpersuaded that Professor McManus, an academic who had never met the appellant, had any relevant evidence to give, which could not be given by the psychologist who had examined the appellant. The question of tactics used could also be addressed in general terms by Dr Halsey. Further, whether certain tactics should have been used and the efficacy of the continuum of risk in the case was of relevance in the voir dire. The trial was different; the jury’s task was to consider the evidence including the recordings and transcripts and decide whether they could rely on the admissions made. That was a question for the jury, not an expert

The single judge said:-

You submit that the Judge erred in excluding the expert evidence of Prof McManus from the trial.

However:

(i)

Prof McManus is an academic psychologist whose field of expertise is in relation to questioning techniques relevant to the protection of victims of childhood sexual abuse. She had never before been involved in evidence resulting from an UCO.

(ii)

Prof McManus did not interview or otherwise see you.

(iii)

Whilst Prof McManus could give general evidence about why people may make false confessions, the relevant issue for the jury was whether you might have made false confessions in this case given the actual tactics used by the police in this case and your own psychological make up. The Judge concluded that those issues, including the risk factors in this case that you gave false confessions, could be and were covered in the evidence of Prof Halsey who had examined you. The Judge was unarguably entitled to conclude that evidence from Prof McManus as to whether, in all the circumstances, your admissions were reliable was unnecessary and inadmissible as being the very issue which the jury, on the same evidence as available to Prof McManus, was required to address.

We, again, agree.

We add two observations in relation to all of the decisions on Grounds 1-4. First, the appellant gave evidence to the jury about why he said what he did to Paddy. We have summarised it at some length above at [51(xii)-(xv)]. He did not say that he had been tricked or pressured into saying anything. Clearly his relationship with Paddy was important but his case was that he decided to lie to him to “big himself up”. Secondly, he was quite clearly willing to confess to different people at different times on many other occasions without being put under any pressure of any kind. It was not the case that any of those confessions resulted from his “vulnerabilities” being exploited by anyone. This makes it less likely that the confessions to Paddy were the result of any inappropriate conduct by the police. This man was willing to confess in certain situations.

We therefore refuse leave in respect of grounds 1-4.

Mr Tully KC, in opening the appeal, took us to the bundle of documents about Charlie Franklin and his conviction.

These show that he was convicted of two offences, one of rape and one of attempted rape, arising out of the same incident on 4 November 2012. It occurred in the Clifton area of Bristol, at the Somerset House Public House where he sometimes worked or lived. He had a key to get in when it was closed. The victim had been the last person to leave an event at 1am, and was very drunk. She came into contact with Franklin after she left. He bumped into her in the street where her phone did not work. He invited her to the pub. He raped her on the floor in the bar area of the pub. She said she was threatened by him. He said he would break her neck, using the phrase “Snap your neck”. Medical evidence and photographs showedbruising. There was a medical report detailing injuries, saying they were consistent with non-consensual sexual attack. He fell asleep and she escaped in a partially dressed state. She left personal items behind.

Mr Tully submitted that this was a predatory opportunistic attack on a lone and vulnerable female, after leaving licensed premises in drunken state. She thought she was going to die. He submits that this was a sufficiently similar event to what must have happened to Claire Holland that it would be admissible at a trial if the defence knew of it and were able to deploy it.

The prosecution has lodged a response to this Ground which contains some important factual material, and we will set it out:-

Ground 7, Factual background It is acknowledged that disclosure of Franklin’s convictions ought to have been made prior to trial. It is not accepted that those convictions or the facts behind them were admissible at the appellant’s trial. Two witnesses (Emma Walters who was the barmaid and Paul Bayford, the licensee) referred to Franklin in their original witness statements. Further statements were obtained from each since the disclosure concerning Franklin was made, but nothing of any further significance emerged.

Franklin was spoken to in August 2012 as part of the missing person enquiry. He did not make a statement but a note was made of what he said. He said he had been playing scrabble with Walters, thought Claire Holland was quite drunk but could not recall any conversation other than telling her not to bang the scrabble board. He thought he left at closing time, could not say when Claire Holland left, but thought she left before him. The account was consistent with the statements from Walters and Bayford and was disclosed to the defence prior to the trial.

Five months after Claire Holland’s disappearance, in the early hours of 4 November 2012, in a public house in Clifton, Franklin raped a woman (“V”). V said she was very drunk when she left a wedding reception, and could not remember what led her to be at the public house. Her first memory was of being naked on the floor of the pub while Franklin tried to have sex with her, he was threatening and aggressive and said he was going to break her neck. She did not resist him. Franklin attempted to have sex with her a second time, but he fell asleep, and V escaped and called for her mother and then the police. Franklin was arrested from the bedroom in which he was still sleeping.

