R v Jack Watkin

On 15 April 2025, following a trial in the Crown Court at Chester, the applicant was convicted of a number of offences arising from the possession of indecent images.

On 24 June 2025, he pleaded guilty to six offences of fraud. Those guilty pleas were entered on the second day of the trial. The judge imposed a sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment for the offences of fraud and a consecutive term of 18 months’ imprisonment for the indecent image offences.

The applicant now renews his application for leave to appeal against the sentence, following refusal by the single judge. The applicant has been represented today on a pro bono basis by Ms Caulfield. We are grateful to her for her submissions.

The applicant first came to the attention of the police in connection with the fraud offences. He had been passing himself off as a person of substantial means, and he persuaded his victims to loan him money to be used to acquire valuable designer handbags, to which he claimed to have special access. He then used that money to fund an extravagant lifestyle. His victims included a close friend and his father. The total amount obtained from all the victims was just under £200,000.

In the course of examining the applicant’s phone in connection with the investigation of the fraud offences, the police became aware that he had downloaded indecent images of children on that device. Subsequent enquiries revealed that he had downloaded further images on another device which he later acquired. The images totalled 637, of which 274 were category A images (the most serious kind). 68 of those 274 images were videos rather than stills.

After his initial arrest, and while on bail, the applicant accessed another phone. Examination of that phone showed that he had continued to download indecent images of children.

In comprehensive sentencing remarks, the judge found that the fraud offences were high culpability for guideline purposes, given the number of victims, and the abuse of trust element in certain of those offences. He found that the case was one of medium to high impact, with different victims falling into different categories. The judge noted that the starting point for a category 2 offence with high culpability was five years’ imprisonment.

The judge expressly referred to the fact that category 2 assumed a financial impact of £300,000, whereas the offences with which he was concerned had a total value of £200,000. However, he noted that the sentence needed to reflect all of the offending, not a single offence.

So far as the indecent image offending was concerned, the judge found that the appropriate category in the sentencing guideline had a starting point of 12 months’ imprisonment, with a range of 26 weeks to three years. The additional offending committed on bail was an aggravating factor, as was the large number of category A videos.

The judge noted that the applicant was essentially of previous good character, and he had regard to the principle of totality. On that basis he arrived at a sentence of five years’ imprisonment for the fraud offences, reduced by ten per cent for the late guilty plea, and, as we have said, he imposed a consecutive term of 18 months’ imprisonment for the other offences.

We take the fraud offences first. One of the proposed grounds of appeal is that the judge’s finding of high culpability failed to reflect the applicant’s diagnosis of autism, his immaturity and various other matters mentioned in the mitigation submissions. These included the applicant’s previous good character; the fact that the value of the offending at £200,000 was below the £300,000 figure which formed the basis of the guideline starting point; that the business had not been fraudulent from the start; and the fact that some money had been paid back.

So far as the indecent image offences are concerned, the proposed ground of appeal is that the judge was wrong to conclude that counts 7, 8 and 9 were committed after the applicant had already been interviewed for the indecent image offences which formed the basis of counts 1 to 6. It is said that the judge simply made a chronological error here. It is also said that the applicant’s age and autism were insufficiently taken into account in considering the sentence for those offences; and equally, that there was no sufficient consideration of totality.

Like the single judge, we are satisfied that none of these grounds is arguable. The judge expressly referred to Dr Asher’s report which dealt with the applicant’s medical diagnosis. He noted that while the diagnosis of autism might have affected the applicant’s ability fully to understand the effect of his behaviour on others, it did not excuse it. Having specifically referred to the report, we are fully satisfied that the judge took into account the applicant’s diagnosis when he passed sentence.

The judge expressly referred to the fact that the trading activity was not said to be fraudulent from the outset and that the total amount obtained was lower than the £300,000 figure in the guidelines. He also referred to the fact that some victims had been reimbursed.

However, the judge had to sentence the applicant for six offences of fraud, with multiple victims, committed over a sustained period. The judge was fully entitled to conclude that any reduction from the starting point for a single offence was offset by the other offences which his sentence had to reflect.

As to the sentence for the indecent images, it is correct that the offences the subject of counts 7, 8 and 9 were committed before the applicant had been interviewed in relation to the indecent images which were the subject of counts 1 to 6. But they were committed after the applicant’s phone had been seized in relation to the offences of fraud and whilst he was on bail. That in itself is an aggravating factor.

The judge referred to the mitigating features of the applicant’s good character, his medical diagnosis and his age. We are satisfied that he plainly took them into account.

The judge was clearly required to impose consecutive sentences for the two very different sets of offending. He expressly addressed the issue of totality.

Standing back, and taking into account everything that Ms Caulfield has said on the applicant’s behalf, the resultant sentence cannot be said to be manifestly excessive.

For those reasons we refuse the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence.