R v Sinead Cahill

An order under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is already in force in relation to the identification of the child involved in this unfortunate incident. That order will remain in force. There must be no report which identifies either the complainant's child or either of the children of the appellant until they reach the age of 18, unless some other order is made in the meantime.

The applicant's application for leave to appeal against sentence has been referred to the Full Court by the Registrar. We give leave.

On 8 April 2026, in the Crown Court at Bristol, the appellant pleaded guilty to a single count of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, having previously offered a guilty plea to the alternative count of an offence under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 at the plea and trial preparation hearing, which was unacceptable to the Crown. She was afforded a 25 per cent reduction for her guilty plea, about which no complaint is made.

On 29 May 2026, she was sentenced by Mr Recorder David Chidgey to three years and nine months' imprisonment.

The incident occurred late at night on 5 April 2024, when the complainant (at that time a neighbour) had invited the appellant back to her flat. Whilst she was there the appellant, who was already intoxicated through alcohol consumption, alleges that she took some cocaine, which she says was offered to her by the complainant. She became involved in an argument with a male friend of the complainant, who left. There had been some previous history between them relating to that person's behaviour towards the appellant's late father who had passed away a couple of years earlier.

The complainant then asked the appellant to leave her flat. The appellant became very angry and attacked the complainant in the hallway by biting her on the right eye, latching on to that eye for a significant amount of time whilst the complainant screamed at her to get off. The incident was witnessed by the complainant's daughter, who was then aged 6, who screamed at her to let go of her mum. When the appellant did let go, the complainant told her daughter to go and fetch help. The little girl left the flat and the appellant also left.

Meanwhile, the complainant went to her bedroom and called the emergency services. Whilst she was still on the phone to them, the appellant returned to the flat with the complainant's daughter. She was heard to say to the child "Your mum's a fucking prick", before entering the bedroom and continuing the attack by jumping, biting and hitting the complainant. The sounds of the attack could be heard on the 999 call. Fortunately, the police arrived soon afterwards and brought the attack to an end by arresting the appellant.

The complainant was taken to hospital and was found to have a 2 centimetre wound to her eyelid which required stitches. It has left scarring which appears to be permanent. She had also sustained concussion from blows to the head. There was a 3 centimetre laceration to the top of her head and a bite mark to her hip. She still suffered some reduced vision some five months after the attack. She continued to experience blurred vision and headaches which caused her to return to the hospital for a CT scan.

At the time of the sentencing hearing there was no update to the medical evidence in relation to the complainant. When the Registrar referred the matter to the full court, directions were given for the prosecution to attend, with a view to obtaining some further evidence. We have been provided with a witness statement from Detective Constable Amy Statton of Avon and Somerset Constabulary. The officer has made many enquiries in order to try to obtain the information that the court sought. She is to be commended for going above and beyond to try to obtain that information, but sadly she was unable to do so for the reasons that she has explained. The position therefore is that this court is in no better position than was the Recorder to assess the nature and gravity of the wound.

The appellant was 29 years old at the time of sentence. She was of previous good character. She is in a long-term, stable relationship with her partner with whom she has two children, now aged 9 and 6. Both have special educational needs. The younger child, who has autism and other learning difficulties, has to be transported to and from school with a parent by taxi. Because of his condition he reacts badly to any changes of routine. We were told this morning by Miss Taylor, who represents the appellant, something of the impact that their mother's incarceration in prison has had on both children. The older child has been able to visit her mother on one occasion, but is tearful and finds it difficult to engage with her during telephone calls from the prison. The younger child is unable to visit because of his condition and because his routine would be disrupted. He has refused to talk to his mother on the phone, and therefore there has been no meaningful contact between them in the two and a half months since she was sent to prison.

The appellant is in receipt of universal credit and disability living allowance for the children. She has good family support from her grandparents, but they cannot help with the children because it is too physically demanding. Her partner has given up his job to stay at home and help with the childcare. He is essentially fending for himself, particularly during the school holidays. He is finding it something of a struggle. There are no safeguarding concerns.

The appellant herself had a difficult and traumatic childhood. She has suffered from anxiety and depression since her teenage years. She is currently prescribed sertraline. We have read and taken account of all the information about her mental health issues. She also has a number of physical health issues, including a painful, ongoing spinal condition which will require surgery in the future, but is currently being treated by analgesics.

The prosecution placed the offending into category B for culpability and category 2 for harm, with a starting point of five years' custody, and a range of four to seven years. The aggravating features that they identified were the intoxication and the presence of the child. They may well have added the fact that the appellant deliberately went back into the flat and continued to attack the complainant, despite the existing injury and the fact that she was engaged in a 999 call.

The Recorder agreed with that categorisation. He took the starting point of five years, balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors, found that they cancelled each other out, and thus ended up with a notional sentence after trial of five years, which he then reduced by 25 per cent for the guilty plea. The resulting sentence of three years and nine months' imprisonment was above the level at which it could be suspended, but the Recorder indicated that even if it had fallen within the range at which it could be suspended by reference to the Imposition Guideline, he would have taken the view that the offending was so serious that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by an immediate custodial sentence.

We have to say that in most cases this sort of offending would definitely fall within that category. It was a horrifying attack on a woman who had no means of defending herself. It was unprovoked and was carried out in her own home in the presence of a child. Any offence of violence which, before mitigation, might attract a sentence in the order of four or five years' imprisonment is unlikely to warrant a suspended sentence, despite the recent changes to the legislation which enable sentences of up to 36 months to be suspended, unless there are very strong reasons within the Imposition Guideline for taking that course.