The fact Franklin had been convicted of rape five months after Claire Holland disappeared would have been disclosed to the defence, had the prosecution legal team (CPS and counsel) been aware of it. Franklin was not a prosecution witness and no statement ever taken from him, but his presence was evident from the witness statements and the disclosed report of his account. The CPS reviewing lawyer was not aware of his conviction. Because he was not a witness a routine criminal record check was not conducted and the rape did not come to the attention of the missing person investigation team. The murder investigation did not commence until 2019, following the appellant’s recorded confession, and the system used by the police at that time would not have alerted the investigation, unlike the present system that would.

It was accepted that DC Withy spoke to Franklin in February 2023 and became aware of the convictions and a report generated, which included an account of the attempts to take a statement from Frankin and two sentences referring to Franklin’s conviction and sentence for rape. As part of the disclosure team a deputy disclosure officer provided a small summary for the non-sensitive unused material schedule, however it omitted any reference to the rape. The lead disclosure officer and CPS reviewing lawyer relied on that summary, and took the view that the report was not disclosable. This was because the summary contained no reference to the rape. The matter came to light in June 2024 when the defence enquired about an online news article which reported Franklin’s conviction and sentence.

Ground 7, submissions: The appellant’s contention was that the information about Franklin, if known, would have been subject to an application to admit it under s.100 of the CJA 2003, and should have been admitted. It is not accepted that an application to admit the convictions, or the facts of them, would or should have succeeded. The facts were not strikingly similar, Claire Holland was murdered; V was raped and there was no evidence that Claire Holland was raped; Franklin appears to have made no attempt to kill or imprison V and Claire Holland was known to Franklin, whereas C was a stranger. The only similarity was that both were drunk and alone at night.

Further, (i) there was no close association between Franklin and Claire Holland. Others also bought her drinks and she left alone, stating she was going to meet the appellant (ii) whilst the convictions demonstrate a propensity for Franklin to rape women (strangers), they did not demonstrate a propensity to murder, dispose of a body or to rape those who are not strangers. By contrast, the appellant’s bad character, which was adduced at trial, demonstrated an historic use of violence towards women with whom he was in a relationship with, including to Claire Holland.

The evidence of Franklin’s conviction therefore fell short of evidence of ‘substantial probative value that the appellant did not murder Claire Holland’ and would have failed to meet the criteria for admission set by s.100 CJA 2003. The evidence fell short of showing or tending to show that Frankin was responsible for the murder.

The question, in our judgment, is whether that submission is correct. If the defence were deprived of evidence which was of substantial probative value because it suggested that someone other than the appellant may have killed Claire Holland by a failure by the prosecution to comply with their duty to give disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, then it would be difficult to say that the conviction was safe. We do not suggest that every failure to disclose the existence of admissible bad character evidence on which a defendant would rely will have this effect, but on the facts of this case that conclusion is inescapable.

Section 100 of the 2003 Act is in these terms:-

100 Non-defendant’s bad character

(1)

In criminal proceedings evidence of the bad character of a person other than the defendant is admissible if and only if—

(a)

it is important explanatory evidence,

(b)

it has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which—

(i)

is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and

(ii)

is of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole,

or

(c)

all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible.

(2)

For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) evidence is important explanatory evidence if—

(a)

without it, the court or jury would find it impossible or difficult properly to understand other evidence in the case, and

(b)

its value for understanding the case as a whole is substantial.

(3)

In assessing the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) the court must have regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant)—

(a)the nature and number of the events, or other things, to which the evidence relates;

(b)when those events or things are alleged to have happened or existed;

(c)

where—

(i)

the evidence is evidence of a person’s misconduct, and

(ii)

it is suggested that the evidence has probative value by reason of similarity between that misconduct and other alleged misconduct,

the nature and extent of the similarities and the dissimilarities between each of the alleged instances of misconduct;

(d)

where—

(i)

the evidence is evidence of a person’s misconduct,

(ii)

it is suggested that that person is also responsible for the misconduct charged, and

(iii)

the identity of the person responsible for the misconduct charged is disputed,

the extent to which the evidence shows or tends to show that the same person was responsible each time.

(4)

Except where subsection (1)(c) applies, evidence of the bad character of a person other than the defendant must not be given without leave of the court.

Whether a particular piece of evidence has substantial probative value on an issue depends on an assessment of all the available evidence on that issue, so that the importance of the disputed piece of evidence can be evaluated in context. So, for example, if there was CCTV evidence of the appellant strangling Ms Holland and disposing of her body on 6 June 2012, the fact that Charlie Franklin had bought her a drink not long before that and left the pub at about the same time as she did would not have substantial probative value in showing that he, rather than the appellant, committed the murder.

There is no CCTV in this case of that kind, but there is other evidence which points to the appellant’s guilt. This is principally the multiple confessions over a period of years to various different people. But it is not limited to that.

