R v Connor Probert

With the leave of the Single Judge the appellant appeals against the imposition of a life sentence with a minimum term of 4 years and 2 months for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. The sentence was imposed in the Crown Court sitting at Cardiff before the Recorder of Cardiff on 11 July 2025. On the same date he was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 2 years and 3 months for strangulation contrary to section 75A(1)(a) and (5) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and a concurrent sentence of 1 year for having an offensive weapon contrary to the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.

The appellant had initially pleaded guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing to only section 20 wounding and the strangulation and weapon offences. The guilty plea to the section 18 grievous bodily harm with intent was entered at the first day of trial when the victim, Orawan Thomas and her son had attended at court to give evidence.

Ms Thomas ran the Royal Orchard Thai Massage Parlour in Cathays, Cardiff. She is disabled with mobility difficulties having contracted polio as a child. At 18:00 on 17 February 2024 the appellant booked a 30-minute deep tissue massage by telephone for 18:30 the same day. He refused to give his name when making the booking and arrived 20 minutes later and paid in cash in advance. Ms Thomas showed the appellant into one of the massage rooms and as she was the only member of staff present at the time she locked the front door behind them. The massage was completed without issue. At the end Ms Thomas told the appellant that he could put his top back on.

As she turned to leave the room the appellant grabbed her from behind and struck her to the head with a hammer from his rucksack that he had brought with him. She turned around and saw that he was holding the hammer level with his shoulder, ready to hit her again. He was dressed only in his trousers. He hit her again to the top of the head with the hammer. She managed to grab one of his arms to try to stop the attack but the appellant struck her again for a third time as she struggled against him. She repeatedly asked him what was wrong, but he either did not answer or said "Nothing", but when she began to scream the appellant told her to stop.

Ms Thomas somehow managed to pull the hammer away from the appellant briefly and was able to strike him with the blunt side as the two struggled over possession of the hammer. She continued to scream. The blood stains on the walls of the massage room in the police photographs show the ferocity of the struggle. The appellant then put his hand on Ms Thomas’ neck. While grappling over the hammer the two moved towards the corner of the room where Ms Thomas slipped on the blood that had poured from her head onto the floor. The appellant knelt beside her on the floor and tightened his grip on her throat, pressing her to the floor so that she could not breathe and pushed his fingers into the centre of her throat increasing the pressure: he was strangling her. She believed the appellant was going to kill her. She began seeing spots before her eyes and losing consciousness but she just managed to turn her head so that she could breathe and somehow managed to get to her feet, while the appellant’s hand was still on her throat.

To try and calm the situation and knowing that her son was due to arrive imminently, Ms Thomas had the presence of mind to ask the appellant if she could have a drink of water. The appellant took his hand off her throat and gave her a bottle of Coke-a-Cola from his bag whilst he continued to hold onto the hammer. He relaxed a little at that point.

When there was a knock at the front door the appellant would not allow her to go to the door, even though she promised not to say anything and told him he could hide in the bathroom at the rear. As the knocks became louder they continued to struggle over the hammer moving into the hallway where the CCTV camera recorded the end of the incident. The appellant backed into the bathroom at the end of the corridor and Ms Thomas let go of the hammer so she could run to the front door to let her son and his wife in. She immediately told her son that the appellant was trying to kill her and the police were called. The appellant remained in the bathroom until the police arrived. He was arrested and interviewed the next day and mainly answered "no comment" to the questions asked of him.

Ms Thomas was treated the same day at the University Hospital of Wales for three wounds to her head. The injury to the top of her head measured between 3 - 4 centimetres in length and 2 - 3 millimetres in depth. There was a wound to the side of the head and another to the external part of her ear, causing the cartilage to split. The injuries to her head were glued and the injury to her ear was sealed with nine stitches. A CT scan confirmed that there was no brain injury or skull fractures. There were also soft tissue injuries to her neck, right arm, and both hands and her shoulder. She was very disturbed by the incident and was visibly shaking for a long time whilst at the hospital.

