R v Sunil Shah

With the leave of the Single Judge, the appellant appeals against a sentence of 7 years and 6 months' custody for causing grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. It was imposed by the Crown Court sitting at Bradford before His Honour Judge Nadim. The appellant was also disqualified from driving for 6 years and the statutory surcharge was imposed.

The incident giving rise to the proceedings occurred on 15 July 2025 on Leeds Road in Bradford when the appellant intentionally drove his car at the victim, Mr Dean Higgins, crushing him between two cars. The victim sustained multiple fractures and breaks in his legs. He has had to have frequent visits to the hospital for surgery, follow-up visits, follow-up surgery and clinic appointments. He is still in pain, takes painkillers daily. Although now walking independently, it is with a degree of stiffness. The emotional and psychological impact has been devastating, and he fears he may never recover. The injuries are permanent.

The facts are these. The appellant and the victim are known to each other through a loose family connection as the victim is the appellant's partner's former brother-in-law and at the time of the offence there was some animosity between them connected to the break-up of the relationship that connects them to each other.

A short while before the incident there was CCTV evidence that the victim's vehicle appeared to be chasing the appellant’s vehicle on the Leeds Road in Bradford. CCTV from a different camera further along the Leeds Road a very short while later showed the victim's car overtake and then sharply cut in front of the appellant's car and then reverse closer to the appellant's car forcing the appellant's car to stop. The victim then got out of his car and went towards the driver's side of the appellant's car as the appellant then reversed so that it was then at a slight angle towards the middle of the road. The victim then ran to the back of his car and opened the boot. The appellant reversed a little further, and whilst the victim was still at the boot area of his car, the appellant straightened up his car so that it was aimed at the victim and then accelerated hard at him, crushing the victim between the two vehicles with such force that he was literally thrown into the boot of his car by the force and speed of the appellant’s vehicle, where he had to be rescued by the emergency services. The appellant then immediately reversed, made a U-turn and left the scene. He attempted to flee the country a few days later but was prevented from doing so and arrested.

His initial account to the police and in his first Defence Case Statement was that he was in fear and was trying to reverse the car, but accidentally drove it forward without realising it was not in reverse gear. He then pleaded guilty on the first day of trial and was given 10 per cent credit for his guilty plea pursuant to the Sentencing Council Guidelines.

In defence submissions for sentence it was conceded that a car was used as a highly dangerous weapon or equivalent (which would place him in Culpability Category A under the guidelines), but that Category C was also engaged by virtue of excessive self-defence.

The appellant was 27 years old at the date of sentence. He had three convictions for seven offences between 14 June 2019 and 28 October 2021 and he had not previously received a custodial sentence. Those offences included driving whilst disqualified, battery and possessing an offensive weapon in a public place.

In brief sentencing remarks the Judge noted that there had been a disagreement between the prosecution and the defence as to whether culpability for the offence fell within A2 (the prosecution submission) or B2 (the defence submission) under the Sentencing Council guidelines. The Judge had discussed this with the parties at an earlier hearing when the appellant pleaded guilty. We do not have a transcript of that hearing. At the start of the sentencing hearing the Judge stated that following on from those earlier discussions, he had concluded that the starting point under the guidelines was 7 years. That meant that he must have accepted the prosecution submissions. He said that had the appellant been convicted after a trial, the minimum sentence he would have imposed would have been one of 8 years and 4 months' imprisonment, which he reduced to 7½ years to reflect both the guilty plea and the mitigation that was advanced on his behalf.

The Judge acknowledged that the appellant had not served a custodial sentence before and bore in mind the character evidence and the impact of his imprisonment on those who depended on him and who cared for him. But he stated that:

He was disqualified from driving for a period of 6 years.

The grounds of appeal relied on were that:

There does not appear to have been consideration of, or a request for, a Newton hearing in this case which there should have been if excessive self-defence was truly being advanced and if it was also being said that it would have materially impacted on the starting point for the sentence under the guidelines.

However, we can perhaps see why it was not pressed by defence counsel. The whole of the incident was captured on good quality CCTV, which we have studied carefully. It is hard to see how the incident could be regarded as self-defence (whether excessive or otherwise). We note this was not the explanation given by the appellant in his initial Defence Case Statement, nor to the police. His initial defence was entirely different: that he was intending to reverse his vehicle and accelerated not realising that the car was in forward drive mode and thus he had no intent to cause any harm to the victim, but was intending to drive away to avoid a confrontation. Even in the Addendum Defence Case Statement served shortly before trial, no mention of self-defence is made in clear terms and again it references his intention to drive away to avoid a confrontation. It also appears from the CCTV that the appellant chose quite deliberately to drive his vehicle at maximum speed intending to cause the victim really serious harm. To have pressed for a Newton hearing in the face of the evidence risked jeopardising the 10% guilty plea discount. Nonetheless it was a matter that should have been clarified in open court by the Judge.

We are satisfied that the Judge was entitled to conclude that the offence fell within Category A culpability because of the use of a car as a highly dangerous weapon or weapon equivalent with a starting point of 7 years, and there is no criticism for the characterisation of Harm as Category 2.

The Judge was perfectly entitled not to accept the submissions that there was an element of excessive self-defence that would lead to a different categorisation of culpability. To the extent that self-defence was even properly in play in the Addendum Defence Case Statement, the CCTV contradicted the contents of that document as we have explained above.

From the starting point of 7 years, the Judge was then entitled to conclude that there were a number of other aggravating features that required an upward adjustment. These included that the injuries sustained and the impact on the victim, which had been described in very great detail by him, were towards the top of the Category 2 range, bordering on Category 1. Although the attack was not pre-meditated and there may have been elements of provocation in the earlier car chase, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant's decision not to, for example, turn left into the side street or drive away as he could have done, but instead deliberately drive at the victim in the manner in which he did in the middle of the day in front of all the other users of the Leeds Road with a young child in his car, were aggravating factors that required an upward adjustment to the starting point. The deterrent principle of sentencing also came into play for the reasons the Judge explained. The way in which the car was used was a relevant factor to take into account and is not mere double counting by the Judge. Furthermore, there were also aggravating features in the evidence, for example the appellant's attempt to leave the country to avoid justice. The previous convictions were also relevant and aggravating.

The Judge then made a downward adjustment to reflect the mitigation and the day-of-trial guilty plea to arrive at a final sentence of 7 years 6 months, which we find that the Judge was entitled to reach. We therefore find that the final sentence was not manifestly excessive and the appeal is dismissed.