However, despite that, it is contended by Miss Taylor on the appellant's behalf that the Recorder, first of all, was wrong to categorise the offending as falling within category 2B, instead of 3B. She submitted that in any event the starting point of five years was too high. The Recorder should have brought the sentence down into the range which was capable of being suspended and, she argued, this was a case in which that course should have been taken.

We have seen a prison report from HMP Eastwood Park which speaks very highly of the appellant's conduct in custody. We are told that she is on the reception wing for new inmates. She has achieved several incentive encouragement entries for her positive behaviour, and she was awarded enhanced incentive status in July, very shortly after arriving in the prison. The staff have noted a positive attitude towards fellow prisoners and staff, and say that she has excelled as a wing worker. She has demonstrated a strong work ethic within that role and she has volunteered to be of assistance on the servery during her day off. She has also helped staff to move furniture and to clear office areas during association periods.

There are two grounds of appeal. Ground 1 relates to the categorisation of the offending. The Recorder placed the harm into category 2 because of the location of the injury (the eye), the fact that there was permanent scarring, and at the stage where he was sentencing there was still some blurring of the complainant's vision. There was also some evidence of ongoing psychological harm, not only to the complainant but to the child who witnessed the attack.

In her Victim Personal Statement the complainant said that she suffered from panic attacks and anxiety, suffered from flashbacks and night terrors and re-lived the attack in her head. She was now unable to work and was living on benefits. She said that she felt her independence had been taken away. She had been left with two teeth marks on top of her eyelid and she said that she had to wear false eyelashes, because the scar is less prominent when she does.

On behalf of the prosecution, Miss Sheerin submitted that in the light of the various harm factors that were identified, the Recorder was entitled to place the offending into category 2B. However, Miss Sheerin accepted, very fairly, that there was no medical evidence – certainly no updated medical evidence - of any impaired vision to the eye. The most she could point to was the relatively recent photograph which showed that there was a degree of swelling and puffiness around the eye, as well as the scar. Although it was a permanent scar, we are persuaded by Miss Taylor that the offence should have fallen into category 3B, although it did merit an uplift towards the higher end of the range within that category.

If we were to take the uplift that the Recorder applied to reflect the aggravating features that he identified, there would be an uplift from the starting point of four years to one of five years.

We turn to ground 2. The Recorder came to the conclusion that the aggravating and mitigating features cancelled each other out, i.e. he afforded 12 months’ credit for mitigation. Miss Taylor submitted, however, that insufficient account was taken of the fact that the appellant is a woman with two young, dependent children each of whom has special needs, particularly the younger child. Those factors, she submitted, should have caused the Recorder to make a greater deduction from the uplifted figure that he achieved.

Although it is usually very much a matter for a sentencing judge to decide how much, if any, weight should be ascribed to factors such as caring responsibilities for young children, we are persuaded by Miss Taylor that a greater deduction should have been made from the sentence to account for that particular mitigating feature in the specific circumstances of this case. A deduction in the order of 18 months would have been more appropriate than the 12 months that the Recorder applied. That would bring down the sentence to one of three years and six months' imprisonment, before credit of 25 per cent for the plea of guilty. Rounding that figure down, we reach a sentence of 30 months' imprisonment. The question then is whether or not to suspend.

The appellant is not the children's sole carer, but we have taken account of concerns raised by their schools and Social Services about the behaviour of both children since their mother has been in prison, and about a change of dynamics within the home. We have also taken into account the matters that Miss Taylor has brought to our attention this morning in relation to the impact that being separated from their mother is having on the children and particularly on the younger child, who has not seen or spoken to her now for several weeks.

In terms of the Imposition Guidelines, there are a number of factors in favour of suspension of the sentence. The appellant is a woman of previous good character. There are obviously good prospects of rehabilitation, as is acknowledged in the pre-sentence report. She has demonstrated that by her behaviour in custody to date. She has undertaken courses to address some of the underlying problems from which she suffers, and she has behaved in an exemplary fashion whilst in custody. There is, therefore, a significant prospect that she would be rehabilitated. She has no previous history of non-compliance with court orders. We have already referred to the impact the custodial sentence has had on others. Therefore, on the face of it, there are a number of positive factors.

The sole factor identified by the Recorder in favour of immediate custody is the serious nature of the offending. We consider that that is a very significant matter. Most such cases would warrant immediate custody, despite the number of factors on the other side of the equation.

In the light of those factors – and as an exceptional step – we are persuaded that the sentence should be suspended for a period of 18 months.

We have considered what the author of the pre-sentence report has recommended as requirements for the order, and we think that some of those requirements should be added to the suspended sentence order. Accordingly, we order that there should be a primary mental health treatment requirement for 12 months, which aims to look at building mental health coping skills; a rehabilitation activity requirement of 20 days; and an alcohol abstinence monitoring requirement for 120 days. In light of the fact that the appellant has already served two and a half months in custody, we do not see that there is any need to include an unpaid work requirement. In any event, because of her caring responsibilities for the children, we consider that would be inappropriate.

To that extent, and with grateful thanks to both counsel for their very able and comprehensive submissions, this appeal against sentence is allowed.