The appellant was 24 years old at the time of the offence, and 25 years old at the date of sentence and of previous good character. There is no suggestion of violent or criminal behaviour in his background and he had a number of glowing testimonials from family and family friends describing his gentle nature and mild manner and kindness to others, particularly animals. He has lived a quiet life with his mother. He had a reasonably positive time at school with good behaviour and GCSE qualifications. He did not complete plumbing and woodwork courses that he had started at Bridgend College after his GCSEs and he has never worked. He and his mother live off the income from various rental properties that she owns. He was unable to explain to the pre-sentence report author why he had chosen not to work. He does not drink or take drugs and until this event was considered both physically and mentally fit.

The pre-sentence report author described him as an isolated young man with very limited interpersonal skills who had lived an insular, semi-reclusive life dependent on his mother both emotionally and financially.

The appellant was able to explain what he had done to the complainant to the pre-sentence report author, but he was unable to explain why he had done it and he appeared to be devoid of any victim empathy. He said that it had "just happened". The pre-sentence report author concluded that the appellant was dangerous, as defined within the meaning of the Sentencing Act 2020. The pre-sentence report author did not consider that the algorithmic assessment tools that considered him to be a low risk of reconviction and recidivism were reliable because there was no comfortable method of ascertaining if similar behaviour would be repeated.

The court had the benefit of a number of psychiatric reports prepared over the 9 months prior to sentence, Dr Imtiaz (9/9/2024), Dr Regu (27/9/2024), Dr Elanny (28/11/2024) and Dr Byrappa (20/6/2025). In their assessments of the appellant he had given inconsistent answers to each of them at various times about what he remembered, what he did and what he was willing to discuss with them. However, to all the psychiatrists and the pre-sentence report author he was either unwilling or unable to say why he had done what he did to the complainant. He said that he could not recall his thoughts during the assault. As a result none of them were able to understand his motivation. They noted that the incident was violent and potentially fatal and it was not clear why he had carried it out. There was no more clarity after he had been transferred to a medium secure hospital under section 38 of the Mental Health Act 1983, where he had had numerous discussions with Dr Byrappa and her team. At times he said he could not remember parts of what happened and at other times he said that he could recall it but did not want to discuss it with them. None of the psychiatrists were able to say when, or if, the risk of the commission of further similar offences would reduce, without the appellant being willing to discuss his motivation and speak openly with them. They were all however agreed there was a risk. A concerted effort to understand his motivation was imperative to help mitigate any future risk.

All the doctors diagnosed the appellant with autism, but their opinion was that this was not linked to the commission of the offence. They were also all agreed that he does not have any co-existing mental disorder.

In her moving victim personal statement the complainant explained how very seriously the offence had affected her physical and mental health and also affected her financially. She had no alternative but to return to work where the attack occurred and where she now no longer feels safe. She had no alternative because it was necessary to keep her business going. She no longer feels able to take on new male customers and the injuries she sustained to her ribs and shoulders have affected her ability to provide deep tissue massages, and she has lost income as a result. She worries constantly at both work and when walking outside and is fearful whenever she sees a man with a rucksack. The complainant feels that her life is changed forever – she will always be looking over her shoulder and always wondering what could have happened to her that day.

In clear and well-structured sentencing remarks the judge found that the complainant was obviously vulnerable due to her personal characteristics and circumstances as a woman on her own, locked into the premises, with mobility issues providing a service to the public. The judge rejected however, the prosecution submissions that the complainant had suffered permanent and irreversible harm and the judge found it was category 3 harm. However she found the level of culpability under the guidelines was category A and that this constituted a case of particular gravity, reflected by the multiple features of culpability.

The judge identified a number of factors in the evidence that made her sure that the appellant had thought about the offence in advance and planned how he would carry it out to avoid detection. The offence must have been premeditated because he refused to give his name, paid in cash, so that there would be no record of the booking and kept his hood up throughout the time that he was in sight of the CCTV camera in the foyer area.

The judge accepted that she had to accept that the appellant had not intended to kill the complainant, and noted, with some surprise, that the prosecution had chosen not to charge him with attempted murder. She made clear that she rejected and expressly disregarded the pre-sentence report author’s conclusion that there had been an intention to kill in the pre-sentence report.

The judge concluded that there was a significant risk that the appellant would commit further specified offences and by doing so would cause serious significant physical or psychological harm to one or more persons, because of the nature and seriousness of the offences, the lack of any victim empathy and inability to explain why he had behaved as he had done and the pre-sentence report. She also noted his inconsistencies in his answers to the four psychiatrists and the pre-sentence report author about what had happened and what he remembered of it and his refusal to discuss the incident or his motivation.