There was strong evidence that Ms Holland was expecting to meet the appellant after she left Seamus O’Donnell’s at closing time. He denies any such arrangement. She said that she was going to have to meet him to her mother, see [14]. She told Ms Davies the Social Worker that she was going to meet him, see [15]. She told Mr Bayford and Rachel (on the phone) that she was going to meet him after work at around 16:00, see [16]. At this time neither of them says she was drunk. She said she was going to buy herself clothes to make herself look nice for him, and Emma Walters did see a recently purchased breast enhancement for fitting inside her bra after she came back from the shops. Ms Walters at [17] says that Claire Holland told her she was going to meet the appellant. Mr Bayford and two regulars at the pub both say that they were told the same thing much later in the evening, see [18] and [19]. There had been phone contact between them: she rang him at 16:09 for 2 minutes and he rang back from the landline at the Richmond where he was working at 18:21. The Richmond is in Clifton which is not very far from the Seamus O’Donnell’s. If he finished work at 22:00, and had a pint, as he said he usually did (see [31]) this would enable him to be in place to meet her after she left the Seamus O’Donnell’s.

There was, therefore, sound evidence from which the jury could find that Claire Holland genuinely thought when she left the pub that she was about to meet the appellant because they had agreed to meet. This is not consistent with his account which is that he declined her request for a meeting during the first of those two calls. His explanation of the second call (not mentioned by him to the police at the time, see [21] and [23]) was that he called to find out what was happening with C. This was first given in evidence at the trial. He also said he had walked home from work that night with Lee Lindley. He had told the police in June 2012 that he had walked home alone. He first mentioned Lindley’s presence in a statement to the police in August 2012. If the jury was sure that, contrary to his denials, the appellant had agreed to meet Claire Holland after closing time when he finished work that is a finding which materially supports the confessions.

There was evidence that the appellant had a propensity to use significant violence towards women with whom he was in a relationship. Ms Davies, the social worker said that this was a feature of his relationship with Claire Holland. The incident in November 2010 when she fell down stairs and the police attended, see [12] and [51(iv)] above, is further concrete evidence of this. The appellant’s position here was weakened by the inherently implausible account he gave of this episode in evidence. The propensity is confirmed by the evidence of Selina Mulcahy at [34] which was substantially admitted by the appellant when speaking to Paddy, see [38(i)]. Again, this material tends to support the confessions.

This trial was, however, principally about the confessions. The jury was well aware of the inconsistencies in them, and of the suggested vulnerabilities of the appellant. They had to decide whether he said those things because he had murdered Claire Holland or for some other reason. In taking that decision, they had all relevant material including, most importantly, the appellant’s own evidence about how he came to say what he did.

There are significant inconsistencies in the different confessions. Did the appellant kill Claire Holland himself or did he get someone else to do it for him? Did he dispose of the body by dismembering it with knives (he owns knives because he is a chef), or did he put it in the river so that it was “halfway to Spain”? These inconsistencies may be an indicator of the falsity of the confessions. On the other hand, the one common theme running through all of these things, said over a period of nearly 10 years, between Adrian Mulcahy in 2014 and Daniel Lewis in 2023, was that he was responsible for the death of Claire Holland. Perhaps the single most illuminating aspect of the evidence of the conversations with Paddy is that even after 10 years the appellant still felt hatred for her, which he expressed with venom. That is an odd emotion for a man to feel about the mother of his child who had died a tragic an unexplained death long ago. He does not appear to have felt that way in February 2012 when he helped to decorate her new flat. What changed?

It seems highly unlikely that he was able to dismember the body and dispose of it without leaving traces. He did not have a car. It is much more likely that, if he killed her, she was put into the river. The harbourmaster says that he does not know of a case where a body has gone into that river and not been recovered, but he (necessarily) does not know what happened to bodies of which he is unaware. The first explanation for her disappearance recorded by the police was that she had fallen in the river and not been found. That seems to be a satisfactory explanation for what happened to her after death.

The evidence about Charlie Franklin is entirely extrinsic to the confessions. Of course, when considering the confession evidence the jury was aware that it was possible that Ms Holland had been murdered by someone other than the appellant, or had died accidentally or by suicide. The jury will have been well aware that drunken young women who are alone late at night in a city are at some level of risk of predatory attack by strangers. The evidence about Charlie Franklin would simply reinforce that obvious truth. They had to decide whether the confessions, supported by the other evidence about the planned meeting and the appellant’s propensity to violence against Claire Holland, made them sure of the appellant’s guilt and required them to reject those other possibilities. They decided that they did. In our judgment the new evidence about Charlie Franklin did not have substantial probative value in respect of the principal issue in the case: did the appellant kill Claire Holland? It was therefore inadmissible. Section 23(2)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 require the court to consider, when deciding whether to receive fresh evidence, “whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; [and] whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal”. Having regard to those factors, we decline to receive the evidence of Charlie Franklin’s conviction and this ground of appeal therefore fails.

This renewed applications for leave to appeal and the appeal are dismissed.