R v Blendi Aliaj

On 13 April 2026, in the Crown Court at Inner London, the appellant, then aged 34 and a man of previous good character, pleaded guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing, to possession of a Class A drug with intent to supply (count 1) and possession of a Class B drug with intent to supply (count 2). It appears that although the record sheet makes it clear that count 2 was amended to reflect the fact that the drug involved (ketamine) is a Class B drug and not Class A as originally stated on the indictment, the amended indictment has not been uploaded onto the Digital Case System. We mention this just to confirm the position.

On 4 June 2026 he was sentenced by HHJ Boyle to 27 months' imprisonment on count 1 and 3 months' imprisonment concurrently on count 2.

He appeals against sentence by leave of the Single Judge on the basis that the sentencing judge failed to apply the Imposition Guidelines correctly, and should have suspended the sentence.

In her original grounds of appeal Ms Cawkwell, who very ably presented the argument orally to us this morning, had also raised a further ground of appeal, namely, that insufficient weight had been given to the appellant's personal mitigation. Before us she withdrew that, very fairly, having had another look at the mathematics and come to the conclusion that she could no longer pursue it. That was in the best traditions of the Bar and we commend Ms Cawkwell for being forthright about that.

On 14 March the appellant's vehicle was stopped by the police. £410 in cash was found in the centre console. Also in the car there was a mobile phone showing messages consistent with his acting under direction as a drugs courier, and in a concealed compartment in a water bottle, which was itself in a concealed compartment in the car, the police found 13 snap bags of cocaine (around 6 grams in total) and two snap bags of ketamine amounting to just over 2 grams.

The pre-sentence report indicated that the appellant had worked in the construction industry doing groundwork since coming to the UK around 6 years ago. Although well paid, the work was periodical and his last contract had ended in January 2026. He began to gamble out of boredom and amassed significant debts. He began to borrow money from illicit sources and when he was unable to pay the money back he agreed to act as a drugs courier in order to settle the debt. He himself had no substance abuse issues. It would appear therefore that the period of his offending before he was apprehended by the police was one of some weeks, although it may not have gone all the way back to the time when his last contract ceased in January.

The author of the report considered that the offences occurred due to poor problem solving and consequential thinking skills, exacerbated by what they described as "financial desperation". The appellant's gambling was flagged as a matter of concern. Despite this he was assessed as being a low risk of further offending and as being suitable for a community-based penalty, with an unpaid work requirement and a rehabilitative activity requirement.

The judge said that the appellant was performing a significant role in a chain but under direction and had no influence upon those above him in the chain. This was category 3 street dealing. He reduced the starting point within the range of 4 years 6 months to the lowest point within the range (3 years and 6 months) because of two lesser role features he identified. He then reduced by a further 6 months for personal mitigation producing a notional sentence after trial of 36 months. He then applied the appropriate 25 per cent discount for the guilty plea. It is now accepted that the limited mitigation which was previous good character and remorse was properly catered for and therefore there was nothing wrong in principle with a 3-year sentence for this offending.

Ms Cawkwell's focus was upon the changes to the law which took place on 22 March 2026 and therefore were applicable to the sentence in this case. As a result of those changes, more serious offending became eligible for suspended sentences and the Imposition Guideline has to be looked at in the context of those changes.

As for the question whether to suspend the sentence, the judge did have regard to the factors in the Imposition Guideline. He found that there were probably good prospects of rehabilitation and there was not a high risk of reoffending, although there was no strong personal mitigation. It was not suggested that immediate custody would have a significant harmful impact on others.

Ms Cawkwell particularly prayed in aid the intention of Parliament to ensure that those who could be rehabilitated would have that opportunity, bearing in mind the current overcrowding conditions in prisons. She submitted that in this case the appellant did have a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and that there was not a high risk of reoffending; indeed there was a low risk across all factors. In the light of the fact that he was not himself responsible for running the drug operation but was somewhere down the lower end of the chain, this was a paradigm example of the kind of case where, as a result of the changes to the law, it would be possible to suspend the sentence.

Whilst he was not thought to present a risk to any person and there was no history of poor compliance or non-compliance with court orders, the judge felt that the offending was so serious that the appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. He observed:

Ms Cawkwell submitted that the judge was wrong in the weight that he ascribed to the factor of seriousness of the offending, bearing in mind the fact that the appellant was only a courier in the operation and the factors that she identified in favour of suspension. She submitted that the judge ought to have regarded those factors as being of greater weight than the single factor he identified against it.

We have considered those submissions very carefully. As the Single Judge said, the changes to the legislation do mean that the possibility of suspension is now available for significantly more serious offending than before. But that does not mean that the approach to the Imposition Guidelines should be any different in principle. It is clear to us that the judge considered all of the factors in the guideline and concluded that those in favour of suspension were outweighed by the serious nature of the offending. That conclusion was not only open to him in principle, it was an evaluative judgment of a type with which this Court will rarely interfere.

This was not a case in which the appellant had been sucked into criminal activity in consequence of being dependent upon drugs. He chose to walk into it of his own accord in order to make easy money to pay back gambling debts at a time when he was unemployed. In those circumstances, and bearing in mind the period of time over which the drug dealing had continued, we cannot say that the judge was wrong in principle to come to the conclusion that he did.

For those reasons, despite the very able way in which the arguments were presented to us this morning by Ms Cawkwell, this appeal is dismissed.