The judge concluded that he had not been honest with his recollection of the offence and that his refusal or inability to discuss the offence and his motivation made it impossible to say when the risk of repetition of similar serious offending causing serious harm would reduce to a point where it would be safe for him to be released.

The judge noted that a life sentence is a last resort under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and she was particularly mindful that it is especially so for a young man with no previous convictions. But having considered the matter carefully, she was satisfied that neither a determinate nor extended sentence was appropriate, since such a sentence might come to an end while the risk posed by the appellant remained significant. She was satisfied that the offence was so serious that a sentence of life imprisonment was required.

There is no challenge to the judge’s approach and calculation of the minimum term to be served of 4 years and 2 months which the judge then expressed, in accordance with the authorities with arithmetic to take account of the time he had already spent in remand so the final minimal term was expressed as 2 years and 283 days.

Mr Evans challenged the sentence on the narrow ground that the court was wrong to find that that the seriousness of the offence was such as to justify the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life and focused in particular on section 285(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020). In his very clear, helpful, oral and written submissions Mr Evans accepted that the judge was entitled to find that the appellant was dangerousand that the imposition of an extended sentence was appropriate. He did not argue against the categorisation of the offence as falling within category 3A under the assault Sentencing Council Guidelines for section 18 nor did he challenge the concurrent sentences for the weapon and strangulation. However he submitted that the seriousness of the offence, leading thankfully to only relatively minor injuries within the context of section 18, was not sufficient to justify a life sentence when the appellant was still under 25 at the time of the offence, had no previous convictions and it was an entirely isolated episode. He also submitted that the appellant had shown some restraint. He could have used more ferocity with his use of the hammer and he submitted the appellant desisted his attack before the complainant's son had arrived. He submitted that the level of danger and the length of time that the appellant posed to the public was best assessed by the facts of the offence and they were insufficient to justify the sentence of last resort.

This was a difficult sentencing exercise for the judge. In meticulous and detailed sentencing remarks the judge carefully followed the approach set out in Attorney-General's Reference No 27 of 2013 (R v Burinskas) in considering discretionary life sentences under the Sentencing Act 2020. She considered dangerousnessand the judge is not criticised for concluding that the appellant was dangerous requiring her to consider whether the seriousness of the offence and offences associated with it justified a life sentence.

The judge was entitled to conclude that the offences had been premeditated and she carefully set out the evidence on which she based that conclusion. She was also satisfied that the appellant had not entirely voluntarily desisted in the way claimed by the appellant. It was the complainant who managed to break free from the stranglehold and the appellant succeeded in keeping the hammer he had used as a weapon and brought with him against her. The CCTV shows it was the complainant breaking away from the appellant as she ran towards the door, letting go of the hammer in order to let her son in, as the other end of the hammer was being held by the appellant.

The judge carefully took account of the fact that the appellant had no previous convictions and his young age. The bizarre nature of the attack was extremely troubling. So too was the appellant’s lack of insight and lack of empathy. The judge's conclusion that his expressed remorse was not convincing was a finding that she was entitled to make on the evidence including all the psychiatric reports. Most troubling of all was that he either could not, or would not, offer any explanation for his behaviour which meant that all the doctors who had examined him were unable to say when the risk of the commission of further similar offences would reduce. The judge considered available alternative sentences of a determinate or extended sentence, but concluded that because there was no reliable estimate of for how long the appellant would remain a danger, a life sentence was justified.

We accept that it is exceptionally unusual for an offender with no previous convictions who has led a hitherto blameless life with many positive character references who commits a section 18 offence that results in category 3 harm whilst still relatively young, to receive a discretionary life sentence. However, on the extraordinary facts and circumstances of this highly, highly unusual case and the very careful way in which the judge approached the sentencing exercise and her assessment of risk, we do not consider that the sentence was manifestly excessive and the appeal is dismissed. This is a case however which very much turns on its own facts.

Finally, we wish to clarify and confirm that the amount of the statutory surcharge set by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Surcharge Order) 2012 (SI 2012/1696) (as amended) applicable at the time of the offending was £228 as recorded on the Notice of Financial Penalty and the Court Extract and not the earlier sum announced by the judge in court at the time.